Newman v. Howard University School of Law
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Opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
MICHAEL NEWMAN,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 1:23-cv-00436 (TNM)
HOWARD UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Three years after he enrolled at Howard University School of Law, Michael Newman
found himself in court—though not as a budding lawyer. Howard expelled Newman before his
final year. Before that, Newman lost his scholarship, drew backlash from his peers, and feuded
with administrators.
Newman now proceeds pro se in this case against his alma mater and several of its
administrators (collectively, “Howard”). His claims have dwindled during the years this case has
progressed. As things stand, Newman presses several contract breach claims (related to his lost
scholarship), claims for racial interference with a contract under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (again, related
to his scholarship), and a handful of defamation claims. Howard now seeks summary judgment.
The Court grants that motion as to all but two of Newman’s defamation claims.
I.
Readers interested in the convoluted history of this case should consult prior decisions. 1
1 The whopping 162 docket entries in this case attest to its demands. Those entries include three proposed complaints, two motions to dismiss, and a litany of miscellaneous requests. To process those motions, the Court held five hearings and issued 138 pages of written orders. See Newman v. Howard Univ. Sch. of Law, 715 F. Supp. 3d 86 (D.D.C. 2024) (“Newman I”);
Newman v. Howard Univ. Sch. of Law, No. 1:23-CV-0436 (TNM), 2024 WL 4227723 (D.D.C.
Sept. 18, 2024) (“Newman II”); Newman v. Howard Univ. Sch. of Law, No. 1:23-CV-00436
(TNM), 2025 WL 1411093 (D.D.C. May 15, 2025) (“Newman III”). But this is the first time the
Court writes with the fruits of discovery before it. So the Court begins with the facts, before
turning to an abbreviated history.
A.
Michael Newman is a former Howard University School of Law student. See Pl.’s Resp.
to Defs.’ Stmt. Mat. Facts (“Pl.’s Resp. DSMF”) ¶ 3, ECF No. 135-10. Howard is an HBCU, or
historically black college or university. 2 See id. ¶ 1. Newman, who is white, chose Howard in
part because of his “dedication to justice and racial understanding.” Defs.’ Resp. to Pl.’s Stmt.
Mat. Facts (“Defs.’ Resp. PSMF”) ¶ 2, ECF No. 158-1. Howard also attracted him with an
academic scholarship. Id. ¶ 6. Newman earned $26,000 towards his first year’s tuition. Id.; see
Pl.’s Ex. 76 (“Scholarship Agreement”), ECF No. 140-6. The scholarship would renew for
Newman’s second year if his “first-year class rank [was] within the top fifty percent (50.00%) of
the class.” Scholarship Agreement at 3. If Newman’s first-year rank dipped below that
threshold, he would lose the scholarship (absent a few exceptions not relevant here). Id. With
this tuition coverage, Newman enrolled at Howard Law in 2020.
Class began online because of COVID, so Newman stayed at his Hawaii home. Pl.’s
Resp. DSMF ¶ 15. He tried to virtually connect with his peers. On the class Facebook page, he
shared his “strong desire to make lasting friendships at Howard” and noted that he “prefer[s]
2 Throughout this Order, the Court’s references to “Howard” include Howard University, Howard University School of Law, and the school officials Newman sues. When the distinction between Defendants is relevant, the Court specifies.
2 engaging people through political debate” and “philosophical discussion.” Pl.’s Ex. 82 at 2, ECF
No. 141-2. Regular current event updates from Newman followed. See, e.g., id. at 3–13.
Other students engaged at first, but things took a turn in October 2020. That month, an
activist delivered a speech about environmental justice. See Defs.’ Resp. PSMF ¶ 106. Newman
disagreed with what he heard and decided to share his thoughts with some classmates. He took
to GroupMe, writing, “Where I part with the black community is where they believe government
solves problems, I only see it causing problems.” Pl.’s Ex. 8 at 3, ECF No. 135-7. 3 Recipients
were offended and told Newman as much. See Pl.’s Resp. DSMF ¶ 63; Defs.’ Ex. 28 at 2, ECF
No. 116-27 (Newman’s email to a professor reflecting on the situation). Peers pressured
Newman to retract his statements and he came to feel that he was no longer “one of the group.”
Defs.’ Ex. 28 at 2.
On top of these social problems, Newman had trouble adjusting to law school classes.
Above all, he “struggl[ed] excessively” with Legal Research, Reasoning & Writing. Defs.’ Ex.
20 at 3, ECF No. 116-20 (Newman’s October 1, 2020, email to a professor). Newman disliked
the professor teaching his class. See id. at 2; Pl.’s Ex. 114 at 3, ECF No. 144-3. He also lost
track of assignments. See Pl.’s Resp. DSMF ¶ 41; Defs.’ Ex. 19 at 3, ECF No. 116-19
(Newman’s September 25, 2020, email to the research librarian about missing assignments);
Defs.’ Ex. 20 at 2 (Newman’s October 1, 2020, email reporting that he “missed a second
deadline in LRRW”). In the end, after administrators rebuffed his request to transfer professors,
Newman dropped the class. Pl.’s Resp. DSMF ¶¶ 45–47; see Defs.’ Ex. 22 at 3, ECF No. 116-22
3 The parties disagree about the makeup of this GroupMe. Howard says it included the full Howard Law Class of 2023. See Pl.’s Resp. DSMF ¶ 62. Newman maintains that he addressed a smaller group—his “section” in law school speak. See Pl.’s Ex. 8 at 3, ECF No. 135-7 (showing a screenshot of the message at issue in a group called “HUSL Section 2”). The dispute is immaterial, but the Court assumes Newman is right for now. 3 (email from Associate Dean Mariela Olivares to Newman).
Abandoning legal writing did not solve all Newman’s problems. In November, he told a
professor that he had been “castigated, condemned, forcibly silenced, and effectively ostracized.”
Defs.’ Ex. 32 at 4, ECF No. 116-31. He described this treatment as “racial discrimination.” Id.
And he asked the professor to understand that these circumstances made him reluctant to speak
in class. Id. Concerned about Newman’s charge, the professor referred Newman to University
resources. Id. at 3. Newman ultimately connected with a representative of the University’s
Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) office. Pl.’s Resp. DSMF ¶ 68; see Defs.’ Ex. 33 at 2,
ECF No. 116-32. Though Newman spoke with her twice, he declined to file a formal
discrimination complaint against any classmate. Pl.’s Resp. DSMF ¶ 69. He also decided
against filing a grievance under the Student Code of Conduct. See Defs.’ Ex. 11 at 2, ECF No.
116-11. At this point, the semester was nearly over. Newman finished with poor grades—two
Ds and a C. Pl.’s Resp. DSMF ¶¶ 25, 52; see Defs.’ Ex. 2 (“Newman Transcript”) at 2, ECF No.
117-1.
During winter break, Newman resolved to explain himself to his peers. See Defs.’ Ex. 34
at 2, ECF No. 116-33 (EEO Coordinator’s December 2020 email noting Newman’s intention).
In early January, Newman sent a letter in three parts (later joined by a fourth) through GroupMe.
See Pl.’s Resp. DSMF ¶ 72; Defs.’ Exs. 37–39, ECF Nos. 116-36–116-38. Among other things,
those mass letters defended his October statements and offered some thoughts on racial identity.
See generally Defs.’ Exs. 37–39. They did not go over well. Several students complained. See,
e.g., Defs.’ Ex. 40 at 2, ECF No. 116-39.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
MICHAEL NEWMAN,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 1:23-cv-00436 (TNM)
HOWARD UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Three years after he enrolled at Howard University School of Law, Michael Newman
found himself in court—though not as a budding lawyer. Howard expelled Newman before his
final year. Before that, Newman lost his scholarship, drew backlash from his peers, and feuded
with administrators.
Newman now proceeds pro se in this case against his alma mater and several of its
administrators (collectively, “Howard”). His claims have dwindled during the years this case has
progressed. As things stand, Newman presses several contract breach claims (related to his lost
scholarship), claims for racial interference with a contract under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (again, related
to his scholarship), and a handful of defamation claims. Howard now seeks summary judgment.
The Court grants that motion as to all but two of Newman’s defamation claims.
I.
