In Re Initiative Petition No. 315, State Question No. 553

649 P.2d 545, 1982 Okla. LEXIS 251

• Court: Supreme Court of Oklahoma
• Decided: May 20, 1982
• Docket: 56115
• Status: Published

Opinions

HODGES, Justice.

The validity of the petition, sufficiency of subscribed signatures, and length of the circulation period of the Horse Racing Petition, Initiative Petition No. 315, State Question No. 553, have been challenged. The proceeding was ordered bifurcated by this Court to determine the validity of the petition before conducting an evidentiary hearing concerning the number and sufficiency of the signatures.

Four attacks are made on the validity of the petition:

1) The imposition of a tax on gate admissions and a tax on sale of pari-mutuel tickets, proposed by § 7 of the petition,¹ violates the Okla.Const. art. 10 §§ 14, 15, 19, 20, and art. 5 § 55.

2) Section 9 of the petition² which proposes a county option vote violates the Okla.Const. art. 5 § 5.

3) The number of valid signatures is to be determined by the votes cast for the state office of presidential elector at the November 4,1980 election rather than the gubernatorial election held in November of 1978.

4) Proponents circulation of the petition exceeded the ninety-day period prescribed by 34 O.S.Supp.1973 § 8.

I and II

The contestants urge that the unconstitutionality of §§ 7 and 9 renders the petition invalid. No assertion is made that any of the procedural steps before submission of the petition violate the constitution.³ The assault on the constitutionality of §§ 7 and 9 of the petition is initially countered by the defense that question is premature.

Until In re Supreme Court Adjudication of Initiative Petitions in Norman, Oklahoma, Numbered 74-1 and 74-2, 534 P.2d 3, 8 (Okl.1975), the constitutionality of the subject matter of a proposed initiative petition was not considered until after the proposition was passed by the voters.⁴ The rule was modified in the Norman Petitions. The court held that under 34 O.S.Supp.1973 § 8, if constitutional questions are raised, the constitutionality of the procedure, form, and subject matter may be considered if the court resolves that the determination could prevent an expensive and unnecessary election.

The quintessential question is whether a determination of the constitutionality of the subject matter of §§ 7 and 9 could prevent a costly and useless election. We find that it could. Because the provisions of §§ 7 and 9 appear to be integral parts of the petition, we do not view them as severable. We, therefore, will answer the constitutional challenges to the subject matter of §§ 7 and 9.

The validity of the attempted imposition of a tax on admission tickets is challenged by contestants urging that it is an attempt by the state to levy a tax for county or city purposes. The tax on proceeds of pari-mu-tuel tickets and allocation to the Oklahoma Horse Racing Commission is attacked alleging it is a tax imposed for private purposes. Both of the proposed taxes is challenged because contestants assert that they do not conform: 1) to the constitutional requirements that their purposes and sums be distinctly specified; and 2) the constitutional procedure for appropriation of money. It is asserted that § 7 violates the Okla.Const. art. 10, §§ 14, 15, 19, 20, and art. 5, § 55. Contestants also contend that § 9 of the petition is infirm because it violates the Okla.Const. art. 5, § 5.⁵ Section 9 provides for an election to permit county option if a petition is filed containing not less than ten percent of the signatures of the qualified voters in the county. The contestants contend that 16% of the legal voters are required to initiate a countywide petition under art. 5, § 5.

Contestants charge that the tax imposed on gate admissions by § 7A violates art. 10, § 20, because it is a tax imposed by the state for county or city purposes.⁶ Proponents counter with the argument that § 7A does not directly impose or levy a tax, nor does it affect the paying out of state funds. Proponents argue that in spite of the express language, “the following taxes are hereby imposed,” no tax imposition or levy is made, because in order for § 7 to become effective in a county, a favorable county option vote must take place pursuant to § 9 of the petition. Pursuant to art. 10, § 20, the state may not levy taxes for local purposes.⁷

In the instant case, however, the tax on gate admissions provided for in § 7A of the petition has no effect even if the petition is adopted by a statewide vote of the people until a favorable county option vote takes place in a particular county. The tax provided by § 7A authorizes a particular county to levy a tax as the result of the favorable county option vote on whether a county will have parimutuel horse racing.

