OPINION
BEVILACQUA, Chief Justice.
The United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island, acting pursuant to Rule 6 of the Supreme Court Rules, has certified to this court a question of law. The nature of the instant controversy is as follows.
Hernán D. Carrillo (Hernán), a minor, is a Rhode Island resident who is currently undergoing inpatient treatment at Emma Pendleton Bradley Hospital (Bradley), a children’s psychiatric hospital in East Providence, Rhode Island. His mother, Sheilah I. Carrillo (Sheilah), filed an application requesting that the state pay for the costs of her son’s hospitalization at Bradley through the catastrophic health insurance plan (CHIP). The CHIP Act, G.L.1956 (1977 Reenactment) §§ 42-62-1 to -25, provides that “[t]he state shall pay for the costs of eligible health services of an eligible person when such costs are determined to be catastrophic.” Section 42-62-6(a), as amended by P.L.1980, ch. 256, § 1. The care and treatment that Hernán receives at Bradley constitutes an “eligible health service” within the meaning of the act, Sheilah meets the act’s definition of “eligible person,”
and the hospitalization costs that Sheilah has incurred are sufficient to be determined “catastrophic” within the meaning of the act.
Sheilah’s CHIP application was denied, however, solely on the ground that she was excluded from CHIP coverage by § 42-62-8, as amended by P.L.1980, ch. 256, § 1, of the CHIP Act. That section provides in pertinent part as follows:
“Exclusions.
— All services and charges within any of the following classifications are excluded from the financial protection provided pursuant to § 42-62-6 and shall not be included as applicable personal resource payments pursuant to § 42-62-7.
(a) Benefits provided pursuant to the laws of the United States, and or the state, including, but not limited to military service-connected disabilities, medical services provided for employees of the armed forces of the United States, medical services financed for the benefit of persons eligible for Medicare (Title XVIII);
persons eligible for Medicaid (Title XIX) shall not be eligible for CHIP * *
*[•]” (Emphasis added.)
Both Sheilah and Hernán are eligible for Medicaid, the medical assistance program administered by the State of Rhode Island under G.L.1956 (1977 Reenactment) §§ 40-8-1 to -14 and title 19 of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1396 to 1397 (West 1974). This program furnishes funds for certain medical services for needy families with dependent children and to aged, blind, or disabled persons who may be categorically or medically needy as defined by the federal statute or the state program. The Rhode Island Medicaid program, however, does not provide payment for the costs of inpatient psychiatric hospital services for an eligible child under age twenty-one.
Roe v. Affleck,
R.I., 390 A.2d 361, 364 (1978).
Sheilah, on behalf of herself, her son, and other persons similarly situated, brought a civil suit in the Federal District Court seeking to enjoin defendants, Don Rohrer, the director of the Rhode Island Department of Administration, and Joseph Cannon, the director of the Rhode Island Department of Health, from refusing to pay for Hernan’s care and treatment at Bradley.
The following question has been certified to this court:
“Under the language of R.I. G.L. § 42-62-8(a), as amended in 1980, is a person
who is eligible for Medicaid (Title XIX of the Social Security Act) ineligible for
all
Catastrophic Health Insurance Plan (CHIP) coverage, or ineligible for CHIP coverage only with regard to payments for care for which Medicaid coverage is available?”
In construing a statute, this court’s primary task is to effectuate the intention of the Legislature.
Vaudreuil v. Nelson Engineering & Construction Co.,
R.I., 399 A.2d 1220 (1979). Therefore, this court will not undertake to read an enactment literally if to do so would result in attributing to the Legislature an intention that is contradictory to or inconsistent with the evident purposes of the act.
Kingsley v. Miller,
R.I., 388 A.2d 357 (1978);
Providence Journal Co. v. Mason,
116 R.I. 614, 359 A.2d 682 (1976);
Angel v. Murray,
113 R.I. 482, 322 A.2d 630 (1974). The CHIP Act is remedial social legislation designed to provide financial assistance to those who incur extremely high medical expenses, and its provisions should be construed liberally to effectuate its purpose.
Cf. Volpe v. Stillman White Co.,
R.I., 415 A.2d 1034 (1980) (Workers’ Compensation Act is social legislation and therefore should be construed liberally).
