NEC Corp. v. U.S. Department of Commerce
Opinion
Opinion
POGUE, Judge:
Plaintiffs NEC Corp. and HNSX Supercomputers, Inc. (collectively, “NEC”) commenced this action to enjoin the United States Department of Commerce (“Commerce”) from conducting an anti-dumping investigation of Vector Supercomputers from Japan. NEC claims that Commerce prejudged the investigation.
Defendant moved to dismiss NEC’s complaint for lack of jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. See USCIT Rs. 12b(l) and (5). The Court denied Defendant’s motion and entered an expedited trial schedule, with the intent to consolidate the preliminary injunction hearing with the trial on the merits. See NEC Corp. v. United States, Court No. 96-10-02360 (Mem. Op. and Order, Dec. 18, 1996).
Subsequently, the Court defined the scope of discovery and scheduled document production and depositions. See NEC Corp. v. United States, 21 CIT 198,958 F. Supp. 624 (CIT 1997).1 On March 4,1997, the Court issued a protective order for documents produced by Defendant that were covered by certain statutory privileges, the attorney-client privilege, the “state secrets privilege,” and the “official information” (or “deliberative process”) privilege. See NEC Corp. v. United States, Court No. 96-10-02360 (Order, Mar. 4,1997). The impending issuance of a preliminary determination in the underlying antidumping investigation prevented consolidation of the preliminary injunction hearing with the trial on the merits. The preliminary injunction hearing was held on March 14,1997. On March 21,1997, the Court denied NEC’s application for a preliminary injunction. See NEC Corp. v. United States, Court No. 96-10-02360, (Mem. Op. and Order on Pis.’ Mot. for Prelim. Inj., Mar. 21, 1997).
[934] On April 7, 1997, Commerce issued its preliminary determination. See Vector Supercomputers from Japan, 62 Fed. Reg. 16,544, 16,547 (Dep’t Commerce 1997) (prelim, determ.). NEC did not respond to the investigation questionnaire, citing the instant action as the reason for nonparticipation. Id. at 16,545. Without NEC’s price information and cost data, Commerce used the “facts otherwise available”2 to calculate a 454 percent dumping margin for NEC. Id.
The Court conducted a three-day trial on April 14,15, and 21,1997, to determine whether Commerce had prejudged the supercomputer investigation.3
Structure and Administration of the Antidumping Statute
The United States antidumping statute bifurcates investigations between two different federal agencies: the Department of Commerce, which makes less than fair value determinations for a class or kind of foreign merchandise; and the International Trade Commission (“ITC”),4 which makes injury determinations.5 If Commerce determines that a class or kind of foreign merchandise is being, or is likely to be sold in the United States at less than its fair value (“LTF\(” i.e., at a price which is lower than the price at which the merchandise is sold in the country of exportation or to a third country), and the ITC determines that an industry in the United States is materially injured or is threatened with material injury, or the establishment of an industry in the United States is materially retarded, by reason of imports of the subject merchandise, Commerce issues an antidumping order directing the United States Customs Service to collect antidumping duties equal to the amount by which the normal value (i.e., the price in the foreign market) exceeds the export price (i.e., the U.S. price) for the merchandise. 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1994). That amount is the dumping margin. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(35)(A) (1994).
The antidumping law requires the Secretary of Commerce, or any other officer to whom the responsibility for carrying out the duties of the statute are transferred, to administer antidumping investigations. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(1) (1994). Antidumping investigations may be commenced in two ways. An interested party may file a petition alleging the elements necessary for an antidumping duty, 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(b), or Commerce may self-initiate an investigation. 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(a); 19 C.F.R. § 353.11 (1996). Prior to self-initiation, Commerce prepares a [935] “predecisional” analysis of the imports in question based on information available.6
Once commenced, the antidumping investigation proceeds through a preliminary and final determination, see 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673b(b), 1673d(a) (1994), unless the ITC issues a negative injury determination. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(c)(2),(3). The purpose of the preliminary determination is to determine whether there is a reasonable basis to believe or suspect that the merchandise which is the subject of the investigation is being sold, or is likely to be sold at LTFV See 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(b) (1994); 19 C.F.R. § 353.15 (1996). The purpose of the final determination is to determine whether the merchandise which is the subject of the investigation is being or is likely to be sold at LTFV See 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(a) (1994); 19 C.F.R. § 353.20. The preliminary and final determinations are based on information presented to or obtained by Commerce during the course of the proceeding. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(2) (1994) Information not placed on the record may not influence the outcome of the investigation, see id., or be considered for purposes of judicial review. See Beker Indus. Corp. v. United States, 7 CIT 313, 315-18 (1984).
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Opinion
POGUE, Judge:
Plaintiffs NEC Corp. and HNSX Supercomputers, Inc. (collectively, “NEC”) commenced this action to enjoin the United States Department of Commerce (“Commerce”) from conducting an anti-dumping investigation of Vector Supercomputers from Japan. NEC claims that Commerce prejudged the investigation.
Defendant moved to dismiss NEC’s complaint for lack of jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. See USCIT Rs. 12b(l) and (5). The Court denied Defendant’s motion and entered an expedited trial schedule, with the intent to consolidate the preliminary injunction hearing with the trial on the merits. See NEC Corp. v. United States, Court No. 96-10-02360 (Mem. Op. and Order, Dec. 18, 1996).
