Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas OPINION
No. 04-22-00763-CR
David RODRIGUEZ Jr., Appellant
v.
The STATE of Texas, Appellee
From the 437th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2020CR10410 Honorable Melisa C. Skinner, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Beth Watkins, Justice
Sitting: Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice Irene Rios, Justice Beth Watkins, Justice
Delivered and Filed: May 22, 2024
AFFIRMED
Appellant David Rodriguez Jr. appeals his manslaughter conviction. He argues the trial
court erred in denying his motion to suppress and in admitting extraneous offense evidence. We
affirm.
BACKGROUND
The 9-1-1 call
Sara Medina called 9-1-1 to report that her seventeen-year-old son, Rodriguez, told her that
he accidently shot his best friend Michael Prieto in the head. She gave the dispatcher Michael’s 04-22-00763-CR
address on Sangria Road and said her son told her Michael was across the street from that address
in a vacant house. She explained that Rodriguez was with her at their home on Oriole Court.
Sangria Road
When officers arrived at the vacant house on Sangria, they found Michael’s body on the
floor with a single gunshot wound to his head. Officers found a spent casing by his feet and a live
cartridge about ten yards from his body.
Oriole Court
Bexar County Sheriff’s Deputy Nogehelia Beltran arrived at the Rodriguez residence on
Oriole Court around 9:00 p.m., and Medina let her in. Deputy Beltran entered Rodriguez’s
bedroom, handcuffed him, took him outside, patted him down, and placed him in her patrol car.
The investigation on Oriole Court continued for several hours. Investigator Mark Waits spoke to
Medina and Rodriguez’s father, as well as officers at the house on Sangria. During that time,
Rodriguez sat handcuffed in the patrol car. Eventually, officers transported Rodriguez to the police
station for an interview. They also asked his parents to come to the station because “David Jr. may
actually need a ride back home.”
Police station—Rodriguez’s visit with his father
At the station, officers left Rodriguez alone in an interview room for approximately 90
minutes. He was still handcuffed. At 1:11 a.m., his father entered the room with Investigator Waits
and Detective Frank Stubbs. Investigator Waits explained to Rodriguez that they brought his father
in to calm him down. Rodriguez’s father faced his son and spoke directly to him, telling him that
he loved him and that the officers “are here to help us.” Detective Stubbs left the room. Rodriguez’s
father continued talking, encouraging his son to give a statement “to let them know what happened,
exactly what happened, I mean, the way, the way it happened, okay.” Rodriguez asked his father,
“Can I just talk to the lawyer?” Investigator Waits responded, “Accidents happen, man, you know?
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So.” Rodriguez’s father repeated that it “was an accident,” and his son said, “I know.” Rodriguez’s
father then told his son, “I already talked to the lawyer, the lawyer just said it’s fine . . . let him
know that what happened because it was an accident. You know what I’m saying.” Rodriguez
responded, “No.” His father then explained that the officers know the boys are like brothers and
they know the shooting was a mistake. Detective Stubbs reentered the room and Investigator Waits
told Rodriguez’s father, “Let us talk to him for a little bit.” Rodriguez’s father left the room, telling
his son, “Let them know what they need to know, okay? Love you.” Rodriguez’s father was in the
room for approximately two minutes.
Stationhouse—Rodriguez’s Custodial Interrogation
At 1:13 a.m., Detective Stubbs read Rodriguez his Miranda rights, and Rodriguez gave a
statement acknowledging that he accidentally shot Michael. He explained that Michael called an
Uber to take Rodriguez from his house to the vacant house across the street from Michael’s home.
Rodriguez said he had been holding Michael’s Smith & Wesson gun for him and intended to give
it back. He thought he had unloaded the gun. Detective Stubbs said, “We know you racked a round
out of it. Did you think it was unloaded at that point or did you pull the magazine out?” Rodriguez
said he remembered thinking there was not a bullet in the gun. With his handcuffed hands, he
motioned pulling back the slide. He said he did not remember if he took the magazine out but
acknowledged that the magazine must have still been in there if, after he pulled the slide, there was
still a bullet in the chamber. He described other actions before, during, and after the shooting and
explained how he returned home. He also acknowledged that he used to have his own gun, but that
the gun had been taken away from him.
