OPINION
Justice FLAHERTY,
for the Court.
The desire of New England Development, LLC (plaintiff or NED), to build a substantial shopping center in Tiverton (Tiverton Commons) and an allegation that the Tiverton Planning Board (planning board) failed to approve NED’s master plan in a timely fashion brings this dispute before the Court. The planning board voted to reject NED’s master plan application, but NED contends that the planning board’s failure to file a written decision in accordance with a statutory deadline triggered its entitlement to a certificate of the planning board’s failure to act and the resulting approval of its master-plan application. When the administrative officer for the Tiverton Planning Board, Noel Berg (Berg), refused to issue that certificate, NED petitioned the Superior Court for a writ of mandamus to compel Berg to issue it, contending that, in view of the board’s failure to act, Berg’s duty to issue the certificate was ministerial in nature. The trial justice denied that petition, and NED timely appealed. For the reasons discussed in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.
[365]*365I
Statutory Scheme
In 1992, the General Assembly enacted G.L. 1956 chapter 23 of title 45 known as the “Rhode Island Land Development and Subdivision Review Enabling Act of 1992,” (P.L. 1992, ch. 385, § 1). The purpose of the act was expressed by the Legislature in § 45-23-29(c). The text of that statute, entitled Legislative Findings and Intent, says, in pertinent part:
“(c) * * * [I]t is the intent of the general assembly:
“(1) That the land development and subdivision enabling authority contained in this chapter provide all cities and towns with the ability to adequately address the present and future needs of the communities;
“(2) That the land development and subdivision enabling authority contained in this chapter require each city and town to develop land development and subdivision regulations in accordance with the community comprehensive plan, capital improvement plan, and zoning ordinance and to ensure the consistency of all local development regulations;
“(3) That certain local procedures for review and approval of land development and subdivision are the same in every city and town;
“(4) That the local procedure for integrating the approvals of state regulatory agencies into the local review and approval process for land development and subdivision is the same in every city and town; and
“(5) That all proposed land developments and subdivisions are reviewed by local officials, following a standard process, prior to recording in local land evidence records.”
NED filed what is described in the act as a major land development master plan application for Tiverton Commons. Section 45-23-40(b) requires that such applications be certified complete or incomplete within 60 days of submission, and subsection (e) requires that the planning board approve, approve with modifications, or deny the application within 120 days of the issuance of a certificate of completion1 according to the requirements of § 45-23-63. Subsection (f) of § 45-23-40 further provides that, if the planning board does not take action within the 120-day period to either approve or deny the master plan, the applicant shall receive, upon request, a certificate of the planning board’s failure to act from the administrative officer of the planning board.2 This certificate results in the approval of the master plan.
[366]*366Section 45-23-63 sets out the procedure planning boards must follow with regard to meetings, votes, decisions, and records. The pertinent part of § 45-23-63 is subsection (a), which requires that “[a]ll records of the planning board proceedings and decisions shall be written and kept permanently available for public review.” Moreover, the act provides that an appeal may be taken only from a decision on file with the town clerk, and that the appeal period runs for twenty days from the filing of that decision. Section 45-23-67(a). In accord with the mandate of § 45-23-26, the Town of Tiverton enacted ordinances that essentially mirror the requirements of the general laws.3
Having set out the pertinent statutory framework for planning board consideration of major land developments, we now undertake a brief review of the facts that gave rise to the appeal currently before us.
II
Facts and Procedural History
NED began its quest to build Tiverton Commons on a forty-acre site on the south side of Souza Road4 in Tiverton on September 3, 2004 by submitting a major land development/master plan application to the Tiverton Planning Board. On October 27, 2004, the board issued a “Certificate of Completeness” for the application, setting in motion the 120-day clock, by the end of which the board was required to “approve of the master plan as submitted, approve with changes and/or conditions, or deny the application.” Section 45-23-40(e).