Readers interested in the convoluted history of this case should consult prior decisions. 1
1 The whopping 162 docket entries in this case attest to its demands. Those entries include three proposed complaints, two motions to dismiss, and a litany of miscellaneous requests. To process those motions, the Court held five hearings and issued 138 pages of written orders. See Newman v. Howard Univ. Sch. of Law, 715 F. Supp. 3d 86 (D.D.C. 2024) (“Newman I”);
Newman v. Howard Univ. Sch. of Law, No. 1:23-CV-0436 (TNM), 2024 WL 4227723 (D.D.C.
Sept. 18, 2024) (“Newman II”); Newman v. Howard Univ. Sch. of Law, No. 1:23-CV-00436
(TNM), 2025 WL 1411093 (D.D.C. May 15, 2025) (“Newman III”). But this is the first time the
Court writes with the fruits of discovery before it. So the Court begins with the facts, before
turning to an abbreviated history.
A.
Michael Newman is a former Howard University School of Law student. See Pl.’s Resp.
to Defs.’ Stmt. Mat. Facts (“Pl.’s Resp. DSMF”) ¶ 3, ECF No. 135-10. Howard is an HBCU, or
historically black college or university. 2 See id. ¶ 1. Newman, who is white, chose Howard in
part because of his “dedication to justice and racial understanding.” Defs.’ Resp. to Pl.’s Stmt.
Mat. Facts (“Defs.’ Resp. PSMF”) ¶ 2, ECF No. 158-1. Howard also attracted him with an
academic scholarship. Id. ¶ 6. Newman earned $26,000 towards his first year’s tuition. Id.; see
Pl.’s Ex. 76 (“Scholarship Agreement”), ECF No. 140-6. The scholarship would renew for
Newman’s second year if his “first-year class rank [was] within the top fifty percent (50.00%) of
the class.” Scholarship Agreement at 3. If Newman’s first-year rank dipped below that
threshold, he would lose the scholarship (absent a few exceptions not relevant here). Id. With
this tuition coverage, Newman enrolled at Howard Law in 2020.
Class began online because of COVID, so Newman stayed at his Hawaii home. Pl.’s
Resp. DSMF ¶ 15. He tried to virtually connect with his peers. On the class Facebook page, he
shared his “strong desire to make lasting friendships at Howard” and noted that he “prefer[s]
2 Throughout this Order, the Court’s references to “Howard” include Howard University, Howard University School of Law, and the school officials Newman sues. When the distinction between Defendants is relevant, the Court specifies.
2 engaging people through political debate” and “philosophical discussion.” Pl.’s Ex. 82 at 2, ECF
No. 141-2. Regular current event updates from Newman followed. See, e.g., id. at 3–13.
Other students engaged at first, but things took a turn in October 2020. That month, an
activist delivered a speech about environmental justice. See Defs.’ Resp. PSMF ¶ 106. Newman
disagreed with what he heard and decided to share his thoughts with some classmates. He took
to GroupMe, writing, “Where I part with the black community is where they believe government
solves problems, I only see it causing problems.” Pl.’s Ex. 8 at 3, ECF No. 135-7. 3 Recipients
were offended and told Newman as much. See Pl.’s Resp. DSMF ¶ 63; Defs.’ Ex. 28 at 2, ECF
No. 116-27 (Newman’s email to a professor reflecting on the situation). Peers pressured
Newman to retract his statements and he came to feel that he was no longer “one of the group.”
Defs.’ Ex. 28 at 2.
On top of these social problems, Newman had trouble adjusting to law school classes.
Above all, he “struggl[ed] excessively” with Legal Research, Reasoning & Writing. Defs.’ Ex.
20 at 3, ECF No. 116-20 (Newman’s October 1, 2020, email to a professor). Newman disliked
the professor teaching his class. See id. at 2; Pl.’s Ex. 114 at 3, ECF No. 144-3. He also lost
track of assignments. See Pl.’s Resp. DSMF ¶ 41; Defs.’ Ex. 19 at 3, ECF No. 116-19
(Newman’s September 25, 2020, email to the research librarian about missing assignments);
Defs.’ Ex. 20 at 2 (Newman’s October 1, 2020, email reporting that he “missed a second
deadline in LRRW”). In the end, after administrators rebuffed his request to transfer professors,
Newman dropped the class. Pl.’s Resp. DSMF ¶¶ 45–47; see Defs.’ Ex. 22 at 3, ECF No. 116-22
3 The parties disagree about the makeup of this GroupMe. Howard says it included the full Howard Law Class of 2023. See Pl.’s Resp. DSMF ¶ 62. Newman maintains that he addressed a smaller group—his “section” in law school speak. See Pl.’s Ex. 8 at 3, ECF No. 135-7 (showing a screenshot of the message at issue in a group called “HUSL Section 2”). The dispute is immaterial, but the Court assumes Newman is right for now. 3 (email from Associate Dean Mariela Olivares to Newman).
Abandoning legal writing did not solve all Newman’s problems. In November, he told a
professor that he had been “castigated, condemned, forcibly silenced, and effectively ostracized.”
Defs.’ Ex. 32 at 4, ECF No. 116-31. He described this treatment as “racial discrimination.” Id.
And he asked the professor to understand that these circumstances made him reluctant to speak
in class. Id. Concerned about Newman’s charge, the professor referred Newman to University
resources. Id. at 3. Newman ultimately connected with a representative of the University’s
Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) office. Pl.’s Resp. DSMF ¶ 68; see Defs.’ Ex. 33 at 2,
ECF No. 116-32. Though Newman spoke with her twice, he declined to file a formal
discrimination complaint against any classmate. Pl.’s Resp. DSMF ¶ 69. He also decided
against filing a grievance under the Student Code of Conduct. See Defs.’ Ex. 11 at 2, ECF No.
116-11. At this point, the semester was nearly over. Newman finished with poor grades—two
Ds and a C. Pl.’s Resp. DSMF ¶¶ 25, 52; see Defs.’ Ex. 2 (“Newman Transcript”) at 2, ECF No.
117-1.
During winter break, Newman resolved to explain himself to his peers. See Defs.’ Ex. 34
at 2, ECF No. 116-33 (EEO Coordinator’s December 2020 email noting Newman’s intention).
In early January, Newman sent a letter in three parts (later joined by a fourth) through GroupMe.
See Pl.’s Resp. DSMF ¶ 72; Defs.’ Exs. 37–39, ECF Nos. 116-36–116-38. Among other things,
those mass letters defended his October statements and offered some thoughts on racial identity.
See generally Defs.’ Exs. 37–39. They did not go over well. Several students complained. See,
e.g., Defs.’ Ex. 40 at 2, ECF No. 116-39. Others kicked Newman out of the class GroupMe. See
Defs.’ Ex. 41 at 2, ECF No. 116-40. For his part, Newman asked administrators to “facilitate
open dialogue” with professionals. Pl.’s Resp. DSMF ¶ 69 (quoting Pl.’s Ex. 124, ECF No. 145-
4 4). That never happened.
Things reached a boiling point in late January 2021. Dissatisfied with the Law School’s
response, Newman complained about his peers’ treatment to Howard University President
Wayne Frederick. Defs.’ Ex. 41 at 2. Frederick forwarded Newman’s email to the Dean of
Howard Law, Danielle Holley, who arranged a meeting with Newman. Pl.’s Resp. DSMF ¶ 78.
On the same day, Newman emailed a link to the documentary, Uncle Tom, to the Class of 2023.
Id. ¶ 79; see Defs.’ Ex. 43 at 2, ECF No. 116-42. Newman wrote that his classmates could
benefit from hearing the “alternative perspectives” the film provided with its focus on
conservative black Americans. Defs.’ Ex. 43 at 2; Pl.’s Resp. DSMF ¶ 80. Later that night,
Newman took to the listserv to send the fourth and final part of his letter series, titled
“Perpetuating Racial Aggression.” See Pl.’s Resp. DSMF ¶ 84; Defs.’ Exs. 45 & 46, ECF Nos.
116-44 & 116-45. Soon after, a law school administrator’s email reminded all students that class
listservs were “restricted to official approved law school business and organizational use.” Pl.’s
Resp. DSMF ¶ 85; Defs.’ Ex. 47, ECF No. 116-46. Holley also emailed Newman personally
twice that night to ask him to stop using school mailing lists. See Pl.’s Resp. DSMF ¶¶ 86, 87;
Defs.’ Exs. No. 42 & 48, ECF Nos. 116-41, 116-47.
