(PC) Barrett v. Ciolli

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ANTHONY BARRETT, Case No. 1:20-cv-01802-NONE-EPG (PC) 12 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RECOMMENDING THAT THIS ACTION 13 v. PROCEED ON PLAINTIFF’S FIFTH AMENDMENT AND EIGHTH 14 A. CIOLLI, et al., AMENDMENT CLAIMS AGAINST MRS. RODRIGUEZ AND DOES 1 THROUGH 20 15 Defendants. AND THAT ALL OTHER CLAIMS AND DEFENDANTS BE DISMISSED 16 (ECF No. 16) 17 OBJECTIONS, IF ANY, DUE WITHIN 18 TWENTY-ONE DAYS 19 20 Plaintiff Anthony Curtis Barrett (“Plaintiff”) is a federal inmate proceeding pro se and in 21 forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics 22 Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). I. BACKGROUND 23 Plaintiff filed the complaint commencing this action on December 22, 2020. (ECF No. 1.) 24 On April 5, 2021, the Court screened Plaintiff’s complaint and found that it failed to state any 25 cognizable claims. (ECF No. 8.) The Court gave Plaintiff thirty days to either “a. File a First 26 Amended Complaint; or b. Notify the Court in writing that he wants to stand on his complaint.” 27 (Id. at 16.) On February 19, 2021, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 9.) 28 1 On May 4, 2021, the Court screened Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint and entered 2 findings and recommendations recommending that this action proceed on Plaintiff’s Fifth 3 Amendment claims for deprivation of property and deprivation of liberty without due process and 4 on Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims for unconstitutional conditions of confinement and deliberate indifference to serious medical needs against Doe defendants. (ECF No. 10.) The Court 5 further recommended that all other claims and defendants be dismissed for failure to state a claim 6 upon which relief may be granted. (Id.) Plaintiff was provided an opportunity to file objections to 7 the findings and recommendations. (Id.) 8 On May 21, 2021, Plaintiff filed his objections to the Court’s findings and 9 recommendations. (ECF No. 12.) Plaintiff’s objections contained new factual allegations that 10 were not included in the original complaint or the First Amended Complaint. (See ECF Nos. 1, 11 9.) However, the Court could not consider factual allegations in Plaintiff’s objections in deciding 12 whether Plaintiff stated any legal claims. The Court therefore entered an order on May 24, 2021, 13 granting Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint. (ECF No. 13.) The Court’s order explained 14 that it was not vacating the findings and recommendations entered on May 4, 2021 at that time 15 but may do so if Plaintiff filed an amended complaint. (Id.) On June 9, 2021, Plaintiff filed a 16 Second Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 16.) In light of the Second Amended Complaint, the 17 Court vacated the findings and recommendations entered on May 4, 2021. (ECF No. 17.) 18 Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint is now before this Court for screening. 19 For the reasons that follow, the Court will recommend that this action proceed on 20 Plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment claim for deprivation of property without due process against Mrs. 21 Rodriguez and John/Jane Does 1 through 5, Plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment claim for deprivation of 22 liberty without due process against John/Jane Does 6 through 10, Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment 23 claim for unconstitutional conditions of confinement against John/Jane Does 11 through 15, and Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs against 24 John/Jane Does 16 through 20. The Court will also recommend that all other claims and 25 defendants be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 26 Plaintiff has twenty-one days from the date of service of these findings and 27 recommendations to file his objections. 28 1 I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT 2 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by inmates seeking relief against a 3 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 4 Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the inmate has raised claims that are legally 5 “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 6 As Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court may also screen the complaint under 28 7 U.S.C. § 1915. “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, 8 the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that the action or appeal fails to 9 state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 10 A complaint is required to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 11 the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 12 required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 13 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 14 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual 15 matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting 16 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting this 17 plausibility standard. Id. at 679. While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as true, courts “are not 18 required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 19 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Additionally, a plaintiff’s legal 20 conclusions are not accepted as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 21 Pleadings of pro se plaintiffs “must be held to less stringent standards than formal 22 pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that 23 pro se complaints should continue to be liberally construed after Iqbal). II. ALLEGATIONS IN THE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT 24 Plaintiff names Lt. Scott, Mr. Young, Mrs. Rodriguez, A. Ciolli, and John and Jane Does 25 as defendants. The Second Amended Complaint alleges as follows: 26 /// 27 /// 28 1 Deprivation of Property 2 On March 9, 2020, prison staff seized Plaintiff’s personal property while conducting an 3 inventory during a lockdown of Unit 2A. Most of the seized property was perishable food, 4 personal hygiene, a solar powered radio, and other personal property. All items were purchased from the prison commissary and could be safely stored in the locker furnished to him by the 5 Federal Bureau of Prisons. On March 8, 2020, prison staff sent out a memo stating that all 6 personal property must be placed in a green duffle bag. On March 9, 2020, prison staff came and 7 had inmates place their property in the green duffle bag. Prison staff told inmates not to take any 8 personal property with them when exiting the cell, including any personal clothing, watches, 9 wallets, mailing stamps, shoes, radios, mp3 players, etc. Inmates had to exit their cells dressed in 10 a white t-shirt, khaki pants, one pair of boxers, and shower shoes. Prison officials failed to 11 document the inmates’ personal property correctly and they did not document what was taken. 