NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION. UNTIL RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR WITHDRAWAL.
Facts & Procedural History
¶1 Petitioner Cynthia Robinson worked as a Nurse's Aide for Employer Fairview Fellowship Home for Senior Citizens, and was injured on February 6, 2014.1 Petitioner requested a finding of injury to her neck, left shoulder, and left knee, as well as temporary total disability. Employer admitted that she was an employee on the date of the accident but denied that her injury arose out of and in the course of her employment under 85A O.S. Supp. 2013 § 2(13). Petitioner argued that if her injury was not compensable, then § 2(13) was an unconstitutional special law and unconstitutionally denied her a remedy for her injury.
¶2 The ALJ found Petitioner's injury was not in the course and scope of employment, and thus, not compensable. The ALJ declined to address Petitioner's constitutional arguments stating: "The Workers' Compensation Commission is an administrative agency rather than a court and is without power to decide the Claimant's Constitutional arguments that this statute does not provide an adequate remedy under the Administrative Workers' Compensation Act."2 The ALJ cited as authority Dow Jones & Co., Inc. v. State ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Commission, 1990 OK 6, 787 P.2d 843.
¶3 Petitioner appealed to the Workers' Compensation Commission, and the Commission affirmed the decision of the ALJ, stating that "claims that legislation is unconstitutional cannot be determined by law or this Commission en Banc. Those claims can only be decided by a court of competent jurisdiction."3 Petitioner again appealed, and in an unpublished decision, the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. Although the court found that Petitioner had "preserved [her] constitutionality argument before the [Workers' Compensation Commission]," the court declined to address such constitutional arguments and suggested Petitioner "seek a declaration in district court regarding the statute's constitutionality." Petitioner Robinson petitioned this Court for certiorari review of the COCA opinion, specifically on the issue of whether this Court and COCA have the jurisdiction to decide the constitutionality of the provisions of Title 85A "even though the Workers' Compensation Commission, as an executive administrative agency, does not have such authority."4
¶4 After Petitioner filed her Petition for Certiorari in this Court, the Attorney General filed notice of his intent to provide his views concerning the authority of the Workers' Compensation Commission to address constitutional issues and the ability of the courts to review those decisions. On January 13, 2016, this Court invited the Attorney General to file his brief on such issues, and the parties were given ten days to respond to the Attorney General's filing. The Attorney General filed his brief on the issues on February 10, 2016, arguing that the Workers' Compensation Commission has the authority to address the constitutionality of a statute as it is being applied in an individual proceeding, subject to judicial review by this Court. Neither party tendered a response to the Attorney General's brief. On February 29, 2016, this Court granted Petitioner Robinson's Petition for Certiorari.
The Workers' Compensation Commission Has the Power to Determine
Whether a Provision of Title 85A is Being Unconstitutionally Applied to a
Particular Party in a Commission Proceeding
¶ 5 The Oklahoma Administrative Workers' Compensation Act creates the Workers' Compensation Commission, which is "an executive agency of the State of Oklahoma . . . ." 85A O.S. Supp. 2013 § 19(A). Limits on the authority of an executive administrative agency to resolve constitutional questions--the question before us in this case--are based upon the constitutional principle of separation of powers. Article 4, § 1 of the Oklahoma Constitution provides:
The powers of the government of the State of Oklahoma shall be divided into three separate departments: The Legislative, Executive, and Judicial; and except as provided in this Constitution, the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial departments of government shall be separate and distinct, and neither shall exercise the powers properly belonging to either of the others.5
Article 7, §1 goes on to provide:
§ 1. Courts in which judicial power vested.
