HODGES, Justice.
The issues presented are whether: 1) a board of education may fail to renew the contract of a probationary teacher on the basis of alleged teaching deficiencies if the teacher does not receive written notification of the deficiencies and an opportunity to correct her job performance, and 2) a local board of education is required to state reasons or findings for its decision to non-reemploy a probationary teacher at the conclusion of a due process hearing.
Patricia J. Jackson, appellant, (teacher) was employed as a probationary teacher
by the Stillwater Board of Education (Board) to teach sixth grade at the Middle School. In accordance with 70 O.S.Supp. 1977 § 6-102.2, the Board published an evaluation policy. The teacher was evaluated three times on specified forms by her immediate supervisor, the principal of the Middle School, during the 1977-1978 school year. Three grading categories were provided on the form [A — area of strength; B — professionally competent, and C — area of concern]. The principal did not give an A rating to any of the teachers under his supervision. The teacher received B ratings, the highest rating given any teacher during the school year in twenty-five categories on the November 9, 1977 evaluation. However, a subsequent form was completed by the principal on November 14, 1977, because the teacher stapled permission slips on the clothing of several students who had failed to return the signed consent forms
for a class field trip. The teacher received B ratings on the January 17, 1978 evaluation form. The superintendent did not witness the teacher’s performance at any time during the year. However, her contract was not renewed by the Board based on the recommendation of the Superintendent, who refused to disclose any specific reasons for her nonreemployment. In response to a request for reasons of nonreemployment, the Board’s counsel stated the reason was sub-standard professional performance. The teacher requested a hearing and after the hearing the Board affirmed the Superintendent’s action but failed to state reasons or findings for its decision.
The teacher filed a declaratory judgment action. The teacher sought a determination by the trial court that the Board breached her contract or, in the alternative, committed ultra vires acts in violation of 70 O.S.Supp. 1977 §§ 6-108.2 and 6-103(A). The teacher also alleged a violation of her civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The court found that the teacher was not afforded due process because of the failure to state reasons or findings or to disclose the evidence upon which its decisions are made and awarded damages of $1,000.00 and an Attorney fee of $1,250.00; but it held that § 6-103.2 was inapplicable because the principal had no reason to believe the teacher would be nonreemployed. The teacher and the Board appealed and the causes were ordered consolidated.
I
The teacher does not seek a review on the merits of cause for dismissal, rather her appeal is limited to a very narrow procedural perspective.
The teacher asserts that 70 O.S.Supp.1977 § 6-103.2 establishes as conditions precedent to a decision by a board of education to nonreemploy
a probationary teacher that: 1) the teacher must be admonished concerning performance which may lead to dismissal followed by administrative assistance and 2) given an opportunity to improve over a period not to exceed two months. The Board contends that § 6-103.2 is inapplicable because the principal had no reason to believe that the teacher’s conduct would lead to nonreemployment;
and that the Superintendent and
Board of Education, pursuant to 70 O.S. Supp.1977 § 6-103.4, had authority to non-reemploy a teacher without either admonishment by the principal, or allowing reasonable time for improvement.
This question turns on a matter of statutory construction. The statute states that “Whenever a superintendent of a school district determines that cause exists for the dismissal or nonreemployment of a teacher he shall submit a recommendation in writing to the board of education of such school district.”
The local board of education may also determine on its own volition not to reemploy a teacher. The fundamental rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and, if possible, give effect to the intention and purpose of the Legislature as expressed in the statute.
The purposes of the admonishment statute are to prevent arbitrary and unreasonable evaluations by principals and to provide assistance for teachers with remedial classroom problems. The enforcement of the admonishment statute as a condition precedent would preclude evaluation for one-third (½) of the school year because the second evaluation must be by February 10; and further, it would vest the principal with sole authority to arbiter the teacher’s performance. Meaningful access to the superintendent and the board by students and parents would be precluded by such an arrangement.
Had the Legislature intended that the admonishment statute § 6-103.2 be employed as a condition precedent to nonreem-ployment, this intention would have been clearly expressed in the statute. It is apparent that there was no legislative intent that the statute apply to the superintendent. The statute is devoid of ambiguity. There is no room for construction or provision for further inquiry when the statute plainly speaks.
Because the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous and its meaning clear, no occasion exists for the operation of rules of construction and its evident meaning must be accepted.
II
The Board contends that the trial court erred when it determined that the teacher was not given reasons or findings upon which the Board’s decision was made.
The teacher counters that 70 O.S.Supp. 1977 § 6-103.4(E)
requires that she be
afforded all procedural due process rights guaranteed by the Oklahoma and United States Constitutions, including a statement of reasons or findings for the decision not to reemploy her.