Fallout continued for the rest of the month. Newman met with Dean Holley and Dean of
Admissions and Student Affairs Reginald McGahee on January 28. See Pl.’s Ex. 81, ECF No.
141-1 (Newman’s self-prepared transcript of the Zoom meeting). During the meeting, Holley
suggested that Newman transfer to another school. Id. at 8. Three days later, Holley led a virtual
town hall that focused on Newman. See Pl.’s Resp. DSMF ¶ 90. Holley framed the meeting as a
discussion about “what’s been happening in our community . . . in the first year class.” Pl.’s Ex.
5 46 (“Town Hall Tr.”) at 2, ECF No. 137-6. 4 Student speakers understood the focus. Many took
direct aim at Newman. Id. at 25–30. They demanded, for example, that Newman formally
apologize for his actions. Id. at 31. With those grievances aired, Holley gave Newman a few
minutes to share his side. Id. at 30, 32–33.
Newman’s social standing never improved, but his grades did. He sought help from
professors and put his classmates’ hostility aside. Pl.’s Resp. DSMF ¶¶ 96, 98. His spring
semester grades reflected that effort. Newman Transcript at 2. That performance, though, was
not enough. At the end of the year, Newman found himself ranked in the bottom half of his class
by GPA. See Pl.’s Resp. DSMF ¶ 101. And so he lost his scholarship. Id. ¶ 102.
Still, Newman returned for his second year. After an uneventful fall, he found himself in
conflict again with Holley. Tensions reignited early in the spring when Newman requested a
meeting with Holley after he learned that another Howard Law student died suddenly. Id.
¶¶ 104–05. At that meeting, Newman asked Holley about the student’s cause of death. Id.
¶ 105; see generally Pl.’s Ex. 39, ECF No. 136-19 (Newman’s self-prepared transcript of the
meeting). Holley found the request “highly inappropriate” and refused to answer. Pl.’s Ex. 39 at
2.
Newman found the answer on his own. An article reported that the student died from a
pulmonary embolism. See Defs.’ Ex. 1 (“Newman Dep.”) at 243:3–13, ECF No. 116-4. He also
came across research suggesting that COVID vaccines could increase the risk of that condition.
Id. at 243:14–244:6. Newman shared all of this research with more than 200 classmates in an
4 Newman produced several secretly recorded Zoom conversations with Howard personnel. Howard had some recordings transcribed and certified, and Newman offered his own transcriptions of others. Howard Mot. for Summ. J. (“Howard Mot.”) at 20 n.5, ECF No. 116. The Court follows the parties’ lead and relies on this evidence for now.
6 email in late January 2022. Pl.’s Resp. DSMF ¶ 107; Defs.’ Ex. 60 at 2, ECF No. 116-59; see
Defs.’ Ex. 61 at 2, ECF No. 116-60 (estimating the number of recipients). His email also
encouraged the University to delay its COVID booster shot deadline to afford “students more
time for inquiry into the potential risks of the Covid vaccine.” Defs.’ Ex. 60 at 2. Several
students upset by the email forwarded it to Holley. Pl.’s Resp. DSMF ¶ 112; Defs.’ Ex. 62
(“Holley Compl.”) at 13–17, ECF No. 116-61. Hours later, Holley told Newman she planned to
“bring student conduct charges” because of his “continue[d] violat[ions of] the University’s
email policy.” Defs.’ Ex. 63 at 2, ECF No. 116-62.
Dean Holley followed through. Her complaint accused Newman of two Student Code of
Conduct violations: “unauthorized and abusive use of the University’s email system” and
“continual harassment of member [sic] of the Howard Law community, and disturbance of the
learning environment.” Holley Compl. at 2. She attached emails from students complaining
about Newman’s mass emails and GroupMe messages. Id. at 4–17.
University officials reviewed the complaint and set a hearing. Pl.’s Resp. DSMF ¶¶ 126,
128. At the initial hearing in April 2022, Newman was barred from questioning the only witness
against him—Dean Holley. Id. ¶ 129. He successfully appealed the resulting decision. See id.
¶ 133. The University ruled that he had a right to cross-examine witnesses. Defs.’ Ex. 73 at 2,
ECF No. 116-72; Pl.’s Resp. DSMF ¶ 134. On remand, the same panel reconvened in July 2022
and allowed Newman to question the Dean. Pl.’s Resp. DSMF ¶ 135; see Defs.’ Ex. 52, ECF
No. 116-51.
In the end, the panel again found Newman responsible for “harassment” and “disruptive
conduct” and recommended expulsion. See Defs.’ Ex. 69 at 6, ECF No. 116-68. This time the
University agreed. Pl.’s Resp. DSMF ¶ 165. And so, Newman’s time at Howard ended. Defs.’
7 Ex. 74 at 2–3, ECF No. 116-73 (letter to Newman reporting the decision).
B.
A few months after his expulsion, Newman filed this lawsuit alleging a bevy of race
discrimination claims and a few tort claims. See Compl., ECF No. 1-2 at 5–54. Howard
removed the case to this Court. See Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1. In February 2024, the Court
dismissed most of Newman’s claims. See Newman I, 715 F. Supp. 3d at 116. It then allowed
Newman to amend some of his claims. Newman II, 2024 WL 4227723, at *14. Another motion
to amend followed, which the Court found mostly futile. Newman III, 2025 WL 1411093, at *1.
Taken together, these decisions left Newman with three sets of claims. First, a group of
contract claims related to his scholarship agreement. See Newman II, 2024 WL 4227723, at *12
(citing First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 304, 307, 308, ECF No. 50-1). Second, claims under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 for race-based interference with his scholarship agreement. See id. at *9; First Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 228–44. Third, three claims for defamation against Dean Holley based on her
statements during the 2022 disciplinary hearing. See Newman II, 2024 WL 4227723, at *14;
First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 317–19. With those claims in play, the parties moved into discovery.
Now, Howard seeks summary judgment. Howard Mot. for Summ. J. (“Howard Mot.”),
ECF No. 116. Newman opposes but offers little in the way of record cites or legal authority. See
Newman Resp. (“Opp’n”), ECF No. 135. His response to Howard’s statement of material facts
is likewise scant on record cites. See generally Pl.’s Resp. DSMF, ECF No. 135-10. Newman
also submitted his own statement of facts, and that document follows the pattern. See Pl.’s Stmt.
Facts, ECF No. 147-2. These submissions violate the Local Rules and this Court’s Standing
Order. See LCvR 7(h); Standing Order ¶ 13(B), ECF No. 5. Newman should know from the
Court’s past warnings that his pro se status does not exempt him from the rules. See, e.g.,
8 Newman II, 2024 WL 4227723, at *6; Oct. 14, 2025, Minute Order. So the Court disregards
Newman’s unsupported factual assertions. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); LCvR 7(h). With that, the
Court continues to the ripe summary judgment motion. 5
II.
Summary judgment is appropriate if Howard shows that “there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). A factual dispute is material if it could alter the outcome of the suit under the governing
substantive law, and genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict
for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Howard
bears the burden of “identifying those portions of the [record] which it believes demonstrate the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)
(cleaned up). If it does so, the burden shifts to Newman to point to “specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250 (cleaned up). His evidence “is to
be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Id. at 255. But he cannot
“rest upon mere allegation or denials of his pleading.” Id. at 248 (cleaned up).
Because Newman sues pro se, the Court liberally construes his filings and considers them
all together. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). That leeway, though, does not
extend to the evidence required at summary judgment. Penkoski v. Bowser, 548 F. Supp. 3d 12,
5 One other motion requires attention. Newman seeks leave to file “corrections” to his statement of material facts and a sur-reply. Mot. for Leave, ECF No. 161-1. The Court denies Newman’s request for leave to file a sur-reply. He has had ample opportunity to make his case and does not raise truly new issues. See Crummey v. Social Sec. Admin., 794 F. Supp. 2d 46, 62 (D.D.C. 2011). As for his “corrections,” the Court permits those that correct typographical errors and add missing citations. See Mot. for Leave at 5–12 (¶¶ 44, 47, 54, 63, 104, 107, 110, 167, 175, 178, 181, 219, 220, 226). The Court accounted for those changes when resolving the summary judgment motion. It denies the rest of the “corrections”—those that offer new or rewritten factual statements. 9 20 (D.D.C. 2021). “[C]ourts hold pro se plaintiffs to the same evidentiary burdens and
presumptions as represented plaintiffs.” Id. And, of course, Newman must also comply with the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Oviedo v. WMATA, 948 F.3d 386, 397 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
III.