Subsequently, the Court defined the scope of discovery and scheduled document production and depositions. See NEC Corp. v. United States, 21 CIT 198,958 F. Supp. 624 (CIT 1997).1 On March 4,1997, the Court issued a protective order for documents produced by Defendant that were covered by certain statutory privileges, the attorney-client privilege, the “state secrets privilege,” and the “official information” (or “deliberative process”) privilege. See NEC Corp. v. United States, Court No. 96-10-02360 (Order, Mar. 4,1997). The impending issuance of a preliminary determination in the underlying antidumping investigation prevented consolidation of the preliminary injunction hearing with the trial on the merits. The preliminary injunction hearing was held on March 14,1997. On March 21,1997, the Court denied NEC’s application for a preliminary injunction. See NEC Corp. v. United States, Court No. 96-10-02360, (Mem. Op. and Order on Pis.’ Mot. for Prelim. Inj., Mar. 21, 1997).
[934] On April 7, 1997, Commerce issued its preliminary determination. See Vector Supercomputers from Japan, 62 Fed. Reg. 16,544, 16,547 (Dep’t Commerce 1997) (prelim, determ.). NEC did not respond to the investigation questionnaire, citing the instant action as the reason for nonparticipation. Id. at 16,545. Without NEC’s price information and cost data, Commerce used the “facts otherwise available”2 to calculate a 454 percent dumping margin for NEC. Id.
The Court conducted a three-day trial on April 14,15, and 21,1997, to determine whether Commerce had prejudged the supercomputer investigation.3
Structure and Administration of the Antidumping Statute
The United States antidumping statute bifurcates investigations between two different federal agencies: the Department of Commerce, which makes less than fair value determinations for a class or kind of foreign merchandise; and the International Trade Commission (“ITC”),4 which makes injury determinations.5 If Commerce determines that a class or kind of foreign merchandise is being, or is likely to be sold in the United States at less than its fair value (“LTF\(” i.e., at a price which is lower than the price at which the merchandise is sold in the country of exportation or to a third country), and the ITC determines that an industry in the United States is materially injured or is threatened with material injury, or the establishment of an industry in the United States is materially retarded, by reason of imports of the subject merchandise, Commerce issues an antidumping order directing the United States Customs Service to collect antidumping duties equal to the amount by which the normal value (i.e., the price in the foreign market) exceeds the export price (i.e., the U.S. price) for the merchandise. 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1994). That amount is the dumping margin. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(35)(A) (1994).
The antidumping law requires the Secretary of Commerce, or any other officer to whom the responsibility for carrying out the duties of the statute are transferred, to administer antidumping investigations. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(1) (1994). Antidumping investigations may be commenced in two ways. An interested party may file a petition alleging the elements necessary for an antidumping duty, 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(b), or Commerce may self-initiate an investigation. 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(a); 19 C.F.R. § 353.11 (1996). Prior to self-initiation, Commerce prepares a [935] “predecisional” analysis of the imports in question based on information available.6
Once commenced, the antidumping investigation proceeds through a preliminary and final determination, see 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673b(b), 1673d(a) (1994), unless the ITC issues a negative injury determination. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(c)(2),(3). The purpose of the preliminary determination is to determine whether there is a reasonable basis to believe or suspect that the merchandise which is the subject of the investigation is being sold, or is likely to be sold at LTFV See 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(b) (1994); 19 C.F.R. § 353.15 (1996). The purpose of the final determination is to determine whether the merchandise which is the subject of the investigation is being or is likely to be sold at LTFV See 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(a) (1994); 19 C.F.R. § 353.20. The preliminary and final determinations are based on information presented to or obtained by Commerce during the course of the proceeding. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(2) (1994) Information not placed on the record may not influence the outcome of the investigation, see id., or be considered for purposes of judicial review. See Beker Indus. Corp. v. United States, 7 CIT 313, 315-18 (1984).
The statute requires Commerce to hold a hearing upon the request of any interested party to the investigation prior to its final determination, see 19 U.S.C. § 1677c (1994); 19 C.F.R. § 353.38(b) (1996), and requires Commerce to address, in the final determination, arguments made at the hearing regarding the proper methodology for the dumping calculations at issue. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677f(i)(3)(A) (1994).
The statute also requires Commerce to consider information submitted by parties to an investigation, to inform a party if its submission in response to Commerce’s request for information is deficient, and to provide the submitting party with an opportunity to remedy or explain its submission. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677m(d) (1994).
The statute further requires Commerce to consider information that is submitted by an interested party and is necessary to the preliminary or final determination if (1) the information is submitted within the deadline for its submission, (2) the information can be verified, (3) the information is not so incomplete that it cannot serve as a reliable basis for reaching the applicable determination, (4) the interested party has demonstrated that it acted to the best of its ability in providing the information and meeting Commerce’s requirements, and (5) the information can be used without undue difficulties. See 19U.S.C. § 1677m(e) (1994).
Additionally, the statute requires Commerce to “verify all information relied upon in making a final determination of an investigation.” 19 U.S.C § 1677m(i)(l) (1994); 19 C.F.R. § 353.36(a)(i) (1996).
