Elkem Metals Co. v. United States

126 F. Supp. 2d 567, 24 Ct. Int'l Trade 1395, 24 C.I.T. 1395, 22 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 2417, 2000 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 169
United States Court of International Trade·Decided December 20, 2000·No. 99-10-00628·Published·Cited by 4 cases

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

EATON, Judge.

Before the Court is Plaintiff Elkem Metals Company’s (“Elkem”) “Motion to Compel Production of Documents” contained in the administrative record (“Record”) and filed under seal by the United States International Trade Commission (“ITC”) in this consolidated action. For the reasons set forth below, Elkem’s motion is granted, in part, and denied, in part.

BACKGROUND

This action contests the ITC’s reconsideration and reversal of its final affirmative injury determinations in countervailing duty investigation No. 303-TA-23 (Final), concerning ferrosilieon from Venezuela, and antidumping investigations Nos. 731-TA-566-570 and 731-TA-641 (Final), concerning ferrosilieon from Brazil, China, Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine, and Venezuela. On December 13, 1999, the ITC filed the Record. The Record is composed of several certified lists which catalog the various documents that the ITC reviewed in rendering its reconsideration determinations. The current controversy surrounds the disclosure of items 1 contained in several documents set forth on Certified List No. 3, specifically, documents numbered 9, 10, 16, 18, 19, and 25. 2 (Pl.’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Compel at 8.) The ITC filed these documents under seal pursuant to USCIT R. 71(c).

The United States (“Government”), on behalf of the ITC, asserts as the basis for the non-disclosure of these documents the deliberative process privilege and, with respect to certain documents, the attorney work product and attorney — client privileges. The Government argues that the deliberative process privilege has been properly asserted (Def.’s Mem. Opp’n to Mot. Compel at 3), and that the documents at issue contain “legal and other types of advisory opinions, conclusions, considerations, deliberations, advice and recommendations prepared by Members of the Commission’s staff, or contain comments or interlineations reflecting the deliberative process of the individual Commissioners.” (Id. at 9 (citation omitted).) The Government further contends that the allegedly privileged documents were prepared in confidence, contain facts that can be obtained elsewhere in the Record, were not incorporated into the ITC’s reconsideration determinations, and have not been disclosed to persons outside the agency. (Id. at 9-10.) Finally, the Government argues that disclosure of the factual information contained in these documents would be prejudicial because it would inadvertently expose the Commissioners’ deliberative process. (Id. at 10.)

Elkem counters that the Government failed to establish a “legal basis for withholding” the documents (Pl.’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Compel at 8) and that the documents do not qualify for protection under the deliberative process privilege because they are procedural and contain factual material that fails to “implicate the policy-making concerns that the privilege is intended to protect.” (PL’s Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Compel at 2.) Elkem also argues that its need for the information contained in the *573 undisclosed documents outweighs the ITC’s need for non-disclosure. (Id. at 11.) Finally, Elkem states that it does not challenge the ITC’s assertion of the attorney work product and attorney—client privileges. (Id. at 2.)

DISCUSSION

I. The Deliberative Process Privilege

The deliberative process privilege, also referred to as the “executive privilege,” protects the “decision making processes of government agencies.” NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 150, 95 S.Ct. 1504, 44 L.Ed.2d 29 (1975) (quoting Tennessean Newspapers, Inc. v. Fed. Hous. Admin., 464 F.2d 657, 660 (6th Cir.1972)); see also USX Corp. v. United States, 11 CIT 419, 420, 664 F.Supp. 519, 521 (1987) (citing United States Steel Corp. v. United States, 6 CIT 285, 286, 578 F.Supp. 418, 419 (1983)). The three primary purposes of the privilege are:

[1] to assure that subordinates within an agency will feel free to provide the decisionmaker with their uninhibited opinions and recommendations without fear of ... criticism; [2] to protect against premature disclosure of proposed policies before they have been ... adopted; and [3] to protect against confusing the issues and misleading the public by dissemination of documents suggesting reasons and rationales for a course of action which were not in fact the ultimate reasons for the agency’s action.

Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 866 (D.C.Cir.1980) (citing Jordan v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 591 F.2d 753, 772-73 (D.C.Cir.1978)). In the instant case, the Court is presented solely with the first of these concerns, i.e., the protection of documents reflecting the communications, advisory opinions, drafts, recommendations, and deliberations prepared prior to, and in connection with, the rendering of a final agency decision. See Coastal States Gas, 617 F.2d at 866; see also NEC Corp. v. United States Dep’t of Commerce, 21 CIT 198, 211, 958 F.Supp. 624, 636 (1997) (citing Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318, 324 (D.D.C.1966), aff'd, 384 F.2d 979 (D.C.Cir.1967)).

For the deliberative process privilege to apply to a document, the court must find that two requirements have been satisfied. The first, or procedural, requirement demands that: (1) the privilege be asserted by the highest ranking member of the government agency or his or her designated subordinate, see Mobil Oil Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 520 F.Supp. 414, 416 (N.D.N.Y.1981); and (2) such individual submit an affidavit sufficiently describing the documents. See Asahi Chem. Indus. Co. v. United States, 1 CIT 21, 23, 1980 WL 2231 (1980) (citing SCM Corp. v. United States, 82 Cust. Ct. 351, 356-57, 473 F.Supp. 791, 796-97 (1979)); see also Mobil Oil, 520 F.Supp. at 416 (stating that affidavit must describe in detail the information the agency seeks to protect and that conclusory descriptions will not suffice).

The second, or substantive, requirement demands that the documents at issue be both “predecisional” and “deliberative.” See Torres v. City Univ. of New York, No. 90 Civ. 2278(CSH), 1992 WL 380561, *7, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18546, at *22-23 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 1992); see also USX Corp., 11 CIT at 420, 664 F.Supp. at 522. A document is predecisional if generated prior to the adoption of an agency policy and “prepared in order to assist an agency decisionmaker in arriving at his decision.” Hopkins v. United States Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 929 F.2d 81, 84 (2d Cir.1991) (quoting Renegotiation Bd. v.

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Elkem Metals Co. v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 2d 567, 24 Ct. Int'l Trade 1395, 24 C.I.T. 1395, 22 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 2417, 2000 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 169 (cit 2000).

126 F. Supp. 2d 567 (Elkem Metals Co. v. United States) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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