UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA __________________________________________ ) SONYA OWENS, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 08-2029 (ESH) ) DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., ) ) Defendants. ) __________________________________________)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Sonya Owens, proceeding pro se, has filed an amended complaint alleging that
the District of Columbia, Office of the Corporation Counsel (now referred to as the Office of the
Attorney General of the District of Columbia (“OAG”)), and Mayor Adrian Fenty, in his official
capacity, engaged in unlawful employment discrimination and retaliation, defamation, and
deprivation of civil rights in violation of a variety of federal statutes, as well as the District of
Columbia Comprehensive Merit Personnel Act (“CMPA”), D.C. Code 1-601.1 et seq. Plaintiff
seeks both monetary damages and equitable relief, including reinstatement. Plaintiff’s
allegations against these same defendants formed the basis of an earlier complaint that she filed
in this Court, with the assistance of counsel, alleging discrimination on the basis of race and
gender, as well as unlawful retaliation. See Owens v. District of Columbia (“Owens I”), No. 05-
CV-1729 (D.D.C. filed Aug. 31, 2005). That civil action came before Magistrate Judge Alan
Kay, went to trial, and resulted in a jury verdict for defendants. See Clerk’s Judgment, Owens I,
No. 05-CV-1729 (D.D.C. Jan. 24, 2008). Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss the
amended complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. For the reasons
set forth below, defendant’s motion will be granted in part and denied in part.
1 BACKGROUND
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The facts, as alleged in the amended complaint and established through exhibits and other
court documents, are as follows:
Plaintiff was a captain with the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department
(“MPD”). (Am. Compl. [“Compl.”] [Dkt. No. 12] ¶ 4.) In June 2001, plaintiff was interviewed
by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) as a witness during the
investigation of gender and pregnancy discrimination complaints filed by two other officers
against a MPD district commander. (Id. ¶ 6.) During the course of that investigation, plaintiff
stated that the two officers had been subject to “disparate inequitable treatment.” (Id. ¶ 7.) In
July 2004, the MPD learned that the two officers had filed a federal discrimination lawsuit, and
in November, the MPD learned that plaintiff had been summoned as a witness in that suit. (Id.
¶¶ 16, 18.) Subsequently, plaintiff’s “police powers were revoked,” “her access to the general
public was restricted,” her “duty assignments and responsibilities were removed without being
told beforehand,” and she received a notice of proposed suspension “for ‘overdue
correspondence.’” (Id. ¶¶ 19-20.) In February 2005, plaintiff testified in the discrimination
lawsuit. (See id. ¶¶ 21-26.) MPD then informed her that she would be suspended as previously
notified. (Id. ¶ 27.)
In March 2005, plaintiff was interviewed by Internal Affairs regarding a citizen
complaint filed by the State of Virginia Arlington County Animal Welfare Shelter (“AAS”).
(Compl. ¶¶ 28-33.) Plaintiff, having apparently viewed this interview as a custodial
interrogation, “invoked her civil rights . . . .” (Id. ¶ 32.) That same month, following this
interview, the MPD “revoked all of [plaintiff’s] official duties,” referred her to the Office of
2 Professional Responsibility for follow-up questioning on the AAS matter (for which plaintiff
sought legal advice and counsel), and suspended her for two weeks for “overdue
correspondence.” (Id. ¶¶ 34-48.) Plaintiff appealed her suspension to the Office of Employee
Appeals (“OEA”). (Id. ¶ 49.)
In April 2005, plaintiff was again suspended for twelve days for being absent without
leave (“AWOL”) for 80 hours during her previous suspension. (Compl. ¶ 58.) She therefore
supplemented her pending OEA appeal to cover this second suspension. (Id. ¶ 60.) In May
plaintiff received a notice of proposed termination from the MPD for, among other things, being
involved in criminal activity. (Id. ¶ 61.) In response, she requested copies of all documents and
information relevant to the MPD’s “investigation(s)” (presumably relating to the claim of her
involvement with criminal activity), although she did not receive anything in response to that
request. (Id. ¶¶ 62, 64.) In August, after she filed a Notice of Intent to sue the District, the MPD
conducted a termination hearing and, shortly before the hearing, provided her with some of the
information she had previously requested. (Id. ¶¶ 65-67.) Plaintiff requested a continuance of
the hearing so that she could review the information she had been given, and the continuance
was granted, although she was not notified of this. (Id. ¶¶ 68-69.)