Congress intended antidumping investigations to be “transparent.” See S. Rep. No 96-246, at 38, 41 (1979), reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. [936]*936424,427.7 Included in the record of the proceedings is a record of any ex parte meeting between interested parties, (or other persons providing factual information in connection with a proceeding), and the person charged with making the determination, (or any person charged with making a final recommendation to that person), in connection with that proceeding. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677f(3) (1994); 19 C.F.R. § 353.35 (1996). Interested parties have the opportunity to submit factual information to rebut, clarify, or correct the factual submissions of another interested party. See 19 C.F.R. § 353.31(2) (1996). Interested parties also may submit case briefs that present their arguments on issues relevant to the final determination. See 19 C.F.R. § 353.38(2) (1996).
Commerce addresses issues prior to and again following the preliminary determination.8 Commerce re-examines its analysis between the preliminary and the final determination.9 The investigation may produce a dumping margin in a preliminary determination that is different from the margin forecast in a self-initiated predecisional analysis (or alleged in a petition pursuant to which an investigation was initiated), and the dumping margin in the final determination may differ significantly from the dumping margin in the preliminary determination.10
Judicial review of Commerce’s final determination is available in the U.S. Court of International Trade. See 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c);1119 U.S.C. § 1516a(a) (2) (B) (i). The court reviews the determination to insure Commerce’s action is in accordance with law and supported by substantial evidence. See 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(l)(B)(i).
Subject to any policies and directives the Secretary may prescribe, the authority to conduct investigations and make all determinations in an-[937] tidumping proceedings has been delegated to the Under Secretary for International Trade, the head of the International Trade Administration, pursuant to Department of Commerce Organization Order 10-3 at § 4.01b.12 Subject to any policies and directives the Under Secretary may prescribe, the Under Secretary, in turn, has delegated the authority to conduct investigations and make all determinations in antidumping proceedings to the Assistant Secretary for Import Administration. See Department of Commerce Organization and Function Order 41-1 Amendment 3 at § l.Old.13
The Assistant Secretary for Import Administration is the head of Import Administration. The Assistant Secretary exercises the functions of the Under Secretary and the administering authority under the U.S. an-tidumping law, including responsibility for the initiation of investigations, and for ensuring the proper administration of the antidumping laws. See Department of Commerce Organization and Function Order 41-1 at § 2. By virtue of this delegation, the Assistant Secretary for Import Administration is the decisionmaker in antidumping investigations. The Assistant Secretary for Import Administration reports to the Under Secretary of Commerce for International Trade. The Under Secretary may give general policy guidance to the Assistant Secretary regarding administration of the antidumping statute, but is not involved in the conduct of, or the determinations issued in connection with, specific investigations. See Department of Commerce Organization and Function Order 41-1, Amendment 3 at § l.Old.
As head of Import Administration, the Assistant Secretary for Import Administration supervises Import Administration staff. Since June 4, 1996, Import Administration staff have been organized into three Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duty Groups, each of which is headed by a Deputy Assistant Secretary. See Department Organization and Function Order 41-1 at § 2.04b. Antidumping investigations are managed on a day-to-day basis by an Import Administration investigation team that works under a Deputy Assistant Secretary.14 Each investigation team normally is comprised of one or more import compliance specialists, one or more accountants, an attorney, and a policy analyst.15 The team is su[938] pervised by the Office Director and may have a team leader.16 The accountant, attorney and policy analyst are assigned by their respective offices.17 For accounting, legal, and policy issues, the attorney, the accountant, and the policy analyst report directly to their respective supervisors.18 The team solicits, collects and analyzes information submitted for the record of the investigation and presents issues to the Assistant Secretary for decision, along with the team’s recommendations on those issues.19
Factual Background
The University Corporation for Atmospheric Research (“UCAR”) is a research consortium funded in part by the National Science Foundation (“NSF”), an independent Executive Branch agency of the U.S. Government. In March 1995, UCAR initiated a bidding process to procure advanced supercomputers.20 As a result of this process, three companies — Federal Computing Corporation (“FCC”), supplying vector supercomputers produced by NEC Corporation (“NEC”), Cray Research, Inc. (“Cray”) and Fujitsu Limited (“Fujitsu”) — were invited to submit a “best and final offer.”21
Guided by its obligation to assure that the procurement process was free of “noncompetitive practices,”22 on or about March 3, 1996, NSF instructed UCAR to obtain evidence that no dumping was involved in NEC’s offer to supply UCAR.23 In response to NSF’s directive, UCAR commissioned Dr. Lloyd Thorndyke to prepare an analysis of NEC’s offer.24 Dr. Thorndyke’s analysis concluded that NEC’s offer did not involve dumping.25
NSF did not request Commerce to undertake a dumping analysis of the UCAR procurement.26 Nevertheless, in contemplating a self-initiated dumping investigation, see 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(a)(l) (1994), Commerce undertook a preliminary analysis of NEC’s bid.27
Specifically, on April 3,1996, Ms. Susan Esserman, Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Import Administration, assembled a team of Tm-[939] port Administration officials to collect information and analyze the possibility that NEC’s offer of supercomputers to UCAR might involve dumping.28
On April 24,1996, Ms. Esserman convened an interagency meeting to obtain technical information on supercomputers and hear a presentation by NSF on the UCAR procurement.29
On May 2, 1996, Ms. Esserman became Commerce’s Acting General Counsel.30 In early May, Mr. Paul Joffe became the Acting Assistant Secretary for Import Administration.31 On May 13, 1996, Ms. Esserman convened an interagency meeting with senior officials of NSF and other agencies to discuss the results of Commerce’s preliminary analysis of NEC’sUCARbid. Attendees at the meeting included, inter alia: Ms. Ess-erman, Paul L. Joffe, Eleanor R. Lewis,32 Gary Taverman,33 John N. McPhee,34 Mary Good,35 Stephen J. Powell, Jr.,36 Dr. George Cotter,37 Dr. Neal Lane, the director of NSF, and Lawrence Rudolph, NSF’s General Counsel.38 The specifics of the May 13th meeting are discussed infra pp.42-45.