The judicial power of this State shall be vested in the Senate, sitting as a Court of Impeachment, a Supreme Court, the Court of Criminal Appeals, the Court on the Judiciary, the State Industrial Court, the Court of Bank Review, the Court of Tax Review, and such intermediate appellate courts as may be provided by statute, District Courts, and such Boards, Agencies and Commissions created by the Constitution or established by statute as exercise adjudicative authority or render decisions in individual proceedings. . . .6
¶6 Adjudicative authority--the "authority to hear and determine forensic disputes"--"is the exclusive domain of the judiciary."7 Consistent with Art. 7, § 1, this Court has on numerous occasions held that "[w]hen an administrative board acts in an adjudicative capacity, it functions much like a court."8 Such proceedings are quasi-judicial in nature--a "term applied to the action of public administrative officers or boards which investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts; draw conclusions from them as a basis for official action; and exercise discretion of a judicial nature in connection with and incidental to the administration of matters entrusted to or assigned to the officers or board."9
¶7 Under Art. 7, § 1, the Commission, as a Commission "established by statute," may "exercise adjudicative authority or render decisions in individual proceedings."10 Pursuant to such, under the AWCA, the Commission and its ALJs have the power "to hear and determine claims for compensation and to conduct hearings and investigations and to make such judgments, decisions, and determinations as may be required by any rule or judgment of the Commission" or as "authorized by law." 85A O.S. Supp. 2013 § 22(C-D). Section 72(A)(4) provides that "[a]dministrative law judges are required to make specific, on-the-record findings of ultimate facts responsive to the issues shaped by the evidence as well as conclusions of law on which its judgment is to be rested." 85A O.S. Supp. 2013 § 72(A)(4) (emphasis added). Section 27(A) of Title 85A provides:
A. The Workers' Compensation Commission shall be vested with jurisdiction over all claims filed pursuant to the Administrative Workers' Compensation Act. All claims so filed shall be heard by the administrative law judge sitting without a jury. The Commission shall have full power and authority to determine all questions in relation to claims for compensation under the provisions of the Administrative Workers' Compensation Act. The Commission, upon application of either party, shall order a hearing. Upon a hearing, either party may present evidence and be represented by counsel. Except as provided in this act, the decision of the administrative law judge shall be final as to all questions of fact and law. The decision of the administrative law judge shall be issued within thirty (30) days following the submission of the case by the parties. The power and jurisdiction of the Commission over each case shall be continuing and it may, from time to time, make such modifications or changes with respect to former findings or orders relating thereto if, in its opinion, it may be justified.11
¶8 The above-highlighted language mirrors statutory language contained in Oklahoma's first "Workmens Compensation Law" enacted in 1915 and administered by the State Industrial Commission. The State Industrial Commission was also given "full power and authority to determine all questions in relation to the payment of claims for compensation under the provisions of this Act,"12 and an award or order of the Commission was final as to questions of fact and all questions of law not appealed to the Oklahoma Supreme Court.13 Although not a court of record,14 the State Industrial Commission was an "administrative fact finding board with certain judicial powers [and] a quasi judicial body"15 "clothed with certain judicial authority."16
¶9 The "full power and authority to determine all questions in relation to claims for compensation" necessarily includes questions of law.17 A question of law includes a constitutional question raised by the interpretation and application of a particular workers' compensation statute to a particular party.18 Thus, the Commission or its ALJs when exercising adjudicative authority may properly refuse to apply a statute to a particular party before it, if the Commission or its ALJs find that such application would be repugnant to the Constitution. To hold otherwise would force parties before the Commission to immediately appeal a decision of the Commission before a final adjudication of the claim on the merits.19 In addition, Petitioners are forced to carry the additional financial burden of filing fees, costs of transcripts, preparation of the record, attorney fees, and the costs of legal representation, only to have this Court remand the case to the Commission to decide a question it could have decided in the first instance. This is not the "'prompt, certain, and inexpensive'" remedy envisioned by the adoption of the workers' compensation system as a result of the industrial bargain. Adams v. Iten Biscuit Co., 1917 OK 47, ¶ 16, 162 P. 938, 944 (quoting Jensen v. S. Pac. Co., 109 N.E. 600, 603 (N.Y. 1915)).