The contestants contend that the “tax" authorized by § 7B of the petition is imposed for private purpose in contravention of the Okla.Const. art. 10, §§ 14, 15.⁸ Contestants urge that because paragraph B of § 7 provides for two-thirds of the “tax” to be retained by the licensee, and one-third as trustee to be distributed as purses, the tax is not for a public purpose within the meaning of art. 10, § 14, and amounts to a gift or donation of public funds to private persons contrary to art. 10, § 15. Proponents refute this assertion by alleging that the term “tax” as used in paragraph B of § 7 is not synonymous with the term “taxes” as used in art. 10, § 14; the two-thirds of the proceeds retained by the licensee are not public funds; and, therefore, art. 10, § 15 is not applicable.

It should be noted that, as is the case of paragraph A of § 7, paragraph B of § 7 does not directly impose the tax upon adoption of the petition. As a practical matter, nothing is imposed under paragraph B unless and until a particular county has a favorable county option vote on the issue of whether to have parimutuel horse racing. No tax is directly imposed by the operation of the terms and provisions of paragraph B of § 7.

From an overall reading of paragraph B of § 7, it is obvious that only one-third of the total proceeds are intended to be paid to the State of Oklahoma general revenue fund. It is obviously the intent of paragraph B to allow the licensee to retain two-thirds of the proceeds: one-third to be held in trust to be distributed as purses for the participating horses; and the other one-third to be used by the licensee as he sees fit. The two-thirds retained by the licensee is in the nature of a charge or a fee rather than of a tax. As such, the two-thirds is not a “tax” within the meaning of art. 10, § 14 and the case authorities construing that section of the constitution.⁹

Paragraph B of § 7 authorizes a pari-mutuel betting fee in an amount not less than four nor more than six percent, which is retained by the licensee who conducts the pari-mutuel betting. The charging of a pari-mutuel betting fee is part of the general practice of pari-mutuel betting.¹⁰ The exercise of the police power of the state, whether by the legislature, or by the people through the statewide initiative process, extends to the prohibition, suppression or regulation of gaming or gambling.¹¹ The police power extends to regulation of minimum and maximum amounts to be charged by a licensee as a pari-mutuel betting fee. This is the effect of paragraph B of § 7 concerning the first one-third of the proceeds, and, as such, it is not a “tax” within the meaning of art. 10, § 14. Likewise, the second one-third of the proceeds referred to in paragraph B, which is held by the licensee as trustee to be distributed as purses for participating horses, is a charge or fee rather than a “tax” within the meaning of art. 10, § 14. The legislative power extends to imposing a charge or fee for distribution as purses as part of the regulation and promotion of pari-mutuel horse racing. The remaining one-third, referred to in paragraph B of § 7, is paid to the State of Oklahoma general revenue fund, and, as such, becomes “public funds” subject to expenditure and appropriation by the legislature. Only this latter one-third of the proceeds referred to in paragraph B are “public funds” within the meaning of art. 10, § 15.¹² Therefore, because the two-thirds are not “taxes” within the meaning of art. 10, § 14 nor “public” or “state” funds within the purview of art. 10, § 15, distribution of the monies in accordance with paragraph B does not contravene the Oklahoma Constitution.