On May 17,1996, Ambassador Stuart Eizenstat, Under Secretary for International Trade, and Ms. Esserman met with Daniel K. Tarullo of the National Economic Council to discuss the UCAR procurement.39 The meeting was limited to a short factual briefing of the UCAR procurement and Import Administration’s inquiry into the matter.40
Also on May 17, 1996, Mr. Brian Mannion, Grants and Agreements Officer of NSF, wrote to Mr. William Rawson, Vice President of UCAR,41 and stated, inter alia:
Under the Cooperative Agreement between UCAR and NSF, UCAR is required to obtain NSF’s approval before UCAR enters into the [940] agreement to acquire the supercomputing capacity that is the subject of this procurement. In purchasing this supercomputer capacity, UCAR must observe the procurement standards set forth in Office of Management and Budget Circular A-110, Uniform Administrative Requirements for Grants and Agreements with Institutions of Higher Education, Hospitals, and Other Non-Profit Organizations, which was incorporated by reference in section 2b of clause I of the general provisions of the Cooperative Agreement. Among other things, those standards require that:
All procurement transactions shall be conducted in a manner to provide, to the maximum extent practical, open and free competition. The recipient shall be alert to organizational conflicts of interest as well as noncompetitive practices among contractors that may restrict or eliminate competition or otherwise restrain trade.
As you know, NSF has been concerned about the possibility that one or more of the proposals could give rise to the imposition of an “anti-dumping duty”* * *
UCAR has provided NSF with several documents that addressed the “antidumping” issue. Subsequently, officials at the Department of Commerce, which has statutory responsibility for administering relevant provisions of the antidumping laws, have advised NSF that they have performed a “constructive analysis” of the proposal with the best performance characteristics. They have reached the preliminary conclusion that the proposal does not constitute an offer at “fair value.”
As you enter into final negotiations with the firm that in UCAR’s judgment has submitted the best proposal, we remain concerned about the dumping issue. Prior to approving this award, therefore, NSF will require that UCAR has given this issue due consideration and that UCAR has obtained sufficient documentation to demonstrate that the proposal does not reflect any “noncompetitive practices among contractors that may restrict or eliminate competition or otherwise restrain trade” in violation of the antidumping laws.42
On May 20,1996, UCAR announced that it had selected for final contract negotiations FCC’s bid to supply a system of four NEC 32 processor SX-4 vector supercomputers for $35.25 million. UCAR found that the NEC systems offered by FCC “provide a distinct technical advantage compared to the systems offered by the other vendors.”43
On May 20,1996, Commerce transmitted to NSF a letter from Acting Assistant Secretary Joffe to Dr. Lane, Director of NSF, (the “Joffe Letter”) stating that “using standard methodology prescribed by the dumping law” Commerce had “estimated” that NEC’s bid to supply UCAR was below cost, and that the dumping margin on NEC’s UCAR bid “is likely to be very high,” and further, that UCAR’s acquisition of NEC supercomputers “could have a serious adverse impact on the domestic in[941] dustry’s efforts to develop a more advanced version of the supercomputer system to be supplied.”44 The Joffe Letter also stated that a formal antidumping investigation could be self-initiated by Commerce or initiated pursuant to an antidumping petition.45 The Secretary of Commerce approved the delivery of the “Joffe Letter” to NSF.46
On the same date, Mr. Joffe sent a second letter to Dr. Lane transmitting a document entitled “Predecisional Memorandum. ”47 The Predeci-sional Memorandum contained a “Dumping Analysis” that included a specific, estimated “Margin Calculation” ranging from 163.38 to 280 percent.48 The Predecisional Memorandum was not based on NEC’s actual cost and pricing data that would be used to make a formal dumping finding under the statute.49 Instead, Import Administration staff reviewed various sources of information, including estimates of NEC’s costs available to the U.S. Government, the Thorndyke Study, and information from NEC financial statements.50
For reasons relating to NSF’s procurement procedures, NSF requested authorization from Commerce to release the analysis to NEC, UCAR and NCAR.51 Commerce transmitted the May 20 Predecisional Memorandum to NSF with authorization for NSF to distribute the Memorandum to NEC, UCAR and NCAR as within Commerce’s “intended official use.”52 Commerce and NSF agreed that the disclosure of the Predecisional Memorandum to NSF, NEC, UCAR and NCAR was for purposes of the procurement.53
Commerce made the Joffe Letter available to the press and public and faxed it directly to Cray on May 20, 1996.54 It was published in Inside U.S. Trade on May 24, 1996.55 The Predecisional Memorandum was published in Inside U.S. Trade on September 13,1996.56 There is no evidence of Inside U.S. Trade’s source for publication.
