Consolidation Coal Co. v. Kramer

305 F.3d 203, 2002 WL 31111838
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Third Circuit
DecidedSeptember 24, 2002
Docket01-4398
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 305 F.3d 203 (Consolidation Coal Co. v. Kramer) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Consolidation Coal Co. v. Kramer, 305 F.3d 203, 2002 WL 31111838 (3d Cir. 2002).

Opinion

BECKER, Chief Judge.

Consolidation Coal Company (“Consolidation”) petitions for review of a determination of the United States Department of Labor Benefits Review Board (the “Board”) that occupational pneumoconiosis hastened the death of Claimant Beatrice J. Kramer’s deceased spouse, Marion W. Kramer (“Kramer”), who also suffered from metastasized colon cancer. Because we conclude that the Board’s October 10, 2001 Decision and Order affirming the award to Claimant of survivor’s benefits pursuant to Title IV of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, as amended, 30 U.S.C. §§ 901 et seq. (the “Act”) was supported by substantial evidence, including the competent opinion of the examining forensic pathologist, and was in accordance with the law, the petition will be denied.

I.

Kramer had more than thirty-three years of coal mine employment, and the parties have stipulated that he suffered from occupational black lung disease, a *205 form of pneumoconiosis. 1 . During his lifetime, Kramer’s claims for benefits were denied because testing conducted by Consolidation’s examining physicians did not establish that Kramer was “totally disabled” by a respiratory or pulmonary impairment, as required for lifetime benefits. See 30 U.S.C. §§ 901 et seq.

The Act and its implementing regulations provide compensation and -other benefits to living coal miners and their dependents where the miner is totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis, and to miners’ surviving dependents where death is due to pneumoconiosis. For purposes of the Act, death is considered due to pneu-moconiosis if the disease was a “substantially contributing cause or factor” leading to death. 20 C.F.R. § 718.205(c). This term has been held to encompass situations in which pneumoconiosis “actually hastened” the miner’s death. See, e.g., Shuff v. Cedar Coal Co., 967 F.2d 977, 980 (4th Cir.1992); Lukosevicz v. Director, OWCP, 888 F.2d 1001, 1004 (3d Cir.1989) (stating that the test is whether the black lung disease “even briefly” hastened the miner’s death). 2

At the time of his initial application for lifetime benefits in 1991, Kramer testified that shortness of breath interfered with his ability to continue employment, prompting his early retirement at age 55, and Kramer’s internist was of the opinion that Kramer was disabled by pneumoconi-osis. The administrative law judge’s (the “ALJ”) 1992 decision concluded that Kramer’s alleged shortness of breath was not totally disabling, based on testing performed by Consolidation’s physician, Dr. Gregory Fino, whose diagnosis included pneumoconiosis. See September 14, 2000 Decision and Order Granting Benefits at 7. ■ The last of Kramer’s non-qualifying pulmonary function and blood gas studies was administered in 1996, when,Kramer filed a duplicate claim, approximately, two-and-one-half years prior to his death. 3 Shortly thereafter, Kramer was diagnosed with cancer of the colon, which metastasized to his liver and then to his lungs.

Following Kramer’s death in October, 1998, Dr. Cyril Wecht (“Wecht”) conducted an autopsy, ’ reviewed Kramer’s medical records, and concluded that Kramer died due to adenocarcinoma of the sigmoid colon with multiple metastases. Wecht also concluded that Kramer’s “moderately severe pneumoconiosis” was a substantial contributing factor to his death in that the presence of this secondary disease process further compromised Kramer’s respiratory function and added to his cardiovascular burden. Wecht explained that, were it not for the pneumoconiosis, Kramer’s non-cancerous lung tissue would have been better able to maintain normal blood gas exchange, allowing Kramer to compensate for a longer time for the respiratory burden caused by the lung tumors. Kramer’s treating surgeon, Dr. Michael Reilly (“Reilly”), concurred in the conclusion that *206 pneumoconiosis hastened death, noting that as a result of this condition Kramer’s lung tissue was less capable of maintaining oxygenation and C02 exchange than it otherwise would have been, so that Kramer could tolerate and compensate for less “tumor load” than an individual with otherwise healthy lung tissue.

In the original hearing on Claimant’s request for survivor’s benefits, Consolidation submitted to the ALJ the medical opinions of its own pathologists, Drs. Jerome Kleinerman, Joseph Tomashefski, and Richard Naeye, and that of a pulmonary disease specialist, Dr. Gregory Fino. 4 Each of Consolidation’s experts concluded that Kramer’s pneumoconiosis did not hasten death. As a basis for this conclusion each expert cited the absence of clinically significant lung dysfunction during Kramer’s lifetime and the premise that Kramer’s pneumoconiosis was a non-progressive disease, ie., one that does not worsen after a miner leaves employment.

In the Decision and Order Granting Benefits, the ALJ concluded that Kramer’s pneumoconiosis hastened, and was therefore a substantially contributing factor in, Kramer’s death, pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 718.205(c)(2). 5 In so holding, the ALJ discussed the medical evidence in great detail and declined to accept the lifetime studies as dispositive. Rather, the ALJ focused on the evidence of Kramer’s pulmonary condition near the time of death. In addition, he expressly accorded less weight to Consolidation’s experts because of the import they affixed to the lifetime studies. 6 On appeal to the Board, Consolidated contended, as it does before this Court, that the ALJ erred in his weighing of the medical evidence and substituted his own judgment for that of the medical experts. The Board rejected these contentions in toto and affirmed Claimant’s entitlement to survivor’s benefits. We have appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 410(a).

II.

The determinations of the Benefits Review Board are reviewed only “for error of law and to assure ... that it has properly adhered to its scope of review.” Walker v. Universal Terminal and Stevedoring Corp., 645 F.2d 170, 172 (3d Cir.1981). The decision of the administrative law judge must be affirmed by the Board if it is supported by substantial evidence and is in accordance with the law. See 33 U.S.C.

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Consolidation Coal Company v. Kramer
305 F.3d 203 (Third Circuit, 2002)

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305 F.3d 203, 2002 WL 31111838, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/consolidation-coal-co-v-kramer-ca3-2002.