At the outset, the Court has jurisdiction over all of Newman’s claims. Jurisdiction over
his federal-law claims exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. And the Court has supplemental
jurisdiction over his state-law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367. The Court takes the merits of each
set of claims in turn, concluding that Howard is entitled to summary judgment on all but two
defamation claims.
Start with the contract claims. A summary of the limits to these claims recognized in
prior orders sets the table. First, the contract claims run against Howard University and Howard
Law School. Order on Mot. to Clarify at 1–2, ECF No. 48. Second, Newman’s scholarship
agreement is the only relevant contract. Newman I, 715 F. Supp. 3d at 103–04. “Howard
promised to pay Newman $26,000 per year in exchange for his meeting certain eligibility
criteria.” Id. at 104; see Scholarship Agreement at 2–3. The relevant requirement here, of
course, is that Newman needed to rank “within the top fifty percent” of his class for the
scholarship to renew. Scholarship Agreement at 3. Newman did not achieve that rank. See, e.g.,
Defs.’ Ex. 59 at 2, ECF No. 116-58 (email reporting Newman’s class rank as “86/148”).
This brings up the third limit. Because Newman’s own failure to meet the eligibility
benchmark would typically excuse Howard’s failure to pay up, Newman’s viable claims are
rooted in his theory that Howard prevented him from upholding his end of the bargain. See, e.g.,
Newman I, 715 F. Supp. 3d at 104–05; Newman II, 2024 WL 4227723, at *11 (citing First Am.
10 Compl. ¶ 279). He can pursue that theory in two ways. The first avenue is a contract defense
known as the “prevention doctrine.” See In re Estate of Drake, 4 A.3d 450, 454 (D.C. 2010)
(noting that if a promisee’s failure to perform is “fairly attributable to the promisor’s own
conduct” then the promisor must still uphold his end of the deal). The second avenue is to
challenge Howard’s actions as a violation of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. See
Paul v. Howard Univ., 754 A.2d 297, 310 (D.C. 2000) (explaining that a party breaches the duty
of good faith and fair dealing by “evad[ing] the spirit of the contract, willfully render[ing]
imperfect performance or “interfer[ing] with the performance by the other party”). Newman
invokes both avenues, though the analyses merge.
Within these limits, Newman brings three claims against Howard for interfering with his
ability to fulfill the scholarship agreement. He claims that (1) it “adjusted its ‘grading and
ranking systems’ specifically to target him,” Newman II, 2024 WL 4227723, at *12 (quoting
First Am. Compl. ¶ 307); (2) “its agents executed a smear campaign against him,” id. (quoting
First Am. Compl. ¶ 308); and (3) it “supported and failed to correct a racially hostile
environment,” id. (quoting First Am. Compl. ¶ 304). Howard wins summary judgment on each.
First up is Newman’s theory that Howard manipulated its ranking systems to his
disadvantage. See First Am. Compl. ¶ 279 (prevention doctrine theory); id. ¶ 307 (breach of
implied duty of good faith and fair dealing). The evidence does not bear this out.
Instead, it shows that Newman failed to rank in the top half of his class because he
struggled academically. Newman’s problems began when he matriculated at Howard Law. He
had trouble keeping track of deadlines. See Pl.’s Resp. DSMF ¶ 41; Defs.’ Ex. 19 at 3; Defs.’
Ex. 20 at 2. His mind wandered during virtual lectures. Defs.’ Ex. 27 at 10:3–11:1, ECF No.
11 116-26. These troubles were reflected in his first semester grades—a pair of Ds and a C.
Newman Transcript at 2. That performance, Newman concedes, put him in the bottom five of
his section. Pl.’s Resp. DSMF ¶ 35. Newman found his footing in the spring. See Newman
Transcript at 2. But even so, that left him with an 82.08 average for his first year. Pl.’s Resp.
DSMF ¶ 19. That GPA placed him in the bottom half of the class. Defs.’ Ex. 59 at 2; see Defs.’
Ex. 14 at 63:1–64:9, ECF No. 116-14 (Director of Student Records’s description of how grades
are translated into class ranks).
In response, Newman offers three arguments that fall short. First, he argues that
administrators thwarted him by walking back their promise that he would not be ranked if he
dropped legal writing. See, e.g., Pl.’s Resp. DSMF ¶¶ 6, 33; Opp’n at 5. The Court twice
rejected Newman’s reliance on this episode. See Newman II, 2024 WL 4227723, at *11;
Newman III, 2025 WL 1411093, at *11. It does not carry the day here either. To start,
administrators repeatedly discouraged Newman from dropping his writing class—and discussed
tips for success in class with him. See, e.g., Pl.’s Ex. 13 at 17–21, ECF No. 135-12; Pl.’s Ex. 3
(“Olivares Email”) at 3, ECF No. 135-2.
Newman nevertheless decided to withdraw from the class, and he now tries to hold his
own decision against Howard by misconstruing administrators’ statements as a promise that he
would retain his scholarship. Associate Dean for Academic Affairs Mariela Olivares told
Newman in an email that he “would not be ranked” with his class “at the end of Spring 2021” if
he dropped his legal writing class. Olivares Email at 3. When Newman approached Dean
McGahee about the matter, he deferred to Olivares. Pl.’s Ex. 13 at 2. Newman says he took the
administrators’ messages to mean that his scholarship would be safe until 2L. See Pl.’s Resp.
DSMF ¶ 34. But Oliveras did not promise him that he would keep his scholarship—only that he
12 would not be ranked. Olivares Email at 3. She was wrong about that. See Pl.’s Ex. 5 at 2, ECF
No. 135-4 (Olivares’s admission at her deposition that she made a “mistake”). But even if she
had been right, Newman’s scholarship would have been on the chopping block. Recall that
Newman had to rank “in the top fifty percent” at the end of his first year for the scholarship to
renew. Scholarship Agreement at 3. An unranked student does not rank “in the top fifty
percent.” Id.
More, the evidence calls into question whether Newman really understood Oliveras’s
answer as a promise that his scholarship would be safe because he would not be ranked. His
summary response to Oliveras’s email said, “my scholarship will be unaffected by withdrawal
from LRRW.” Olivares Email at 2. But he equated that concern with his fear that dropping the
class would put him below the scholarship’s credit requirements. Id. Further, after his exchange
with Olivares, Newman told a professor, “I stand to lose my scholarship and possibly be
dismissed from law school if I don’t bring up my GPA in the spring.” Defs.’ Ex. 58 at 2, ECF
No. 116-57; see also Pl.’s Ex. 96 at 14, ECF No. 142-6 (“I got very poor grades in the fall
semester. I don’t think there’s a chance of me keeping my scholarship.”). Newman’s concern
about his grades during the second half of his first year shows that he feared he could lose the
scholarship because of its ranking requirement.
Second, Newman argues that Howard’s records reporting his rank in different ways imply
mischief. Opp’n at 5; compare Pl.’s Ex. 36 at 18–21, ECF No. 136-16 (ranking sheet showing
152 students) with Defs.’ Ex. 59 at 2 (email reporting Newman’s rank out of 146 students). To
be clear, Newman never argues that he actually ranked in the top half of his class. Instead, he
says that the conflicting records suggest Howard manipulated grades “to make [his] rank appear
deeper into the lower half that it was.” Pl.’s Resp. DSMF ¶ 101. Newman’s exact ranking
13 within the bottom half, though, is irrelevant to whether Howard breached the agreement or its
implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. No matter Newman’s exact rank, he was not in the
top half. See Scholarship Agreement at 3. On that central point, there is no doubt.
In any event, Newman’s interpretation of the evidence has other problems. He paints
Howard’s records as “incoherent and unreliable” because they report different numbers of
students in his class. Pl.’s Resp. DSMF ¶ 101. But the reports come from two different points.