Section 42-62-8(a) provides that “persons eligible for Medicaid (Title XIX) shall not be eligible for CHIP * * * [.]” The defendants contend that a literal interpretation of this section would be reasonable because a Medicaid-eligible person is protected from extremely high medical costs despite the unavailability of CHIP coverage for such costs. According to defendants, the types of health services for which CHIP coverage is available are, with the exception of inpatient psychiatric care, also covered by the Rhode Island Medicaid program. Because state institutions exist to provide free inpatient psychiatric care to those who cannot afford such services, defendants argue, there exists no class of persons without protection from the incurment of catastrophic health-services costs under a literal interpretation of § 42-62-8(a).
After careful scrutiny of the relevant statutes and regulations,
however, we conclude that the Legislature could not have intended that the final clause of § 42-62-8(a) be given a literal interpretation. The defendants’ argument is flawed in that there do exist types of services that are covered by CHIP but for which Medicaid benefits are either actually or potentially unavailable. Examination of the services covered by both programs reveals that, unlike CHIP, the Rhode Island Medicaid program as it is currently administered does not provide benefits for chiropractic services or certain speech and physical therapy services. Moreover, podiatry services, ambulance services, and certain outpatient hospital services are covered by CHIP but are not provided to Medicaid-eligible persons who are classified as medically needy.
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OPINION
BEVILACQUA, Chief Justice.
The United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island, acting pursuant to Rule 6 of the Supreme Court Rules, has certified to this court a question of law. The nature of the instant controversy is as follows.
Hernán D. Carrillo (Hernán), a minor, is a Rhode Island resident who is currently undergoing inpatient treatment at Emma Pendleton Bradley Hospital (Bradley), a children’s psychiatric hospital in East Providence, Rhode Island. His mother, Sheilah I. Carrillo (Sheilah), filed an application requesting that the state pay for the costs of her son’s hospitalization at Bradley through the catastrophic health insurance plan (CHIP). The CHIP Act, G.L.1956 (1977 Reenactment) §§ 42-62-1 to -25, provides that “[t]he state shall pay for the costs of eligible health services of an eligible person when such costs are determined to be catastrophic.” Section 42-62-6(a), as amended by P.L.1980, ch. 256, § 1. The care and treatment that Hernán receives at Bradley constitutes an “eligible health service” within the meaning of the act, Sheilah meets the act’s definition of “eligible person,”
and the hospitalization costs that Sheilah has incurred are sufficient to be determined “catastrophic” within the meaning of the act.
Sheilah’s CHIP application was denied, however, solely on the ground that she was excluded from CHIP coverage by § 42-62-8, as amended by P.L.1980, ch. 256, § 1, of the CHIP Act. That section provides in pertinent part as follows:
“Exclusions.
— All services and charges within any of the following classifications are excluded from the financial protection provided pursuant to § 42-62-6 and shall not be included as applicable personal resource payments pursuant to § 42-62-7.
(a) Benefits provided pursuant to the laws of the United States, and or the state, including, but not limited to military service-connected disabilities, medical services provided for employees of the armed forces of the United States, medical services financed for the benefit of persons eligible for Medicare (Title XVIII);
persons eligible for Medicaid (Title XIX) shall not be eligible for CHIP * *
*[•]” (Emphasis added.)
Both Sheilah and Hernán are eligible for Medicaid, the medical assistance program administered by the State of Rhode Island under G.L.1956 (1977 Reenactment) §§ 40-8-1 to -14 and title 19 of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1396 to 1397 (West 1974). This program furnishes funds for certain medical services for needy families with dependent children and to aged, blind, or disabled persons who may be categorically or medically needy as defined by the federal statute or the state program. The Rhode Island Medicaid program, however, does not provide payment for the costs of inpatient psychiatric hospital services for an eligible child under age twenty-one.
Roe v. Affleck,
R.I., 390 A.2d 361, 364 (1978).
Sheilah, on behalf of herself, her son, and other persons similarly situated, brought a civil suit in the Federal District Court seeking to enjoin defendants, Don Rohrer, the director of the Rhode Island Department of Administration, and Joseph Cannon, the director of the Rhode Island Department of Health, from refusing to pay for Hernan’s care and treatment at Bradley.
The following question has been certified to this court:
“Under the language of R.I. G.L. § 42-62-8(a), as amended in 1980, is a person
who is eligible for Medicaid (Title XIX of the Social Security Act) ineligible for
all
Catastrophic Health Insurance Plan (CHIP) coverage, or ineligible for CHIP coverage only with regard to payments for care for which Medicaid coverage is available?”