On June 4, 1996, Cray executives, accompanied by outside counsel, met with Import Administration staff for pre-petition counseling.57
On June 5, 1996, Robert LaRussa, who had no prior involvement in the issues relating to the UCAR procurement, succeeded Mr. Joffe as [942] Acting Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Import Administration.58 On June 7,1996, Mr. LaRussa was briefed by Mr. Taverman on the pre-decisional analysis and the dissemination and general content of the Predecisional Memorandum.59 He also read the Joffe Letter at that time.60 Mr. LaRussa did not read the predecisional dumping analysis.61
Mr. LaRussa has had no communication with Mr. Eizenstat or Ms. Esserman relating to the preparation, dissemination, purpose, or content of the Predecisional Memorandum; neither Ms. Esserman nor Mr. Eizenstat had communicated to Mr. LaRussa their views on Cray’s anti-dumping petition; and Mr. Eizenstat gave Mr. LaRussa only general guidance to observe all standard applicable procedures in the pending investigation of vector supercomputers from Japan.62
On June 6,1996, Mr. Joffe, then a Senior Advisor to the Assistant Secretary for Import Administration, Mr. Powell, and Mr. Taverman, met with Democratic staff members from the House of Representatives Science Committee to discuss the UCAR procurement. Mr. Taverman explained the predecisional analysis and the resulting estimated dumping margins.63
On June 10,1996, Ms. Esserman, Mr. Joffe, Mr. LaRussa, Mr. Powell, and Mr. Taverman met with staff members of the House Ways and Means Committee and Senate Finance Committee, at the request of one of the staff members, to discuss the UCAR procurement. Mr. Taverman again explained the predecisional analysis and the estimated dumping margins.64 Acting Assistant Secretary LaRussa did not make any presentation or ask or answer any questions at the June 10 meeting.65
On June 11, 1996, Ms. Esserman, Mr. Powell, Mr. Joffe, Mr. Taver-man, and Mr. LaRussa met with Representative David E. Skaggs,66 at his request, to discuss the UCAR procurement. They explained the anti-dumping process to Congressman Skaggs, and Mr. Taverman explained in general terms the predecisional dumping analysis.67
On June 20,1996, Mr. Rawson of UCAR wrote to Mr. Mannion at the NSF to state that, in response to NSF’s May 17 letter, UCAR had asked FCC/HNSX/NEC to comment upon Commerce’s May 20,1996, Predeci-sional Memorandum and also had retained its own legal and economic [943] experts to evaluate the FCC/HNSX/NEC response as well as Commerce’s Predecisional Memorandum.68
UCAR concluded, based on its information, that the FCC/HNSX/NEC offer to supply four of NEC’s SX-4 32 processor supercomputers was not at less than fair value.69
On June 24, 1996, NSF Director Lane forwarded to the Secretary of Commerce, Michael Kantor, Mr. Rawson’s letter of June 20, 1996, together with the enclosed cost analyses, asking Secretary Kantor to inform him “in the near future” about Commerce’s intentions regarding the self-initiation of an antidumping investigation of supercomputers from Japan.70 Also on June 24, 1996, NSF General Counsel Rudolph wrote to Ms. Esserman conveying the same cost analyses.71
On July 29,1996, Cray filed an antidumping petition with Commerce and the U.S. International Trade Commission (“ITC”) against vector supercomputers from Japan.72
On August 2,1996, NEC wrote to Under Secretary Eizenstat advising him of a request to Commerce’s Inspector General for an investigation of the circumstances surrounding the issuance of Commerce’s Predeci-sional Memorandum as well as NEC’s claim that Commerce had improperly released NEC’s business confidential information to Cray. NEC sought suspension of the antidumping investigation initiated pursuant to Cray’s petition, pending the conclusion of the Inspector General’s investigation.73
On August 14,1996, Mr. LaRussa received a note from Under Secretary Eizenstat transmitting a letter from NEC’s counsel dated August 2, 1996, and instructing Mr. LaRussa to draft a response to a letter from NEC’s counsel containing allegations that Commerce Department actions related to its antidumping investigation “may include violations of a Federal criminal statute, applicable Department regulations, and the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.”74
On August 19, 1996, Commerce initiated the supercomputer investigation.75 The investigation was assigned to Import Administration’s Office of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Enforcement II.76
On August 20, 1996, NSF issued a press release in which Dr. Neal Lane, NSF’s Director, stated, inter alia:
In my view, it would be inappropriate for NSF to approve this procurement until the dumping issue has been resolved.
[944] In light of the numerous questions raised about and interest expressed in this procurement, I am pleased that the issue of dumping is being properly addressed by the appropriate federal agencies. The Department of Commerce and the International Trade Commission have the statutory authority, the expertise, and the established procedures to determine whether this offer is being made at less than fair value, and whether it would be injurious to American industry.