On August 31, 2005, plaintiff filed Owens I alleging discrimination and retaliation under
42 U.S.C. § 1981 and three provisions of the D.C. Human Rights Act (“DCHRA”), D.C. Code §
2-1402.11 and § 2-1402.61(a) & (c). (See Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss Amended Compl. [“Mot.”]
[Dkt. No. 14], Ex. 1 (Owens I complaint) at 15-19.) Shortly thereafter, the MPD resumed
plaintiff’s termination hearing without notifying her and included several additional charges.
(Compl. ¶¶ 71-72.) In October 2005, the MPD notified plaintiff that it had decided to terminate
her employment as of November. (Id. ¶ 73.) In December, plaintiff appealed her termination to
3 the OEA. (Id. ¶ 74.)
In July 2006, an OEA administrative law judge (“ALJ”) dismissed plaintiff’s appeal of
her suspension. (Compl. ¶ 75.) In August, plaintiff filed a petition seeking review of that
dismissal by the Board of the OEA (“the Board”). (Id. ¶ 76.) In September, the OEA also
ordered MPD to provide plaintiff with transcripts of her termination hearings, and in October, the
OEA conducted a hearing on plaintiff’s termination appeal. (Id. ¶¶ 77-78.) A year later, in
November 2007, an OEA ALJ upheld the termination. (Id. ¶ 79.) In December plaintiff filed a
petition for review of her termination with the Board. (Id. ¶ 80.)
Owens I went to trial in January 2008, with Magistrate Judge Alan Kay presiding.
Plaintiff contends that during trial, witnesses for the MPD and the AAS testified that the AAS
did not, in fact, file a citizen complaint regarding plaintiff, and that MPD witnesses also testified
about how, among other things, the MPD “had conducted ‘an ongoing criminal investigation that
never stopped’” since November 2004. (Compl. ¶¶ 81-87.) On January 22, the jury found for
the defendants, concluding that plaintiff had failed to prove that defendants had retaliated or
discriminated against her. (Mot., Ex. 2 (Owens I jury verdict form) at 1-2.) The judgment in
Owens I was entered two days later. (See id., Ex. 3 (Owens I judgment).) No appeal was taken
from this judgment.
On April 9, 2008, plaintiff filed a petition for review with the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals that “raise[d] the issues in this suit” and sought review of the OEA ALJ’s decisions.
(Pl.’s Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss (“2nd Opp’n”)1 [Dkt. No. 17] at 3; see id. at 7 (Court of Appeals
order).) However, on May 7, 2008, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of
1 This opposition brief does not contain all of plaintiff’s arguments. She also filed a separate opposition entitled “Plaintiff’s Opposition to the Defendant’s [sic] Motion to Amend Parties” (“1st Opp’n”). [Dkt. No. 16.]
4 jurisdiction. (Id., Ex. 1 at 7.) The court explained that because plaintiff’s petitions for review
were also still pending with the OEA Board, no appealable final administrative order had been
issued. (Id. at 3.) The dismissal was without prejudice to plaintiff “filing a petition for review
once a final order has issued.” (Id.)
On May 12, 2008, plaintiff moved to withdraw her two petitions for review that were
pending before the OEA Board. (Compl., Ex. 1 at 5-7.) On July 24, the Board granted
plaintiff’s motion, dismissed both appeals, and served plaintiff with notice. (Compl. ¶ 87 & Ex.
1 at 2, 4.) The Board’s order of dismissal noted that the ALJ’s initial decisions would become
the OEA’s “final decision[s]” after five days – i.e., on or about August 1, 2008 – and that once
plaintiff received formal notice of the final decisions, she would have 30 days to take an appeal
to the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. (Compl., Ex. 1 at 3.) Subsequently, plaintiff
appears to have filed another petition with the Court of Appeals, because on September 25, the
court “dismiss[ed] her petition as [she] is not aggrieved . . . .” (2nd Opp’n at 7 (Court of Appeals
order).) Plaintiff moved for reconsideration but the Court of Appeals denied that motion on
October 10, noting that “petitioner has suffered no legal injury after the Office of Employee
Appeals granted her motion to dismiss the petitions . . . .” (Id.)