Contestants allege that both paragraphs of § 7 are invalid because the reference to “taxes” does not meet: the constitutional requirements that their purposes and sums be distinctly specified; and the constitutional procedure for appropriation of money. The Okla.Const. art. 10, § 19 provides that every act levying a tax shall “specify distinctly the purpose for which said tax is levied” and that a tax levied and collected for one purpose shall not be devoted to another purpose.¹³

In McGannon v. State, 33 Okl. 145, 124 P. 1063 (1912), it was held that the “purpose” requirement of art. 10, § 19 was intended to apply only to annual recurring taxes imposed generally upon the entire property of the state, and not to a special tax. The McGannon decision was followed in Ex Parte Marler, 140 Okl. 194, 282 P. 353 (1929). Contestants contend that the purpose requirement of art. 10, § 19 is applicable to the “taxes” referred to in § 7 of the petition, citing Meyer v. Lynde-Bowman-Darby Co., 35 Okl. 480, 130 P. 548 (1913). A review of the Myers case indicates that the tax in question was an annual recurring tax as opposed to a special tax. Subsequently, in State ex rel. Bd. of Com’rs. of Harmon County v. Oklahoma Tax Comm., 191 Okl. 155, 127 P.2d 1052 (1942), it was held that the second requirement of § 19, that a tax levied for one purpose shall not be devoted to another purpose, was not limited in its application to only annual recurring taxes such as ad valorem taxes. The opinion in the Harmon County case distinguishes the earlier decision in McGannon on the basis that the decision in McGannon did not deal with the second requirement of § 19 but was limited to the first requirement, that a purpose must be stated.

In this instance, it does not appear that any taxes imposed under the authority of § 7 of the petition would be annually recurring taxes, but, rather, would be in the nature of special taxes. Under the rule set forth in McGannon as explained or distinguished by this Court’s later decision in the Harmon County case, it appears that the purpose requirement of art. 10, § 19 would be inapplicable. Even though the Harmon County case modifies the earlier McGannon decision, the net effect is that an act levying a special tax does not have to set forth a purpose, but if a specific purpose is stated the tax cannot be devoted to any other purpose. Additionally, it should be noted that based upon the previous discussion regarding challenges to § 7 of the petition, premised on art. 10, §§ 14, 15, § 7 does not impose or levy any tax. At most, it is a legislative authorization for taxation if a favorable vote is obtained in a county on the question of pari-mutuel betting.

Contestants argue that the provisions of § 7 contravene the requirements of the Okla.Const. art. 5, § 55,¹⁴ because § 7 fails to distinctly specify the sum of money being appropriated. It is apparent, based on the reasons previously given, that § 7 of the petition does not appropriate public funds, and that art. 5, § 55 is not applicable.

The contestants claim that the county option vote provision, § 9 of the petition, violates the Okla.Const. art. 5, § 5 which requires signatures of 16% of the votes in the county to invoke initiative petition procedures in the county. Contestants cite no case authority in which it has been held that a county option vote such as that provided for in § 9 of the proposed petition amounts to “invocation of the initiative” with the purview of art. 5, § 5. Contestants cite Hughes v. Bryan, 425 P.2d 952 (Okl.1967) which defines the initiative process in the first syllabus as follows:

“Initiative means the power of the people to propose bills and laws, and to enact to reject them at the polls, independent of legislative assembly.. .

Based on this, contestants argue that the county option vote under § 9 of the petition, amounts to the exercise of local legislative power, or law-making function.

The voters of a county could not be means of the county initiative procedures legalize pari-mutuel horse race betting in the absence of statewide legislative action to remove statewide criminal prohibitions. In the absence of either: the legislative repeal of the state statute prohibiting horse race betting; a statewide initiative repealing the state statutory prohibition on horse race betting; the voters of a county have no independent authority or power to enact by means of the initiative process a county ordinance to legalize horse race betting in that county. The county initiative process does not extend to this subject. Until the proposed statewide initiative petition is adopted, legalizing pari-mutuel betting and providing for county option vote, the county has no authority to conduct a county election on the question. Consequently, the county option vote provided in § 9 of the petition does not fall within the definition of the initiative process enunciated in Hughes v. Bryan, supra, because it cannot be acted upon at the county level in the absence of legislative authorization at the state level.¹⁵

Ill

The contestants assert that the number of valid signatures is to be determined by the votes case for the office of presidential elector on November 4, 1980. The official records of the State Election Board reflect that 1,172,303 votes were cast for this office. The requisite number of signatures is 93,784, based on the 1980 election. Proponents contend the number of signatures should be determined by the number of votes cast for the office of Governor at the general election held in November, 1978, which would require' 62,194 valid signatures.

