ALMA WILSON, Justice.
This appeal involves an administrative order of the Oklahoma Water Resources Board [Board]. The Board approved the application of Mobil Oil Corporation [Mobil] to withdraw fresh ground water for secondary and tertiary waterflood operations in Texas County, Oklahoma. The District Court of Texas County partially reversed the Board’s order. This appeal resulted.
Mobil filed its application with the Board on February 13, 1979. Mobil requested a temporary permit to withdraw 6375.03 acre-feet of fresh ground water annually during the projected 20-year life of its oil and gas recovery project. The leased water rights covered 3,442 acres overlying the Ogallala Aquifer in Texas County, Oklahoma. The proposed place of use covered a total surface area of 24,540 acres in Texas County. Mobil estimated that it would withdraw annually an average of .744 acre-feet of fresh ground water per acre of leased ground water rights; maximum use would occur in 1993 when 1.852 acre-feet of fresh ground water would be withdrawn; minimum use would occur in 1998 when .209 acre-feet of fresh ground water would be withdrawn.
An administrative hearing was held on August 16, 1979. The Texas County Irrigation and Water Resources Association [Association] and three adjacent landowners protested Mobil’s application. The Board ruled that Mobil had complied with all applicable statutory and administrative prerequisites and issued a temporary permit for a term of 20 years. The temporary permit was subject to automatic annual revalidation by the Board.
The Association sought judicial review of the Board’s administrative ruling in the District Court of Texas County. The Association urged, inter alia, that the use of fresh ground water for secondary and tertiary oil recovery constitutes waste because the water is not continued in the natural cycle, but is polluted and lost permanently. The District Court did not view the use of fresh ground water by Mobil in secondary or tertiary oil recovery to be waste under the law. The District Court also conceded that Mobil’s proposed use is a beneficial one. The District Court, however, further determined that Mobil’s proposed use of fresh ground water off the lands from [41]*41which it is produced constitutes an unreasonable use of water from a critical ground water source. Thus, the District Court affirmed the Board’s issuance of the permit, but reversed the Board’s decision insofar as it permitted Mobil to transport fresh ground, water off the premises from which it is withdrawn.
The Board and Mobil prosecuted this appeal from the order of the District Court. These appellants maintain that under the facts of this case the District Court erred as a matter of law in not affirming, in total, the Board’s administrative order. The Oklahoma Municipal League [League] and Oklahoma Gas and Electric Company [OG & E] petitioned this Court for leave to file briefs amicus curiae in this appeal. The League and OG & E take no position on the question of whether or not the Board, under the facts of this particular case, erred in issuing a permit to Mobil. These amicus curiae present the following substantive issues to this Court for resolution:
(1) Is a concept of conflicting beneficial uses in a critical ground water area recognized under current Oklahoma ground water law?
(2) May percolating water be used off the lands from which it is produced under current Oklahoma ground water law?