II. THE INSTANT ACTION
On November 25, 2008, plaintiff initiated this action. The amended complaint was filed
on March 20, 2009. Paragraphs 3 through 64 of the amended complaint recount factual
allegations that were the gravamen of the complaint in Owens I. However, paragraphs 65
through 87 of the amended complaint recount additional facts following the initiation of Owens
I, pertaining to the administrative events leading up to and following her termination from the
MPD. The amended complaint presents seven counts. Count One alleges that defendants
5 retaliated against plaintiff, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, because she engaged in the protected
activity of supporting the two female officers against the MPD in their EEO proceedings and
lawsuit. (Compl. ¶¶ 88-112.) Count Two alleges that defendants retaliated against plaintiff in
violation of the False Claims Act’s whistleblower protections, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h). (Id. ¶¶ 113-
120.) Count Three alleges that defendants violated various provisions of the CMPA by, among
other things, terminating her without cause and failing to follow a variety of personnel
regulations in suspending her, firing her, and adjudicating her appeals of the suspensions and
firing. (Id. ¶¶ 121-131.) Count Four alleges that defendants retaliated against plaintiff, in
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, by “conduct[ing] a hearing that terminated her employment”
shortly after she initiated the Owens I lawsuit. (Id. ¶¶ 133-134.) Count Five alleges that
defendants defamed plaintiff by making statements “so stigmatizing that they severely disqualify
and [a]ffect her potential future employment . . . .” (Id. ¶ 143.) For example, plaintiff alleges
that her personnel record “states that she was terminated because [defendants] convicted her of
filing a false police report, engaging in criminal misconduct with conviction in a court of law,
conduct unbecoming[,] and insubordination.” (Id. ¶ 142.) Counts Six and Seven allege that
defendants violated 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242 by conspiring to deprive and actually depriving
plaintiff of her constitutional rights by, among other things, the MPD’s conduct during the
investigation into the AAS complaint. (Id. ¶¶ 149-161.)
ANALYSIS
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“‘When ruling on a defendant’s motion to dismiss, a judge must accept as true all of the
factual allegations contained in the complaint.’” Atherton v. Dist. of Columbia Office of Mayor,
567 F.3d 672, 681 (D.C. Cir. June 2, 2009) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007))
6 (edits omitted). “‘So long as the pleadings suggest a “plausible” scenario to show that the
pleader is entitled to relief, a court may not dismiss.’” Id. (quoting Tooley v. Napolitano, 556
F.3d 836, 839 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (edits omitted). However,
[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
“A pro se complaint,” such as plaintiff’s, “‘must be held to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Atherton, 567 F.3d at 681 (quoting Erickson, 551 U.S. at
94). “But even a pro se complainant must plead ‘factual matter’ that permits the court to infer
‘more than the mere possibility of misconduct.’” Id. at 681-82 (quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at
1950).
II. AMENABILITY OF DEFENDANTS TO SUIT
Defendants correctly argue that because the OAG is a subordinate agency of the District
of Columbia government, it may not be sued in its own name. “[A] subordinate governmental
agency may not sue or be sued in the absence of a statutory provision to that effect.” Trifax
Corp. v. Dist. of Columbia, 53 F. Supp. 2d 20, 26 (D.D.C. 1999); see Kundrat v. Dist. of
Columbia, 106 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2000) (citing cases). Given the absence of any statutory
authority enabling suits against the OAG in its own name, the OAG will be dismissed. See, e.g.,
Doe v. Dist. of Columbia, 609 F. Supp. 2d 38, 40-41 (D.D.C. 2009) (dismissing two District
agencies as non sui juris).