The ultimate question is whether the time of circulation of the petition, September 1, 1980, or the date of filing the petition, December 1, 1980, is the determinative date of the last general election as mandated by the Okla.Const. art. 5, § 2.¹⁶

The Okla.Const. art. 5, § 2 provides that eight percent of the legal voters shall have the right to propose any legislative measure based on the total number of votes cast at the last general election for the state office receiving the highest number of votes. The contestants rely on In re Petition No. 281, 434 P.2d 941 (Okl.1967) in support of the assertion that the November 4, 1980, election is the last general election as defined by art. 5, § 2. In Petition No. 281, the Court held that the constitutional phrase, “the total number of votes cast at the last general election for the State office receiving the highest number of votes at such election,” refers to the last general election which precedes the filing of the petition which contains the required number of signatures. The proponents argue that, pursuant to Shelton v. Lambert, 399 P.2d 467 (Okl.1965), the last general election means the general election preceding the circulation and filing of the petition. Shelton was discussed and distinguished in Petition No. 281. The Court held that, because the parties had stipulated that a certain election was the preceding election, the case was not in point.¹⁷

The proponents assert that Petition No. 281 can be distinguished. They contend: (1) The rule is unworkable because at the time circulation is begun, it would be impossible to determine how many signatures are necessary, and (2) in Petition No. 281 the computation of number of signatures based on the later election resulted in reducing the number of signatures required to place the question on the ballot. We are not persuaded by these arguments. The time of circulation and subsequent filing is within the control of the proponents of the proposal. Any uncertainty can be avoided by scheduling the circulation and filing pri- or to an ensuing general election, or postponing the circulation until after a pending general election. The fact that the use of the rule enunciated in Petition No. 281 results in an increase instead of a reduction is not relevant to the construction of art. 5, § 2.

We find the case of Petition No. 281 is dispositive and that the minimum number of valid signatures required on Petition No. 315 before it may be submitted to a vote of the people is 93,784, which represents eight percent of the votes cast for the office of presidential elector at the general election held on November 4, 1980.

IV

Contestants contend that the circulation period for Petition No. 315 was more than ninety days and, therefore, the petition is invalid on its face.¹⁸ The basis for this contention is that the Attorney General timely approved the ballot title without change; no appeal was possible; and the 90-day period could not be extended.¹⁹ The applicable statute, 34 O.S.Supp. 1975 § 10(A),²⁰ provides that any person who is dissatisfied with the wording of a ballot title may appeal to this Court within ten (10)days after it is filed by the Attorney General with the Secretary of State.

The proponents filed the petition with the Secretary of State, and the ballot title with the Attorney General for precirculation approval on August 18, 1980. The Attorney General approved the ballot title August 21, 1980. After circulation, on December 1, 1980, the petition was filed with the Secretary of State, The proponents rely on § 10(A) for the proposition that the circulation period did not commence until September 1,1980, ten days after the expiration of the appeal time. The basis for this position is that any dissatisfied person had ten days to appeal from the approval of the ballot title. According to the proponents’ calculations, the 90-day period of time expired Saturday, November 29, 1980, and the petition was timely filed on the next business day, Monday, December 1, 1980. We agree.²¹ The 90-day period for circulation does not begin until the proposed title has been reviewed by the Attorney General, the 10-day appeal period has expired, and any appeals timely filed, exhausted.