Some are from January 2021 (showing rankings after one semester), e.g., Pl.’s Ex. 36 at 11–14,
while others are from June 2021 (showing rankings after two semesters), e.g., id. at 18–20. The
student total apparently changed as students dropped out. See id. at 2–3 (administrators’
conversation about removing a student who withdrew). Newman maintains that even the June
2021 ranking sheet differs from the rank he received over email for the same period because the
former showed 152 students, while the email put his rank at 82 out of 146. Pl.’s Resp. DSMF
¶ 101. But, again, neither of those documents shows Newman in the top half.
Third, Newman speculates that professors and administrators depressed his grades
because they disliked him. See, e.g., Opp’n at 5. He points out that administrators asked for his
grades in early 2021, around when students complained about his listserv missives. Pl.’s Resp.
DSMF ¶ 32. And he says his rank “fulfilled” Dean Holley’s suggestion that he “find a law
school that is maybe a better fit.” PSMF ¶ 183 (quoting Pl.’s Ex. 81 at 9). But no evidence
shows that administrators—including Holley—tried to change or otherwise interfere with his
grades. Instead, Newman rests on “bald conjecture” about the administrators’ motives for
making requests within their official purview. See Newman III, 2025 WL 1411093, at *8
(rejecting a proposed amended claim that traded on similar speculation).
As for his professors, Newman suspects some of wrongdoing but offers little in the way
14 of evidence. See Newman Dep. at 130:5–131:1 (admitting that he has no evidence that some
professors did anything wrong). In fact, Newman opted not to depose the professors he thinks
disliked him. See Reply at 9 n.2, ECF No. 158. The only evidence Newman has comes from his
Property grade, and it does not show what he says. Pointing to Professor Carlton Waterhouse’s
scoresheet, he argues that the professor “quietly assigned [him] a ‘0’ for peer review” after he
“raised concerns about peer bias.” Opp’n at 5. In fact, Waterhouse removed the peer review
score at Newman’s request.
In March 2021, Newman wrote to Dean Olivares with concerns about the Property
grading system. Pl.’s Ex. 22 at 2, ECF No. 136-2. The peer rating component, he feared, invited
his classmates to give him low scores because he was unpopular. Id. So he asked “that this
component of the score be removed or [his] individual score bolstered artificially to whatever
degree reasonable based on a more objective assessment of [his] contribution.” Id. Newman got
what he wanted. See Pl.’s Ex. 21 at 5, ECF No. 136-1. The “Peer Eval” component on
Waterhouse’s scoresheet is blacked out for Newman. Id. see Pl.’s Ex. 20 at 3, ECF No. 135-19
(message from the Property teaching assistant to Newman telling him, “Professor Waterhouse
instructed me not to include peer evaluations in your grade due to potential bias”). And Newman
apparently got a boost to compensate for the excised figure. Pl.’s Ex. 21 at 5 (showing that
Newman’s raw score—without a peer evaluation grade—was a “13” and that he received a “B”
while another student with a “13.5” raw score received a “D”).
Otherwise, Newman falls back on his theory that because professors could have broken
anonymization they might have “depressed his overall grade.” Opp’n at 5. Construing his
filings generously, Newman at most shows that some professors incorporated subjective points
into grades. See Pl.’s Resp. DSMF ¶ 23. But he does not show that this grading practice led to
15 artificially deflated grades for him. For example, though Newman claims that he received the
“lowest participation score” in his Property class, the grade sheets show that he received the
median grade—a 4 out of 5. Pl.’s Ex. 21 at 5. Without evidence to support his claims,
Newman’s argument boils down to speculation. And speculation cannot defeat summary
judgment. Morris v. McCarthy, 825 F.3d 658, 674 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
The next contract claim fails for similar reasons. This claim theorizes that Howard
administrators launched a “smear campaign” against Newman, causing “his professors and their
TA’s [sic]” to award “him reduced scores in his classes.” First Am. Compl. ¶ 308; see Opp’n at
15. But, as discussed, the record shows that Newman lost his scholarship because of his poor
academic performance and includes no evidence that Newman’s professors interfered with his
grades in the way he alleges. See supra Part III.A.i. So Newman cannot show that any “smear
campaign” had “the effect of destroying or injuring” his right “to receive the fruits of” the
scholarship agreement. Paul, 754 A.2d at 310.
Newman protests that “[t]he record contains multiple instances of administrators
soliciting, receiving, and circulating unverified student complaints and compilations targeting
[him], copying multiple professors.” Opp’n at 15. As support, he cites evidence that some
professors received criticism about him from other students and that they shared the students’
emails with administrators. Pl.’s Ex. 63 at 5, ECF No. 139-3; Pl.’s Ex. 9, ECF No. 135-8. Aside
from repeating his unsupported allegations of grade manipulation, Newman does not explain
how any of this inhibited his ability to perform under the scholarship agreement. Accord
Cambridge Holdings Grp., Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 357 F. Supp. 2d 89, 96 (D.D.C. 2004)
(dismissing a breach of good faith and fair dealing claim where plaintiff did not allege injury
16 rights under the contract at issue). Newman may disagree with what his classmates had to say
about him, but a professor’s attention to another student’s complaint—unaccompanied by any
sort of grade-based retribution against Newman—does not show “willful” interference with
Newman’s scholarship. See Paul, 754 A.2d at 310.
Last up for the contract claims is Howard’s failure to correct a racially hostile
environment. See First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 70–71. The theory is that Howard did not appropriately
address the animosity Newman’s peers showed him, thereby interfering with his ability to get top
grades. See, e.g., Opp’n at 12–14. But, once again, the evidence does not show that Howard’s
failure to respond to peer-on-peer hostility had “the effect of destroying or injuring” Newman’s
right “to receive the fruits of” the scholarship agreement. Paul, 754 A.2d at 310.
Paul v. Howard University is instructive. 754 A.2d 297 (D.C. 2000). There, the court
rejected the plaintiff’s claim that Howard University’s denial of her tenure application violated
the duty of good faith and fair dealing. Id. at 310–11. That claim failed because the plaintiff
“had no contractual right to receive tenure automatically” and Howard officials “acted within the
standards set forth in the handbooks when considering her tenure applications.” Id. at 311.
Similar facts present here. Though Newman apparently forgets, see Opp’n at 17, the
scholarship agreement did not promise Newman a “welcoming environment” free of hostility
from other students, Newman II, 2024 WL 4227723, at *11. And Howard’s response to
Newman’s concerns about his peers’ treatment followed set policies. Professors and
administrators who learned about Newman’s social ostracization referred him to grievance
procedures. See, e.g., Defs.’ Ex. 32 at 3 (Professor Patricia Worthy’s referral email); Defs.’ Ex.
11 at 2 (Dean McGahee’s email inviting Newman to file a grievance for any violations of the
17 Student Code of Conduct in the GroupMe). Newman found those procedures unappealing and
declined to pursue them during his first year. See Pl.’s Resp. DSMF ¶ 70. He thought the school
should instead “facilitate open dialogue in an educational setting with a trained professional.”
Pl.’s Ex. 124 at 2, ECF No. 145-4. Howard’s refusal to arrange his preferred remedy does not
amount to bad faith.
That is particularly true considering the help Newman got. Howard Law officials
devoted lots of time to helping Newman succeed socially and academically. Dean McGahee, for
example, had a series of long talks with Newman. See, e.g., Pl.’s Ex. 34, ECF No. 136-14
(Newman’s transcript of his conversation with McGahee in mid-October 2020); Pl.’s Ex. 13,
ECF No. 135-12 (Newman’s transcript of his conversation with McGahee in early October
2020); cf. Pl.’s Ex. 9 at 20 (email from a professor agreeing to speak with Newman about the
challenges Newman “faced as a Caucasian student at Howard”). More, when Newman did file a
complaint (in January 2022 against Dean Holley) the University hired a law firm to investigate.
Pl.’s Resp. DSMF ¶ 115.
To be sure, the record is replete with evidence that Newman’s peers mocked and
excluded him. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 76, 77. And Holley responded questionably to that behavior—
including by leading the town hall that devolved into a grievance session about Newman. See id.
¶ 91. But Newman offers no evidence that links those problems to his ability “to receive the
fruits of the” scholarship agreement. Paul, 754 A.2d at 310. So Howard earns summary
judgment on the claims. See Cambridge Holdings Grp., 357 F. Supp. 2d at 96.