12 Prison staff took Plaintiff’s personal property and forced him to sign incomplete property forms 13 under threat and duress. 14 Plaintiff asked for the return of his property and sent requests to Lt. Cobbs for the return 15 of his personal property. Plaintiff never received a response from Lt. Cobbs. Plaintiff also sent 16 claims to the Federal Bureau of Prisons Regional and Central Offices and those claims were 17 denied. As a prisoner, Plaintiff has a protected right and interest in his personal property and 18 Plaintiff’s property was taken deliberately to punish him for other inmates’ acts. This was clearly 19 an unfair practice by the Federal Bureau of Prisons staff and officials. 20 The green duffle bag was 16” in depth and 42” in length and totaled approximately 6.2 21 feet in square measurement. This green duffle bag was only used to take inmate’s property. Prison 22 staff knew that the green duffle bag was smaller than the inmates’ assigned lockers. The assigned 23 lockers were in each inmates’ cell and were the same size, measuring approximately 24” in width, 24 18” in depth, and 40” in height, equaling approximately 10.8 feet in square measurement. Each 25 officer and prison official participated in an unlawful confiscation of Plaintiff’s personal property 26 and violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. They had no reason whatsoever to confiscate 27 Plaintiff’s personal property. 28 1 Inmates store their personal property in the assigned lockers and not in a green duffle bag. 2 The green duffle bag was only used for this particular occasion in order to take inmates’ personal 3 property. Plaintiff did not have any choice but to comply with the orders given to him and he was 4 not provided an opportunity to store his personal property or send it home on his behalf. Prison 5 officials and staff took and enjoyed Plaintiff’s personal property. A. Ciolli deprived Plaintiff of 6 his property and liberty without due process and with unconstitutional conditions of confinement. 7 When Plaintiff returned to his unit, he witnessed some of his personal property in the officers’ 8 station. Plaintiff asked one of the officers working the unit to return his personal property and the 9 officer stated that the property was a perk of the job. On the day of this search, there were many 10 different officers and prison officials and it was almost impossible to get names. The 11 Superintendent of Education had Plaintiff sign an incomplete property form and was also part of 12 the search team that took personal property. 13 The search was only conducted to take inmates’ personal property and was not done 14 according to policy. Plaintiff’s personal property was taken by prison staff and officials under the 15 guise of a search. Prison staff and officials should not be allowed to abuse their authority and by 16 doing so they take away the rights of the people they serve. Plaintiff’s family provides him with 17 financial support to purchase things he needs. For prison staff and officials to take Plaintiff’s 18 personal property because they are in a position of authority is unfair to Plaintiff and his family. 19 The Federal Bureau of Prisons and its staff have abused their authority and deprived Plaintiff of 20 his constitutional rights and Plaintiff has a right to be compensated for his property loss. The only 21 way Plaintiff can get justice for the deprivation is through the court. The Federal Bureau of 22 Prisons and its staff change the rules at their convenience to benefit the prison staff and officials 23 because they can and they make the rules. Plaintiff has exhibits in support of his deprivation of 24 property claim. All defendants were personally responsible for violation of Plaintiff’s rights. This 25 includes John and Jane Doe staff, officials, and prison officers. 26 Lockdown 27 The lockdown was unduly disparate informal punishment and was executed under the 28 fabricated and erroneous pretext that Unit 2A was banging and kicking on cell doors and yelling 1 at prison staff during the 10:00 AM count. The punishment is cruel and unusual. Plaintiff is a 2 United States Army veteran and the treatment federal prisoners receive is totally unbelievable. 3 Plaintiff often thinks to himself that he was willing to give his life for people like this. Inmates are 4 treated as if they are not even human. 5 Prison staff and officers failed to provide inmates with basic necessities such as 6 toothpaste, toothbrushes, toilet paper, and soap. Plaintiff did not have any personal hygiene for a 7 full week. This is the United States and not some third world country. This treatment caused 8 tension between Plaintiff and his cellmate. The Federal Bureau of Prisons and its officials had 9 two men existing in a confined space and living in inhumane conditions for one week. Prison staff 10 knew that they were abusing their authority, but it’s punishment and they are prisoners so who 11 care what happens to them. The lack of sanitation was severe and prolonged. 12 Inmates received nutritionally inadequate food for one full week and they were served the 13 same meals for breakfast, lunch, and dinner. The food was totally unhealthy for Plaintiff because 14 he suffers from hypertension, diabetes, chronic kidney disease, anxiety, and PTSD. The lack of 15 exercise caused Plaintiff great stress and the way he was treated was inhumane. Plaintiff believes 16 that all of this caused his hypertension and diabetes. 17 Plaintiff was denied medical and psychological care for that entire week. Plaintiff did not 18 receive any of his prescribed medications. He was diagnosed by a physician of his conditions and 19 the treatment was denied. This was left unattended and caused a substantial risk of serious harm. 20 Plaintiff did not have hypertension or diabetes until this occurrence. Adequate medical and 21 psychological care has been violated. Plaintiff is really suffering from this denial today. 22 Plaintiff was assaulted by his cellmate twice, once during the week of this lockdown and 23 another on June 27, 2020. Plaintiff’s safety was denied. He was helpless and believes that his race 24 contributed to the denial of medical and psychological care because there was a difference 25 between the way he was treated and the Mexican inmates. Plaintiff’s medical condition went from 26 pre-diabetes to diabetes. He never had hypertension. He believes that the deprivation of medical 27 care, lack of exercise, and inadequate food all contributed to his current medical conditions. 28 Plaintiff’s personal safety was jeopardized and no one did anything about it. It was as if it did not 1 even happen. 