V

The parties have not raised the issue of the sufficiency of the ballot title, and the general rule precludes consideration of issues which have not been previously raised.²² However, when questions of a general public nature are involved, which affect the state at large, the people of the state become indirect parties and their interests must be protected to prevent a possible “practical injustice” even if the person who might have objected is silent.²³

The ballot title must contain the gist of the proposition in one hundred fifty words or less couched in language which may be easily understood by people not engaged in the practice of law.²⁴ The ballot title submitted to popular vote by the electorate must be neither deceptive nor misleading in order to permit the voters to reach an informed decision.²⁵

It is with these principles in mind that we feel constrained to amend the ballot title. The ballot title provides . .. “for a tax on pari-mutuel wagers; providing for distribution of taxes collected ...” The reference to taxes standing alone may be misleading as explained in Propositions I and II, supra. Paragraph B of § 7 actually refers to both taxes and fees collected, and with this modification the following ballot title is adopted:

Ballot Title

Initiative Petition No. 315

State Question No. 553

THE GIST OF THE PROPOSITION IS AS FOLLOWS:

Shall a statute

CREATING THE OKLAHOMA HORSE RACING COMMISSION; PROVIDING FOR COMPOSITION, APPOINTMENT, TERMS OF OFFICE AND COMPENSATION OF THE COMMISSION; AUTHORIZING PARI-MUTUEL WAGERING ON HORSE RACING; GRANTING THE COMMISSION FULL REGULATORY AUTHORITY OVER HORSE RACING WHERE PARI-MUTUEL WAGERING IS CONDUCTED AND PARIMUTUEL WAGERING THEREON; PROVIDING FOR LICENSING OF RACE TRACKS WHERE PARI-MU-TUEL WAGERING IS CONDUCTED; ESTABLISHING A TAX ON GATE ADMISSIONS AND A TAX AND FEES ON PARI-MUTUEL WAGERS; PROVIDING FOR DISTRIBUTION OF TAXES AND FEES COLLECTED; REQUIRING RECORD KEEPING BY LICENSE HOLDERS; PROVIDING FOR COUNTY OPTION; AND DIRECTING THE LEGISLATURE TO ENACT LAWS GIVING EFFECT TO THE STATUTE,

be adopted by the people?

YES — FOR THE STATUTE

NO —AGAINST THE STATUTE

VI

This matter is referred to a Referee of this Court to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine factual issues which relate to the number and sufficiency of the signatures on the petition.

IRWIN, C. J., BARNES, V. C. J., and LAVENDER, SIMMS, DOOLIN, HAR-GRAVE, JJ., concur. OP ALA, J., concurs in result.

1 .Section 7 of the petition imposes a tax on gate receipts and pari-mutuel tickets:

The following taxes are hereby imposed:

(a) A tax of ten percent (10%) of the amount received by any licensee on tickets for admission to the grounds where such horse races or meetings are held or conducted. All taxes levied herein on admission tickets shall be paid to the city in which the track is located. If a track is not located within the city limits, taxes levied on admission tickets shall be paid to the county in which the track is located.

(b) A tax of not less than twelve percent (12%) or more than eighteen percent (18%) on the proceeds from the sale of pari-mutuel tickets. The tax shall be divided into three equal parts with one-third to be retained by the licensee; one-third held by licensee as trustee to be distributed as purses for participating horses and one-third to be paid by the Commission to the State of Oklahoma general revenue fund. One-third of all taxes levied on pari-mutuel wagers shall be paid to the Commission within a reasonable period of time after the close of each day’s racing program.

2 . Section 9 of the petition relates to county option:

No pari-mutuel racetrack shall be licensed in any county unless the majority of the voters of said county, voting at an election held for that purpose, approve the conducting of pari-mutuel horse racing in said county. An election shall be called upon the filing of a petition with the county election board containing not less than ten percent (10%) of the qualified voters within any such county.

3 . In re Initiative Petition No. 314, State Question No. 550, 625 P.2d 595 (Okl.1980).