I am acutely aware that the National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR), which is operated by UCAR, needs state-of-the-art computational equipment to maintain U.S. world leadership in climate modeling research. I feel, however, that acting now on this procurement would be inconsistent with the responsible stewardship of taxpayer monies.77
On September 12, 1996, the Chairman of the ITC notified the Secretary of Commerce that the Commission had made an affirmative determination in the preliminary injury phase of the antidumping investigation regarding vector supercomputers from Japan,78 which was published on September 25, 1996, in the Federal Register.79
On September 30,1996, Commerce sent Section A of its antidumping questionnaire to counsel for NEC.80 The same questionnaire was sent to Fujitsu Limited (“Fujitsu”).81
On October 15, 1996, NEC sent a letter to Secretary Kantor stating “we have today asked the Court of International Trade to enjoin the Department’s continued prosecution of its antidumping investigation of supercomputers from Japan.”82 NEC explained that the reason for this action was that Commerce publicly endorsed “the merits of our competitor’s dumping claim before the antidumping investigation was even initiated” and therefore “Commerce has deprived NEC and HNSX of the right to a fair and impartial decision-maker to which they are entitled under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Accordingly, [NEC] will respectfully withhold their response to the Department questionnaire until such time as a qualified independent party, who is impartial and has not already prejudged the matter, is appointed as a ‘special master’ to conduct the investigation.”83
As noted above, NEC filed this lawsuit on October 15,1996 seeking to enjoin Commerce’s investigation of vector supercomputers from Japan.
Discussion
NEC’s constitutionally based prejudgment claim (seeking disqualification of an administrative decisionmaker) invokes the protections of [945] the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.84 See, e.g., Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46, 95 S. Ct. 1456,1464 (1975)(reviewing whether combination of investigative and adjudicative functions creates an unconstitutional risk of bias in administrative adjudication). Before an administrative action implicates constitutional due process concerns, however, that action must deprive a party of “life, liberty, or property. ”85 Therefore, a prejudgment claim based on the Due Process Clause requires that the court “first determine whether a protected property or liberty interest exists, ” before determining “what procedures are necessary to protect that interest.” Techsnabexport, Ltd. v. United States, 16 CIT 420,426, 795 F. Supp. 428,435 (1992) (citing American Ass ’n of Exporters & Importers v. United States, 751 F.2d 1239, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
The Supreme Court has interpreted Congress’ power “to regulate Commerce with foreign nations”86 to be “so complete * * * that no one can be said to have a vested right to carry on foreign commerce with the United States.” The Abby Dodge, 223 U.S. 166,176-77,32 S. Ct. 310,313 (1912); see also authorities cited in Arjay Assocs., Inc. v. United States, 8 Fed. Cir (T) 16, 18-20, 891 F.2d 894, 896-98 (1989);87 and B-West Imports, Inc. v. United States, 880 F. Supp. 853,863-64 (CIT 1995). NEC did not identify a specific constitutionally protected interest at stake in the pending antidumping investigation. Indeed, the authorities set forth in [946] Arjay demonstrate judicial caution toward recognition of constitutionally protected interests for matters involving foreign trade or commerce. These cases from the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit seem to preclude recognition of a constitutionally based prejudgment claim.
The absence of a constitutional claim, however, does not foreclose a statutory claim. A statute defining procedures for submission of information, 19U.S.C. § 1677m(d) &(e), and for a hearing, 19U.S.C. § 1677c, “command[s] by implication”88 that the procedures and hearing be fair, see Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 321, 53 S. Ct. 350,360 (1933), and not a “hollow formality.”89 Prejudgment of an antidumping investigation, wherein the decisionmaker has a closed mind at initiation, would undermine the statutory procedures that Congress has prescribed. Recognition of a statutorily based prejudgment claim is therefore appropriate.90
By its nature, however, the claim is limited, and the burden for establishing it is heavy. Principles applicable to constitutionally based bias claims are equally applicable to the statutory claim. To begin, administrative decisionmakers enjoy a presumption of honesty and integrity which must be overcome. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47, 95 S. Ct. 1456,1464 (1974) (“The contention that the combination of investigative and adjudicative functions necessarily creates an unconstitutional risk of bias in administrative adjudication * * * must overcome a presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators; * * *”). In evaluating NEC’s claim for prejudgment, “the Court starts with the assumption that the decisionmaker, the Assistant Secretary for Import Administration, is a person of honesty and integrity — basically, that he or she does not prejudge investigations.” NEC Corp. v. United [947] States, Court No. 96-10-02360, at 8 (Mem. Op. and Order on Pl.’s Mot. for Prelim. Inj., Mar. 21, 1997).
A public position on a policy issue is not disqualifying; nor is prior knowledge of adjudicative facts. See Hortonville Joint School Dist. No. 1 v. Hortonville Educational Assn., 426 U.S. 482,493,96 S. Ct. 2308,2314 (1976) (“Mere familiarity with the facts of a case gained by an agency in the performance of its statutory role does not, however, disqualify a deci-sionmaker. * * * Nor is a decisionmaker disqualified simply because he has taken a position, even in public, on a policy issue related to the dispute, in the absence of a showing that he is not ‘capable of judging a particular controversy fairly on the basis of its own circumstances. ”’)(quoting United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409,421,61S. Ct. 999,1004 (1941)) (citations omitted).