At 1:46 a.m., the interview ended.
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Indictment and Motion to Suppress
A grand jury indicted Rodriguez on a single manslaughter charge. He filed a motion to
suppress his statement. At the motion to suppress hearing, he argued officers violated his rights
under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments and article 38.22 of the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure. First, he argued his statement was the fruit of the poisonous tree obtained pursuant to
a warrantless arrest for which the officers lacked probable cause. Second, he argued that the
officers violated Miranda and article 38.22 when they took his statement after he clearly invoked
the right to counsel and while his father acted as an agent for law enforcement. After hearing from
Deputy Beltran, Investigator Waits, and Rodriguez’s father, the trial court denied the motion.
Jury Trial and Sentence
At trial, the State argued the evidence would show that Rodriguez acted recklessly. See
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.03(c) (“A person acts recklessly . . . when he is aware of but
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk[.]”). Rodriguez argued the evidence
would show that he shot Michael accidently and that, at most, he acted with criminal negligence.
Id. at § 6.03(d) (“A person acts with criminal negligence . . . when he ought to be aware of a
substantial and unjustifiable risk[.]”).
The medical examiner testified that the bullet entered on the right side of Michael’s head
and exited the back of his head. He also testified that the entry wound characteristics—a tight
dense cluster of powder tattooing without soot—suggested a close range of fire. The jury heard
several law enforcement officers testify, listened to the 9-1-1 call, and watched the video of
Rodriguez’s custodial interrogation.
Sergeant Bruce Hallonquist testified about semi-automatic firearms, the crime scene, and
firearm safety. He explained that to load the firearm, the user inserts the magazine containing the
ammunition into the grip of the firearm and then racks the slide back to move a round of
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ammunition into the firing chamber. To empty the firearm, the user drops the magazine from the
grip and then racks the slide back to eject the live round. If the user fails to drop the magazine first,
racking the slide back ejects the live round and picks up another, reloading the firearm. Sergeant
Hallonquist identified the casing and bullet found at the crime scene as “an empty casing for a 40
caliber” and “a live round for a 40 caliber”—consistent for use with a semi-automatic firearm. He
stated the first two rules of firearm safety as: “treat all weapons and/or firearms as if they’re loaded
at all times” and “never point [a firearm] at anything you’re not willing to shoot.”
To rebut the defense of accident Rodriguez raised during his opening statement—and over
Rodriguez’s objections—the trial court admitted a fourteen-second video of Rodriguez taking a
loaded magazine in and out of the handle of a semi-automatic firearm and pointing the firearm at
the camera. In closing, Rodriguez reiterated that at most he acted negligently; he was unaware that
the firearm could still discharge after he racked the slide back. According to the State, the reckless
act was not Rodriguez’s belief that the firearm was unloaded or his inability to unload it, but his
failure to follow the rules of firearm safety. The jury reviewed the charges of manslaughter and
criminally negligent homicide and convicted Rodriguez of manslaughter. After a punishment
hearing, the jury recommended the trial court sentence Rodriguez to ten years in prison, and the
trial court did so. Rodriguez now appeals.
ANALYSIS
Motion to Suppress
On appeal, Rodriguez argues the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress because
his statement: (1) was involuntary under article 38.22 and the Fifth Amendment; (2) was the
unattenuated fruit of an arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment; and (3) was taken in violation
of his Fifth Amendment right to counsel. He combines the first two arguments. “Questions of
voluntariness and attenuation of taint are closely related; however, an attenuation analysis is
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logically distinct from one involving only questions of voluntariness.” Flores v. State, 172 S.W.3d
742, 748 n.4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.) “The voluntariness of the statement
is a threshold requirement” to attenuation. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603–04 (1975);
Martinez v. State, 620 S.W.3d 734, 741 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (“A confession may be voluntary
for Fifth Amendment purposes in that Miranda warnings were given and understood, but that is
not sufficient to purge the taint of an illegal arrest.”). We therefore address the three issues
separately.