7 Plaintiff has also sued Mayor Fenty in his official capacity only. Defendants seek to
dismiss the claims against the Mayor on the theory that “this suit is in reality a suit against the
District . . . .” (Mot. at 8.) Defendants are correct “that a lawsuit against the Mayor acting in his
official capacity is the same as a suit against the District. However, even though retaining the
Mayor as a party in the suit is redundant, there is no requirement that, because of the
equivalence, the public official defendant must be dismissed. Accordingly, the Court denies the
motion to dismiss the claims against the Mayor in his official capacity.” Johnson v. Dist. of
Columbia, 572 F. Supp. 2d 94, 112 (D.D.C. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted); see also Winder v. Erste, No. 03-CV-2623, 2005 WL 736639, at *5 (D.D.C. Mar. 31,
2005) (declining to dismiss District official where plaintiff claimed unlawful retaliation in
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
III. COUNT TWO
Count Two of the complaint alleges that defendants retaliated against plaintiff in
violation of the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h). Section 3730 permits private citizens to
bring qui tam actions in the government’s name for violations of § 3729, which defines the false
claims prohibited under the Act. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729 & 3730(b)(1). Section 3730(h) only
prohibits employers from retaliating against employees “because of lawful acts done by the
employee . . . in furtherance of other efforts to stop 1 or more violations of this subchapter.” Id.
§ 3730(h)(1) (emphasis added); see generally id. §§ 3721-3733 (subchapter provisions. Because
the complaint does not allege that plaintiff attempted to stop a false claim against the
8 government,2 it does not contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiff has therefore failed to state a claim under § 3730(h), and Count Two shall be dismissed.
IV. COUNTS SIX AND SEVEN
Counts Six and Seven of the complaint allege that defendants violated 18 U.S.C. §§ 241
and 242. These criminal statutes do not provide a private right of action. Crosby v. Catret, 308
F. App’x 453, 453 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“The district court properly rejected appellant’s attempt to
invoke 18 U.S.C. § 241 and 18 U.S.C. § 242 to initiate a prosecution against the named
defendants because there is no private right of action under these criminal statutes.”); Johnson v.
D.C. Criminal Justice Act, 305 F. App’x 662, 662 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (same). For this reason,
Counts Six and Seven will be dismissed.
V. THE REMAINING COUNTS
Defendants have also moved to dismiss Counts One, Three, Four, and Five on grounds of
res judicata and to dismiss Count Five’s defamation claim on statute of limitations grounds. The
Court will address these arguments in turn.
A. Res Judicata
Defendants argue that plaintiff’s lawsuit must be dismissed “[u]nder the doctrine of res
judicata and the closely related principle of claim preclusion,” because this action involves the
same parties and arises out of the same set of operative facts as Owens I, which was concluded
with a final adjudication on the merits. (Mot. at 9-10.) “‘Under the doctrine of res judicata, or
2 A “claim” is defined as “any request or demand, whether under a contract or otherwise, for money or property which is made to a contractor, grantee, or other recipient if the United States Government provides any portion of the money or property which is requested or demanded, or if the Government will reimburse such contractor, grantee, or other recipient for any portion of the money or property which is requested or demanded.” 31 U.S.C. § 3729(c).
9 claim preclusion, a subsequent lawsuit will be barred if there has been prior litigation (1)
involving the same claims or cause of action, (2) between the same parties or their privies, and
(3) there has been a final, valid judgment on the merits, (4) by a court of competent
jurisdiction.’” Capitol Hill Group v. Pillsbury, Winthrop, Shaw, Pittman, LLC, No. 08-7109,
2009 WL 1812732, at *3 (D.C. Cir. June 26, 2009) (quoting Smalls v. United States, 471 F.3d
186, 192 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). “[C]laim preclusion is [] intended to prevent litigation of matters
that should have been raised in an earlier suit.” NRDC v. EPA, 513 F.3d 257, 261 (D.C. Cir.
2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). For this reason, “[r]es judicata bars relitigation not
only of matters determined in a previous litigation but also ones a party could have raised.”
Capitol Hill Group, 2009 WL 1812732, at *5 (internal quotation marks, edits, and ellipsis
omitted). In other words, “‘claim preclusion precludes the litigation of claims, not just
arguments.’” Id. at *4 (quoting NRDC, 513 F.3d at 261).