In an effort to address local concerns, NED subsequently consented to eight different extensions of the statutory decision deadline.5 During the time that NED’s application was pending, the planning board discussed the application at regularly held meetings, and it also held workshops at which NED and the planning board worked jointly on the plan in an effort to make it mutually acceptable. At the September 29, 2005, board meeting, the parties agreed to an ultimate deadline extension, establishing December 30, 2005, as the final date for the planning board to take action on the application. At this same meeting, the board and NED agreed that NED would withdraw the original master plan that called for a 335,000-square-foot complex, and replace it with [367]*367an alternate design that called for a 275,-000-square-foot complex. There was no indication at the meeting that this plan substitution was to be treated as a new application.6 Additionally, five dates were set for future meetings to consider the application before the December 30, 2005 deadline.7
NED’s efforts did not bear fruit, however, and when the planning board met on November 21, 2005, its members voted unanimously to deny the master plan application for Tiverton Commons. But, no written decision of the planning board was filed with the town clerk before December 30, 2005. Consequently, on January 3, 2006, NED requested that Berg issue it a certificate of the planning board’s failure to act by January 9, 2006. Issuance of that certificate would have resulted in the approval of the master plan by the terms of § 45-23-40(f). When it received no response from Berg, NED filed a verified petition for writ of mandamus in the Superior Court for Newport County on January 10, 2006.
After the mandamus petition was filed, Berg, in a letter dated January 11, 2006, informed NED that the November 21, 2005 vote to deny the master plan application was all (in the opinion of the planning board) that was required to be done to satisfy the statutory requirements, and, therefore, he could not issue NED the certificate it had requested. Shortly thereafter, on January 13, 2006, Berg completed a written decision denying the master plan application, and he filed it with the town clerk. That decision was never presented to or voted on by the planning board. It is also noteworthy that NED filed a timely appeal of that decision to the Tiverton Board of Appeals on February 1, 2006.8 That appeal has been stayed pending the outcome of this appeal.
A trial was held in Superior Court on the petition for writ of mandamus on February 28, 2006. At that trial, NED asserted that § 45-23-40(e) & (f) required the [368]*368planning board to issue a written decision and file it with the town clerk with respect to its vote on the master plan application by the conclusion of the statutory time period — in this case December 30, 2005. NED further maintained that the planning board’s failure to file a written decision by that date triggered a ministerial duty on the part of the administrative officer for the planning board, Berg, to issue the certificate of the planning board’s failure to act, and resulted in the approval of the master plan.
In response, Berg interposed several arguments. First, he argued that NED lacked standing because it did not own the land it sought to develop.9 Second, Berg maintained that the requirement that the board make a decision on the master plan within the statutory time period did not include a requirement that a written decision be issued within that period, and, therefore, the November 21, 2005 vote satisfied the planning board’s statutory duty. Third, he took the position that mandamus was unavailable to NED because an administrative remedy had not been exhausted — namely, an appeal of the denial by the planning board to the Tiverton Board of Appeals.10
In his decision, the trial justice summarily dismissed the standing argument and proceeded to address the substantive argument on the statutory requirements and the question of exhaustion of administrative remedies. He found that, read together, § 45-23-40(e), which requires the planning board to “approve of the master plan as submitted, approve with changes and/or conditions, or deny the application, according to the requirements of § 45-23-63” within 120 days of issuing the certificate of completeness of the master plan application, or such later time to which the applicant consents, and § 45-23-63(a), which mandates that “[a]ll records of the planning board proceedings and decisions shall be written,” clearly and unambiguously require the planning board to issue a written decision within the statutory time frame. He further found that because the planning board failed to issue a written decision by the deadline, the statute imposed a mandatory duty on the administrative officer, at the request of the applicant, to issue the certificate of the planning board’s failure to act.
Despite these findings, the trial justice nevertheless denied NED’s mandamus petition because he concluded that, proeedurally, NED was required to pursue an administrative appeal of the planning board’s denial of its application to the Tiverton Board of Appeals before seeking relief in the Superior Court.