A general claim of agency viewpoint or policy bias is not actionable. See, e.g., FTC v. Cinderella Career & Finishing Schools, Inc., 404 F.2d 1308, 1315 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (Cinderella I), (refusing to enjoin Federal Trade Commission from conducting hearing on plaintiff s alleged unfair trade practices notwithstanding the Commission’s pre-hearing issuance of a press release stating the Commission had found “reason to believe” that the law had been violated). See also Withrow, 421 U.S. at 58, 95 S. Ct. at 1470 (“The initial charge or determination of probable cause and the ultimate adjudication have different bases and purposes. The fact that the same agency makes them in tandem and that they relate to the same issues does not result in a procedural due process violation. ”). Thus, the Assistant Secretary’s preliminary opinion on whether imports are being dumped cannot alone support disqualification. The antidumping statute contemplates that a decisionmaker will make up his or her mind over the course of the administrative process, starting from a viewpoint at the initiation of the investigation, “there may be dumping,” and leading to a conclusion upon issuance of the final determination, “there is dumping,” or “there is no dumping.” NEC Corp. v. United States, 958 F. Supp. 624, 629 (CIT 1997).
As noted above, the Assistant Secretary for Import Administration is the decisionmaker for antidumping investigations. See supra pp. 10. The Assistant Secretary, of course, cannot make every decision in every case.91 The sheer volume of data, the technical nature of the issues in complex cases, and the large number of proceedings (investigations and reviews) require the Assistant Secretary to rely heavily upon the recommendations and assistance of the investigation team and other import [948] administration92 and Commerce Department staff.93 Despite their influence in antidumping investigations, the independently formed opinions of Import Administration staff are not relevant to the prejudgment cause of action recognized here. Import Administration staff must communicate their recommendations to their superiors as part of their official duties; these recommendations are not final, however important they may be, and cannot lead to a showing that the mind of the Assistant Secretary for Import Administration, the decisionmaker in antidump-ing investigations, is closed. See NEC Corp. v. United States, 958 F. Supp. 624,635-36 (CIT 1997) (citing Corning Savings & Loan Assn. v.Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 571F. Supp. 396,404 (E.D. Ark. 1983), aff’d, 736 F.2d 479 (8th Cir. 1984)).94 For similar reasons the opinions of officials from other agencies are also not relevant to NEC’s prejudgment claim. Id. at 635.
Antidumping proceedings are not adjudicatory95 but investigatory, see H.R. Rep. No. 96-317, at 77 (1979); S. Rep. No. 96-249, at 100 (1979), reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 381, 486. See also Budd Co. v. United [949] States 1 CIT 67, 72, 507 F. Supp. 997,1001 (1980) (“Congress has recognized that the administrative proceedings under Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930 are investigatory, not adjudicatory.”), with statutorily prescribed procedures: a final determination in which the Department must articulate and substantiate its decisionmaking, see 19 U.S.C. § 1677f(i)(3)(A) (1994); an opportunity to submit factual information and legal argument, see 19 U.S.C. § 1677m(d)-(e) (1994); 19 C.F.R. §§ 353.31(2), 353.38(2) (1996); an opportunity to argue important issues at a hearing, see 19 U.S.C. § 1677c (1994); 19 C.F.R. § 353.58(b) (1996); and an opportunity for judicial review of the final determination to insure Commerce’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and in accordance with law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c); 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(2)(B)(i), 1516a(b)(l)(B)(i).
While these procedures must not be rendered nugatory by prejudgment, at the same time, any claim of prejudgment must be circumscribed to ensure that the administrative process is not disrupted. Thus, the claim recognized by the Court precludes only conduct by the deci-sionmaker that will render the statutory procedures a hollow formality.
Under this statutory scheme, a plaintiff must demonstrate more than the appearance of prejudgment to disqualify a decisionmaker. Aplaintiff must show from the conduct and statements of the decisionmaker96 that the outcome of the investigation had already been determined and that plaintiffs participation in the administrative process would be futile.
In addition, the presumption of honesty and integrity operating in favor of administrative decisionmakers coupled with the considerable process Congress has codified in the antidumping statute requires clear and convincing proof for the court to conclude that the process has actually been undermined by prejudgment. See Association ofNat’l Adver. v. FTC, 201 U.S. App. D.C. 165, 172-84, 627 F.2d 1151, 1158-70 (1979) (“The ‘clear and convincing’ test is necessary to rebut the presumption of administrative regularity.”).
NEC has an added burden in the present case because a new decision-maker replaced the Assistant Secretary under whose command the pre-decisional analysis and letter were prepared and disseminated. Furthermore, as noted above, supi'a 11-12, Acting Assistant Secretary Robert LaRussa has had only a cursory involvement with the matters in dispute here. NEC’s burden is twofold: first, to demonstrate that Mr. La-Russa’s predecessor prejudged the investigation, and second, that by virtue of that prejudgment, Mr. LaRussa’s decisional independence is constrained in a way that precludes a fair investigation.
[950] Applying the standard articulated above to the facts of this case, the risk of prejudgment arose from Import Administration’s rendering advice to another federal agency prior to initiation of a formal dumping investigation.97 The advice was first given orally by Ms. Esserman98 at the May 13th interagency meeting with representatives from NSF, and subsequently reduced to writing at NSF’s request with the result being the Joffe letter and the Predecisional Memorandum.