Plaintiff contends that the elements “necessary to trigger a ‘res judicata’ defense do not
exist.” (2nd Opp’n at 3.) This is incorrect.3 It is clear that this action and Owens I involve the
same parties: plaintiff, the District of Columbia, and the Mayor. It is also clear that the two
actions involve substantially the same claims or causes of action. “[T]here is an identity of the
causes of action when the cases are based on the same nucleus of facts because it is the facts
surrounding the transaction or occurrence which operate to constitute the cause of action, not the
legal theory on which a litigant relies.” Capitol Hill Group, 2009 WL 1812732, at *4 (internal
quotation marks omitted). Here, paragraphs 3 through 64 of the instant complaint are virtually
identical to allegations found in the Owens I complaint’s statement of facts. (Compare Compl.
¶¶ 3-64 with Mot., Ex. 1 ¶¶ 3-102.) Therefore, the two actions share a common factual nucleus,
3 The Court also rejects plaintiff’s contention that defendants’ res judicata argument is untimely.
10 and to the extent that plaintiff’s claims are based upon the allegations that are duplicative of
those made in Owens I, plaintiff could have and should have brought those claims in Owens I.
See, e.g., Nader v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 590 F. Supp. 2d 164, 170 (D.D.C. 2008) (finding
claims barred under res judicata where they were or could have been brought in previous civil
action). Finally, the jury verdict in Owens I was a final and valid adjudication of the merits of
plaintiff’s discrimination and retaliation claims, which were also the basis for the allegations
repeated in paragraphs 3 through 64 of the instant complaint.
Accordingly, plaintiff’s remaining causes of action are barred to the extent that they arise
from facts alleged in paragraphs 3 through 64. See Moment v. Dist. of Columbia, No. 05-CV-
2470, 2007 WL 861138, at *3-*4 (D.D.C. Mar. 20, 2007) (finding claims barred under res
judicata where plaintiff’s instant allegations were identical to those made against same
defendants in previous action). However, to the extent that plaintiff’s claims are based upon
issues that were not and could not have been raised in Owens I – namely, those stemming from
her termination and her efforts to administratively appeal that termination4 – they are not barred
by res judicata.
B. Statute of Limitations as to Defamation
Defendants also move to dismiss plaintiff’s defamation claim as time-barred. “In the
District of Columbia, the statute of limitations for defamation is one year.” Wallace v. Skadden,
Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, 715 A.2d 873, 882 (D.C. 1998); accord Savoy v. VMT Long Term
Care Mgmt. Co., Inc., 522 F. Supp. 2d 211, 213 (D.D.C. 2007) (“[Under D.C. law], any claim
for slander must be brought within one year from the time the action accrues . . . .”); see D.C.
4 In Owens I, plaintiff did not amend her complaint to include any claims arising from the termination, nor did the Court’s review of plaintiff’s pleadings or the jury instructions in Owens I reveal that her termination was ever cited as a retaliatory action.
11 Code § 12-301(4). “‘Defamation occurs on publication, and the statute of limitations runs from
the date of publication.’” Wallace, 715 A.2d at 882 (quoting Foretich v. Glamour, 741 F. Supp.
247, 252 (D.D.C. 1990)); accord Thomas v. News World Communications, 681 F. Supp. 55, 73
(D.D.C. 1988) (“Libel actions [under D.C. law] accrue on the date of publication.”).
Here, plaintiff’s only remaining defamation claims relate to defendants’ alleged
statements relating to the reasons for her termination. Such claims are subject to the CMPA’s
administrative exhaustion requirements. See Washington v. Dist. of Columbia, 538 F. Supp. 2d
269, 278-80 (D.D.C. 2008) (concluding that supervisor’s allegedly defamatory statements were
sufficiently related to “personnel” issues and therefore “require[d] the exhaustion of CMPA
remedies prior to filing suit”). It appears from the complaint that plaintiff indeed sought to
exhaust her administrative remedies by taking an appeal to the OEA’s ALJ and Board and
receiving a final decision before pursuing judicial relief. (See Compl. ¶¶ 74-80, 87 & Ex. 1.) Cf.
Hoey v. Dist. of Columbia, 540 F. Supp. 2d 218, 231 (D.D.C. 2008) (dismissing defamation
claims for failure to exhaust because plaintiff “was first required by the CMPA to present them
to OEA and obtain a Final Decision from that body before pursuing judicial relief”). Other
judges of this Court have deemed it appropriate to equitably toll statutes of limitations under
D.C. law where claimants first sought to exhaust their available administrative remedies. See
Waldau v. Coughlin, No. 95-CV-1151, 1996 WL 312197, at *9 (D.D.C. June 3, 1996)
(concluding that plaintiff’s efforts to administratively exhaust claims through Merits Systems
Protective Board tolled statute of limitations for Bivens claims under D.C. law); Pettaway v.
Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n of Am., 547 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5-6 (D.D.C. 2008) (finding “good
cause to equitably toll the District of Columbia’s three-year statute of limitations” for plaintiff’s
ERISA claim because she “pursued her rights diligently” through mandatory channels for
12 exhausting administrative remedies (internal quotation marks and edits omitted)); cf. Gull
Airborne Instruments, Inc. v. Weinberger, 694 F.2d 838, 844 & n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (rejecting
laches defense where delay in filing suit resulted from exhausting administrative remedies
because, inter alia, “it would be an injustice to unsuccessful bidders [on government
procurement contracts] if we now penalized them merely for exhausting those administrative
remedies” and because plaintiff’s “many attempts to receive administrative relief served to put
the government on notice that [plaintiff] was not sleeping on its rights”). The Court concludes
that the complaint states facts which, if true, could support a finding of exhaustion and thereby
merit equitable tolling of the one-year statute of limitations for defamation claims until the date
when the OEA’s decisions became final: on or about August 1, 2008. Accordingly, the Court
will not dismiss plaintiff’s defamation claims relating to her termination.
VI. PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR NEW TRIAL
In her opposition, plaintiff asserts that she is entitled to a new trial pursuant to Federal
Rule of Procedure 60(b). (2nd Opp’n at 4.) Rule 60(b) provides that “[o]n motion and just
terms, the [C]ourt may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment” for several enumerated reasons,
including “newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been
discovered in time to move for a new trial” and “fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or
extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2)
& (3). Here, plaintiff contends that during the Owens I trial, defendants allegedly “admitted to
making a false police report, knowingly suspending her twice for the same act, and conducting
an ongoing criminal investigation,” and that such admissions are newly discovered evidence and
proof of fraud. (2nd Opp’n at 4-5.) Construing plaintiff’s argument as a motion under Rule
60(b)(2) and (3) for relief from the final judgment in Owens I, the Court must deny plaintiff’s
13 request as untimely.5
Motions under Rule 60(b) for reasons of mistake, newly discovered evidence, or fraud
“must be made . . . no more than a year after the entry of the judgment or order or the date of the
proceeding” from which the movant seeks relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1). This one-year time
limit is “ironclad,” Goland v. Central Intelligence Agency, 607 F.2d 339, 372 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
(discussing motion based on newly discovered evidence), and cannot be extended by the Court.
See Carr v. Dist. of Columbia, 543 F.2d 917, 925-26 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (“We see no elasticity in
Rule 60(b)’s one-year time limit on the motions to which it applies; it is not judicially extendable
. . . .” (footnote omitted)).
The judgment in Owens I was issued on January 24, 2008. Plaintiff’s opposition motion
containing her request for a new trial was not filed until May 13, 2009 – almost four months
beyond the one-year time limit. The Court must therefore deny plaintiff’s request for relief
under Rule 60(b)(3). See Baltia Air Lines, Inc. v. Transaction Mgmt., Inc., 98 F.3d 640, 643
(D.C. Cir. 1996) (rejecting challenge to original judgment under Rule 60(b)(3) where challenge
was made three months after one-year time limit).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in
part. OAG is dismissed as a defendant. Counts Two, Six, and Seven are dismissed in their
entirety. Counts One, Three, Four, and Five are dismissed to the extent that their claims are
based on paragraphs 3 through 64 of the amended complaint; they survive defendants’ motion to
the extent that their claims arise from (1) the termination of plaintiff’s employment with the
5 In addition, as correctly argued by defendants, any Rule 60(b) request for relief from the judgment in Owens I must be addressed to Magistrate Judge Kay. (See Reply at 4 (citing authorities).)
14 MPD or (2) the allegations of paragraphs 65 through 87 of the amended complaint. A separate
order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
/s/ ELLEN SEGAL HUVELLE United States District Judge
DATE: July 6, 2009