Ill
Standard of Review
A writ of mandamus is an extreme remedy that will be issued only when: (1) the petitioner has a clear legal right to the relief sought, (2) the respondent has a ministerial duty to perform the requested act without discretion to refuse, and (3) the petitioner has no adequate remedy at law. Union Station Associates v. Rossi, 862 A.2d 185, 193 (R.I.2004). “A ministerial function is one that is to be [369]*369performed by an official in a prescribed manner based on a particular set of facts ‘without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety of the act being done.’ ” Arnold v. Rhode Island Department of Labor and Training Board of Review, 822 A.2d 164, 167 (R.I.2003) (quoting Beacon Restaurant v. Adamo, 103 R.I. 698, 703, 241 A.2d 291, 294 (1968)). “Once these prerequisites have been shown, it is within the sound discretion of the Superior Court justice to ultimately issue the writ.” Martone v. Johnston School Committee, 824 A.2d 426, 429 (R.I.2003). The existence of unexhausted administrative remedies may serve to prevent the issuance of a writ of mandamus. See Krivitsky v. Town of Westerly, 849 A.2d 359, 363 (R.I.2004) (availability of de novo hearing before town council of town manager’s refusal to issue a license rendered mandamus remedy unavailable). Furthermore, when discerning the meaning of a statute, we consistently have stated that we give the words of the statute their plain and ordinary meaning. Pastore v. Samson, 900 A.2d 1067, 1078 (R.I.2006). However, when the language of a statute is not susceptible to literal interpretation, it is ambiguous, and we must look to give meaning to the intent of the General Assembly. Retirement Board of Employees’ Retirement System of State v. DiPrete, 845 A.2d 270, 279 (R.I.2004). “[I]t is * * * well established that, when confronted with statutory provisions that are unclear or ambiguous, this Court, * * * will examine statutes in their entirety, and will ‘glean the intent and purpose of the Legislature “from a consideration of the entire statute, keeping in mind [the] nature, object, language and arrangement” of the provisions to be construed.’ ” State v. DiCicco, 707 A.2d 251, 253 n. 1 (R.I.1998) (quoting In re Advisory to the Governor, 668 A.2d 1246, 1248 (R.I.1996) and Algiers v. Fox, 122 R.I. 55, 58, 404 A.2d 72, 74 (1979)). Significantly, we are free to affirm judgments of the Superior Court on grounds other than those relied on by that court, as long as the factual findings of the Superior Court support those grounds. DeSimone Electric, Inc. v. CMG, Inc., 901 A.2d 613, 620-21 (R.I.2006).
IV
Analysis
On appeal, NED maintains that the trial justice erred when he denied the writ of mandamus, because the statutory scheme provided it a clear legal right to a certificate of the planning board’s failure to act, that a mere ministerial duty was imposed on Berg to issue that certificate without any exercise of discretion, and that it had no adequate remedy at law to obtain the relief it sought. Berg, on the other hand, asserts that NED did not have a clear legal right to the issuance of the certificate because the planning board denied the application within the statutory time limit by voting to do so at its meeting on November 21, 2005.11
[370]*370NED argues that it is entitled to the issuance of a writ of mandamus because § 45-23-40(e) requires that the planning board take action on the master plan application “according to the requirements of § 45-23-63” by December 30, 2005; that the phrase “according to the requirements of § 45-23-63” means that the action required was the filing of a written decision with the town clerk; and that, § 45-23-40(f) obliges Berg to issue to NED a certificate of the planning board’s failure to act because the written decision was not filed by December 30, 2005. NED also maintains that no adequate remedy at law exists for the relief it seeks because it has no means other than a mandamus action to compel a public official to perform a ministerial duty that he is refusing to do.
Berg, on the other hand, posits that the statutory scheme does not require a written decision be filed by the statutory deadline, but that only an action on the part of the board — in this case a vote denying the application — 'was necessary by that time. Additionally, Berg asks this Court to agree with the trial justice that NED has not yet exhausted its administrative remedies — via an appeal of the denial of the application— and that, therefore the petition for mandamus is improper.
For mandamus to lie, NED must show that all three conditions required for the writ to issue are met: (1) that NED has a clear legal right to the relief sought — the issuance of the certificate of the planning board’s failure to act by the administrative officer, Berg; (2) that the action requested of the government official was ministerial in nature — that Berg had no discretion to withhold the certificate; and (3) that mandamus is the only means for NED to obtain the relief sought. Because we hold NED does not have a clear legal right to the issuance of the certificate, we address only that issue here.