Standard of Review
“In reviewing claims concerning Miranda violations and the admission of statements made
as the result of custodial interrogation, we conduct the bifurcated review articulated in Guzman v.
State.” Pecina v. State, 361 S.W.3d 68, 78–79 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). “We afford almost total
deference to the trial court’s rulings on questions of historical fact and on application of law to fact
questions that turn upon credibility and demeanor while we review de novo the trial court’s rulings
on application of law to fact questions that do not turn upon credibility and demeanor.” Id. at 79.
The same standard applies when reviewing a trial court’s attenuation of taint decision. State v.
Mazuca, 375 S.W.3d 294, 307 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). We uphold a trial court’s motion to
suppress ruling if it is correct on any theory of law that finds support in the record. State v.
Steelman, 93 S.W.3d 102, 107 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
Involuntariness
Rodriguez contends Deputy Beltran unlawfully arrested him when she placed him in
handcuffs “without probable cause” because she “had no information suggesting that the shooting
was anything but an accidental one.” Then, officers held him handcuffed in custody for more than
four hours before reading his rights under Miranda and article 38.22. He argues his illegal arrest
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constituted a coercive force that overcame his will, rendering involuntary his decision to waive
those rights.
Applicable Law
“[A]n accused’s custodial-interrogation statement is not admissible unless, prior to making
the statement, he received the warnings provided in . . . article 38.22, § 2(a) . . . (which incorporate
the requirements of Miranda), and he knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived those
rights.” Oursbourn v. State, 259 S.W.3d 159, 171–72 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); TEX. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 38.22 § 2(a) & 3(a)(2). To evaluate whether a defendant knowingly, intelligently,
and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights, Texas appellate courts “turn to the standard outlined in
Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 [] (1986).” Joseph v. State, 309 S.W.3d 20, 25 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2010). “The inquiry has two distinct dimensions.” Moran, 475 U.S. at 421. “First, the
relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free
and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception.” Id. “Second, the waiver
must have been made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and
the consequences of the decision to abandon it.” Id. “Only if the ‘totality of the circumstances
surrounding the interrogation’ reveal both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of
comprehension may a court properly conclude that the Miranda rights have been waived.” Id.
Application
The trial court 1 found “no police misconduct and no coercion that made [Rodriguez’s]
statement involuntary” and “that [Rodriguez] was given his Miranda warnings, that he understood
and waived his Miranda rights, and that his statement was freely and voluntarily given.” We agree.
First, as the trial court noted for the record, “whether [officers] believed they had probable cause
1 Judge Joel Perez signed findings of fact and conclusions of law in which he noted that Judge Melisa Skinner presided over the trial and made her credibility findings clear on the record.
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or not, they had probable cause.” By the time Beltran arrived to detain Rodriguez, the
circumstances indicated he was involved in the shooting death of another person.
Second, although officers held seventeen-year-old Rodriguez handcuffed in custody for
more than four hours, he spent the first half of that time in a police car parked in front of his own
house, while his parents talked to the officers. And at the end of the second half of that time, his
father visited him at the police station and advised him to give a statement. Video recordings from
both locations reveal that Rodriguez was alone for most of the time. The trial court found that
Rodriguez was given the required warnings, that he understood his rights, and that he freely and
voluntarily waived those rights when he gave his statement. The totality of the circumstances
supports those findings and indicates that Rodriguez was aware of both the nature of the rights he
was abandoning and the consequences of his decision to abandon them. Joseph, 309 S.W.3d at 25;
Moran, 475 U.S. at 421. We therefore overrule Rodriguez’s involuntary waiver argument. See
Brown, 422 U.S. at 604; Martinez, 620 S.W.3d at 741.
Fruit of Illegal Arrest
Rodriguez next argues his statement was the result of an unlawful warrantless arrest and
that the taint from the illegal arrest had not attenuated enough to allow the statement’s admission.