Howard next seeks summary judgment on Newman’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
Howard Mot. at 30–38. A § 1981 claim demands evidence that Newman was deprived of a
18 protected right, and that intentional race discrimination was a but-for cause of that deprivation.
Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 589 U.S. 327, 339 (2020). Newman
invokes his right to contract. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b) (defining the protected right to “make and
enforce contracts” as including “the making, performance, modification, and termination of
contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual
relationship”). He claims that Howard Law, Howard University, and five individual
administrators interfered with his scholarship by manipulating his grades and stirring up racial
hostility. First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 230–39; see Newman III, 2025 WL 1411093, at *9 n.5
(permitting certain factual allegations from Newman’s proposed Second Amended Complaint to
supplement this § 1981 claim). Unsurprisingly then, Newman’s § 1981 claim overlaps with his
breach-of-contract claims. And, once again, Howard earns summary judgment. 6
At the outset, Newman’s § 1981 claim against the individual Howard officials fails
because there is no evidence that they affected his scholarship. Along with Dean Holley, the
individual Defendants are four Howard University officials: President Wayne Frederick, Vice
President of Student Affairs Cynthia Evers, Associate Vice President of Student Affairs Debra
Bright, and Director of Student Conduct and Community Standards Lawan Lanier-Smith. See
First Am. Compl. at 81 (stating § 1981 claims “against all Defendants”). 7 Newman “must
6 Newman also alleges that Howard interfered with his “contract with Howard” by “expelling him for racially discriminatory reasons,” thereby depriving him of a J.D. First Am. Compl. ¶ 240. The Court has never addressed this claim because Howard previously waived objection to it. See Newman II, 2024 WL 4227723, at *9; Newman III, 2024 WL 1411093, at *7. Once again, Howard ignores Newman’s § 1981 claim relating to his degree and expulsion. See Howard Mot. at 30–38. And, once again, the Court follows suit. It will proceed to trial. 7 Newman also alleged that Dean McGahee violated § 1981 by interfering with his scholarship, but the Court explained that any such claim would be futile. See Newman III, 2025 WL 1411093, at *8. The Court also rejected as futile Newman’s proposed § 1981 claims against 19 demonstrate some affirmative link” to causally connect each individual’s actions with his
scholarship loss. Patterson v. Cnty. of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 229 (2d Cir. 2004) (cleaned up);
accord Mitchell v. Amtrak, 407 F. Supp. 2d 213, 227 n.11 (D.D.C. 2005). The evidence cannot
supply that link.
Bright, Evers, and Lanier-Smith are the most removed. They entered Newman’s orbit
during his 2022 disciplinary hearing, a year after he lost his scholarship. See, e.g., Pl.’s Resp.
DSMF ¶¶ 131, 133. Indeed, Newman’s criticisms of their actions focus on the expulsion that
resulted from the hearing. Opp’n at 21. And he points to no evidence that Bright or Evers even
knew about knew about his scholarship before he lost it. See Pl.’s Resp. DSMF ¶¶ 169–70.
President Frederick is also an attenuated actor. Newman offers his January 2021 email to
Frederick, faulting Frederick for not referring his racial discrimination complaint to the EEO
office. Opp’n at 21; Pl.’s Resp. DSMF ¶ 169; see Pl.’s Ex. 10 at 9, ECF No. 135-9. But
Newman does not explain how Frederick’s inaction affected his scholarship. In fact, Newman
had spoken to the EEO office (and decided against filing charges) by the time he emailed
Frederick. See Pl.’s Resp. DSMF ¶ 69. So it is unclear what more Frederick could have done.
The evidence against Dean Holley also comes up short. Newman theorizes that she
interfered with his scholarship by manipulating his grades and stirring up hostility against him.
See Opp’n at 20. Again, though, there is no evidence of grade manipulation. See supra Part
III.A.i; Reply at 12–13. And while Holley disliked Newman and sympathized with student
complaints about him, see infra Part III.C.i, no evidence shows that her feelings manifested in
Olivares and Professor Alice Thomas. Id. at *7–9. Though Newman ignores those prior holdings, see Opp’n at 20–21, the Court will not rehash them here. More, even if the claims were live, they would fail without evidence of intentional racial discrimination. See infra Part III.B.ii. 20 action affecting his scholarship. Newman speculates that the January 2021 town hall depressed
his grades by distracting him from schoolwork. See Opp’n at 7. But “a pro se plaintiff, like any
other, cannot defeat summary judgment by making mere allegations or denials that are
unsupported by affidavits or other competent evidence.” Bloom v. McHugh, 828 F. Supp. 2d 43,
53 (D.D.C. 2011). And the record cuts against Newman’s theory. See Pl.’s Resp. DSMF ¶ 98
(admitting that his grades improved in Spring 2021, after the town hall).
In short, without evidence linking the individual Defendants’ actions to Newman’s
scholarship, the § 1981 claim against these Defendants fails. See Patterson, 375 F.3d at 229.
More, this § 1981 claim fails against every Defendant because the evidence does not
show that his “race was a but-for cause” of his scholarship loss. Comcast Corp., 589 U.S. at 333.
This causal showing demands either direct or circumstantial evidence of racial discrimination.
Moini v. Wrighton, 602 F. Supp. 3d 162, 172 (D.D.C. 2022), aff’d sub nom. Moini v. Granberg,
2024 WL 2106214 (D.C. Cir. May 1, 2024).
“The record contains no direct evidence of discrimination” by Howard—“for example, a
statement that itself shows racial . . . bias in the [scholarship] decision.” Vatel v. All. of Auto.
Mfrs., 627 F.3d 1245, 1247 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Newman reports “abundant” evidence but offers
no record cites in support. Opp’n at 22. True, Newman’s peers hurled racial insults at him. See,
e.g., Pl.’s Ex. 10 at 8 (Newman’s transcript of messages with classmates showing that another
classmate called him “Mayo king”). But no classmate played a role in terminating Newman’s
scholarship.
So Newman’s evidence is properly considered circumstantial—and it comes up short.
Circumstantial evidence of discrimination triggers the familiar McDonnell Douglas framework.
21 See Brown v. Sessoms, 774 F.3d 1016, 1022 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (applying McDonnell Douglas to a
§ 1981 claim); see generally McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under
that framework, the plaintiff typically must present a prima facie case of discrimination before
the burden shifts to the defendant. See, e.g., Wheeler v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 812 F.3d
1109, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2016). In this Circuit, however, when a defendant offers a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its actions, the Court “need not—and should not—decide whether
the plaintiff actually made out a prima facie case.” Brady v. Off. of Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d
490, 494 (D.C. Cir. 2008); see Wheeler, 812 F.3d at 1114.
Howard offers such a justification. It maintains that Newman lost his scholarship
because he did not rank in the top half of his class at the end of his first year. Howard Mot. at
36–38. Again, the evidence supports that story. See supra Part III.A.i. So the Court skips to the
third McDonnell Douglas step, asking whether Newman “produced enough evidence for a
reasonable jury to find that [Howard] intentionally discriminated against [him] on the basis of
race.” Wilson v. DNC Servs. Corp., 417 F. Supp. 3d 86, 92 (D.D.C. 2019); see Wheeler, 812
F.3d at 1114.
Newman has not done so. To be sure, Newman’s grievance smorgasbord paints a bleak
picture of his time at Howard Law. But the three categories of evidence he musters do not create
a triable issue over racial discrimination.
First, Newman criticizes Howard’s enforcement of its scholarship policies. He points out
that the school’s average scholarship award is lower for white students than any other group.
Opp’n at 5; see Pl.’s Resp. DSMF ¶ 8. This evidence may be relevant if Newman brought a
§ 1981 claim based on the terms of his award. See Domino’s Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U.S.
470, 476 (2006) (acknowledging that § 1981 permits a claim for racial discrimination in contract
22 formation). But he did not. Newman’s claim instead turns on alleged interference with the
scholarship agreement he signed. See First Am. Compl. ¶ 229; Reply at 16. Aside from
scholarship data, Newman repeats his attacks on Dean Olivares’s incorrect statement that he
would not be ranked if he dropped his writing class. Opp’n at 18. Adding to the problems
covered above, see supra Part III.A.i, is the fact that Olivares’s statement has no discernable
relationship to Newman’s race. He does not, for example, argue that any similarly situated non-
white student avoided ranking and kept a scholarship he otherwise should have lost. See Royall
v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 548 F.3d 137, 144 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (recognizing differential
treatment as a way of showing pretext).