2 Access to Courts 3 Plaintiff did not have the ability to meet filing deadlines or to present his claim. When 4 Plaintiff did receive answers to various claims that he had filed, they were denied. This goes for 5 both the federal courts and the Federal Bureau of Prison’s administrative remedies. At USP 6 Atwater, the staff only allows inmates to possess legal work on open cases. Legal materials at 7 USP Atwater is considered personal property and this denies Plaintiff legal materials used to 8 access the courts. If Plaintiff is not allowed his legal material, this is a denial of access to the 9 courts because he is being denied the materials to work on his case. Not to mention access to the 10 law library for one full week due to lockdown. Not having access to legal materials is also a part 11 of not having access to the courts because this is still an actual injury and actual prejudice with 12 respect to contemplated or existing litigation. This hinders Plaintiff’s ability to meet a filing 13 deadline or to present a claim. Every defendant who is guilty of willful inhumanity or oppression 14 towards Plaintiff or any other inmate under his or her care or in his or her custody has violated 15 their own policies. 16 Medical Care 17 The medical treatment that Plaintiff received during this period was a deliberate 18 indifference to serious medical needs. Not giving Plaintiff his prescribed medication and denying 19 him psychological care has caused his condition to worsen. This mistreatment has further 20 significant injury and the defendants’ response to the need was deliberately indifferent. Prison 21 staff deliberately threw Plaintiff’s prescribed medication away during this search and denied him 22 access to obtain that medication. Prison staff disregarded an excessive risk to his health and 23 safety. Prison staff purposely denied Plaintiff’s medical needs and harm caused by indifference. 24 Plaintiff was denied medical and psychological care for an entire week and he did not receive any 25 of his prescribed medication. Plaintiff currently suffers from hypertension, diabetes, chronic 26 kidney disease, anxiety, and PTSD, and his condition went from pre-diabetes to diabetes. He 27 believes the lack of medical care, the injury to his eyes from the assault by his cellmate, the lack 28 of exercise, and inadequate food all contributed to his current medical conditions. Prison staff 1 knew they were abusing their authority and did nothing about it. Prison staff and officials or 2 officers are John and Jane Does. A. Ciolli was the official that went against policies that were in 3 force. He changed the policies to fit his need. 4 In general, the Bureau of Prisons, under the direction of the Attorney General, shall have 5 charge of the management and regulation of all federal penal and correctional institutions, 6 provide suitable quarters, and provide for the safekeeping, care, and subsistence of all persons 7 charged with or convicted of offenses against the United States. Plaintiff was assaulted by his 8 cellmate twice. This assault failed the safekeeping standard and care by A. Ciolli and all the John 9 and Jane Does at the United States Penitentiary. Plaintiff could have easily lost his life. The 10 policies set out for the staff and officials are not upheld and someone has to be held accountable. 11 A. Ciolli has failed to uphold the office that he was sworn to uphold. Plaintiff’s care and 12 safekeeping is in the hands of the officials and staff of the Federal Bureau of Prisons. A misuse of 13 power has caused Plaintiff’s constitutional rights to be violated. Cruel and unusual punishment, 14 deprivation of property, denial of medical care and psychological care, due process property, and 15 access to courts. There was a negligence of the John and Jane Does in failing to follow their own 16 policies. The above defendants were negligent and this negligence contributed to Plaintiff’s loss. 17 The loss of Plaintiff’s sanity, health, and eye sight. Plaintiff has suffered losses that he may never 18 get back. 19 III. BIVENS CLAIMS 20 Based on the case Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), 21 courts have found that individuals may sue federal officials for damages for constitutional 22 violations under certain circumstances. A Bivens action is the federal analog to suits brought 23 against state officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250 (2006). The basis 24 of a Bivens action is some illegal or inappropriate conduct on the part of a federal official or agent 25 that violates a clearly established constitutional right. Baiser v. Department of Justice, Office of 26 U.S. Trustee, 327 F.3d 903, 909 (9th Cir. 2003). “To state a claim for relief under Bivens, a 27 plaintiff must allege that a federal officer deprived him of his constitutional rights.” Serra v. 28 Lappin, 600 F.3d 1191, 1200 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Schearz v. United States, 234 F.3d 428, 432 1 (9th Cir. 2000). A Bivens claim is only available against officers in their individual capacities. 2 Morgan v. U.S., 323 F.3d 776, 780 n.3 (9th Cir. 2003); Vaccaro v. Dobre, 81 F.3d 854, 857 (9th 3 Cir. 1996). “A plaintiff must plead more than a merely negligent act by a federal official in order 4 to state a colorable claim under Bivens.” O’Neal v. Eu, 866 F.2d 314, 314 (9th Cir. 1988). 5 Plaintiff must allege facts linking each named defendant to the violation of his rights. 6 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; Simmons v. Navajo County, Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2010); 7 Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 2009); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 8 934 (9th Cir. 2002). The factual allegations must be sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief, 9 and the mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 10 U.S. at 678–79. 11 Additionally, a plaintiff must demonstrate that each named defendant personally 12 participated in the deprivation of his rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77. In other words, there must 13 be an actual connection or link between the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged 14 to have been suffered by Plaintiff. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 691, 695 (1978). 15 Not all constitutional cases against federal officers for damages may proceed as Bivens 16 claims. There is a two-part test to determine whether a Bivens action may proceed. Ziglar v. 17 Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1859-60 (2017). A court must first consider whether the claim presents a 18 new context from the three cases the Supreme Court has allowed to proceed under Bivens: Bivens; 19 Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979); and Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980).1 If the answer 20 is no, the claim may proceed. If the answer is yes, the court must apply a “special factors” 21 analysis to determine whether “special factors counsel hesitation” in expanding Bivens to the 22 action. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1857, 1875. 23 24