The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine precludes the use of direct and indirect evidence
obtained following an illegal arrest. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963). But
not all evidence is “‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ simply because it would not have come to light
but for the illegal actions of the police.” Id. at 487–88. A legal break in the causal connection
between the illegal conduct and the acquisition of the evidence will dissipate the taint. Monge v.
State, 315 S.W.3d 35, 40–41 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). “[E]vidence sufficiently attenuated from the
violation of the law is not considered to be ‘obtained’” from the violation. Johnson v. State, 871
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S.W.2d 744, 750–51 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). The State has the burden to prove attenuation.
Monge, 315 S.W.3d at 40. In deciding attenuation, we consider the Brown factors: (1) whether
Miranda warnings were given; (2) the time between the arrest and the confession; (3) the presence
of any intervening circumstances; and (4) the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.
Brown, 422 U.S. at 603–04.
The trial court held that the Miranda warnings, the four-hour delay between the arrest and
the statement, the intervening circumstance of the visit from Rodriguez’s father, and the absence
of official misconduct all weighed in favor of attenuation. The trial court’s fact findings and
conclusion are supported by the record. 2
Whether Miranda warnings were given. “Miranda warnings are an important and
necessary factor in determining whether the confession is obtained by exploitation of an illegal
arrest.” Monge, 315 S.W.3d at 40. Before Rodriguez made a statement, Detective Stubbs read
Rodriguez his Miranda warnings, thus the first Brown factor weighs in favor of the State on
attenuation. Id. at 40–41.
The time between the arrest and the confession. “If the time between an illegal arrest
and a confession is short, it allows little time for attenuation of taint and indicates that there may
be a causal connection between the illegal arrest and the confession.” Martinez, 620 S.W.3d at
741. “The taint of the illegal arrest is more likely to be attenuated if the suspect has had time to
rest, reflect, and eat; and time to consider options and exercise free will.” Id. The Texas Court of
2 At the motion to suppress hearing, the State briefly argued (as it does here) that the arrest was legal because there was probable cause Rodriguez had committed a felony, and the circumstances showed he was found in a suspicious place. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 14.03(a)(1); see Swain v. State, 181 S.W.3d 359, 366 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“Any ‘place’ may become suspicious when a person at that location and the accompanying circumstances raise a reasonable belief that the person has committed a crime and exigent circumstances call for immediate action or detention by police.”). The trial court did not address this argument. We likewise decline to do so because we agree with the trial court’s attenuation of taint finding.
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Criminal Appeals has recognized, “if there is a short period of time (under three hours) between
the illegal arrest and the confession, this factor will weigh in favor of [the defendant].” Monge,
315 S.W.3d at 40. Here, even though the timespan was four hours, the videos show that Rodriguez
cried, dozed, prayed, and was offered water and coffee. We therefore consider this factor neutral.
The presence of any intervening circumstances. “Examples of significant intervening
circumstances” that may break the causal connection between an illegal arrest and a confession
“include the opportunity to meet with family[.]” Martinez, 620 S.W.3d at 741. The trial court held
that the intervening circumstance of his father’s visit weighed in favor of attenuation. It found
credible Investigator Waits’s testimony that he brought Rodriguez’s father in to calm his son.
Rodriguez’s father testified that he agreed to Investigator Waits’s request because he thought it
would help his son. He recognized he had “the opportunity to say no.” He testified that Investigator
Waits “made it seem like we’re going to go home” but made no promises to that effect. After
viewing the stationhouse video, we agree with the trial court—Rodriguez’s father is calm and
comforting to his son. See Bell v. State, 724 S.W.2d 780, 791 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (considering
visit with family a significant intervening circumstance). This factor favors the State.
The purpose and flagrancy of official misconduct. This “is one of the most important
factors to be considered.” Monge, 315 S.W.3d at 42 (internal quotation marks omitted). Arrests in
the absence of probable cause, pretext arrests, unnecessarily intrusive arrests, and arrests for no
apparent justification made with intent to extract a confession by exploitation may be “flagrantly
abusive.” Id. In this context, the failure to obtain an arrest warrant when probable cause exists is
considered “a comparatively less serious misconduct.” Id. Here, the record does not reflect flagrant
abuse; rather, authorities failed to obtain a warrant in the face of probable cause. This factor
likewise favors the State.
