Nazer v. Warden at Riker's Island

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJune 20, 2023
Docket1:23-cv-03798
StatusUnknown

This text of Nazer v. Warden at Riker's Island (Nazer v. Warden at Riker's Island) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Nazer v. Warden at Riker's Island, (S.D.N.Y. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK IZZAT NAZAR Petitioner, 23-CV-3798 (LTS) -against- ORDER TO AMEND WARDEN, Respondent. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Petitioner is currently detained at the Vernon C. Bain Center on Rikers Island in connection with criminal charges pending against him in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, New York County. He brings this pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging his detention pending trial. By order dated May 5, 2023, the Court granted Petitioner’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). The Court directs Petitioner to file an amended petition within 60 days of the date of this order as detailed below. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus from a person in custody challenging the legality of his detention on the ground that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). The Court has the authority to review the petition and “award the writ or issue an order directing the respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted, unless it appears from the application that the applicant or person detained is not entitled [to such relief].” 28 U.S.C. § 2243. The Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally and interpret them “to raise the strongest arguments they suggest.” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474-75 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see Green v. United States, 260 F.3d 78, 83 (2d Cir. 2001). Nevertheless, a pro se litigant is not exempt “from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.” Triestman, 470 F.3d at 477 (quoting Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983)). BACKGROUND Petitioner brings this petition for a writ of habeas corpus petition alleging that he is being detained illegally during the pendency of his criminal proceedings in New York County on

robbery charges. The following facts are drawn from the petition. Petitioner faces criminal charges under Indictment Number 41263/2021, arising from a robbery involving a pair of socks allegedly taken from the T.J. Maxx store on Wall Street. (ECF 2 at 1.) Petitioner contends that the bail that was initially set for him was “illegal under the Bail Reform Act,” but he was nevertheless released on bail (Id. at 2.) During this period while Petitioner was not in detention, his defense counsel failed to schedule a mental health examination for him under N.Y. Criminal Procedure Law § 730. On August 25, 2022, Petitioner was remanded to custody. One reason that the court articulated for doing so was to permit the Section 730 examination to take place. Petitioner now has “fulfilled that objective,” and was found “fit” to proceed. (Id. at 2, 4.) The court’s second

reason for remanding Petitioner is that he had missed an appearance, and the court found that he had absconded, which Petitioner argues was an erroneous conclusion. Petitioner explains that, at some point, a “clerk” incorrectly told Petitioner that he had an appearance scheduled on the 25th day of an unidentified month – not the 24th day of the month; this caused him to miss the court appearance. Even though Petitioner had “willfully been appearing” until this mix-up, he was found to have absconded. Petitioner seems to argue that revoking his bail and remanding him to custody violated his rights, among other reasons, because (1) the initial decision to require him to post bail was unlawful; and (2) remanding him for missing an appearance is unlawful because it is harsher than the penalties permitted under the guidelines for violations of supervised release or probation. Petitioner seeks immediate release. DISCUSSION A petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is the appropriate vehicle for a pretrial detainee to seek release on the grounds that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution of the United States or federal law. See, e.g., Clemente v. Conn., No. 3:21-CV-0408, 2022 WL 527757, at *1 (D. Conn. Jan. 27, 2022); Fullwellen v. City of New York, No. 21-CV- 7219, 2021 WL 4940984, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2021); Robinson v. Sposato, No. 11-CV-0191, 2012 WL 1965631, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. May 29, 2012); see also Hoffler v. Bezio, 831 F. Supp. 2d 570, 575 (N.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d on other grounds, 726 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2013); Marte v. Berkman, No. 11-CV-6082, 2011 WL 4946708, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2011), aff’d on other grounds sub nom., Marte v. Vance, 480 F. App’x 83 (2d Cir. 2012) (summary order). Before seeking relief in the federal courts through a Section 2241 habeas corpus petition, a petitioner first must exhaust his available state court remedies. See United States ex rel. Scranton v. New York, 532 F.2d 292, 294 (2d Cir. 1976) (“While [Section 2241] does not by its

own terms require the exhaustion of state remedies as a prerequisite to the grant of federal habeas relief, decisional law has superimposed such a requirement in order to accommodate principles of federalism.”). A petitioner may satisfy the exhaustion requirement by fairly presenting his claims through one complete round of the state’s established appellate review process. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 844-45 (1999). Here, it is not clear what challenge to his detention Petitioner is making that is based on federal law or the U.S. Constitution. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (relief is available under Section 2241 only on the ground that petitioner “is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States”).

It is also unclear from the allegations of the petition whether Petitioner has raised his federal challenge to his detention in the state court, or has fully exhausted such grounds for relief by appealing to the highest state court available. The petition thus does not show that Petitioner has exhausted his state court remedies.1 LEAVE TO AMEND PETITION Petitioner proceeds in this matter without the benefit of an attorney. District courts generally grant a self-represented party an opportunity to amend, unless amendment would be futile, see Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988), and it is not clear that it would be futile to grant Petitioner leave to submit an amended petition.

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Related

Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
O'Sullivan v. Boerckel
526 U.S. 838 (Supreme Court, 1999)
Hill v. Curcione
657 F.3d 116 (Second Circuit, 2011)
Marte v. Vance
480 F. App'x 83 (Second Circuit, 2012)
Hoffler v. Bezio
726 F.3d 144 (Second Circuit, 2013)
Hoffler v. Bezio
831 F. Supp. 2d 570 (N.D. New York, 2011)
Salahuddin v. Cuomo
861 F.2d 40 (Second Circuit, 1988)

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Nazer v. Warden at Riker's Island, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/nazer-v-warden-at-rikers-island-nysd-2023.