25 1 The Supreme Court has summarized those three cases: In Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, the Court broke new ground by holding that a person claiming to be the victim of an unlawful arrest and search could bring a Fourth Amendment claim for 26 damages against the responsible agents even though no federal statute authorized such a claim. The Court subsequently extended Bivens to cover two additional constitutional claims: in Davis v. Passman, a former 27 congressional staffer’s Fifth Amendment claim of dismissal based on sex, and in Carlson v. Green, a federal prisoner’s Eighth Amendment claim for failure to provide adequate medical treatment. 28 Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 741 (2020) (citations shortened). 1 The Ninth Circuit has summarized those special factors as follows:

2 the rank of the officer involved; whether Bivens is being used as a vehicle to 3 alter an entity’s policy; the burden on the government if such claims are recognized; whether litigation would reveal sensitive information; whether 4 Congress has indicated that it does not wish to provide a remedy; whether there are alternate avenues of relief available; and whether there is adequate 5 deterrence absent a damages remedy, among other factors. But the most important question for us to examine is whether the Judiciary is well suited, 6 absent congressional action or instruction, to consider and weigh the costs and 7 benefits of allowing a damages action to proceed. If there are sound reasons to think Congress might doubt the efficacy or necessity of a damages remedy the 8 courts must refrain from creating the remedy in order to respect the role of Congress in determining the nature and extent of federal-court jurisdiction 9 under Article III. 10 Lanuza v. Love, 899 F.3d 1019, 1028 (9th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks, citations and 11 alterations omitted). 12 IV. ANALYSIS OF PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS 13 A. Deprivation of Property 14 The Due Process Clause protects prisoners from being deprived of property without due 15 process of law, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974),2 and prisoners have a protected 16 interest in their personal property, Hansen v. May, 502 F.2d 728, 730 (9th Cir. 1974). An 17 authorized, intentional deprivation of property is actionable under the Due Process Clause. See 18 Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532 n.13 (1984) (citing Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 19 U.S. 422 (1982)); Quick v. Jones, 754 F.2d 1521, 1524 (9th Cir. 1985). An authorized deprivation 20 is one carried out pursuant to established state procedures, regulations, or statutes. Logan, 455 21 U.S. at 436; Piatt v. McDougall, 773 F.2d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir.1985); see also Knudson v. City of 22 Ellensburg, 832 F.2d 1142, 1149 (9th Cir. 1987). 23 “[D]ue process rights of prisoners and pretrial detainees [to deprivation of property 24 without due process of law] are not absolute; they are subject to reasonable limitation or 25 retraction in light of the legitimate security concerns of the institution.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.

26 2 Wolff and other cases cited in this section involved state, not federal, actors, and were therefore decided under the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause. However, courts use the same standards under the Fifth Amendment’s 27 due process clause. Raditch v. United States, 929 F.2d 478, 481 (9th Cir. 1991) (“Although Hudson involved § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment, the same due process principles apply to the federal government through the Fifth 28 Amendment.”). 1 520, 554 (1979). 2 In Greene, (9th Cir. 2011), the Nevada Department of Corrections instituted a ban on 3 inmate possession of typewriters. The Ninth Circuit held that such a ban did not violate inmates’ 4 constitutional rights because the department of corrections had the legal authority to regulate 5 inmate property:

6 An agency, such as the NDOC, violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when it prescribes and enforces forfeitures of 7 property “[w]ithout underlying [statutory] authority and competent procedural protections.” Vance v. Barrett, 345 F.3d 1083, 1090 (9th Cir.2003). Nevada 8 law provides for the regulation of personal property of offenders. 9 Nev.Rev.Stat. § 209.239. The statute grants authority to the NDOC to create policies by which to regulate inmates’ property. Implicit in the regulation of 10 inmate property is the authority to define what an inmate can and cannot possess. In any event, when the NDOC prohibited inmates from possessing 11 typewriters inside its institutions, that is all it did. The typewriters were not 12 forfeited to the state; rather, inmates were allowed to send them home or make certain other dispositions of them. 13 Here, prison officials enacted a system-wide ban with no exceptions. While 14 Downs was not offered an individual pre-deprivation hearing, he was notified of the change in the regulation and given an adequate opportunity to comply 15 with it. With respect to the personal property of prisoners, that is all the 16 process that is due. See generally, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974) (“[T]he fact that prisoners retain rights 17 under the Due Process Clause in no way implies that these rights are not subject to restrictions imposed by the nature of the regime to which they have 18 been lawfully committed.”). As the NDOC’s enactment fell within its statutory authority, we conclude that there was no violation of due process. 19

20 Nev. Dep’t of Corr. v. Greene, 648 F.3d 1014, 1019 (9th Cir. 2011) (brackets in original). 21 Plaintiff has alleged that his personal property was confiscated after he was required to put 22 all personal items in a green duffel bag, which was smaller than his personal locker. Plaintiff did 23 not have an opportunity to keep his property or send it to someone else, and he lost it without any 24 ability to have it returned. Prison officials failed to document the inmates’ personal property 25 correctly and they did not document what was taken. Plaintiff was also forced to sign incomplete 26 property forms under duress. The Superintendent of Education, who Plaintiff identifies as Mrs. 27 Rodriguez, made Plaintiff sign an incomplete property form and was also part of the search team 28 that took personal property. Plaintiff asked one of the officers working the unit to return his 1 personal property and the officer stated that the property was a perk of the job. There were many 2 different officers and prison officials and it was almost impossible to get names. 