In construing a statute, this court’s primary task is to effectuate the intention of the Legislature.
Vaudreuil v. Nelson Engineering & Construction Co.,
R.I., 399 A.2d 1220 (1979). Therefore, this court will not undertake to read an enactment literally if to do so would result in attributing to the Legislature an intention that is contradictory to or inconsistent with the evident purposes of the act.
Kingsley v. Miller,
R.I., 388 A.2d 357 (1978);
Providence Journal Co. v. Mason,
116 R.I. 614, 359 A.2d 682 (1976);
Angel v. Murray,
113 R.I. 482, 322 A.2d 630 (1974). The CHIP Act is remedial social legislation designed to provide financial assistance to those who incur extremely high medical expenses, and its provisions should be construed liberally to effectuate its purpose.
Cf. Volpe v. Stillman White Co.,
R.I., 415 A.2d 1034 (1980) (Workers’ Compensation Act is social legislation and therefore should be construed liberally).
Section 42-62-8(a) provides that “persons eligible for Medicaid (Title XIX) shall not be eligible for CHIP * * * [.]” The defendants contend that a literal interpretation of this section would be reasonable because a Medicaid-eligible person is protected from extremely high medical costs despite the unavailability of CHIP coverage for such costs. According to defendants, the types of health services for which CHIP coverage is available are, with the exception of inpatient psychiatric care, also covered by the Rhode Island Medicaid program. Because state institutions exist to provide free inpatient psychiatric care to those who cannot afford such services, defendants argue, there exists no class of persons without protection from the incurment of catastrophic health-services costs under a literal interpretation of § 42-62-8(a).
After careful scrutiny of the relevant statutes and regulations,
however, we conclude that the Legislature could not have intended that the final clause of § 42-62-8(a) be given a literal interpretation. The defendants’ argument is flawed in that there do exist types of services that are covered by CHIP but for which Medicaid benefits are either actually or potentially unavailable. Examination of the services covered by both programs reveals that, unlike CHIP, the Rhode Island Medicaid program as it is currently administered does not provide benefits for chiropractic services or certain speech and physical therapy services. Moreover, podiatry services, ambulance services, and certain outpatient hospital services are covered by CHIP but are not provided to Medicaid-eligible persons who are classified as medically needy. Furthermore, a comparison of the enabling statutes of CHIP and Medicaid demonstrates the potential for an even greater disparity in the types of services covered by the two programs because several of the services statutorily required to be reimbursable under CHIP are not required to be included in the Medicaid program.
The
possibility exists, therefore, that some services that are presently included in both CHIP and Medicaid may be eliminated from the Medicaid program by administrative action in the future.
Because the Medicaid program does not, or may not in the future, provide benefits for every type of health service that is covered by CHIP, the exclusion of persons from CHIP coverage solely on the basis that they are eligible for Medicaid would mean that Medicaid-eligible persons receiving services not covered by Medicaid would be excluded from certain services under both programs. A literal interpretation of the final clause of § 42-62-8(a), therefore, would render a portion of the most needy segment of the state’s population — those eligible for Medicaid — unprotected from high medical costs. Clearly, such a result would conflict with the purposes of the CHIP Act.
We believe that the obvious legislative intent behind § 42-62-8 is to prevent a person who has other means of financing medical care and treatment from effecting a double recovery by also receiving reimbursement for such costs through CHIP. We therefore conclude that under § 42-62-8(a), a person who is eligible for Medicaid or
other state or federal program
that provides a means of defraying health-service costs is ineligible for CHIP coverage only for the costs of those services available under such programs.
In the case of inpatient psychiatric care for Medicaid-eligible persons, it is apparent that although Medicaid is not available for such care, the state has otherwise ensured that Medicaid-eligible persons be protected from excessive health costs by providing that persons unable to pay for such services may be treated at state or private institutions at state expense.
Because this statutory plan constitutes a
health benefit provided by the state,
persons for whom this benefit is available are excluded under § 42-62-8(a) from obtaining CHIP coverage for the costs of such care. Accordingly, it is our opinion that inpatient psychiatric hospital services for Medicaid-eligible persons who may obtain such services at state expense are not reimbursable under CHIP.