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Conclusion. Three of the four Brown factors weigh in favor of the State. Weighing the
factors together, we are satisfied that the confession in this case was sufficiently attenuated from
the taint of any illegal arrest. Id. at 43.
Motion to Suppress-Invocation of Counsel
Next, Rodriguez argues that when his father came inside the interrogation room with the
officers, he acted as an agent of the officers. He contends that when he asked his father, “Can I
just talk to a lawyer?” he invoked his right to counsel, and all questioning should have stopped.
Miranda applies whether the questioning is by law enforcement officers or their agents.
Wilkerson v. State, 173 S.W.3d 521, 527 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). And Miranda applies “whenever
a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent.” Rhode
Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300–01 (1980). “[T]he term ‘interrogation’ under Miranda refers
not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other
than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably
likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.” Id. at 301. “The latter portion of this
definition focuses primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect, rather than the intent of the
police.” Id. “[O]nce a defendant in custody asks to speak with a lawyer, all interrogation must
cease until a lawyer is present.” Id. at 293.
The trial court found that Rodriguez’s father did not interview his son; instead, “all his
father did was, for the most part, talk at him.” It noted that when Rodriguez said “can I just talk to
the lawyer, to his father . . . his father says back to him, I already talked to the lawyer, he said it’s
fine, it was an accident, a mistake. That the victim was his best friend, that you were like brothers.”
“So that’s -- that’s -- he’s not interrogating him at all. There’s no real interview.” The trial court
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stated that “based on the credibility the witnesses,” Rodriguez’s father did not act as an agent of
law enforcement because he “was not at the police station to accomplish the same purpose as the
police” and did not act “in tandem” with police but rather “to provide comfort to” his son. We
agree.
Courts determine whether a citizen acts as an agent of law enforcement by considering:
“the relationship between the police and the potential police agent,” “the record concerning the
interviewer’s actions and perceptions,” and “the record for evidence of the defendant’s perceptions
of the encounter.” Wilkerson, 173 S.W.3d at 530–31. Although Investigator Waits and Detective
Stubbs knew that Rodriguez’s father was going to speak with his son, arranged the meeting, and
were present in the interview room, the father did not interview or question his son. See id. at 530
(questions informing the relationship between the police and the potential police agent).
Rodriguez’s father believed he would take his son home after police questioned him, and he did
not act as a police agent by asking questions aimed at building a case. See id. (questions concerning
the interviewer’s actions and perceptions). There is no evidence that Rodriguez thought his father
was a law-enforcement agent, nor that a reasonable person in his position would believe that his
father was an agent. Id. at 530–31 (examining the record for evidence of the defendant’s
perceptions of the encounter).
Nor did Rodriguez’s father subject his son to the functional equivalent of questioning. In
Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520 (1987), the Supreme Court addressed whether Mauro, who had
already asserted his right to counsel, was subject to interrogation or its functional equivalent when
police “allowed his wife to speak with him in the presence of a police officer.” Id. at 521. The
Supreme Court held Mauro was not. Id. at 530. Although officers knew Mauro might incriminate
himself, the detective in the room “asked Mauro no questions about the crime or his conduct.” Id.
at 527. The “decision to allow Mauro’s wife to see him was [not] the kind of psychological ploy
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that properly could be treated as the functional equivalent of interrogation.” Id. There was “no
evidence that the officers sent Mrs. Mauro in to see her husband for the purpose of eliciting
incriminating statements.” Id. at 528. And, “examining the situation from his perspective,” it is
doubtful Mauro “would feel that he was being coerced to incriminate himself in any way.” Id.
Although, in contrast to this case, Mauro’s wife made “insistent demands” to speak to her husband
and the officers had tried to discourage her from talking to her husband, see id., the same lack of
evidence is present here. “Officers do not interrogate a suspect simply by hoping that he will
incriminate himself.” Id.