3 Construing the Second Amended Complaint liberally, the Court finds that Plaintiff has 4 sufficiently alleged a claim for deprivation of property without due process. Therefore, the Court 5 will recommend that Plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment deprivation of property without due process 6 claim against Mrs. Rodriguez and John/Jane Does 1 through 5 proceed past screening.3 7 B. Lockdown 8 1. Eighth Amendment Conditions of Confinement 9 “It is undisputed that the treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under 10 which [the prisoner] is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment.” Helling v. 11 McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993); see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). 12 Conditions of confinement may, consistent with the Constitution, be restrictive and harsh. See 13 Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981); Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th 14 Cir. 2006); Osolinski v. Kane, 92 F.3d 934, 937 (9th Cir. 1996); Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 15 1521, 1531 (9th Cir. 1993) (en banc). Prison officials must, however, provide prisoners with 16 “food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” Toussaint v. McCarthy, 17 801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986), abrogated in part on other grounds by Sandin v. Connor, 18 515 U.S. 472 (1995); see also Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2000); Hoptowit v. 19 Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 1982); Wright v. Rushen, 642 F.2d 1129, 1132-33 (9th Cir. 20 1981). 21 Two requirements must be met to show an Eighth Amendment violation. Farmer, 511 22 U.S. at 834. “First, the deprivation alleged must be, objectively, sufficiently serious.” Id. (citation 23 and internal quotation marks omitted). Second, “a prison official must have a sufficiently culpable 24 state of mind,” which for conditions of confinement claims “is one of deliberate indifference.” Id. 25 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Prison officials act with deliberate indifference 26 when they know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health or safety. Id. at 837. The 27 3 The Court does not take a position on whether this claim is subject to a remedy under Bivens. Defendants, once they 28 are identified and served, may file any appropriate motions concerning this claim if they choose. 1 circumstances, nature, and duration of the deprivations are critical in determining whether the 2 conditions complained of are grave enough to form the basis of a viable Eighth Amendment 3 claim. Johnson, 217 F.3d at 731. Mere negligence on the part of a prison official is not sufficient 4 to establish liability, but rather, the official’s conduct must have been wanton. Farmer, 511 U.S. 5 at 835; Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998). 6 “‘The occasional presence of a rodent is insufficient to establish the objective component 7 of an Eighth Amendment claim, which requires that a deprivation be sufficiently serious.’” 8 Jackson v. Walker, 2009 WL 1743639 at *8 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (quoting Tucker v. Rose, 955 9 F.Supp. 810, 816 (N.D. Ohio 1997). However, a “lack of sanitation that is severe or prolonged 10 can constitute an infliction of pain within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.” Anderson v. 11 Cty. of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir.), opinion amended on denial of reh’g, 75 F.3d 448 (9th 12 Cir. 1995). “[T]he state is obligated to provide ‘nutritionally adequate food that is prepared and 13 served under conditions which do not present an immediate danger to the health and well being of 14 the inmates who consume it,’” and “‘the state health code, while not establishing ‘constitutional 15 minima,’ is relevant in making a finding regarding the constitutionality of existing conditions.’” 16 Jackson, 2009 WL 1743639, at *8 (quoting Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 571 (10th Cir. 1980)). 17 With respect to lack of exercise, “ordinarily the lack of outside exercise for extended 18 periods is a sufficiently serious deprivation and thus meets the requisite harm necessary to satisfy 19 [the] objective test.” LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1457 (9th Cir. 1993). However, “a 20 temporary denial of outdoor exercise with no medical effects is not a substantial deprivation.” 21 May v. Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557, 565 (9th Cir. 1997). 22 Plaintiff has alleged he was denied personal hygiene, including toothpaste, toothbrushes, 23 toilet paper, and soap during a one-week lockdown. Plaintiff received food that was not from the 24 national menu and was served the same meals for breakfast, lunch, and dinner. Plaintiff was also 25 deprived of exercise for one week. Plaintiff suffers from hypertension, diabetes, chronic kidney 26 disease, anxiety, and PTSD, and his condition went from pre-diabetes to diabetes. Plaintiff 27 believes that the lack of exercise and inadequate food contributed to his current medical 28 conditions. Prison officials knew they were abusing their authority and did nothing about it. 1 Construing the First Amended Complaint liberally, the Court finds that, for screening 2 purposes, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that he was subjected to unconstitutional conditions of 3 confinement, and that prison staff were aware of these conditions but failed to act. The Court will 4 therefore recommend that Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim against 5 John/Jane Does 6 through 10 proceed past screening.4 6 2. Fifth Amendment Procedural Due Process 7 The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that no person “shall be 8 deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. “A 9 threshold requirement to a substantive or procedural due process claim is [a] plaintiff’s showing 10 of a liberty or property interest protected by the Constitution.” Wedges/Ledges of Cal., Inc. v. City 11 of Phoenix, 24 F.3d 56, 62 (9th Cir. 1994); Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005). “States 12 may under certain circumstances create liberty interests which are protected by the Due Process 13 Clause. But these interests will be generally limited to freedom from restraint which, while not 14 exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due 15 Process Clause of its own force, nonetheless imposes atypical and significant hardship on the 16 inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483- 17 86 (1995) (internal citations and footnotes omitted). 18 Plaintiff alleges that the lockdown was unduly disparate informal punishment and was 19 executed under the fabricated and erroneous pretext that Unit 2A was banging and kicking on cell 20 doors and yelling at prison staff during the 10:00 AM count. Prison officials knew they were 21 abusing their authority and did nothing about it. 22 Construing the First Amended Complaint liberally, the Court finds that, for screening 23 purposes, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that he was placed on lockdown for one week, which 24 posed an atypical and significant hardship, without procedural due process. The Court will 25 therefore recommend that Plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment procedural due process claim against Does 26 11 through 15 proceed past screening.5