Historically, there has been a distinction drawn between a right and a privilege for the application of the due process clause. The distinction seems to have been discarded in favor of the concept of entitlement which is based on expectations derived from independent state law. Entitlements have become synonymous with state fostered justifiable expectations which are not equated with a right when given but which are protected by due process when curtailment is threatened.
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HODGES, Justice.
The issues presented are whether: 1) a board of education may fail to renew the contract of a probationary teacher on the basis of alleged teaching deficiencies if the teacher does not receive written notification of the deficiencies and an opportunity to correct her job performance, and 2) a local board of education is required to state reasons or findings for its decision to non-reemploy a probationary teacher at the conclusion of a due process hearing.
Patricia J. Jackson, appellant, (teacher) was employed as a probationary teacher
by the Stillwater Board of Education (Board) to teach sixth grade at the Middle School. In accordance with 70 O.S.Supp. 1977 § 6-102.2, the Board published an evaluation policy. The teacher was evaluated three times on specified forms by her immediate supervisor, the principal of the Middle School, during the 1977-1978 school year. Three grading categories were provided on the form [A — area of strength; B — professionally competent, and C — area of concern]. The principal did not give an A rating to any of the teachers under his supervision. The teacher received B ratings, the highest rating given any teacher during the school year in twenty-five categories on the November 9, 1977 evaluation. However, a subsequent form was completed by the principal on November 14, 1977, because the teacher stapled permission slips on the clothing of several students who had failed to return the signed consent forms
for a class field trip. The teacher received B ratings on the January 17, 1978 evaluation form. The superintendent did not witness the teacher’s performance at any time during the year. However, her contract was not renewed by the Board based on the recommendation of the Superintendent, who refused to disclose any specific reasons for her nonreemployment. In response to a request for reasons of nonreemployment, the Board’s counsel stated the reason was sub-standard professional performance. The teacher requested a hearing and after the hearing the Board affirmed the Superintendent’s action but failed to state reasons or findings for its decision.
The teacher filed a declaratory judgment action. The teacher sought a determination by the trial court that the Board breached her contract or, in the alternative, committed ultra vires acts in violation of 70 O.S.Supp. 1977 §§ 6-108.2 and 6-103(A). The teacher also alleged a violation of her civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The court found that the teacher was not afforded due process because of the failure to state reasons or findings or to disclose the evidence upon which its decisions are made and awarded damages of $1,000.00 and an Attorney fee of $1,250.00; but it held that § 6-103.2 was inapplicable because the principal had no reason to believe the teacher would be nonreemployed. The teacher and the Board appealed and the causes were ordered consolidated.
I
The teacher does not seek a review on the merits of cause for dismissal, rather her appeal is limited to a very narrow procedural perspective.
The teacher asserts that 70 O.S.Supp.1977 § 6-103.2 establishes as conditions precedent to a decision by a board of education to nonreemploy
a probationary teacher that: 1) the teacher must be admonished concerning performance which may lead to dismissal followed by administrative assistance and 2) given an opportunity to improve over a period not to exceed two months. The Board contends that § 6-103.2 is inapplicable because the principal had no reason to believe that the teacher’s conduct would lead to nonreemployment;
and that the Superintendent and
Board of Education, pursuant to 70 O.S. Supp.1977 § 6-103.4, had authority to non-reemploy a teacher without either admonishment by the principal, or allowing reasonable time for improvement.
This question turns on a matter of statutory construction. The statute states that “Whenever a superintendent of a school district determines that cause exists for the dismissal or nonreemployment of a teacher he shall submit a recommendation in writing to the board of education of such school district.”
The local board of education may also determine on its own volition not to reemploy a teacher. The fundamental rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and, if possible, give effect to the intention and purpose of the Legislature as expressed in the statute.
The purposes of the admonishment statute are to prevent arbitrary and unreasonable evaluations by principals and to provide assistance for teachers with remedial classroom problems. The enforcement of the admonishment statute as a condition precedent would preclude evaluation for one-third (½) of the school year because the second evaluation must be by February 10; and further, it would vest the principal with sole authority to arbiter the teacher’s performance. Meaningful access to the superintendent and the board by students and parents would be precluded by such an arrangement.
Had the Legislature intended that the admonishment statute § 6-103.2 be employed as a condition precedent to nonreem-ployment, this intention would have been clearly expressed in the statute. It is apparent that there was no legislative intent that the statute apply to the superintendent. The statute is devoid of ambiguity. There is no room for construction or provision for further inquiry when the statute plainly speaks.