The trial justice found that §§ 45-23-40(e), (f) and 45-23-63 clearly and unambiguously require that planning boards issue a written decision by the statutory deadline or the master plan application was approved and the certificate of the planning board’s failure to act must be issued by the administrative officer. Nevertheless, he denied the writ of mandamus because he determined that NED had not exhausted its administrative remedies. Although we agree with the trial justice’s conclusion that mandamus should not lie, we respectfully disagree with his interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions. Because we hold that the statutory requirements do not furnish NED with a “clear legal right” to the relief it seeks, we affirm the decision of the trial justice on grounds other than those upon which he relied.
Section 45-23-40(e) sets out the requirements for a decision of the planning board:
“Decision. The planning board shall, within one hundred and twenty (120) days of certification of completeness, or within a further amount of time that may be consented to by the applicant, [371]*371approve of the master plan as submitted, approve with changes and/or conditions, or deny the application, according to the requirements of § 45-23-63.”
Section 45-23-40© sets out the circumstances under which the master plan application is approved, in essence by default, and a certificate of the planning board’s failure to act must be issued:
“Failure to act. Failure of the planning board to act within the prescribed period constitutes approval of the master plan, and a certificate of the administrative officer as to the failure of the planning board to act within the required time and the resulting approval will be issued on request of the applicant.”
Conversely, § 45-23-63 is a procedural statute entitled, “Procedure — Meetings— Votes — Decisions and records.” It states, in subsection (a): “All records of the planning board proceedings and decisions shall be written and kept permanently available for public review.”
When discerning the meaning of a statute, we consistently have stated that we give the words of the statute their plain and ordinary meaning. Pastore, 900 A.2d at 1078. However, as in this case, when the language of a statute is not susceptible to literal interpretation, it is ambiguous, and we must look to give meaning to the intent of the General Assembly. DiPrete, 845 A.2d at 279. Therefore, we will look at the entire statute, including the “ ‘nature, object, language and arrangement’ ” of the provisions to construe their meaning. DiCicco, 707 A.2d at 253 n. 1.
We agree with the trial justice that § 45-23-40(e) calls for a written decision approving or denying the master plan application within 120 days. We are also of the opinion that § 45-23-40© imposes a ministerial duty on the administrative officer, if the planning board fails to take action within 120 days, to issue a certificate of that failure to act to the applicant, and that, consequently, the master plan would be approved. We do not, however, conclude that it is clear that the “[f]ailure * * * to act within the prescribed period” described in § 45-23-40© incorporates the requirement that the written decision be issued within 120 days under penalty of default approval.
NED argues that the language of § 45-23^0(e) is mandatory, and therefore, because it is followed by § 45-23-40©, the sanction of default approval found in © adheres to a failure to follow the mandate of (e). We previously have held, however, that statutes imposing apparently mandatory time restrictions on public officials are often directory in nature. See Washington Highway Development, Inc. v. Bendick, 576 A.2d 115, 117 (R.I.1990) (statute requiring DEM to issue decision within six weeks was directory and not mandatory); Beauehesne v. David London & Co., 118 R.I. 651, 660, 375 A.2d 920, 924-25 (1977) (requirement that Workers’ Compensation Court issue a decision within ten days was directory and not mandatory); Providence Teachers Union v. McGovern, 113 R.I. 169, 177, 319 A.2d 358, 363-64 (1974) (requirement that arbitration hearing begin within ten days of the appointment of the arbitration panel was directory and not mandatory). Therefore, while such statutes direct public officials to perform a duty, they often provide no sanction for failing to perform that duty,
In Bendick, 576 A.2d at 115, the applicable statute said that “‘the director shall make his decision on the application * * * within a period of six weeks,’ ” yet the decision was not issued in that time frame. Like NED in this case, the applicant in that action sought a writ of mandamus, contending that a failure to act within the statutory time frame estopped the DEM director from denying his application. Id. [372]*372However, we rejected that contention, holding that because the statute did not say that the failure to comply with the time constraints removed the director’s jurisdiction to decide the matter, and because the statute contained no negative language in the event the director failed to act within the statutorily described period, we were constrained to find the statute directory as opposed to mandatory. Id. at 117. Therefore, we ordered the DEM director to issue his decision forthwith, but held that no consequence flowed from his failure to comply with the statutory timetable. Id.
