New Jersey Television Corp. v. Federal Communications Commission

393 F.3d 219, 364 U.S. App. D.C. 196, 34 Communications Reg. (P&F) 855, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 26881
CourtCourt of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
DecidedDecember 28, 2004
Docket03-1444
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 393 F.3d 219 (New Jersey Television Corp. v. Federal Communications Commission) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
New Jersey Television Corp. v. Federal Communications Commission, 393 F.3d 219, 364 U.S. App. D.C. 196, 34 Communications Reg. (P&F) 855, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 26881 (D.C. Cir. 2004).

Opinion

STEPHEN F. WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.

New Jersey Television Corporation (“NJTV”) appeals from a Federal Communications Commission order dismissing its application to build a low-power television broadcast station. The FCC ordered dismissal, seventeen years after NJTV filed, because the station would unduly interfere with a full service television station on the same channel. New Jersey Television Corporation (NJTC), 18 FCC Red 24409, 24409 (2003) (citing 47 C.F.R. § 74.706). NJTV now requests us to order the FCC to keep the application on file and give it preferential consideration if the channel becomes available again. Alternatively, NJTV requests an order of “displacement relief’ — permission that the Commission in some cases grants licensees and permit-tees to modify their broadcasting to reduce interference and thus preserve their broadcast entitlement — for which it would have been eligible had the FCC granted the application promptly. NJTV lacks standing to make the first request and failed to assert the second before the Com *221 mission clearly enough to meet the requirements of 47 U.S.C. § 405(a). Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

* * *

NJTV applied in 1981 to build a low-power station on Channel 42 in Cherry Hill, New Jersey. In 1983, pursuant to § 309(i) of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 309(i), the FCC established lotteries — in lieu of comparative hearings — to grant such licenses when mutually exclusive applicants filed. Three years later, the FCC accepted NJTV’s application for filing and held a lottery. NJTV lost, but the lottery became moot in 1998. That year, the FCC granted Channel 42 to WTXF for use in that station’s transition from analog to digital broadcasting; it then dismissed both the lottery winner’s and NJTV’s applications. WTXF may operate one analog and one digital channel until the digital transition concludes, at which point WTXF will return one channel to the FCC. See 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(14). NJTV petitioned for reconsideration, which the FCC staff denied. The FCC affirmed the dismissal in 2003, and NJTV now appeals.

Our analysis begins with “[t]he requirement that jurisdiction be established as a threshold matter.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 94, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 1012, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998). The priority for jurisdictional issues, however, doesn’t control the sequence in which we resolve non-merits issues that prevent us from reaching the merits. Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 584-85, 119 S.Ct. 1563, 1570-71, 143 L.Ed.2d 760 (1999); see also Grand Council of the Crees v. FERC, 198 F.3d 950, 954 (D.C.Cir.2000). One such issue is Article III standing, the familiar elements of which are (1) injury in fact, (2) causation, and (3) redressability. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2136, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). Apropos injury in fact, the harm must be “concrete and particularized ... and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Loss of an opportunity to compete for a benefit may be an injury in fact if it is not merely “illusory.” Ranger Cellular v. FCC, 348 F.3d 1044, 1050 (D.C.Cir.2003).

NJTV here asserts “an interest in not being exposed to competing proposals in a prohibitive auction scenario.” App. Br. at 17. In other words, if WTXF returns Channel 42 to the FCC and the FCC makes Channel 42 available again, NJTV hopes that the Commission will assign the channel to one of the undismissed applicants from the 1986 lottery. With NJTV being evidently the only such applicant (if it prevails here), its prospects of seeming the channel would be superb.

This claim is something of an upgrade from what NJTV sought explicitly from the Commission, which was merely that its application be kept on file. But that deficiency doesn’t in itself undermine NJTV’s assertion of standing here, as the Article III requirement “kicks in” only “[w]hen the petitioner later seeks judicial review.” See Sierra Club v. ERA, 292 F.3d 895, 899 (D.C.Cir.2002). The question remains whether any combination of fact or doctrine, presented in the administrative record or before the court, puts flesh on NJTV’s notion that being kept on file would have had a real prospect of leading to preferential treatment. Id. at 899-901. No such combination appears.

The digital transition may not end at a precisely foreseeable time, but it will end. An interest in the enforcement of cut-off rules, which is what NJTV is really asserting, nevertheless “is just that — an interest, not a vested right.” Bachow Communica *222 tions, Inc. v. FCC, 237 F.3d 683, 688 (D.C.Cir.2001). Even so, if the FCC had a policy of protecting the interests of parties who prevailed under ancient cut-off rules and competitions, NJTV’s prospects of securing the desired entitlement still might be ranked a “realistic possibility.” See Ranger Cellular, 348 F.3d at 1050.

But NJTV points to no such policy, and we can discern none. Indeed, on the very day it dismissed NJTV’s application, the Mass Media Bureau unceremoniously threw out the lottery winner’s as well. Further, the Commission appears to have a practice of moving on from obsolete allocation systems when new ones become available. Cf. Bachow, 237 F.3d at 686. Finally, 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(l) seems to require auctioning generally, subject to exceptions that appear not to include low-power television. See § 309(j)(2). The FCC has in fact read § 309(j) as placing low-power stations within the auction process. In re Amendment of Parts 73 and 74 of the Commission’s Rules To Establish Rules for Digital Low Power Television, Television Translator, and Television Booster Stations and To Amend Rules for Digital Class A Television Stations, 19 FCC Red 19331, at ¶163, 2004 WL 2210980, 2004 FCC LEXIS 5632 (2004).

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393 F.3d 219, 364 U.S. App. D.C. 196, 34 Communications Reg. (P&F) 855, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 26881, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/new-jersey-television-corp-v-federal-communications-commission-cadc-2004.