Pattiani v. Industrial Accident Commission

250 P. 864, 199 Cal. 596, 49 A.L.R. 446, 1926 Cal. LEXIS 310
CourtCalifornia Supreme Court
DecidedNovember 9, 1926
DocketDocket No. S.F. 12110.
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 250 P. 864 (Pattiani v. Industrial Accident Commission) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering California Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Pattiani v. Industrial Accident Commission, 250 P. 864, 199 Cal. 596, 49 A.L.R. 446, 1926 Cal. LEXIS 310 (Cal. 1926).

Opinions

RICHARDS, J.

The petitioner herein applied for and was granted a writ of review, whereby he sought to have annulled an order of the Industrial Accident Commission denying him compensation. The petitioner was employed during the latter portion of the year 1924 by Langley & Michaels Company of the city of San Francisco, a corporation engaged in the maintaining and operation of drugstores. In the early part of November of that year the petitioner was sent by his employers upon a business trip, in the course of which he was to visit a number of eastern cities for the purpose of investigating the subject of new equipment to be installed in his employer’s place of business in San Francisco, and to negotiate for the purchase of *598 such equipment. In pursuance of his said instructions petitioner left San Francisco on November 2, 1924, on his way east, calling at Portland, Seattle, Minneapolis, Chicago, Cleveland, Albany, and New York, and thence returning home through New Jersey to Philadelphia, Indianapolis, St. Louis, Kansas City, Los Angeles, and finally to the place of his regular employment, San Francisco. He arrived home on the 2d of December, 1924. While in the city of New York he spent five days, during which he lived at a well-known hotel, and visited a number of business establishments within the scope of his instructions. He testified that while in said city and on or about the 17th of November, and also about three days later, he ate raw oysters at his hotel, and possibly at another place. After leaving New York and while upon his homeward trip he found himself ill, which illness continued until he arrived in San Francisco and thereafter for some time. He sought medical aid and it was finally determined that his ailment was that of typhoid fever. He applied to the Industrial Accident Commission for an award and a hearing was had upon his said application, whereupon the Commission made the following finding: “That the employment of the applicant was normally and generally in the city and county of San Francisco; . . . that upon the occasion of the alleged injury herein, the applicant was temporarily in the city of New York, by reason of a trip or visit to said locality arising out of his employment; that while upon such trip or visit at New York the applicant contracted and became ill with typhoid fever; that at the time of said visit or trip by the applicant in New York City there was prevalent in said locality an epidemic of typhoid fever; that the evidence does not establish as a fact that said epidemic was caused or aggravated by contaminated oysters; that the fact that applicant was required by his employment to visit or sojourn in a locality where there was an epidemic of disease, does not constitute a special exposure arising out of the employment, but was in fact an exposure or risk of the commonalty in general and not peculiar to or characteristic of said employment.” The Commission, basing its conclusion upon its foregoing finding as to the facts, denied an award, and also denied the petitioner’s application for a rehearing, whereupon he applied to this court for a writ of review.

*599 The only assignable connection with typhoid infection which the applicant undertook to show at the hearing before the Commission was that of his having eaten contaminated oysters while in the city of New York. The Commission found against that contention and by so doing must be held to have negatived the conclusion that the applicant contracted said disease because of the existence of such epidemic in said city, or by any contact with such prevailing disorder.

The sole question presented in this proceeding is as to whether or not the injury of said employee is compensable in view of the findings of the Commission with respect to the nature and circumstances and origin of his said injury, which finding is supported by the evidence presented to the Commission. In the Matter of Dryden v. Lachman Bros., 8 Cal. I. A. C. 14, wherein a hearing upon application for a writ of review was denied by this court, the facts were these: The applicant for compensation, in the course of his employment and in the city in which he was employed, visited a home to take measurements for window-shades. There had been scarlatina in this home prior to such visit, but the house had been fumigated. Subsequent to such visit a girl living in the home became ill of scarlatina, as did also the said applicant several days later. Compensation was denied, the Commission saying: “It is not unreasonable to suppose that . . . applicant did contract scarlatina while at work measuring for or putting up the shades above mentioned, although he might have contracted the disease elsewhere. It is in evidence that there is at all times scarlatina in San Francisco and that the commonalty is likely to be subjected to contagion from that source. ... It is certain that compensation could not be allowed for an injury sustained in the form of a contagious or infectious disease where the risk of such contagion or infection was a risk of the commonalty. There must be as a justification for an award for compensation for such an injury a very special exposure beyond that to which the commonalty is subjected. Of course, the commonalty did not have access to No. 314 Locust Street, San Francisco, but the risk of infection from that source was a risk participated in by every person who for any reason did enter that home during the interim between the two periods of quarantine, and therefore and for that reason the risk was not a very special one appertaining *600 to the industry in which applicant was engaged.” In denying the application for a writ of review in the above matter this court apparently approved the conclusion of the Commission that, in order to the recovery of compensation for an injury arising out of the contraction of an infectious or contagious disorder while engaged in the performance of the duties of the employee in the place of his regular employment, “there must be as a justification for an award for compensation for such an injury a very special exposure beyond that to which the commonalty is subjected.” In the Matter of Shepherd v. A. Schilling & Co., 11 Cal. I. A. C. 57, the husband of the applicant for an award was employed as a sales manager of his employer, the principal place of business of which was the city of Oakland. In the course of his employment, and on November 4, 1922, he left Oakland, traveling through the northwest and thence to Denver and other towns in its region, and thence to Albuquerque, at which latter place smallpox developed, and from its effects he died on December 13, 1922. The evidence before the Commission showed that a smallpox epidemic was prevalent in Denver from September 1, 1922, into December, 1922, and that the deceased, who was in Denver part of that period, interviewed between fifty and a hundred people. It is a fair intendment from the findings of the Commission that the deceased probably contracted said disease while in Denver; but there was neither allegation nor proof before the Commission that he was exposed there to any extent beyond that of the general public, nor was there any evidence to the effect that any of the people interviewed were afflicted with said disease.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Co. v. Bohls
304 S.W.2d 534 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1957)
Treadway v. Industrial Commission
213 P.2d 373 (Arizona Supreme Court, 1950)
Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission
135 P.2d 153 (California Supreme Court, 1943)
Union Mining Co. v. Blank
28 A.2d 568 (Court of Appeals of Maryland, 1942)
Pac. Emp. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com.
19 Cal. 2d 622 (California Supreme Court, 1942)
Pacific Employers Insurance v. Industrial Accident Commission
122 P.2d 570 (California Supreme Court, 1942)
Todd Dry Docks, Inc. v. Marshal
49 F.2d 621 (W.D. Washington, 1931)
Belcher v. Commissioner
11 B.T.A. 1294 (Board of Tax Appeals, 1928)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
250 P. 864, 199 Cal. 596, 49 A.L.R. 446, 1926 Cal. LEXIS 310, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pattiani-v-industrial-accident-commission-cal-1926.