Second, and relatedly, Newman argues that he was treated differently than his non-white
peers. A defendant’s favorable treatment of a similarly situated individual of a different race can
show pretext. See Royall, 548 F.3d at 144. But it requires a “nearly identical” comparator.
Neuren v. Adduci, Mastriani, Meeks & Schill, 43 F.3d 1507, 1514 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (cleaned up).
Though Newman complains he received worse treatment than his peers in many ways, he does
not point to a particular peer for comparison. For example, Newman stresses that the Law
School denied his request for an exam time accommodation to adjust for his Hawaii time zone,
though it made exceptions for other reasons. Opp’n at 18–19; see Pl.’s Ex. 5 at 5:06. But no
other student requested or received the location-based accommodation Newman wanted. See
Pl.’s Resp. DSMF ¶ 14. His complaints about the discipline he received for sending unsolicited
listserv messages have the same problem. See Opp’n at 19.
Third, Newman protests that a direct comparator is unnecessary because he has other
evidence of the racially charged climate he encountered at Howard Law. See id. True, pretext
can be shown in many ways. But Newman’s remaining evidence also comes up short. He
23 begins broadly, taking issue with the racial focus of materials he read for class. See id. at 13, 19.
That evidence has limited value. See Moini, 602 F. Supp. 3d at 180–81 (declining to consider
evidence of a “racist climate on campus” in favor of “available specific evidence directly
relevant to the particular plaintiff” (citing Williams v. Boorstin, 663 F.3d 109, 115 n.38 (D.C.
Cir. 1980)). Otherwise, Newman criticizes his peers’ conduct, pointing to insults in GroupMe
messages and statements during the town hall. Opp’n at 19–20. But, again, Newman has not
connected any of this peer behavior to his scholarship.
In the end, Howard shows that Newman lost his scholarship because he failed to rank in
the top half of the class at the end of his first year. And the evidence shows that he failed to do
that because he struggled academically. Newman counters with a convincing story that Howard
Law School was far from a pleasant environment for him. But the evidence falls short where it
matters most for a § 1981 claim. It does not permit a jury to find that intentional racial
discrimination played a role in his scholarship loss. See Brady, 520 F.3d at 494.
C.
Last, consider Newman’s defamation claims against Dean Holley. Those claims turn on
three statements made during Newman’s 2022 disciplinary hearing. First, “Holley accused
Newman of ‘harassment’ against her and against the students.” First Am. Compl. ¶ 319.
Second, “Holley called Newman’s email regarding a deceased classmate ‘defamatory’ and
repeatedly characterized Newman’s general conduct as ‘defamatory.’ ” Id. ¶ 317. And third,
“Holley accused Newman of saying African-Americans suffer from hive mind.” Id. ¶ 318.
To prevail on these claims, Newman must show that Holley made a “false and
defamatory statement about him, without privilege, to a third party and that the statement was
made at least negligently and caused Newman special harm.” Newman II, 2024 WL 4227723, at
24 *13 (citing Oparaugo v. Watts, 884 A.2d 63, 76 (D.C. 2005)). Each alleged defamatory
statement occurred in a University disciplinary proceeding, so Holley is entitled to a qualified
privilege. See Newman I, 715 F. Supp. 3d at 113. Overcoming that privilege requires Newman
to show that Holley’s statements “were made with express malice.” Id. The Court begins by
finding that Newman clears the malice hurdle, before turning to the remaining claim elements.
In the end, Newman’s first defamation claim is not actionable, but the rest are.
“Malice, in the context of a qualified privilege, is the equivalent of bad faith. It is the
doing of an act without just cause or excuse, with such a conscious indifference or reckless
disregard as to its results or effects upon the rights or feelings of others as to constitute ill will.”
Payne v. Clark, 25 A.3d 918, 925 (D.C. 2011) (citation omitted). To determine whether there is
a triable issue of malice, the Court “looks to the primary motive by which the defendant is
apparently inspired.” Id. (citation omitted). Under that test, “the mere existence of ill will” does
not establish malice if the speaker made the statement for a proper purpose. Id. at 926. But,
ultimately, “[w]hether a person acts with malice is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury.” Id.
(citation omitted).
A jury could find that Dean Holley made the three statements with malice. Her dislike of
and frustration with Newman is apparent as early as January 2021—a year before she filed the
complaint against him. See Opp’n at 17, 20, 28–29. In January 2021, Holley led the town hall
that devolved into a grievance fest about Newman. See generally Town Hall Tr., ECF No. 137-
6. And though she did not identify Newman by name herself at the meeting, she endorsed
students’ complaints about Newman. See, e.g., id. at 15 (“You came to an HBCU to be free of
this kind of activity.”).
25 A few days earlier, Holley told Newman that Howard “does not seem to be a very good
fit for you.” Pl.’s Ex. 81 at 8; see id. (“[M]y opinion is that this—you did not choose the right
space for your legal education.”). And, in the same meeting she complained that she “spent
25%” of her time in the “last three weeks” addressing Newman and his behavior. Id. at 10. By
January 2022, Holley still saw Newman as “a disturbance.” Pl.’s Ex. 39 at 13, ECF No. 136-19.
She told him as much in a meeting days before filing charges against him. Id.
Holley seeks refuge in the principle that actual malice does not exist even if the speaker
“feels resentment and indignation towards the plaintiff” so long as the “primary purpose” of the
speech is to “further the interest which is entitled to protection.” Armenian Assembly of Am., Inc.
v. Cafesjian, 692 F. Supp. 2d 20, 50–51 (D.D.C. 2010), aff’d, 758 F.3d 265 (D.C. Cir. 2014)
(cleaned up). She claims that she made the statements to further her protected interest of
representing other students’ complaints about Newman’s actions. Howard Mot. at 39; see Defs.’
Ex. 52 at 36:22–24 (Holley’s testimony about the purpose of her statement).
But construing the facts in the light most favorable to Newman, the record suggests
Holley may have had ulterior motives. There is no evidence that a student filed a formal
complaint against Newman. See Defs.’ Ex. 52 at 10:14–19 (Holley’s testimony at the
disciplinary hearing that one student “wanted to” file a complaint but “as far as I know she didn’t
do that”). And Holley herself told students a year before that “a student must file” a complaint
about another student’s Code of Conduct violation. Town Hall Tr. at 6 (“[I]f [a student]
violate[s] the Student Code of Conduct, I don’t have the power to do anything about that myself.
That is something that a student must file a complaint about.”); see id. at 12 (“If you have a
complaint, you must file a complaint with the Office of Student Affairs . . . I think the Code is
very clear on who should file the complaint. It should be the student who is directly impacted.”).
26 So her decision—after a year of frustration with Newman—to bring charges on behalf of
unnamed student victims who opted not to file their own complaints is at least open to question.
This evidence, combined with Holley’s past treatment of Newman, could permit a jury to find
that Holley made the statements because of her ill will for Newman.
Now turn to the statements themselves. Dean Holley argues that each statement was
neither injurious nor false.
Start with the injury requirement. Holley’s argument that “there is no evidence the three
statements at issue were injurious to [Newman’s] reputation” can be quickly put to rest. Howard
Mot. at 52. Holley protests that the disciplinary panel’s report “did not rely on [her]
characterization of Newman’s conduct as a basis for Newman’s disciplinary decision.” Id. True,
the report did not explicitly quote her statements. See generally Defs.’ Ex. 69, ECF No. 116-68.
But as Newman points out, Holley made the allegedly defamatory statements in the proceeding
that led to the expulsion report. See Pl.’s Resp. DSMF ¶ 164. And the report states that it is
based on “the documents and statements provided by Dean Holley-Walker and any cross
examination of her.” Defs.’ Ex. 69 at 5. From this, a jury could find the statements injurious.
Now for the next question: Were Holley’s statements false? See Howard Mot. at 40–52.