27 4 As above, the Court does not take a position on whether this claim is subject to a remedy under Bivens. Defendants, once they are identified and served, may file any appropriate motions concerning this claim if they choose. 28 5 As above, the Court does not take a position on whether this claim is subject to a remedy under Bivens. Defendants, 1 C. Medical Care 2 “[T]o maintain an Eighth Amendment claim based on prison medical treatment, an inmate 3 must show ‘deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.’” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 4 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). This requires Plaintiff 5 to show (1) “a ‘serious medical need’ by demonstrating that ‘failure to treat a prisoner’s condition 6 could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’” and 7 (2) that “the defendant’s response to the need was deliberately indifferent.” Id. (quoting 8 McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 1992)) (citation and internal quotations 9 marks omitted), overruled on other grounds by WMX Technologies v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th 10 Cir. 1997) (en banc). 11 Deliberate indifference is established only where the defendant subjectively “knows of and 12 disregards an excessive risk to inmate health and safety.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 13 (9th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Deliberate 14 indifference can be established “by showing (a) a purposeful act or failure to respond to a 15 prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and (b) harm caused by the indifference.” Jett, 439 F.3d 16 at 1096 (citation omitted). Civil recklessness (failure “to act in the face of an unjustifiably high 17 risk of harm that is either known or so obvious that it should be known”) is insufficient to 18 establish an Eighth Amendment violation. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836-37 & n.5 19 (1994) (citations omitted). 20 A difference of opinion between an inmate and prison medical personnel—or between 21 medical professionals—regarding appropriate medical diagnosis and treatment is not enough to 22 establish a deliberate indifference claim. Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989); 23 Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 2004). Additionally, “a complaint that a 24 physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid 25 claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice does not 26 become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 27 once they are identified and served, may file any appropriate motions concerning this claim if they choose. 28 1 106. To establish a difference of opinion rising to the level of deliberate indifference, a “plaintiff 2 must show that the course of treatment the doctors chose was medically unacceptable under the 3 circumstances.” Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996). 4 Here, Plaintiff alleges he was denied medical and psychological care of an entire week 5 and did not receive any of his prescribed medications. Prison staff deliberately threw Plaintiff’s 6 prescribed medication away during the search and denied him access to that medication. Plaintiff 7 suffers from hypertension, diabetes, chronic kidney disease, anxiety, and PTSD, and his condition 8 went from pre-diabetes to diabetes. Plaintiff believes that the lack of medical care contributed to 9 his current medical conditions. Prison officials knew they were abusing their authority and did 10 nothing about it.6 Construing the First Amended Complaint liberally, the Court finds that, for 11 screening purposes, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a claim for deliberate indifference to serious 12 medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment against Does 16 through 20.7 13 D. Access to Courts 14 Prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the courts. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 15 343, 350 (1996); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977). The right is limited to the filing of 16 direct criminal appeals, habeas petitions, and civil rights actions. Id. at 354. Claims for denial of 17 access to the courts may arise from the frustration or hindrance of “a litigating opportunity yet to 18 be gained” (forward-looking access claim) or from the loss of a suit that cannot now be tried 19

20 6 Plaintiff also alleges that he believes that his race contributed to the denial of medical and psychological care because there was a difference between the way he was treated and the Mexican inmates. To the extent Plaintiff 21 intends to raise a claim for violation of the Equal Protection Clause, the Supreme Court has only recognized a Bivens remedy for gender discrimination in the context of the Fifth Amendment. See Davis, 442 U.S. 228. However, even if 22 an equal protection claim could be brought under Bivens, Plaintiff fails to state a claim. “To prevail on an Equal Protection claim . . ., Plaintiff must allege facts plausibly showing that ‘the defendants acted with an intent or purpose 23 to discriminate against him based upon membership in a protected class,’” (citing see Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1166 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686 (9th Cir. 2001)), or that 24 similarly situated individuals were intentionally treated differently without a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agr., 553 U.S. 591, 601-02, (2008); Lazy Y Ranch Ltd. v. Behrens, 546 25 F.3d 580, 592 (9th Cir. 2008). Plaintiff has not alleged that any facts demonstrating that he was a member in a protected class. Plaintiff also has not alleged facts showing that any defendants intentionally discriminated against Plaintiff based on his race, or that he was intentionally treated differently than other similarly situated inmates based 26 on his race without a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for relief for violation of his right to equal protection. 27

