Home/S.D. New York/North American Soccer League v. National Football League

North American Soccer League v. National Football League

505 F. Supp. 659, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15038
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedNovember 17, 1980
Docket78 Civ. 4560-CSH
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 505 F. Supp. 659 (North American Soccer League v. National Football League) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
North American Soccer League v. National Football League, 505 F. Supp. 659, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15038 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

HAIGHT, District Judge:

INTRODUCTION

This is a private antitrust suit, tried to the Court without a jury. Plaintiff North American Soccer League (the “NASL”) is an unincorporated association of 24 professional soccer clubs located throughout the United States and Canada. The other plaintiffs are 21 of those 24 member organizations. Defendant National Football League (the “NFL”) is an unincorporated association of 28 professional football clubs located throughout the United States. The other defendants are 25 of those 28 member organizations.

In October, 1978, the NFL scheduled a meeting to vote upon a proposed amendment to its by-laws which reads as follows:

“Amend Article IX, by adding a new Section 9.4 as follows:
“9.4(A) No person (1) owning a majority interest in a member club, or (2) directly or indirectly having substantial operational control, or substantial influence over the operations, of a member club, or (3) serving as an officer or director of a member club, nor (4) any spouse or minor child of any such person, may directly or indirectly acquire, retain, or possess any interest in another major team sport (including major league baseball, basketball, hockey and soccer).
“(B) The prohibition set forth in subsection (A) hereof shall also apply to relatives of such persons (including siblings, parents, adult children, adult and minor grand children, nephews and nieces, and relatives by marriage) (1) if such person directly or indirectly provided or contributed all or any part of the funds used to purchase or operate the other sports league entity, or (2) if there exists between such person and any such relative a significant community of interest in the successful operation of the other sports league entity.
“(C) The Commissioner shall investigate, to the extent he deems necessary or appropriate, any reported or apparent viola *662 tion of this Section and shall report his findings to the Executive Committee pri- or to imposition of disciplinary action by the Committee.
“(D) Beginning on February 1, 1980, any person who, after notice and hearing by the Executive Committee, is found to have violated subsection (A) or (B) above will be subject to fines of up to $25,000 per month for each of the first three months of violations; up to $50,000 per month for each of the next three months; and up to $75,000 per month thereafter. In addition, violations of more than six months’ duration may be dealt with by the Executive Committee pursuant to Article VIII, Section 8.13(B).
“(E) If such person does not pay such fine to the League Treasurer within 20 days of its assessment, the unpaid amount thereof may be withheld, in whole or in part, by the Commissioner from available funds in possession of the League Office belonging to the member club with which the person in violation is affiliated.”

This proposed by-law will hereafter be referred to as the “cross-ownership ban.”

Plaintiffs allege that the cross-ownership ban, if enacted by defendants, would violate Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1. Their complaint, invoking Sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15 and 15/26" style="color:var(--green);border-bottom:1px solid var(--green-border)">26, sought to preliminarily and permanently enjoin implementation of the by-law. Plaintiffs also prayed for a declaratory judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201, declaring the proposed cross-ownership ban, together with other actual and threatened conduct by defendants, violative of the Sherman Act, and for treble damages. Jurisdiction lay under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337, and venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 and 15 U.S.C. §§ 15 and 15/22" style="color:var(--green);border-bottom:1px solid var(--green-border)">22.

Defendants denied the allegations of the complaint, and asserted two counterclaims against plaintiffs, alleging Sherman Act violations on their part.

At the outset I granted plaintiffs a preliminary injunction, restraining defendants from enacting the proposed by-law or otherwise implementing the cross-ownership ban. 465 F.Supp. 665. The case then proceeded through discovery, preparation of a joint pre-trial order, and trial. I wish particularly to compliment counsel for both sides for meticulous preparation and able advocacy.

I now enter the following Findings of Fact, Discussion, and Conclusions of Law. Rule 52(a), F.R.Civ.P.

FINDINGS OF FACT

These findings adopt, in substantial measure, the helpful statement of agreed facts prepared by the parties in connection with the pre-trial order.

I. THE PARTIES

No. 1: Plaintiff North American Soccer League (the “NASL”) is an unincorporated association of twenty-four (24) professional soccer clubs located throughout the United States and Canada.

No. 2: The NASL was organized in 1968 upon the merger of two predecessor soccer leagues for the purpose of promoting major league professional soccer in North America and is engaged in interstate commerce in the business of operating a professional soccer league.

No. 3: The other plaintiffs (or their successors) are 21 of the NASL member organizations (each of which is a corporation except where noted) which, at the time suit was filed, owned and operated professional soccer clubs for profit under the names and in the cities set forth below:

*663

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Plant Oil Powered Diesel Fuel Systems, Inc. v. Exxonmobil Corp.
801 F. Supp. 2d 1163 (D. New Mexico, 2011)
McNeil v. National Football League
790 F. Supp. 871 (D. Minnesota, 1992)
Volvo North America Corp. v. Men's International Professional Tennis Council
857 F.2d 55 (Second Circuit, 1988)
Volvo North America Corporation, International Merchandising Corporation, and Proserv, Inc. v. Men's International Professional Tennis Council, M. Marshall Happer, Iii, and Philippe Chatrier, Men's International Professional Tennis Council and M. Marshall Happer, Iii, Counterclaimants v. Volvo North America Corporation, International Merchandising Corporation, and Proserv, Inc., Counterclaim-Defendants v. Donald L. Dell, Raymond S. Benton, Dell, Benton & Falk, Mark H. McCormack International Merchandising Group, International Management Inc., Transworld International Inc., and A.B. Volvo, Additional Counterclaim-Defendants
857 F.2d 55 (Second Circuit, 1988)
United States Football League v. National Football League
634 F. Supp. 1155 (S.D. New York, 1986)
Syufy Enterprises v. American Multicinema, Inc.
602 F. Supp. 1466 (N.D. California, 1983)
National Football League v. North American Soccer League
459 U.S. 1074 (Supreme Court, 1983)
North American Soccer League v. National Football League
670 F.2d 1249 (Second Circuit, 1982)
Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. National Football League
519 F. Supp. 581 (C.D. California, 1981)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
505 F. Supp. 659, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15038, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/north-american-soccer-league-v-national-football-league-nysd-1980.