I
In 1972, our Legislature revised Oklahoma’s statutory system for regulating the use of ground water. See Laws 1972 c. 248, § 1, et seq., now 82 O.S.1981, § 1020.1 et seq. Prior to the 1972 enactment, the 1949 Ground Water Law, as amended at 82 O.S.1971, § 1001-1019, was in effect. The 1949 Act envisioned a sys-tern of conservation in which only the safe annual yield of a basin as measured by its average annual recharge would be permitted to be withdrawn. Accordingly, the 1949 Act recognized the concept of a “critical ground water area”.1 Under the 1972 revisions, however, the Legislature adopted a policy of utilization of water as opposed to the prior use conservation policy. The declaration of policy of the 1972 Ground Water Act, 82 O.S.1981, § 1020.2, expressly provides:
“It is hereby declared to be the public policy of this state, in the interest of the agricultural stability, domestic, municipal, industrial, and other beneficial uses, general economy, health and welfare of the state and its citizens, to utilize the ground water resources of the state, and for that purpose to provide reasonable regulations for the allocation for reasonable use based on hydrologic surveys of fresh ground water basins to determine a restriction on the production based upon the acres overlying the ground water basin or subbasin. The provisions of this act shall not apply to the taking, using or disposal of salt water associated with the exploration, production or recovery of oil and gas or the taking, using or disposal of water trapped in producing mines.”2 (Emphasis added)
As reflected in the above declaration of policy, use regulation and management is contemplated as the means of restricting production of water. The 1972 Act thus contains no provisions for the designation of a “critical ground water area”. Rather, apportionment for reasonable use is the standard. Pursuant to this standard, beyond prior existing water rights, the right to withdraw ground water for non-domestic use is apportioned based [42]*42on the maximum annual yield of the basin. The maximum annual yield is measured on a minimum basin life of 20 years, and the amount of land overlying the basin or sub-basin.3 Consequently, whereas under the 1949 Act a permit for the extraction of water could not be issued if the Water Resources Board found that such use would result in depletion above the average annual rate of recharge; under the 1972 Act a regular permit to use water allocates to the applicant for beneficial use a proportionate share of the maximum annual yield of the basin. Since the proportionate share of the maximum annual yield of the basin equals the percentage of land owned or leased by the applicant (as compared to the total acreage of the basin), the use of non-use by one landowner neither decreases nor increases the proportionate share of another. Moreover, in addition to not recognizing “critical ground water areas”, the 1972 Act neither recognizes nor mentions preferences between beneficial uses. The concept of conflicting beneficial uses in a critical ground water area has no application in the current ground water law.
II
The policy and statutory scheme for regulating the use of ground water set forth above do not embrace a prohibition against the use of fresh ground water off the premises from which it is withdrawn. Indeed, the 1972 Act indicates an intention by the Legislature to allow the use of duly allocated ground water at a distance from the land from which the water is produced so long as current use regulations, including waste prohibition, are satisfied. This intention is evidenced by Section 1020.8 which provides that an application contain among other things, “the places of taking and use” (emphasis added), as well as Section 1020.15 which prohibits waste by “[t]ransporting fresh ground water from a well to the place of use in such a manner that there is an excessive loss in transit.”
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ALMA WILSON, Justice.
This appeal involves an administrative order of the Oklahoma Water Resources Board [Board]. The Board approved the application of Mobil Oil Corporation [Mobil] to withdraw fresh ground water for secondary and tertiary waterflood operations in Texas County, Oklahoma. The District Court of Texas County partially reversed the Board’s order. This appeal resulted.
Mobil filed its application with the Board on February 13, 1979. Mobil requested a temporary permit to withdraw 6375.03 acre-feet of fresh ground water annually during the projected 20-year life of its oil and gas recovery project. The leased water rights covered 3,442 acres overlying the Ogallala Aquifer in Texas County, Oklahoma. The proposed place of use covered a total surface area of 24,540 acres in Texas County. Mobil estimated that it would withdraw annually an average of .744 acre-feet of fresh ground water per acre of leased ground water rights; maximum use would occur in 1993 when 1.852 acre-feet of fresh ground water would be withdrawn; minimum use would occur in 1998 when .209 acre-feet of fresh ground water would be withdrawn.
An administrative hearing was held on August 16, 1979. The Texas County Irrigation and Water Resources Association [Association] and three adjacent landowners protested Mobil’s application. The Board ruled that Mobil had complied with all applicable statutory and administrative prerequisites and issued a temporary permit for a term of 20 years. The temporary permit was subject to automatic annual revalidation by the Board.
The Association sought judicial review of the Board’s administrative ruling in the District Court of Texas County. The Association urged, inter alia, that the use of fresh ground water for secondary and tertiary oil recovery constitutes waste because the water is not continued in the natural cycle, but is polluted and lost permanently. The District Court did not view the use of fresh ground water by Mobil in secondary or tertiary oil recovery to be waste under the law. The District Court also conceded that Mobil’s proposed use is a beneficial one. The District Court, however, further determined that Mobil’s proposed use of fresh ground water off the lands from [41]*41which it is produced constitutes an unreasonable use of water from a critical ground water source. Thus, the District Court affirmed the Board’s issuance of the permit, but reversed the Board’s decision insofar as it permitted Mobil to transport fresh ground, water off the premises from which it is withdrawn.