7 As above, the Court does not take a position on whether this claim is subject to a remedy under Bivens. Defendants, 28 once they are identified and served, may file any appropriate motions concerning this claim if they choose. 1 (backward-looking claim). Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 412-15 (2002); see also Silva 2 v. Di Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1102 (9th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds by Coleman v. 3 Tollefson, 575 U.S. 532 (2015) (differentiating “between two types of access to court claims: 4 those involving prisoners’ right to affirmative assistance and those involving prisoners’ rights to 5 litigate without active interference.”). 6 The provision of an adequate law library or legal assistance is not an end in itself, “but 7 only the means for ensuring ‘a reasonably adequate opportunity to present claimed violations of 8 fundamental constitutional rights to the courts.’” Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351 (quoting Bounds, 430 9 U.S. at 825). Indeed, there is no “abstract, freestanding right to a law library or legal 10 assistance.” Id. at 351. Therefore, a prisoner’s complaint will not survive screening if it simply 11 alleges facts showing “that his prison’s law library or legal assistance program is subpar in some 12 theoretical sense.” Id. 13 To state a viable claim for relief for denial of a right of access to the courts, Plaintiff must 14 show that he suffered an actual injury, which requires “actual prejudice with respect to 15 contemplated or existing litigation, such as the inability to meet a filing deadline or to present a 16 claim.” Lewis, 518 U.S. at 348; see also Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 936 (9th Cir. 17 2004) (defining actual injury as the “inability to file a complaint or defend against a charge”). 18 Plaintiff need not show that he would have been successful on the merits of his claims, but only 19 that they were not frivolous. Allen v. Sakai, 48 F.3d 1082, 1085 & n.12 (9th Cir. 1994). A claim 20 “is frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 21 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The Ninth Circuit has emphasized that “[a] prisoner need not show, ex 22 post, that he would have been successful on the merits had his claim been considered. To hold 23 otherwise would permit prison officials to substitute their judgment for the courts’ and to interfere 24 with a prisoner’s right to court access on the chance that the prisoner’s claim would eventually be 25 deemed frivolous.” Allen, 48 F.3d at 1091 (footnote omitted). 26 The nature and description of the underlying claim must be set forth in the pleading “as if 27 it were being independently pursued.” Harbury, 536 U.S. at 417. Hence, “the underlying cause of 28 action and its lost remedy must be addressed by allegations in the complaint sufficient to give fair 1 notice to a defendant.” Harbury, 536 U.S. at 416 (citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 2 506, 513–15 (2002)). Finally, Plaintiff must specifically allege the “remedy that may be awarded 3 as recompense but not otherwise available in some suit that may yet be brought.” Id. at 415. 4 Plaintiff alleges that he did not have the ability to meet filing deadlines or to present his 5 claims for both the federal courts and the prison’s administrative remedies. However, an access- 6 to-courts claim is limited to the filing of direct criminal appeals, habeas petitions, and civil rights 7 actions and does not apply to administrative grievances. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 354. Additionally, Plaintiff does not allege facts showing that he was pursuing a non-frivolous claim and suffered 8 actual injury from any denial of access to the courts. Plaintiff does not describe any of the claims 9 he was unable to present or deadlines he could not meet due to the alleged lack of access to the 10 courts. Plaintiff therefore has not adequately set forth the nature and description of the underlying 11 claims. As a result, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for denial of access to the courts.8 12 E. Failure to Protect 13 Under the Eighth Amendment, prison officials have a duty to protect prisoners from 14 violence at the hands of other prisoners. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994). To 15 establish a violation of this duty, the prisoner must establish that prison officials were deliberately 16 indifferent to a serious threat to the inmate's safety. Id. at 834. 17 “‘Deliberate indifference’ has both subjective and objective components.” Labatad v. 18 Corr. Corp. of Am., 714 F.3d 1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 2013). The prisoner must show that “the 19 official [knew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to inmate ... safety; the official must both be 20 aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm 21 exists, and [the official] must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. “Liability may 22

23 8 In a reported case concerning a privately-operated federal prison, the Ninth Circuit held “that Bivens should not be so expanded” to “include access to the courts and procedural due process claims against private defendants under the 24 First and Fifth Amendments, respectively.” Vega v. United States, 881 F.3d 1146, 1148 (9th Cir. 2018). In an unreported opinion, that court found no Bivens remedy for First Amendment access-to-courts claims. Schwarz, 761 F. 25 App’x at 734-35. District courts have reached similar conclusions. See, e.g., Moore v. United States, No. 1:20-cv- 00451-DAD-SAB (PC), 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106303, at *7-8 (E.D. Cal. June 16, 2020) (citing Schwarz and collecting cases), findings and recommendations adopted, ECF No. 19 at 2 (Oct. 14, 2020) (considering and 26 disagreeing with objections concerning actual injury and availability of Bivens); Lee v. Matevousian, No. 1:18-CV- 00169-GSA-PC, 2018 WL 5603593, at *3-4 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2018) (finding, in light of Abbasi, no Bivens remedy 27 for denial of access to courts). However, the Court need not determine whether Plaintiff can state a Bivens claim because he fails to allege a constitutional violation. 28 1 follow only if a prison official ‘knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and 2 disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.’” Labatad, 714 F.3d at 1160 3 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847). 4 Plaintiff alleges that he was assaulted by his cellmate twice and that defendants A. Ciolli 5 and John/Jane Does failed to protect him from these attacks. Plaintiff does not allege any facts 6 indicating that A. Ciolli or the John/Jane Does knew that Plaintiff was at risk of being attacked by 7 his cellmate and disregarded that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it. Further, 8 the allegations of the Second Amended Complaint do not show that prison staff made an 9 intentional decision, instead of making a negligent decision or mistake. To constitute a violation 10 of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, Plaintiff must have been subjected to an intentional decision 11 that put Plaintiff at substantial risk of serious harm. Claims that prison staff were negligent do 12 not state a violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff 13 has failed to state a cognizable Eight Amendment failure to protect claim.9 14 F. Personal Involvement Although Plaintiff may sue individual prison employees for damages under Bivens, he 15 must link each named defendant to a violation of his constitutional rights. A prison employee 16 cannot be held liable under Bivens simply for supervising other employees. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 17 676–77 (“In a § 1983 suit or a Bivens action ... the term “supervisory liability” is a misnomer.”) A 18 government official is only liable for his or her own misconduct. Id.; Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 19 1202, 1205–08 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 566 U.S. 982 (2012). Therefore, when a named 20 defendant holds a supervisory position, the causal link between him and the claimed 21 constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. Id. at 676-77; Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 22 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978). To state a claim 23 for relief based on a theory of supervisory liability, Plaintiff must allege some facts that would 24 support a claim that the supervisory defendants either: personally participated in the alleged 25