In the case now before us, we are presented with a very similar situation. NED filed an application for master plan approval, and § 45-2S-40(e) says that the planning board “shall within one hundred and twenty (120) days approve, approve with changes and/or conditions, or deny the application, according to the requirements of § 45-23-63.” Section 45-23-63(a) requires that “all records of proceedings and decisions of the planning board shall be in writing.” Thus, we are faced with two statutes, both couched in mandatory language, that, when read together, arguably seem to require a written decision within 120 days. But, significantly, § 45-23-40(e) does not sanction the failure to file a written decision.
A sanction is found, however, in the language of § 45-23-40(f). That statute says that if the planning board fails to act within the statutory time frame, the administrative officer "will issue a certificate of the failure to act, which results in the approval of the master plan. NED contends that “act,” as it is used in (f) can only mean “file a written decision” as required by (e). We are not persuaded by that argument.
“Act,” in its plain and ordinary meaning, means “to do something.” Random House Unabridged Dictionary 19 (2d ed. 1993). That definition clearly encompasses a broader scope of behavior than merely filing a written decision. In fact, in this case, the planning board clearly did do “something.” On November 21, 2005, the planning board voted to deny the master plan application.
NED directs our attention to Board of Selectmen of Pembroke v. R. & P. Realty Corp., 348 Mass. 120, 202 N.E.2d 409, 414 (1964), a Massachusetts case in which a similarly worded statute directed the constructive approval of a development plan because the planning board failed to file a written decision by the statutory deadline. However, there is a very significant difference between the wording of the Massachusetts statute, and the wording of the statute currently before us. The Massachusetts statute attaches a sanction to the failure of the planning board to take a “final action.” Id. at 410. Furthermore, the sanction is found in the same section of the statute as the requirement that the decision be written. Id. Here, on the other hand, the mandatory section of the statute requires “action” as opposed to “final action,” and the sanction is in a separate section of the statute than the requirement that a written decision be filed.
We therefore hold that § 45-23-40(e) does include a requirement that the planning board file a written decision within 120 days, and the absence of a sanction in that section renders this requirement directory as opposed to mandatory. We also hold that § 45-23-40(f) contains a mandatory requirement that the planning board act on the application within the statutory timetable, and that failure to abide by that requirement will result in the constructive approval of the master plan, and require the administrative officer to issue the certificate of the planning board’s failure to act. That requirement, [373]*373however, does not encompass the requirement that a written decision be filed. In oui’ opinion, the fact that the planning board voted to deny the application by the deadline satisfies the “action” requirement of § 45 — 23—40(f). Thus, because the Tiver-ton Planning Board fulfilled the requirements imposed on it by § 45 — 28—40(f), NED does not have a clear legal right to the issuance of the certificate of the planning board’s failure to act, and mandamus cannot lie.
We do not believe that the Legislature intended to tacitly remove the authority of municipalities to control development within their borders when they have timely voted to deny a master plan application but failed to file a written decision within the prescribed period. Section 45-23-60 sets out the required findings that planning boards must make when reaching decisions on land development applications. Adherence to this statute constitutes drafting a substantial written decision. While § 45-23-40(e) does direct a decision to be written and filed within 120 days, imposing the sanction of approval by default for failure to meet the deadline would be overly burdensome. Ftmthermore, the intent of the chapter, as expressed in § 45-23-29(c)(1), (2), is to “provide all cities and towns with the ability to adequately address the present and future needs of the communities * * * and to ensure the consistency of all local development regulations * * Imposing the drastic sanction of the approval of an application for failing to meet the deadline for filing such a substantial written decision does not further this goal, but instead selves to remove review from the hands of local officials by approving development projects simply because the planning board was unable to meet procedural strictures.
We are cognizant of the fact that developers who are faced with a planning board decision denying them applications cannot appeal those decisions until a written decision has been filed with the town clerk. Section 45-23-67. In this case, the board’s decision was filed on January 13, 2006, within a reasonable time after the statutory time clock had expired.12 Therefore, the acts of the planning board did not interfere with NED’s right to pursue an appeal.
V
Conclusion
For the reasons stated in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court, to which we remand the papers in this case.
Justice ROBINSON did not participate.