Packard Motor Car Company v. The Webster Motor Car Company, the Webster Motor Car Company v. Packard Motor Car Company

243 F.2d 418

• Court: Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
• Decided: May 16, 1957
• Docket: 13153_1
• Status: Published

Opinions

EDGERTON, Chief Judge.

Packard Motor Car Company and two of its officers appeal from a judgment for $570,000 in favor of Webster Motor Car Company, a former Packard dealer in Baltimore, for alleged violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1, 2, 15. The essential facts are not disputed.

There were formerly four dealers in Packard cars in Baltimore. In 1953 there were three, of which Webster was one. The usual dealer contract in the automobile business, and the contract between Packard and Webster, were for one year, with no option of extension. It was the custom in the business to extend contracts, from year to year, “barring some reason for cancellation.” Webster and Packard had extended their contracts from year to year a considerable number of times.

In 1953 Zell Motor Car Company, the largest of the three Baltimore dealers in Packard cars, told Packard that Zell was losing money and would quit unless Packard gave it an exclusive contract. Packard told Zell it would do so, and told Webster and the other Baltimore dealer that their contracts would not be renewed. After Webster protested and threatened suit, Packard offered Webster the usual one-year renewal but refused to promise more. Packard told Zell, in effect, that this would be Webster’s last renewal. Webster declined Packard’s offer, quit the business, and brought this suit.

The District Court submitted to the jury the question whether there was an unreasonable restraint of trade, and also whether there was an agreement or attempt to monopolize. The jury found for the plaintiff and awarded $190,000 damages, which the court trebled in accordance with the statute. Motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and for a new trial, were denied. The court held that the jury had “a right to reach the conclusion that an agreement on the part of the manufacturer with one of its own dealers to terminate the franchise of all competitors and to grant to him a monopoly within a certain area, is an agreement in unreasonable restraint of trade, or an agreement to monopolize.” Webster Motor Car Co. v. Packard Motor Car Co., D.C., 135 F.Supp. 4, 9.

We think the defendants were entitled to judgment. We agree substantially with Schwing Motor Co. v. Hudson Sales Co., D.C.D.Md.1956, 138 F.Supp. 899, affirmed 4 Cir., 1956, 239 F.2d 176.

1. There was no monopoly, or attempt or conspiracy to monopolize, within the meaning of the Sherman Act. The cellophane case, which had not been decided when the present case was tried, makes this clear. The Supreme Court there said: “this power that, let us say, automobile or soft-drink manufacturers have over their trademarked products is not the power that makes an illegal monopoly. Illegal power must be appraised in terms of the competitive market for the product.” And the Court held that “In considering what is the relevant market for determining the control of price and competition * * * commodities reasonably interchangeable by consumers for the same purposes make up that ‘part of the trade or commerce’, monopolization of which may be illegal.” The Court accordingly held that, although du Pont produced about 75% of the cellophane sold in this country, there was no monopoly, because “the relevant market” was flexible packaging materials, including such things as glassine, waxed paper, and foil, as well as cellophane, and cellophane accounted for only 17.9% of this market. United States v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 393, 395, 399-400, 76 S.Ct. 994, 1006, 1007, 100 L.Ed. 1264. Since there are other cars “reasonably interchangeable by consumers for the same purposes” as Packard cars and therefore in competition with Packards, an exclusive contract for marketing Packards does not create a monopoly. And there is no evidence of any attempt or conspiracy to create a monopoly, since there is no evidence of any attempt to get control of the relevant market.

2. There was no contract or conspiracy in restraint of trade within the meaning of the Sherman Act. As the court informed the jury, it has long been clear that only unreasonable restraints of trade are unlawful. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 31 S.Ct. 502, 55 L.Ed. 619. When an exclusive dealership “is not part and parcel of a scheme to monopolize and effective competition exists at both the seller and buyer levels, the arrangement has invariably been upheld as a reasonable restraint of trade. In short, the rule was virtually one of per se legality” until the District Court decided the present case.¹ Of Packard’s 1600 dealers, 1100 were the only Packard dealers in their cities, some of which were nearly as large as Baltimore, and such a ratio was typical in the automobile industry. The fact that any other dealers in the same product of the same manufacturer are eliminated does not make an exclusive dealership illegal; it is the essential nature of the arrangement. The fact that Zell asked for the arrangement does not make it illegal. Since the immediate object of an exclusive dealership is to protect the dealer from competition in the manufacturer’s product, it is likely to be the dealer who asks for it.^{2 3}

The short of it is that a relatively small manufacturer, competing with large manufacturers, thought it advantageous to retain its largest dealer in Baltimore, and could not do so without agreeing to drop its other Baltimore dealers. To penalize the small manufacturer for competing in this way not only fails to promote the policy of the antitrust laws but defeats it.

3. Though Packard had formerly expressed an intention not to renew its contract with Webster, Packard offered and Webster refused the usual renewal. That Packard had agreed with Zell not to renew Webster’s contract again when the proffered renewal expired is immaterial, not only because the agreement was legal but also because it inflicted no damage.

The judgment in favor of Webster is reversed. Webster’s cross-appeal concerning the amount of Webster’s attorneys’ fee is dismissed as moot.

No. 13152 reversed; No. 13153 dismissed.

1 . Handler, “Annual Antitrust Review”, 11 Record of the Ass’n of the Bar of the City of New York, 367, 370 (1956). Fargo Glass & Paint Co. v. Globe American Corp., 7 Cir., 201 F.2d 534, certiorari denied 1953, 345 U.S. 942, 73 S.Ct. 833, 97 L.Ed. 1368; Bascom Launder Corp. v. Telecoin Corp., 2 Cir., 204 F.2d 331, certiorari denied 1953, 345 U.S. 994, 73 S.Ct. 1133, 97 L.Ed. 1401; United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., D.C.S.D.N.Y., 45 F.Supp. 387, 398-399, affirmed by an equally divided Court 1944, 321 U.S. 707, 719, 64 S.Ct. 805, 88 L.Ed. 1024. Cf. Federal Trade Commission v. Raymond Bros. Clark Co., 263 U.S. 565, 44 S.Ct 162, 68 L.Ed. 448; G. & P. Amusement Co. v. Regent Theater Co., D.C., 107 F.Supp. 453, affirmed 6 Cir., 216 F.2d 749; Boro Hall Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 2 Cir., 124 F.2d 822; Hudson Sales Corp. v. Waldrip, 5 Cir., 211 F.2d 268; Herren Candy Co. v. Curtiss Candy Co., D.C.,—F.Supp.—.

2 . Handler, supra note 2, at page 372.

3 . Butchers’ Union v. Cresent City Co., 1884, 111 U.S. 746, 4 S.Ct. 652, 28 L.Ed. 585, concurring opinions of Mr. Justice Field and Mr. Justice Bradley.