Because the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous and its meaning clear, no occasion exists for the operation of rules of construction and its evident meaning must be accepted.
II
The Board contends that the trial court erred when it determined that the teacher was not given reasons or findings upon which the Board’s decision was made.
The teacher counters that 70 O.S.Supp. 1977 § 6-103.4(E)
requires that she be
afforded all procedural due process rights guaranteed by the Oklahoma and United States Constitutions, including a statement of reasons or findings for the decision not to reemploy her.
Historically, there has been a distinction drawn between a right and a privilege for the application of the due process clause. The distinction seems to have been discarded in favor of the concept of entitlement which is based on expectations derived from independent state law. Entitlements have become synonymous with state fostered justifiable expectations which are not equated with a right when given but which are protected by due process when curtailment is threatened.
Title 70 O.S.Supp.1977 § 6-103.4(B) entitles a probationary teacher to a due process hearing. Although the statute does not expressly state that findings must be made, the State Board of Education Policy Bulletin and Guide for Implementing Teacher Hearing Procedures provides that the right to a due process hearing entitles the teacher to be given notice and an opportunity to be heard; granted a reasonable time to prepare for the hearing; be heard before a fair and impartial tribunal; advised of the decision reached by the board and a general explanation of the basis upon which the decision was reached,
and a written transcript of the proceedings.
Notice is a jurisdictional requirement as well as a fundamental requisite of due process. Due process requires adequate notice and a realistic opportunity to appear at a hearing in a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. The right to be heard is of little value unless adequate notice is given, and due process is violated by the mere act of exercising judicial power upon process not reasonably calculated to apprise interested parties of the pendency of an action. Procedural due process of law contemplates a fair and open hearing before a legally constituted court or other authority with notice and an opportunity to present evidence and argument, representation by counsel, if desired, and information concerning the claims of the opposing party with reasonable opportunity to controvert them.
The purpose of any due process proceeding is to afford the opportunity to each person to present evidence and arguments in a forum which provides fair and equal justice. It seems not only fair, courteous, and an exercise of due process, but an efficient administration of justice for notice to be given
concerning what deficiencies resulted in the teacher being non-reemployed. “No better instrument has been devised for arriving at truth than to give a person in jeopardy of serious loss notice of the case against him and an opportunity to meet it. Nor has a better way been found for generating the feeling that justice has been done.”
The issue is not merely the appearance of justice, but from a perspective that treats process as intrinsically significant, the very essence of justice. Whatever the outcome, a due process hearing permits the affected person the right to be heard from and the right to be told why a decision is being made in a certain way.
Because 70 O.S.Supp.1977 § 6-103.4(E) does not require the making of findings of fact, the school board contends it was not required to do so. The Minnesota Supreme Court was faced with the same problem and a similar statute in
Morey v. School Board of Ind. Schl. Dist. No. 492,
268 Minn. 110, 128 N.W.2d 302, 307 (1964).
The Court said:
“In a case such as the present one, where the school board, acting in a quasi-judicial capacity
might have based its resolution on any or all of several grounds, findings of fact are vital to prevent substitution of the reviewing court’s judgment for that of the school board’s. Without findings of fact, the trial court had no way of knowing upon which of the four charges the school board based its decision. If the trial court were to review the merits of the case without findings of fact, there would be no safeguard against judicial encroachment on the school board’s function since the trial court might affirm on a charge rejected by the school board.”
It is fundamental that an absence of required findings is fatal to the validity of administrative decisions even if the record discloses evidence to support proper findings.
Findings of an administrative agen
cy acting in a quasi-judicial capacity should contain a recitation of basic or underlying facts drawn from the evidence sufficiently stated to enable the reviewing court to intelligently review the decision and ascertain if the facts upon which the order is based create a reasonable basis for the order.
The protection afforded by findings assures that justice is administered according to facts and law, and not through Star Chamber techniques.
The crux of the matter is that democracy implies respect for the elementary rights of the person, however suspect or undeserving; a democratic government must practice fairness — and fairness can rarely be obtained by secret, one-sided determination of facts decisive of rights.
Boards of Education are required even without statutory requirements to give notice in advance of the hearing of the reasons for nonreemployment and make findings of fact on issues presented in any due process hearing.
AFFIRMED.
IRWIN, C. J., BARNES, V. C. J., and LAVENDER, DOOLIN, OPALA and WILSON, JJ., concur.
HARGRAVE, J., concurs in Part I; dissents to Part II.
SIMMS, J., dissents.