(PC) Davis v. Walker

District Court, E.D. California·Decided April 24, 2024·No. 2:08-cv-00593·Unknown

Opinion

KENNARD DAVIS, No. 2:08-cv-0593 KJM DB Plaintiff, v. JAMES WALKER, et al., Defendants.

KENNARD DAVIS, No. 2:10-cv-2139 KJM DB Plaintiff, v. JAMES WALKER, et al., FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Defendants.

Plaintiff, a state prisoner, proceeds with these civil rights actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1 Before the court are multiple motions filed by plaintiff. Below, this court addresses plaintiff’s 1 Plaintiff makes essentially the same allegations regarding her medical care, among other things, in the two cases covered by this order and, with few exceptions, files the same documents in both cases. Therefore, the court has and will continue to issue the same orders in both cases. Unless otherwise noted, the electronic filing numbers in the text refer to the docket in the 2008 case. motions for preliminary injunctive relief filed here on February 15 and April 1, 2024 and related motions. The basis for and status of plaintiff’s cases has been set out in recent orders and will not be repeated here. (See ECF Nos. 281, 340.) Plaintiff’s claims in both cases involve conduct that occurred when she was incarcerated at California State Prison, Sacramento (“CSP-Sac”).2 Currently, the primary issue before the court is plaintiff’s motion to be restored to competency status. (ECF No. 271.) This court determined that the first step in that process is evaluation of plaintiff by a neutral expert. (ECF Nos. 320, 340.) On March 14, 2024, this court appointed an expert to conduct that evaluation. (ECF No. 352.) On February 15, 2024, plaintiff filed a motion for preliminary injunctive relief. (ECF No. 345.) Plaintiff alleges a variety of risks to her safety at Salinas Valley State Prison (“SVSP”). Plaintiff primarily appears to seek transfer to a “safe and secure prison . . . that is consistent with plaintiff’s inmate case factors.” (Id. at 18.) In order to evaluate plaintiff’s motion, and out of an abundance of caution, this court ordered a response from defendants. (ECF No. 346.) Defendants filed that response. (ECF No. 357.) Plaintiff filed a reply. (ECF No. 368.) Since mid-March, plaintiff filed multiple motions related to her motion for preliminary injunctive relief. (ECF Nos. 354, 355, 358, 359, 362, 364.) They include a second motion for a preliminary injunction, motions to certify a class to seek injunctive relief regarding safety at SVSP, and a motion to present evidence related to safety at SVSP. Plaintiff filed two motions in which she specifically requests an injunction requiring the prison to move her to a facility, besides SVSP, that is consistent with her inmate case factors. In her February 15, 2024 motion, plaintiff makes a litany of allegations. (ECF No. 345.) As best this court can discern, they include allegations that many prison staff, including the deputy

2 Plaintiff was transferred to other prisons beginning in 2016. (See, e.g., ECF Nos. 56, 110, 129.) She is currently incarcerated at Salinas Valley State Prison. It appears that plaintiff has not been incarcerated at CSP-Sac since she left in 2016. warden, plaintiff’s correctional counselor, the grievance coordinator, and various correctional officers have paid other inmates to: (1) physically harm and sexually assault plaintiff; (2) destroy plaintiff’s legal and personal property or disseminate it to plaintiff’s enemies; (3) discriminate against plaintiff based on her transgender status. In addition, they have denied plaintiff medical treatment. Plaintiff appears to allege these prison staff members have done so because they have spoken to and/or know defendants in the present cases and are retaliating against plaintiff to dissuade plaintiff from pursuing these cases and her pending habeas corpus case. Plaintiff asks to be transferred to a “safe and secure” prison that is consistent with plaintiff’s inmate case factors. Plaintiff references her request for a transfer to an “all female” prison. (Id. at 18.) In her more recent motion, filed here on April 1, plaintiff generally makes the same allegations and asks the court to prevent SVSP staff from moving her into “D” yard, which was scheduled to occur on March 29. (ECF No. 364.) As best this court can tell from plaintiff’s reply, she has not been moved to “D” yard. In their opposition to plaintiff’s motion, defendants point out that plaintiff’s claims against them arose during her incarceration at CSP-Sac, where she is no longer incarcerated. Therefore, defendants contend, this court does not have jurisdiction to impose an injunction because plaintiff’s complaints are directed at non-parties. In addition, defendants provide declarations from prison staff, including plaintiff’s correctional counselor, regarding steps staff have taken to address plaintiff’s safety concerns and the availability of medical care. (ECF No. 357.) In her reply, plaintiff states that the defendants in these cases refused to provide plaintiff medical treatment. Plaintiff then goes on to reiterate her concerns about her safety at SVSP, in particular due to her transgender status, and alleges that defendants’ attorneys and SVSP staff are “proxies” or “agents” of the defendants in these cases. Plaintiff challenges the declaration of her correctional counselor provided by defendants. Plaintiff argues that the counselor omitted any discussion of her transgender status and does not explain the status of those plaintiff is being housed with. Plaintiff contends she is at risk everywhere at SVSP because her enemies can harm her or pay someone else to do so. She further argues that she should not have to wait until she is //// assaulted before she obtains relief. Finally, she contends her “imminent danger safety concerns” prevent her from accessing medical treatment. (ECF No. 368.) I. Legal Standards A party requesting preliminary injunctive relief must show that “he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). The propriety of a request for injunctive relief hinges on a significant threat of irreparable injury that must be imminent in nature. Caribbean Marine Serv. Co. v. Baldridge, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988). Alternatively, under the so-called sliding scale approach, as long as the plaintiff demonstrates the requisite likelihood of irreparable harm and can show that an injunction is in the public interest, a preliminary injunction may issue so long as serious questions going to the merits of the case are raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in plaintiff's favor. Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131-36 (9th Cir. 2011) (concluding that the “serious questions” version of the sliding scale test for preliminary injunctions remains viable after Winter). The principle purpose of preliminary injunctive relief is to preserve the court’s power to render a meaningful decision after a trial on the merits. See 11A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2947 (3d ed.). Implicit in this required showing is that the relief awarded is only temporary and there will be a full hearing on the merits of the claims raised in the injunction when the action is brought to trial. In addition to its authority over defendants in the present case, the court also has jurisdiction under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), to issue writs “necessary or appropriate in aid of their jurisdictions and agre

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