The Board and Mobil prosecuted this appeal from the order of the District Court. These appellants maintain that under the facts of this case the District Court erred as a matter of law in not affirming, in total, the Board’s administrative order. The Oklahoma Municipal League [League] and Oklahoma Gas and Electric Company [OG & E] petitioned this Court for leave to file briefs amicus curiae in this appeal. The League and OG & E take no position on the question of whether or not the Board, under the facts of this particular case, erred in issuing a permit to Mobil. These amicus curiae present the following substantive issues to this Court for resolution:
(1) Is a concept of conflicting beneficial uses in a critical ground water area recognized under current Oklahoma ground water law?
(2) May percolating water be used off the lands from which it is produced under current Oklahoma ground water law?
I
In 1972, our Legislature revised Oklahoma’s statutory system for regulating the use of ground water. See Laws 1972 c. 248, § 1, et seq., now 82 O.S.1981, § 1020.1 et seq. Prior to the 1972 enactment, the 1949 Ground Water Law, as amended at 82 O.S.1971, § 1001-1019, was in effect. The 1949 Act envisioned a sys-tern of conservation in which only the safe annual yield of a basin as measured by its average annual recharge would be permitted to be withdrawn. Accordingly, the 1949 Act recognized the concept of a “critical ground water area”.1 Under the 1972 revisions, however, the Legislature adopted a policy of utilization of water as opposed to the prior use conservation policy. The declaration of policy of the 1972 Ground Water Act, 82 O.S.1981, § 1020.2, expressly provides:
“It is hereby declared to be the public policy of this state, in the interest of the agricultural stability, domestic, municipal, industrial, and other beneficial uses, general economy, health and welfare of the state and its citizens, to utilize the ground water resources of the state, and for that purpose to provide reasonable regulations for the allocation for reasonable use based on hydrologic surveys of fresh ground water basins to determine a restriction on the production based upon the acres overlying the ground water basin or subbasin. The provisions of this act shall not apply to the taking, using or disposal of salt water associated with the exploration, production or recovery of oil and gas or the taking, using or disposal of water trapped in producing mines.”2 (Emphasis added)
As reflected in the above declaration of policy, use regulation and management is contemplated as the means of restricting production of water. The 1972 Act thus contains no provisions for the designation of a “critical ground water area”. Rather, apportionment for reasonable use is the standard. Pursuant to this standard, beyond prior existing water rights, the right to withdraw ground water for non-domestic use is apportioned based [42]*42on the maximum annual yield of the basin. The maximum annual yield is measured on a minimum basin life of 20 years, and the amount of land overlying the basin or sub-basin.3 Consequently, whereas under the 1949 Act a permit for the extraction of water could not be issued if the Water Resources Board found that such use would result in depletion above the average annual rate of recharge; under the 1972 Act a regular permit to use water allocates to the applicant for beneficial use a proportionate share of the maximum annual yield of the basin. Since the proportionate share of the maximum annual yield of the basin equals the percentage of land owned or leased by the applicant (as compared to the total acreage of the basin), the use of non-use by one landowner neither decreases nor increases the proportionate share of another. Moreover, in addition to not recognizing “critical ground water areas”, the 1972 Act neither recognizes nor mentions preferences between beneficial uses. The concept of conflicting beneficial uses in a critical ground water area has no application in the current ground water law.
II
The policy and statutory scheme for regulating the use of ground water set forth above do not embrace a prohibition against the use of fresh ground water off the premises from which it is withdrawn. Indeed, the 1972 Act indicates an intention by the Legislature to allow the use of duly allocated ground water at a distance from the land from which the water is produced so long as current use regulations, including waste prohibition, are satisfied. This intention is evidenced by Section 1020.8 which provides that an application contain among other things, “the places of taking and use” (emphasis added), as well as Section 1020.15 which prohibits waste by “[t]ransporting fresh ground water from a well to the place of use in such a manner that there is an excessive loss in transit.”