4 . Oklahomans for Modem Alcoholic Beverage Controls v. Shelton, 501 P.2d 1089 (Okl.1972); In Re Initiative Petition No. 259, State Question No. 376, 316 P.2d 139 (Okl.1957); In Re Initiative Petitions Nos. 112, 114, 117, 118, 153 Okl. 205, 6 P.2d 703 (1931); McAlister v. State, 96 Okl. 143, 221 P. 779 (1923); Threadgill v. Cross, 26 Okl. 403, 109 P. 558 (1910).

5 . The Okla.Const. art. 5, § 5 provides in pertinent part:

***** The requisite number of petitioners for the invocation of the initiative and referendum in counties and districts shall bear twice, or double, the ratio to the whole number of legal voters in such county or district, as herein provided therefor in the State at large.”

6 . The Okla.Const. art. 10, § 20 provides:

“The Legislature shall not impose taxes for the purpose of any county, city, town, or other municipal corporation, but may, by general laws, confer on the proper authorities thereof, respectively, the power to assess and collect such taxes.”

7 . City of Ardmore v. Excise Bd. of Carter County, 155 Okl. 126, 8 P.2d 2 (1932); Spann v. State, 152 Okl. 60, 3 P.2d 861 (1931).

8 . The Okla.Const. art. 10, §§ 14, 15 provides in pertinent part as follows:

“§ 14 Taxes shall be levied and collected for public purposes only ...”

“§ 15 ... nor shall the state ... make any donation by gift ... by tax or otherwise, to any company, association or corporation.”

9 . Vette v. Childers, 102 Okl. 140, 228 P. 145 (1924); V.F.W. v. Childers, 197 Okl. 331, 171 P.2d 618 (1946).

10 . See, Donovan v. Eastern Racing Assoc., 324 Mass. 393, 86 N.E.2d 903 (1949).

11 .Nelson v. State, 37 Okl.Cr. 90, 256 P. 939 (1927); Prickett v. State, 88 Okl.Cr. 213, 201 P.2d 798 (1949). See also State ex rel. Grimes v. Bd. of Com’rs., 1 P.2d 570, 572 (Nev.1931), wherein it is stated:

“Gaming as a calling or business is in the same class as the selling of intoxicating liquors in respect to deleterious tendencies. The state may regulate or suppress it without interfering with any of those inherent rights of citizenship which it is the object of government to protect and secure.”

12 . V.F.W. v. Childers, supra, note 9; Hawks v. Bland, 156 Okl. 48, 9 P.2d 720 (1932).

13 . The Okla.Const. art. 10, § 19 provides in pertinent part:

“Every act enacted by the Legislature, .. . levying a tax, shall specify distinctly the purpose for which said tax is levied ...”

14 . The Okla.Const. art. 5, § 55 provides in pertinent part:

“No money shall be paid out of the treasury of this state, nor any of its funds, nor any of the funds under its management, except in pursuance of an appropriation by law, ... and every such law making a new appropriation, or continuing or reviving an appropriation, shall distinctly specify the sum appropriated and the object to which it is to be applied.”

15 . For a discussion of the police power of the State encompassing the prohibition, suppression or regulation of gaming, see cases cited in note 11, supra.

16 . It is provided by the Okla.Const. art. 5, § 2: “The first power reserved by the people is the initiative, and eight per centum of the legal voters shall have the right to propose any legislative measure, and fifteen per cen-tum of the legal voters shall have the right to propose amendments to the Constitution by petition, and every such petition shall include the full test of the measure so proposed. The second power is the referendum, and it may be ordered (except as to laws necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, or safety), either by petition signed by five per centum of the legal voters or by the Legislature as other bills are enacted. The ratio and per centum of legal voters hereinbefore stated shall be based upon the total number of votes cast at the last general election for the State office receiving the highest number of votes at such election.”