Because Rodriguez’s father did not act as an agent of law enforcement or subject his son
to custodial interrogation or its functional equivalent at the time he asked about talking to an
attorney, the question did not act as an effective invocation of his Miranda right to counsel. Innis,
446 U.S. at 299–300; Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 297 (1990) (“It is the premise of Miranda
that the danger of coercion results from the interaction of custody and official interrogation.”). We
therefore overrule Rodriguez’s complaints about the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress.
Extraneous Offense
In his final issue, Rodriguez argues the trial court erred in admitting the fourteen-second
video of him handling a firearm, over his Rule 404(b) and 403 objections.
Applicable Law and Standard of Review
Extraneous offense evidence is admissible under both Rules 404(b) and 403 if: (1) it “is
relevant to a fact of consequence in the case apart from its tendency to prove conduct in conformity
with character”; and (2) its probative value is not “substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice,” confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury. Martin v. State, 173 S.W.3d 463, 467
(Tex. Crim. App. 2005); TEX. R. EVID. 404(b); TEX. R. EVID. 403. We review a trial court’s
decision to admit evidence for an abuse of discretion. Martin, 173 S.W.3d at 467. If the trial court’s
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ruling was within the zone of reasonable disagreement and correct on any theory of law applicable
to the case, we are required to uphold it. Dossett v. State, 216 S.W.3d 7, 27 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 2006, pet. ref’d).
The fourteen-second video depicts Rodriguez standing in front of a bathroom mirror and
holding a firearm by his waist. He raises it, points it at the camera, removes its magazine, tilts the
magazine towards the camera to show the live rounds inside it, re-inserts the magazine, and points
it at the camera again—all the while appearing to sing and sway. As defense counsel put it, the
video captured “a kid acting like a gang banger.” The trial court found it admissible to rebut the
defense of accident set out in Rodriguez’s opening statement.
Rodriguez argues the evidence fails to rebut his defense of accident because “[s]omeone
could know how to remove a clip from a firearm yet remain unaware that racking the slide
chambers a live round, making the firearm deadly even if the clip is later removed.” But “[u]nder
Rule of Evidence 401, evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make a ‘fact . . . of
consequence’ more or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Beham v. State, 559
S.W.3d 474, 482 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (quoting TEX. R. EVID. 401). And evidence that
Rodriguez had previously handled a semi-automatic firearm, in whatever manner, tends to make
the defense of a lack of awareness less probable. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
finding the evidence relevant and admissible outside of character conformity. TEX. R. EVID. 401,
404(b)(2).
Nor did the trial court abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence over the Rule 403
objection. First, the evidence presented little danger of unfair prejudice. The jury had already heard
Rodriguez admit that he possessed the firearm for a few days before he met Michael to return it.
See Gigliobianco v. State, 210 S.W.3d 637, 641 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (“‘[U]nfair prejudice,’
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refers to a tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily,
an emotional one.”). Second, the evidence did not tend to confuse the issues. It bore on a subject
of a genuine controversy—Rodriguez’s experience with firearms. Id. (“‘[C]onfusion of the issues,’
refers to a tendency to confuse or distract the jury from the main issues in the case.”). Third, the
evidence was not misleading. And the jury was well-equipped to judge the evidence’s probative
force given Sergeant Hallonquist’s testimony about clearing semi-automatic firearms. Id.
(“‘[M]isleading the jury,’ refers to a tendency of an item of evidence to be given undue
weight . . . on other than emotional grounds.”). Fourth, the evidence did not cause an undue delay
or consume an inordinate about of time; the video was only fourteen seconds long and quickly
authenticated. Finally, rather than a part of a needless presentation of cumulative evidence, it was
the only evidence of its kind admitted at the guilt-innocence phase. The trial court could have
reasonably concluded that the probative value of the short video was not substantially outweighed
by the countervailing factors specified in the rule. See id. at 642–43. Therefore, we discern no
abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court and overrule Rodriguez’s evidentiary complaint.
CONCLUSION
Having overruled Rodriguez’s issues, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Beth Watkins, Justice
PUBLISH
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