Significantly, the only substantive limitation on use per se, whether on or off the place of origin, is that it be a reasonable use. In this context, Section 1020.2, discussed supra, provides:
“It is hereby declared to be the public policy of this state, ... to utilize the ground water resources of the state, and for that purpose to provide reasonable regulations for the allocation for reasonable use based on hydrologic surveys of fresh ground water basins to determine a restriction on the production, based on the acres overlying the ground water basin or subbasin.... (Emphasis added).
Regulations for the allocation of ground water for reasonable use are codified at 82 O.S.1981, § 1020.9, which provides:
“At the hearing, the Board shall determine from the evidence presented by the parties interested, from the hydrologic surveys and from other relevant data available to the Board and applicant, whether the lands owned or leased by the applicant overlie the fresh groundwater basin or subbasin and whether the use to which the applicant intends to put the water is a beneficial vise. If so, and if the Board finds that waste will not occur, the Board shall approve the application by issuing a regular permit. ...” (Emphasis added).
We conclude that movement of fresh ground water off the producing premises is not precluded by the limitation of reasonable use so long as use regulations now codified in the 1972 Oklahoma Ground Water Law, 82 O.S.1981, § 1020.1, et seq., [43]*43have been properly adjudicated and the evidence establishes that the applicant is in compliance therewith.
Ill
In their petitions-in-error, Mobil and the Board include the following propositions as error under the facts of the present case:
“The District Court was in error when it determined that Mobil’s off the premises use under authority of permit granted by Oklahoma Water Resources Board was an unreasonable use and the Oklahoma Water Resources Board exceeded its authority in approving and granting Mobil its permit.”
“The District Court was in error when it failed to affirm the Oklahoma Water Resources Board’s Order in its entirety as being in conformity with the law and regulations.”
“That the trial court’s finding, conclusion and determination that the issue before the Court was whether appellant applied “the law of reasonable use" as relates to a ground water use from a “critical ground water area” and as relates to the permit granted by appellant to defendant Mobil, was contrary to relevant law and applicable Oklahoma Ground Water Law.”
“That the trial court’s finding, conclusion and determination that defendant Mobil’s [off the premises] use under authority of permit granted by appellant was an unreasonable use and that appellant exceeded its authority in approving and granting defendant its permit, was error and contrary to relevant and applicable Oklahoma Ground Water Law.”
“That the trial court erred under applicable law and under the record of the proceedings before it in not affirming, in total, appellant’s administrative Order and ruling appealed in the action below and in not denying, in total, the relief prayed for by appellee (plaintiffs below) in the proceedings below.” [Emphasis added].
A determination of these propositions of error necessarily requires a review of the record of the administrative hearing conducted by the Board.4 It is urged that the trial court erred under relevant and applicable Oklahoma Ground Water Law in finding Mobil’s off the premises use unreasonable in this case. Whether Mobil has complied with the use regulations of the current ground water law, such that its proposed movement of water off the producing premises is not precluded by the limitation of reasonable use is dependent upon the evidence in the record.
Under the current ground water law of this state, prior to the approval of Mobil’s application for allocation of fresh ground water, it was incumbent upon Mobil to present evidence that the intended use was reasonable by establishing: (1) it owns or leases lands overlying the Ogallala formation; (2) that its intended use is a beneficial use; and, (3) that waste will not occur. See, 82 O.S.1981, § 1020.9, supra.
Mobil objects to our consideration of the third element, above, on the ground that the question of waste was not presented by cross-appeal. Obviously, the issue of the use and control of fresh water is one publici juris, and of immediate local, national, and international concern.5 This Court may, in its discretion consider a public-law issue upon a theory not presented to the trial court, unfettered by the form of redress sought.6 However, in the present [44]*44case, we note that a finding that waste will not occur is an integral part of the “relevant and applicable Oklahoma Ground Water Law” urged by Mobil on appeal to challenge the trial court’s refusal to affirm the administrative order in its entirety and deny any relief to the Association. Hence, it is unnecessary to exercise our discretion (enlarge the issues) in this matter as Mobil has effectively petitioned this Court to apply the current ground water law to the proceedings in the record to determine the correctness of the administrative order.