17 . In In Re Initiative Petition No. 281, 434 P.2d 941, 944 (Okl.1967), the Court said:

“Provision in Section 2 of Article V of the Oklahoma Constitution relating to initiative petition, requiring that in order for the same to be sufficient it must be signed by a number of legal voters equal to at least fifteen per centum of ‘the total number of votes cast at the last general election for the State office receiving the highest number of votes at such election,’ refers to the last general election preceding the filing of such petition which has thereon the requisite number of signatures."

18 . It is provided by 34 O.S.Supp. 1973 § 8 in pertinent part:

“When a citizen or citizens desire to circulate a petition initiating a proposition of any nature, whether to become a statute law or an amendment to the Constitution, or for the purpose of invoking a referendum upon legislative enactments, such citizen or citizens shall, when such petition is prepared, and before the same is circulated or signed by electors, file a true and exact copy of same in the office of the Secretary of State and, within ninety (90) days after such filing of an initiative petition, the signed copies thereof shall be filed with the Secretary of State, but the signed copies of a referendum petition shall be filed with the Secretary of State within ninety (90) days after the adjournment of the Legislature enacting the measure on which the referendum is invoked. The electors shall sign their legally registered name, their address, and the name of the county in which they reside. Any petition not filed in accordance with this provision shall not be considered. When the signed copies of a petition are timely filed, the Supreme Court of the state shall make or cause to be made a physical count of the number of signatures appearing on the petition. Upon the order of the Supreme Court it shall be the duty of the Secretary of State to forthwith cause to be published, in at least one newspaper of general circulation in the state, a notice of such filing and the apparent sufficiency or insufficiency thereof and notice that any citizen or citizens of the state may file a protest to the petition or an objection to the count made by the Supreme Court of the state, by a written notice to the Supreme Court of the state and to the person or persons filing the petition, said protest to be filed within ten (10) days after publication .... ”

19 . The time for the Attorney General’s approval is dictated by 34 O.S.Supp. 1975 § 9(B):

“Within three (3) days after the filing of such copy and ballot title with the Attorney General, he shall, in writing, notify the Secretary of State whether or not the proposed ballot title is in legal form and in harmony with the law. Should such ballot title not be in proper form, in the opinion of the Attorney General, it shall be his duty, within said three (3) days, to prepare and file a ballot title which does conform to the law.”

20 . Appeals upon the question of ballot title are determined by 34 O.S.Supp. 1975 § 10(A):

“Any person who is dissatisfied with the wording of a ballot title may, within ten (10) days after the same is filed by the Attorney General with the Secretary of State as aforesaid, appeal to the Supreme Court by petition in which shall be offered a substitute ballot title for the one from which the appeal is taken. Upon the hearing of such appeal, the court may correct or amend the ballot title before the court, or accept the substitute suggested, or may draft a new one which will conform to this chapter.”

21 . In Re Question No. 377, Initiative Petition No. 260, 299 P.2d 532 (Okl.1956). See also 34 O.S.Supp. 1975 § 10(A).

In Re State Question No. 541, Initiative Petition No. 310, 601 P.2d 103 (Okl.1979). See also Op.Atty.Gen.No.80-116 (June 16, 1980).

22 . Helfinstine v. Martin, 561 P.2d 951, 960 (Okl.1977).

23 . Murdock v. Ward, 178 U.S. 139, 149, 20 S.Ct. 775, 779, 44 L.Ed. 1009, 1013 (1899); Lipscomb v. State Ind. Comm., 199 Okl. 597, 188 P.2d 841, 842 (1948); In Re Initiative Petition No. 10 of Oklahoma City, 186 Okl. 497, 98 P.2d 896, 897 (1940); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. State, 175 Okl. 11, 52 P.2d 81, 83 (1935); Massachusetts Nat. Bank v. Shinn, 163 N.Y. 360, 57 N.E. 611, 612 (1900).

24 . 34 O.S.Supp. 1975 § 9(A).

25 . Pierce v. Cartwright, 638 P.2d 450 (Okl.1981); Arthur v. City of Stillwater, 611 P.2d 637, 643 (Okl.1980).