Natkin & Company v. RF Ball Construction Company

123 N.W.2d 415, 255 Iowa 1156, 1963 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 753
CourtSupreme Court of Iowa
DecidedSeptember 17, 1963
Docket50913
StatusPublished
Cited by15 cases

This text of 123 N.W.2d 415 (Natkin & Company v. RF Ball Construction Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Natkin & Company v. RF Ball Construction Company, 123 N.W.2d 415, 255 Iowa 1156, 1963 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 753 (iowa 1963).

Opinion

StuaRt, J.

This appeal involves a dispute between a defendant and an intervenor in an action brought in equity under the provisions of chapter 573, Code of Iowa, relating to claims for labor and materials on public improvements. All other claims involved in the action have been resolved. Mason City Brick and Tile Company, hereinafter referred to as Mason City, filed a claim with the Cedar Rapids Independent School District for the price of the last carload of bricks furnished Southern Fireproofing Company, a partnership, which was the masonry subcontractor on two school buildings in the district. Southern Fireproofing Company and the individual partners, hereinafter referred to as Southern, counterclaimed against Mason City for damages alleged to have been sustained because the bricks Mason City furnished did not meet the specifications as to length. The trial court held that -under the specifications Mason City was required to furnish bricks only 11%" long” rather than 11%" as claimed by Southern and even if they were to have been 11%" only 3 percent of the bricks furnished for one school were not within the %e" tolerance. The trial court also held Southern failed to properly prove its damages. Southern has appealed.

The trial court’s finding that the -bricks met the specifications of the contract can be upheld: (1) if the specifications called for 11%" brick rather than 11%" brick, (this involves an interpretation of the specifications) or (2) if the tolerance of %6" applies to the average of all bricks furnished. Southern contends each brick could be either %(1" longer or shorter than the specified length, but all bricks should average the specified length. Mason City argues every brick could be shorter than the specified length and still be within the tolerance.

As the facts on these two propositions are not related they will be set out separately.

I. The typewritten specifications for the construction of the school buildings dated July 11, 1955, provided as follows:

“4-06. Face Beicr shall meet the requirements of A.S.T.M. *1159 Spec. C-216-50. Grade SW, Type FBS. All face brick shall be ‘norman’ size (2%" x 3%" x 11%"). Face brick for the George Washington School shall be ‘Norman Rose Velour’ face brick, manufactured by the Endieott Clay Products Company, Fair-bury, Nebraska.
“Face brick for the Thomas Jefferson School shall be ‘Norman Dark Blend Velour’ face brick manufactured by the Endieott Clay Products Company, Fairbury, Nebraska.”

On August 1, 1955, the specifications were, amended in the following respects:

“a. Paragraph 4-06, size of Norman Brick shall be 21/j" x 3%" x 11%" instead of 2%" x 31/]/' x 11%" as specified.” (Emphasis supplied.)

The evidence is clear that “Norman size brick” manufactured by Endieott Clay Products Company of Fairbury Nebraska is 2%" x 3%" x 11%". This is shown by the price list, testimony of Endieott’s officers and correspondence between Mason City and Southern. It is also clear Endieott could easily have made brick 11%" long but that the brick for this job had been run prior to the time complaint was made about the short brick. It is equally clear Southern expected brick 11%" long and contemplated either an adjustment in the price or a correction in the size. Mason City was firm and consistent in its position that the brick delivered met the specifications.

The trial court held the typewritten specifications “Norman size (2%" x 3%" x 11%")” created an ambiguity and applied the rule of law that words shall govern in the ease of inconsistency between words and figures. 17 C. J. S. 730, Contracts, section 311, saying:

“In view of the fact that the samples submitted and approved were 11% inches long, that the architects were familiar with the Endieott products, that the price list put out by Endieott discloses that the length of Norman face brick is 11%", that the A.S.T.M. specifications provide that purchasers should ascertain the type and sizes of brick available in the locality under consideration, and the rule of law pertaining to interpretation of contracts, the Court is of the opinion and decides that *1160 the specifications called for face brick 11%" in length. All brick furnished were within the permissible tolerance.”

We find no evidence which would justify the inference that the architects approved brick 11%" long. They did not testify for either party and Mr. C. E. Pearson, plant manager for Mason City, over objection, stated only that the architects obtained 32 samples of each brick which they approved. Furthermore we are not concerned with the architects’ knowledge but with the contract between Mason City and Southern in which bricks “norman size 21/4" x 3%" x 11%" ” were specified. Southern did not see the Endicott price list, nor was it at anytime informed that the measurements of the brick listed in the specifications were incorrect. The architects who wrote the specifications were the ones familiar with the Endicott product and were the ones charged with the duty of investigating the size of the brick under the A.S.T.M. specifications referred to by the trial court. “Note 5” reads as follows:

“Note 5 — Purchasers should ascertain the type and sizés of brick available in the locality under consideration and should specify accordingly, stating a size and type represented by the available brick. In general, brick having a wide range of colors will require greater tolerance for the full range of colors than for a restricted range of colors.” (Emphasis supplied.)

Southern, bidding on the specifications which specified “norman size (2% x 3% x 11%)” should be able to rely upon the architects specifications and not be required to check their accuracy as to size. This is particularly true since the architects found it necessary to correct one dimension in this very specification. The “2%” dimension in the original specifications was changed to “2%” by amendment. This action would tend to assure the bidder of the importance and accuracy of the figures contrary to Mason City’s claim that “norman size” designated the specific measurements.

In order for the rule relied upon by the trial court to apply to the instant case an inconsistency must exist between the words and figures. The most common and obvious inconsistency, of course, occurs in the situation where one number is written out and is followed by a different figure. There is *1161 no question about the applicability of the rule in such case. Here there is no obvious ambiguity and if one exists it could only arise because “norman size” has a fixed and definite meaning in the trade as a brick 2]4" x 3%" x 11%".

There is not a great deal of evidence on this point. “Norman size” brick manufactured by Endicott is 11%" long, but Endi-cott could easily make brick 11%". It would be reasonable to assume they would adjust their molds to meet the length specification on an order of 600,000 to 650,000 bricks. The only evidence which even suggests that “norman size” means brick 2%" x V-/%" x 11%" is found in the following testimony of Mr. Pearson, plant manager for Mason City:

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
123 N.W.2d 415, 255 Iowa 1156, 1963 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 753, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/natkin-company-v-rf-ball-construction-company-iowa-1963.