The record of the administrative hearing shows that Mobil held valid ground water leases covering 3,442 acres overlying the Ogallala fresh water basin. Likewise, Mobil’s intended use of the fresh water in secondary or tertiary oil recovery falls within the enumerated beneficial uses provided by the declaration of policy: “.... agricultural, domestic, municipal, industrial and other beneficial uses_” 82 O.S. 1981, § 1020.2; and, Water Resources Board Rule 125.1, which states:
“Beneficial use of the use of such quantity of stream or ground water when reasonable intelligence and reasonable diligence are exercised in its application for a lawful purpose and is economically necessary for that purpose. Beneficial uses include but are not limited to municipal, industrial, agricultural, irrigation, recreation, fish and wildlife, etc.”
The Board’s order, however, does not contain essential findings of fact to support a finding that waste will not occur in the process of tertiary oil recovery.7 The concepts of beneficial and non-wasteful use are not identical as urged by the Board. The appropriate definition of waste is found in the Board’s own Rules and Regulations: 8
WASTE OR WASTE OF WATER means any act permitting or causing the pollution of fresh water or the use of such water in an inefficient manner or any manner that is not beneficial and is further defined in 82 O.S.Supp.1972, § 1020.15. (Emphasis ours).
Waste by pollution, as above enumerated, is expressly defined by the pollution laws of this state, 82 O.S.1981, §§ 926.1, 932.-1(d), which also apply to underground water. Section 926.1 defines pollutions as follows:
Pollution means contamination or other alteration of the physical, chemical or biological properties of any natural waters of the State or such discharge of any liquid, gaseous, or solid substance into any waters of the State as will or is likely to create a nuisance or render such waters harmful or detrimental or injurious to public health, safety, or welfare, or to domestic, commercial industrial, agricultural, recreational, or other legitimate beneficial uses, or to livestock, wild animals, birds, fish, or other aquatic life.
While this Court has held that use of fresh ground water for secondary oil recovery is not “waste per se”, we have not previously addressed the same issue with respect to use of fresh water for tertiary recovery. In Texas County Irrigation v. Cities Ser. Oil Co., 570 P.2d 49 (Okl.1977), we stated “these views (that use of fresh water for secondary oil recovery is not waste per se) do not mean fresh ground water use in a water flood secondary oil recovery program under any circumstance may not constitute waste. That is an administrative decision for the Board after individual proceedings before the agency where probative evidence may be admitted and given effect.” We today adopt this view with respect to tertiary oil recovery.
In this case involving secondary and tertiary oil recovery, the Board made a [45]*45general finding that Mobil’s operations would not result in waste:
“5. The Board further finds and determines based upon the testimony, exhibits and evidence presented, that applicant’s intended use of the fresh ground water subject of this application is for secondary and tertiary oil recovery; that such intended use is and constitutes, under the facts presented and as contemplated under the laws of the State of Oklahoma and rules and regulations of the Board, a beneficial use of ground water; and further, under the evidence presented and as contemplated by law, waste, by virtue of applicant’s intended use, will not occur. With regard to this finding and determination, the Board acknowledges the variously related concerns and objections of protestants, the same said concerns and objections being generally that the granting of the subject application would result in waste. Respecting these objections and concerns, the Board finds and determines that such objections are not supported nor sustained by, and are contrary to, the reliable, competent, and substantial evidence presented herein, the same being as reflected by the testimony and all exhibits presented, and such objections cannot therefore be sustained.”
However, the specific probative evidence upon which the Board presumably based its general conclusion that waste — waste by pollution, as well as waste by depletion— will not occur, is not included in the order. Mere recitation that the Board finds that waste will not occur is insufficient. A finding of no waste must be supported by evidence in the record.
The evidence, as reflected by the testimony and exhibits of the administrative hearing, establishes indisputably that the tertiary process proposed by Mobil is one in which detergent additives and polymers will be mixed with the fresh water to reduce the water’s surface tension so that more oil can be recovered from the formation. Mobil, nevertheless, presented absolutely no evidence identifying these specific chemical additives; or whether these unidentified chemical additives were harmful or harmless; or whether the water contaminated by these unidentified chemical additives could possibly later be reclaimed through treatment. Mobil’s representatives stated only that the contaminated water would be disposed of “somehow”.