The Predecisional Memorandum and Joffe letter do not in and of themselves establish prejudgment. The letter is not definitive: Commerce “estimated” that NEC’s bid to supply UCAR was below cost, and that the dumping margin on NEC’s UCAR bid “is likely to be very high, ” and that UCAR’s acquisition of NEC supercomputers “could have a serious adverse impact on the domestic industry’s efforts to develop a more advanced version of the supercomputer system to be supplied.”99 See Cinderella J, 404 F.2d at 1315 (addressing the issue of whether the FTC’s issuance of press releases stating that the Commission had “reason to believe” that the law had been violated constituted prejudgment, the court rejected the contention that issuance of the press releases, in and of themselves, placed Commission members “under a very real pressure to vindicate themselves and justify their charges.”).
[951] The Predecisional Memorandum is not definitive either. It was based only on information available to the Department at the time it was prepared.100 It was not based on NEC’s actual sales and cost data that would be used for the preliminary and final determinations, assuming NEC participated in the investigation. With different data from completed questionnaire responses, the results of the actual investigation could be different. See Esserman Prelim. Inj. Test., Hr’gExs. and Docs., Vol 2, Tab 38 at 2233-236.
The Predecisional Memorandum includes costs for Research and Development (“R & D”) in its calculation of estimated dumping margins.101 NEC argues that this indicates prejudgment of the critical methodological issue in the investigation.102 The Court does not agree. In the formal investigation, NEC would be free to argue, in its case brief and at a hearing, its position on R & D expenses. See, e.g., FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 701,68 S. Ct. 793,803 (1948) (“Here, * * *, members of the cement industry were legally authorized participants in the hearings. They produced evidence — volumes of it. They were free to point out to the Commission by testimony, by cross-examination of witnesses, and by arguments, conditions of the trade practices under attack which they thought kept these practices within the range of legally permissible business activities.”). The Court cannot conclude that the procedures for argument and submission of factual information on R & D expenses were rendered meaningless by the Predecisional Memorandum. If anything, their meaning was only amplified as NEC became aware of the Department’s preliminary thinking on a key methodological question.
The allegation in NEC’s complaint that presented an actionable claim necessitating trial was contained in paragraph 24, which stated, “Commerce representatives repeatedly stated [at interagency meetings] that the NEC supercomputers were being offered to UCAR at less than fair value.”103 Through the course of the litigation, it became apparent to the Court that the critical event in NEC’s prejudgment claim was the May 13th meeting when Commerce discussed its preliminary analysis of NEC’s bid with representatives from NSF, and at which the alleged statements from paragraph 24 of the Complaint would have been made. It is to the substance of the May 13th meeting that the Court now turns.
During the May 13th meeting Ms. Esserman explained the structure and operation of the antidumping statute and presented the Department’s preliminary analysis of NEC’s UCAR bid.104
[952] Mr. McPhee, the Director of Commerce’s Office of Computers and Business Equipment within the Office of Trade Development,105 had prepared proposed “Talking Points” for the May 13th interagency meeting.106 Mr. McPhee’s draft “Talking Points” contained the following “Summary of Antidumping Findings: Based on a comparison of NEC’s bid price to its estimated cost of production * * * we find that dumping is occurring at significant levels, ranging from approximately 100-300 percent.”107 Mr. McPhee’s source for the percentage estimates was the Department’s predecisional analysis.108
Ms. Esserman reviewed Mr. McPhee’s “Talking Points,” concluded that they were inappropriate,109 and did not use them for her presentation at the May 13th meeting,110 although they were in her possession.111 At the meeting, Ms. Esserman indicated that based on the preliminary analysis the NEC bid could result in substantial dumping margins, ranging from 100-300%.112
In response to questions from N SF about the likely outcome of the administrative proceedings, Ms. Esserman indicated that a dumping finding and an injury determination by the ITC could be made and successfully upheld.113
This statement can be interpreted two ways. NEC posits that it demonstrates prejudgment of the antidumping investigation. Alternatively, it can be read as a prediction of a possible outcome. The wisdom of making such a statement can certainly be questioned, especially if issued by a superior in the presence of persons who would staff a future investigation. The risk is that the statement becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. In this instance, however, the evidence does not support such a conclusion. The statement was preliminary and advisory. Mr. Rudolph, NSF’s general counsel who attended the May 13th meeting, testified that Ms. Ess-erman qualified her belief in the dumping finding as “based on the preliminary analysis as understood to date.”114 Ms. Esserman’s statement also was made with sensitivity to the existing data and to the forthcoming administrative process which could alter the result. Ms. Esserman testified at the preliminary injunction hearing that the procedure of an antidumping investigation, and its ultimate conclusion in a final determination, would be based on an entirely different data base [953] that would include the foreign producer’s actual data.115 She also testified at length about the transparent procedures required in the administrative process which could alter the result.116
Weighing all the evidence, the Court finds that Ms. Esserman was providing advice in the nature of a forecast rather than prejudging the outcome of the investigation. Consequently, the Court cannot conclude that Ms. Esserman’s statement so constrained Mr. LaRussa as to lead to a pre-determined result.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs’ application for a permanent injunction is denied. Judgment will be entered accordingly.
Footnotes
21 Ct. Int'l Trade 933 (NEC Corp. v. U.S. Department of Commerce) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.