26 9 The Ninth Circuit has not definitively held that a failure to protect claim can be brought under Bivens and there is a split among district courts on the issue. See Schanck v. Haggard, 2021 WL 1060174, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2021) 27 (collecting cases). However, as above, the Court need not determine whether Plaintiff can state a Bivens claim because he fails to allege a constitutional violation. 28 1 deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them; or 2 promulgated or “implement[ed] a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of 3 constitutional rights and is the moving force of the constitutional violation.” Hansen v. Black, 4 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). 5 Plaintiff has not alleged any facts indicating that Lt. Scott, Mr. Young, and A. Ciolli 6 personally participated in the deprivation of his rights. As to Lt. Scott and Mr. Young, there do 7 not appear to be any references to these individuals in the Second Amended Complaint other than 8 listing them as defendants. As to A. Ciolli, Plaintiff concludes that this defendant violated 9 Plaintiff’s rights and failed to uphold his responsibilities. However, Plaintiff does not identify any 10 facts supporting these conclusions or describing how A. Ciolli was involved in the alleged 11 constitutional deprivations. 12 Additionally, Plaintiff does not allege that A. Ciolli, Lt. Scott, or Mr. Young knew of the 13 alleged constitutional violations and failed to act to prevent them, or that they instituted any 14 policies that were so deficient that the policies were the moving force behind the constitutional 15 violations. Although Plaintiff alleges that A. Ciolli changed unidentified prison policies to fit his 16 needs, he does not describe what those policies were, how they changed, or which of his claims 17 are based on those policy changes.10 The Second Amended Complaint does not contain any facts 18 establishing a causal link between those policy changes and the alleged constitutional violations. 19 /// 20 10 In his objections to the Court’s findings and recommendations entered on May 4, 2021, Plaintiff alleged: 21 I believe that A. Ciolli can be held liable for violation of my rights not because he is the Warden, 22 but because he actually participated in the deprivation of my property. It was the orders of A. Ciolli that denied me inadequate food which I believe contributed to my current medical conditions. I was 23 also denied exercise, proper sanitation personal hygiene, showers, medical and psychological care all because the head official gave the orders. Even if A. Ciolli did not participate in everything that 24 violated my rights, he played the main role of the official that went against the policies that were in force and change them to fit his need at the time. 25 (ECF No. 12 at 1.) In response to Plaintiff’s objections, the Court permitted Plaintiff to file an amended complaint and instructed him to include all factual allegations against A. Ciolli related to his claims. (ECF No. 13 at 2.) Despite 26 these instructions, Plaintiff did not include the foregoing allegations regarding A. Ciolli in the Second Amended Complaint. As the Court has previously explained to Plaintiff, it cannot consider factual allegations in Plaintiff’s 27 objections in deciding whether Plaintiff has stated any legal claims. Further, Plaintiff has been provided the relevant legal standards on two separate occasions and has been given two opportunities to amend his complaint to remedy 28 any deficiencies. 1 Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against Lt. Scott, Mr. Young, and A. 2 Ciolli and the Court will recommend that these defendants be dismissed. 3 V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 4 The Court has screened Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint and finds that Plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment and Eighth Amendment claims against Mrs. Rodriguez and John/Jane Does 1 5 through 20 should proceed past screening. The Court also finds that all other claims and 6 defendants should be dismissed. 7 The Court previously explained to Plaintiff the deficiencies in his complaint, provided 8 Plaintiff with relevant legal standards, and provided Plaintiff an opportunity to amend his 9 complaint two times. As Plaintiff filed his Second Amended Complaint with the benefit of the 10 information provided by the Court, it appears that further leave to amend would be futile. 11 Accordingly, based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 12 1. This case proceed on Plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment claim for deprivation of property 13 without due process against Mrs. Rodriguez and John/Jane Does 1 through 5, 14 Plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment claim for deprivation of liberty without due process 15 against John/Jane Does 6 through 10, Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim for 16 unconstitutional conditions of confinement against John/Jane Does 11 through 15, and 17 Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical 18 needs against John/Jane Does 16 through 20; 19 2. All other claims and defendants be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which 20 relief may be granted; and 21 3. The Clerk of Court be directed to terminate A. Ciolli and the Federal Bureau of 22 Prisons and to add Mrs. Rodriguez and John/Jane Does 1 through 20 as defendants on 23 the docket. These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States district judge 24 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within twenty-one 25 (21) days after being served with these findings and recommendations, Plaintiff may file written 26 objections with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s 27 Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the 28 1 | specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 2 | 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 3 4 IT IS SO ORDERED.

5] Dated: _ July 12, 2021 [see hey 6 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28