Further, the record of the administrative hearing shows Mobil presently has no program to monitor on a regular basis the drop in the Ogallala water level, resulting from Mobil’s mining activities. Furthermore, the record plainly shows that Mobil failed to sufficiently comply with Rule 820.1 of the Oklahoma Water Resources Board’s Rules, Regulations and Modes of Procedure. This rule requires an applicant, in addition to meeting all the other requirements in applying for a permit to use fresh ground water, to submit to the Board:
(c) “An economic study containing the following information:
(1) A detailed analysis of the relative cost of obtaining salt water and any other feasible alternative versus the relative cost of obtaining fresh water,
(2) Total project costs and the amount of oil or gas expected to be recovered and the value expected to be realized,
(8) The estimated value of fresh water for other purposes (purposes or uses common to the area or vicinity subject of the application) as measured against the overall estimated value of the oil or gas to be recovered,
(4) The additional expense per barrel recovered if the applicant is required to use or treat salt water instead of fresh water in the recovery process, and
(5) An evaluation of other recovery methods or alternatives considered and why recovery requiring the use of fresh water was deemed to be necessary or the most feasible.”
The only cost comparison presented by Mobil was that of oil recovery as measured against irrigation of certain agricultural crops. Comparative estimates of other types of existing beneficial uses were not [46]*46submitted. Additionally, no accounting figures were offered with regard to the cost and possible feasibility of utilizing treated salt water for tertiary recovery, rather than fresh water. The evidence did indicate, however, that fresh water once used in the tertiary process cannot be used again.
Inasmuch as it is the duty of the Board to protect against waste of ground water by depletion, as well as waste of ground water by pollution, a consideration by the Board of waste in this context is mandatory. In this regard, 82 O.S.1981, § 1020.15(3), is instructive:
“The Board shall not permit any fresh ground water user to commit waste by ... taking any fresh ground water in any manner so that the water is lost for beneficial use.”
Finally, we note that Mobil’s 20-year “temporary” permit was granted prior to a determination of the maximum annual yield of the Ogallala formation. Nevertheless, according to Water Resources Board Rule 840.4, (adopted 4-12-79), Mobil is entitled to annual automatic revalidation of this permit based solely upon a statement of rate of consumption, without reference to any objective standard of reasonable usage. Rule 840.4 provides:
“840.4 ANNUAL REVALIDATION AND EXPIRATION OF TEMPORARY GROUND WATER PERMITS: A temporary ground water permit must be revali-dated annually during its term. Water use report forms will be mailed in January to each temporary permit holder. Return of the completed, signed, and dated water use report form to the Board within thirty (SO) days of receipt will automatically revalidate a temporary ground water permit whose revali-dation is not protested. If revalidation is protested, the temporary permit will not be automatically revalidated but will be submitted to the Board for consideration. The temporary permit shall lapse at expiration of its term, revocation, cancellation, suspension, or upon the issuance of a regular permit, whichever shall occur first.” (Emphasis ours.)
The rule, above, thus effectively repeals, by administrative fiat, the substantive legislatively prescribed safeguards which distinguish between a regular and temporary permit. These statutory safeguards are expressly provided by 82 O.S.1981, § 1020.-11(A) and (B):
“A. Regular Permit. A regular permit is an authorization to put groundwater to beneficial use for other than domestic purposes. The regular permit shall be granted only after completion of the hydrologic survey and determination of the maximum annual yield for the appropriate basin or subbasin. It can be revoked or cancelled only as provided by Sections 1020.12 and 1020.15 of this title. (Emphasis added.)