“The question for falsity is whether ‘the substance, the gist, the sting, of the libelous charge can
be justified.’” Newman II, 2024 WL 4227723, at *13 (quoting Armstrong v. Thompson, 80 A.3d
177, 183 (D.C. 2013)). Under District law, a statement is not considered “false” if it contains
only “[s]light inaccuracies of expression.” See Liberty Lobby Inc., v. Dow Jones & Co., 838
F.2d 1287, 1296 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Further, “a statement of opinion is actionable only if it has an
explicit or implicit factual foundation and is therefore objectively verifiable.” Guilford Transp.
27 Indus., Inc. v. Wilner, 760 A.2d 580, 597 (D.C. 2000).
First up is Holley’s statement that Newman committed harassment. See Defs.’ Ex. 52 at
35:15–36:20; First Am. Compl. ¶ 319. She earns summary judgment on this claim because the
statement was substantially true. See Liberty Lobby, 838 F.2d at 1291. She charged Newman
with “harassment,” which the Howard Student Code of Conduct defines as “engaging in verbal,
electronic, visual, written or physical behavior directed at an individual or group that, in the view
of a reasonable person, is likely to provoke or otherwise result in a negative or injurious response
. . .” Pl.’s Ex. 69 at 7.
The record bears that charge out. Many students complained that they felt harassed by
Newman’s unsolicited emails. Newman himself recognized that some of his peers likely did not
want his messages. Newman Dep. at 193:9–18. The most important one was the email
discussing the deceased Howard student as part of a pitch for delayed vaccine deadlines. See
Defs.’ Ex. 60 at 2, ECF No. 116-59 (Newman’s email). Students described that email as “deeply
disturbing,” an “exploitation” of the student’s death, and “emotionally violating.” Pl.’s Ex. 108
at 2, 3, 5, ECF No. 143-8. Holley also found the “message completely disgusting and
disturbing.” Id. at 1. Newman maintains that his classmates were merely disagreeing with his
views. See Opp’n at 36. Maybe so. But his classmates’ repeated negative reactions to his
messages support Holley’s charge that he engaged in “harassment” as defined by the Code. See
Pl.’s Ex. 69 at 7. In other words, the “substance” of her charge is justified. Armstrong, 80 A.3d
at 183. So Holley wins summary judgment.
Second is Holley’s characterization of Newman’s email about the deceased student as
“defamatory.” Defs.’ Ex. 52 at 14:24–15:2, 35:7, 35:23–25; see First Am. Compl. ¶ 317. She
first frames the statement as a non-actionable opinion. Howard Mot. at 42–43. The Court
28 rejected this argument years ago. Newman I, 715 F. Supp. 3d at 115. Nothing in the record
changes that holding. Holley now frames her use of “defamatory” as a personal gripe made “in
colloquial terms,” rather than a legal charge. Defs.’ Ex. 77 ¶ 13, ECF No. 116-76. But
throughout the disciplinary process Holley used her position as Law School Dean to bolster her
complaint. See, e.g., Defs.’ Ex. 52 at 35:10–11; Holley Compl. at 3. That context suggests she
meant “defamatory” in its legal sense. See Sigal Const. Corp. v. Stanbury, 586 A.2d 1204, 1210
(D.C. 1991) (directing courts to consider the context of a statement when determining whether it
is opinion). Whether that charge is true turns on genuinely disputed “objectively verifiable”
facts. Guilford Transp. Indus., 760 A.2d at 597; see Howard Mot. at 42.
As for falsity, the analysis for this statement turns on the same elements Newman himself
needs to prove for his claim that Holley defamed him. Holley focuses on falsity, arguing that
Newman’s statement was truly defamatory. See Howard Mot. at 47–49. In doing so, she recasts
her description of Newman’s email as “defamatory” against her. See id. at 47; Reply at 27. In
other words, that she lied “about a student’s cause of death.” Reply at 27. But the context of
Holley’s statement shows that she accused Newman of defaming the deceased student—not
herself. See Holley Compl. at 2 (describing Newman’s email as making a “false allegation that a
recently deceased member of the Howard Law Class of 2022, [redacted] died due to receiving
the COVID-19 vaccine and booster”). And Holley’s briefing pays little attention to whether
Newman defamed the student. She does not, for example, explain how Newman’s speculation
about the student’s cause of death made the student appear “odious, infamous, or ridiculous.”
Howard Univ. v. Best, 484 A.2d 958, 989 (D.C. 1984). So summary judgment is inappropriate.
Now on to Newman’s last defamation claim. It is based on Holley’s statement, “You
said that black people have hive mind.” Defs.’ Ex. 52 at 13:14–15; see First Am. Compl. ¶ 318.
29 This claim also survives. Again, the statement was not framed as Holley’s opinion. See
Newman I, 715 F. Supp. 3d at 115. Holley was not, for example, offering an abstract “charge[]
of racism.” Florio v. Gallaudet Univ., 119 F.4th 67, 77 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (cleaned up). Her full
statement was: “You said that black people have hive mind. You said that black people believe
that the government should solve -- and that’s actually in the chat.” Defs.’ Ex. 52 at 30:14–17
(emphasis added). Those are not words “expressing a subjective view, an interpretation, a
theory, conjecture, or surmise.” Guilford Transp. Indus., 760 A.2d at 597. She was “claiming to
be in possession of objectively verifiable statements.” Id. So the statement is an actionable
factual assertion.
And a jury could find that it was a false one. It is undisputed that Newman wrote in a
GroupMe, “I *don’t* know what I’m doing. What I’m *trying* to do is share with you a
viewpoint that you won’t hear anywhere else because you all suffer badly from hive mind.”
Defs.’ Ex. 29 at 2, ECF No. 116-28.
Sufficient evidence supports Newman’s argument that this statement referred to a few
classmates, not all African Americans. See Opp’n at 33–34. To start, he posted it in the
“Howard University School of Law Class of 23.” Defs.’ Ex. 29 at 2. And he wrote it in
response to another student’s question, “I’m just wondering why are u here? (as we seem to
bother you so much).” Id. Newman’s message itself also suggests a focused critique. He says,
“Your professors do not challenge you to question your assumptions” and “I still love all of you
even though you so completely despise me.” Id. From this a jury could conclude that he did not
accuse African Americans generally of suffering from “hive mind.”
Holley’s counter that Newman made comments about the “black community” “mere
minutes earlier” is mistaken. Howard Mot. at 50. Newman’s “hive mind” comment came in
30 January 2021. See Pl.’s Ex. 80 at 2–3, ECF No. 116-79 (email from student complaining about
the comment in January 2021); Pl.’s Resp. DSMF ¶ 63. That was months, not minutes, after his
October 2020 statement, “Where I part with the black community is where they believe
government solves problems.” Howard Mot. at 50 (emphasis omitted); see Pl.’s Resp. DSMF
¶ 62. And though Holley is correct that at least one student interpreted Newman’s comment as
an accusation against “the class (and the Black community more generally),” Pl.’s Ex. 80 at 3,
that evidence is best sent to the jury to be considered against Newman’s contrary proffer.
IV.
In the end, Howard wins summary judgment on the contract breach claims, the § 1981
claim based on interference with Newman’s scholarship agreement, and the defamation claim
against Holley for her “harassment” accusation. Two of Newman’s defamation claims—based
on Holley’s description of his email as “defamatory” and her statement that he said African
Americans suffer from “hive mind”—resist summary judgment. And because Howard does not
address Newman’s allegations that Defendants substantially interfered with his ability to obtain a
J.D. degree, that § 1981 claim also continues. See First Am. Compl. ¶ 240–44.
Accordingly, it is:
ORDERED that the Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 116, is GRANTED IN
PART as to Newman’s breach-of-contract claims, his § 1981 claim based on Defendants’
interference with his scholarship, and his defamation claim against Holley based on her
accusation that Newman committed harassment. The Motion is DENIED IN PART as to
Newman’s remaining two defamation claims. See First. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 317, 318. It is further
ORDERED that the Motion for Leave, ECF No. 161, is GRANTED IN PART as to
Newman’s request to amend paragraphs 44, 47, 54, 63, 104, 107, 110, 167, 175, 178, 181, 219,
31 220, and 226 of his Statement of Material Facts, and DENIED IN PART as to his proposed sur-
reply and all other requested amendments.
SO ORDERED.
2026.03.25 15:02:42 -04'00' Dated: March 25, 2026 TREVOR N. McFADDEN, U.S.D.J.
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Newman v. Howard University School of Law, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/newman-v-howard-university-school-of-law-dcd-2026.