Orange v. Island Creek Coal Co.

786 F.2d 724
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
DecidedMarch 25, 1986
DocketNo. 84-3501
StatusPublished
Cited by37 cases

This text of 786 F.2d 724 (Orange v. Island Creek Coal Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Orange v. Island Creek Coal Co., 786 F.2d 724 (6th Cir. 1986).

Opinions

SILER, Chief Judge.

The petitioner/claimant, Thomas L. Orange, brought this action under the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 921(c) (1978), for review of a decision by the Benefits Review Board (Board), denying his claim for benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-945 (1971 & Supp.1985). The Board affirmed the Administrative [725]*725Law Judge’s (AU’s) decision that Orange was not entitled to benefits despite the finding that he was entitled to the interim presumption of disability under 20 C.F.R. § 727.203(a)(4). Orange argues for reversal of the Board’s decision: (1) because the medical opinions upon which the decision is based are not well reasoned, and (2) because the AU’s decision demonstrates bias.

The issues to be decided by this Court are whether there is substantial evidence in the record to uphold the AU’s decision and/or whether the Board committed any error of law or failed to adhere to the statutory standard governing its review of the AU’s factual determinations. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs v. Rowe, 710 F.2d 251 (6th Cir. 1983). For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the Board.

Claimant is a 65 year-old non-smoker who spent 31 years around coal mines, 10 years underground and 21 years at the tipple. After breathing problems forced his retirement at age 56, he filed this claim for benefits on June 28, 1976.

The AU denied the claim twice. He first held that claimant was not entitled to invocation of the 20 C.F.R. § 727.203(a) interim presumption. The Board reversed this decision, holding. that the AU had improperly weighed the evidence in determining that Orange was not entitled to the presumption under 20 C.F.R. § 727.-203(a)(1), (a)(2), and (a)(4)1 and because the AU failed to consider the claimant’s eligibility for benefits under Part 410, 20 C.F.R. as required by 20 C.F.R. § 727.203(d).2

It was remanded primarily due to the Board’s decision in Stiner v. Bethelem Mines Corp., 3 BLR 1-487 (1981), where it held that a single documented medical opinion from a physician exercising reasoned medical judgment, which establishes the presence of a totally disabling pulmonary or respiratory impairment, is sufficient to invoke the interim presumption under Section 727.203(a)(4). Later, the Board discontinued the practice, and the requirements of the Board are now that all relevant . documented medical opinions must be considered in determining whether the presumption under Section 727.203(a)(4) should be invoked. Nevertheless, the remand by the Board was to the claimant’s advantage, so reversal would not be required, as it was in Consolidation Coal Co. v. Sanati, 713 F.2d 480 (4th Cir.1983).

The AU again denied the claim on remand. He found that Orange was entitled to the presumption under 20 C.F.R. § 727.-203(a)(4) (reasoned medical opinion), but not under (a)(1) (X-rays) or (a)(2) (ventilatory studies). After reviewing the evidence, the AU held that the presumption was rebutted under Section 727.203(b)(4) and Orange was not eligible for benefits under Part 410, 20 C.F.R. The Board affirmed.

Although there were some positive readings of X-rays by physicians, claimant has not raised as error the failure of the AU to find a presumption under Section 727.-203(a)(1), (2) or to find, alternatively, eligibility under Section 727.203(d). Thus, as [726]*726posed by the claimant, the issues are restricted to whether there was substantial evidence to uphold the ALJ’s decision pertaining to the rebuttal of the Section 727.-203(a)(4) presumption and whether the AU’s decision should be vacated due to bias by the AU.

The record contains widely disparate medical opinions on the extent of Orange’s disability. Dr. Neal Calhoun examined claimant on July 26, 1976, and noted that he had symptoms of chronic lung disease. He reviewed a chest X-ray taken by Radiology Associates, and he determined that it showed pneumoconiosis, category V2, type q. (The same X-ray was interpreted by Dr. Crowder and Dr. W. Davis in September, 1976, to show category Vi, type q, pneumoconiosis.) Dr. Calhoun also reviewed pulmonary function studies by Dr. Frank Pitzer and staff at Jennie Stuart Memorial Hospital. The tests, on which Orange was noted to have put forth maximal effort, showed a moderately severe reduction in vital capacity, a marked reduction in forced expiratory volume, and a marked reduction in maximal ventilatory volume. Based on these tests, Dr. Calhoun concluded that Orange was a pulmonary cripple. His diagnosis was “[c]oal miner’s pneumoconiosis, far advanced, crippling and disabling the patient 100% for coal mining or similar work.”

Dr. William Anderson examined Orange on August 22, 1976, and interpreted an X-ray as indicating pneumoconiosis, category I. (This X-ray was later re-read as negative by Dr. Marshall.) Dr. Anderson stated that the results of the pulmonary function study were not reportable because Orange was uncooperative.

Dr. Bennett Crowder examined Orange on September 3, 1976, and reported that the anterior/posterior diameter of the chest was increased and the diaphragm appeared to be flattened somewhat. He reviewed an X-ray by Payne, Davis, and Parrott at the Midtown Medical Center in Hopkinsville, and interpreted the X-ray to indicate pneumoconiosis, category 1/1, type q. (This is the same X-ray that Dr. Calhoun interpreted as category 1/2, type q.) Dr. Crowder also reviewed the pulmonary function test performed at Jennie Stuart Memorial Hospital. ■ Except for the fact that breath sounds were absent in the lower two-thirds of the chest, the test results indicated a severe pulmonary impairment not anticipated by interpretation of the X-ray or the physical examination. His final impression' was 100 per cent disability from coal mining or similar work due to coal miner’s pneumoconiosis.

Dr. Ballard Wright examined claimant’s case on October 18, 1976, but the physical examination was conducted by Dr. D.C. Hagg. Dr. Hagg noted that Orange was barrel chested with decreased breath sounds over all areas. His impression was emphysema. Dr. Wright interpreted the X-ray as negative but noted that the resting blood gas analysis indicated mild hypoxemia. He also commented that the patient did not give optimal cooperation on the pulmonary function studies. His final diagnostic impression was negative for pneumoconiosis and emphysema.

Dr. Thomas Gallo examined claimant on March 29, 1977, and noted that his neck was without venous distention or cervical adenopathy and the chest was clear. Dr. Gallo read an X-ray as negative and an arterial blood gas test as normal.

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Bluebook (online)
786 F.2d 724, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/orange-v-island-creek-coal-co-ca6-1986.