B. Temporary Permit. A temporary permit is an authorization for the same purposes as a regular permit but granted by the Board prior to completion of the hydrologic survey and the determination of the maximum annual yield of the basin or subbasin. Unless requested by a majority of owners of the land, the water allocated by a temporary permit shall not be less than two (2) acre-feet annually for each acre of land owned or leased by the applicant in the basin or subbasin; provided, however, if the applicant presents clear and convincing evidence that allocation in excess of two (2) acre-feet annually for each acre of land overlying the basin or subbasin will not exhaust the water thereunder in less than twenty (20) years, then the Board may issue temporary permits in such basin or subbasin in such amounts in excess of said limitation as will assure a minimum twenty-year life for such basin or subbasin. A temporary permit must be revalidated annually during its term. The permit shall lapse at expiration of its term or upon the issuance of a regular permit, whichever shall occur first. It is subject to revocation or cancellation as provided in Sections 1020.12 and 1020.15 of this title.” (Emphasis added.)
[47]*47Clearly, the sole statutory protection against excessive depletion of ground water resources upon which a temporary permit is conditioned is an annual review of the original temporary authorization. In conformity with Legislative intent that allocation of ground water resources be based upon reasonable regulations,9 the holder of a temporary permit must, therefore, annually substantiate the legal foundation of its original temporary permit. The term “re-validate” in this context necessarily possesses an element of legal strength and force, and inconsistent positions have no such force. Consequently, the requirements provided in 82 O.S.1981, § 1020.9, supra, are equally applicable to the revali-dation process. Accordingly, an applicant for revalidation must re-establish (1) that the lands owned or leased by the applicant overlie the fresh ground water basin or subbasin; (2) that the use is a beneficial use; and, (3) that waste (by depletion or pollution) will not occur. Otherwise, in the absence of protest, the routine granting of temporary permits becomes tantamount to the ex parte issuance of a regular permit and the requirements of hydrologic surveys and the determination of annual yields become meaningless.
In the case of Lowrey v. Hodges, 555 P.2d 1016 (Okl.1976), we held that “[a] temporary permit is not tantamount to a regular permit in that the statute provides it must be revalidated annually.” (emphasis added.) Automatic revalidation is directly inconsistent with the position taken by this Court in Lowrey that “[i]t [a temporary permit] is thus subject to review on a yearly basis and possible nonrenewal”, (emphasis added.), and ignores the statutory mandate to the Board to provide reasonable regulations for the allocation for reasonable use of fresh ground water resources. See, 82 O.S.1981, § 1020.2, supra. Also, see, Adams v. Professional Practice Comm’n, 524 P.2d 932 (Okl.1974), which holds that an administrative agency may not under the guise of its rule making power act contrary to the statute which is the source of its authority. Water Resources Board Rule 840.4, supra, does not conform with the authorizing statute and is therefore without force.
Inasmuch as it is deemed essential to a proper disposition of the issues presented by Mobil under the facts of this case, we remand this matter to the Water Resources Board for the taking and consideration of further evidence consistent with the dictates of this opinion.10 Upon rehearing, the Water Resources Board is instructed to receive evidence and make essential findings of fact to determine whether waste by pollution, as well as waste by depletion, will not occur. The Board is further instructed to have further hearing on the hydrological survey and determination of the maximum annual yield of the Ogallala fresh water basin. Further, the Board before issuing permits for use of fresh ground water for tertiary recovery should do so only with the benefit of rules and regulations tailored to focus inquiry upon the pertinent issues peculiar to the tertiary process.
This Court recognizes the practical problem of allocating proportionate use of ground water without the important determination of a realistic maximum annual yield and the present status of recharge and discharge of the water basin. However, the Board’s issuance of a permit must meet all statutory requirements, including, [48]*48“allocation for reasonable use” and “restriction of the production” based upon information provided by hydrologic survey. We interpret inquiry into these matters to be legally necessary and reasonable in order that the water resources of our state may be utilized responsibly.
The decisions below are REVERSED, and this matter is hereby REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS to the Water Resources Board.
HODGES, DOOLIN and OPALA, JJ., concur.
KAUGER, J., concurs specially.
BARNES, C.J., LAVENDER and HAR-GRAVE, JJ., and ROBINSON, S.J. (appointed in place of SIMMS, V.C.J. who disqualified), concur in part, dissent in part.