¶10 "The benefit from having the administrative process initially address a constitutional issue among other issues within the agency's purview is that the process may result in fact-finding or interpretation and application of statutory processes that may obviate the need to adjudicate a constitutional question." N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. Huber, 63 A.3d 197, 218 (N.J. 2013). This Court does not generally, in the exercise of our appellate jurisdiction, "make first instance determinations on disputed questions of fact or law."20 "'A constitutional claim that hinges upon factual issues reviewable at the administrative level must first be addressed to the agency so that a necessary factual record can be established.'" In re Fichera v. City of New York, 145 A.D.2d 482, 484 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d 1988) (emphasis added) (citing Matter of Dozier v. New York City, 130 A.D.2d 128, 135 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d 1987)).
¶11 The Court of Civil Appeals' suggestion that Petitioner file a declaratory judgment action in the district court is contrary to the AWCA, which specifically provides that "[a]ll appeals or disputes arising from actions of the Commission shall be governed by provisions of this act and the Commission shall not be subject to the provisions of the Oklahoma Administrative Procedures Act, except as provided in this act." 85A O.S. Supp. 2013 § 19(F). Thus, 75 O.S. 2011 § 307, which allows for the filing a Petition for Declaratory Review in the district court under the Administrative Procedures Act, does not apply to cases pending before the Workers' Compensation Commission. In fact, the exclusive remedy provision of 85A O.S. Supp. 2013 § 5 specifically bars injured workers from pursuing relief in the district court. Thus, we conclude that the Workers' Compensation Commission has the power to determine whether a provision of Title 85A is being unconstitutionally applied to a particular party in a proceeding before the Commission.21
A Decision of the Workers' Compensation Commission is Subject to Review by this Court
¶12 Of course, the power of the Commission and its ALJs to determine the constitutionality of a provision of Title 85A is limited. Although the Commission, when acting in an adjudicative capacity functions much like a court, the Commission is an executive branch agency lacking the full power of the judiciary.22 Article 7, § 1 grants the Commission only that judicial power necessary to "render decisions in individual proceedings," meaning the Commission only has the power to resolve, on a case-by-case basis, questions regarding the constitutional or unconstitutional application of a statute to a particular party in a proceeding before it, and the Commission's decision is binding only on the parties in that case.23 The Legislature may not confer upon the Commission the power to determine the facial constitutionality of a statute, and the Commission may not assume that power--such power resides in the judiciary alone.24
¶13 The Commission may not issue decisions that conflict with the rulings of this Court, and the Commission's decisions are subject to review by this Court. This Court is the ultimate authority on the interpretation of the laws of this State,25 and in addition to our constitutional authority to review a decision of the Commission, we are also statutorily tasked with reviewing a "judgment, decision or award of the Commission." 85A O.S. Supp. 2013 § 78(C). Finally, the Workers' Compensation Commission may only address issues that arise in claims within their jurisdiction and that involve the application of the Workers' Compensation Act. Under Title 85A, the Commission has the "exclusive responsibility and duty to carry out the provisions of this act." 85A O.S. Supp. 2013 § 19(A) (emphasis added).
¶14 The Court of Civil Appeals clearly has the power to review a decision of the Commission when such a case has been properly and timely appealed to this Court and assigned to the Court of Civil Appeals by this Court.26 In addition, just as this Court has a duty to review the constitutionality of a challenged legislative enactment when presented with a justiciable case or controversy, so too does the Court of Civil Appeals.27
Conclusion
¶15 We conclude that the Workers' Compensation Commission has the power to determine whether a provision of Title 85A is being unconstitutionally applied to a particular party in a proceeding before the Commission.28 The Court of Civil Appeals' opinion in this case is vacated. The Commission's decision in this case is vacated and the cause is reversed and remanded for a new hearing before the assigned ALJ.
COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS' OPINION VACATED; WORKERS'
COMPENSATION COMMISSION ORDER VACATED; CAUSE REVERSED
AND REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS
¶16 Reif, C.J., Combs, V.C.J., Kauger, Watt, Edmondson, Colbert and Gurich, JJ., concur.
¶17 Winchester and Taylor, JJ., concur in result.