National Farmers Union Insurance Companies, a Utah Corporation, and Lodge Grass School District No. 27 v. Crow Tribe of Indians

736 F.2d 1320, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 20849, 18 Educ. L. Rep. 321

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: July 3, 1984
• Docket: 83-3606, 83-3645
• Status: Published

Opinions

FLETCHER, Circuit Judge:

In May of 1982, Leroy Sage, a minor and an enrolled member of the Crow Indian Tribe, was struck by a motorcycle while in the parking lot of Lodge Grass School District No. 27. The School District is located on land owned by the State of Montana and within the exterior boundaries of the Crow Indian Reservation. Sage and his guardian, Flora Not Afraid, filed a negligence suit against the school district in Crow Tribal Court. Tribal process was served on the chairman of the school board, but the school district failed to answer Sage’s complaint or to appear in tribal court to contest its jurisdiction. Sage ultimately obtained a default judgment against the school district. Upon receiving notice of the default judgment, the school district notified its insurer, National Farmers Union Insurance (National), of the tribal suit. Neither the school district nor National contested the default judgment in Crow Tribal Court, see Crow Tribal R.Civ. P. 17, or sought an appeal to the Crow Tribal Court of Appeals, see Crow Tribal Code § 31-1-103; Crow Tribal R.App.P. 2. Instead, National obtained a temporary restraining order from a federal district court prohibiting Sage from enforcing his default judgment, and filed suit against the Crow Tribe, the Crow Tribal Council, the Crow Tribal Court, tribal judges and the chairman of the tribal council, seeking a permanent injunction.¹ On December 29, 1982, the district court entered a permanent injunction prohibiting Sage, Not Afraid, their counsel, the tribal judges and the chairman of the tribal council from executing on any judgment or pressing any claim against National or the school district arising from Sage’s injury. We reverse.

The district court held that it had jurisdiction over the suit under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976),² and ruled that National’s claim arose under federal common law. See National Farmers Union Insurance v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 560 F.Supp. 213, 214-15 (D.Mont.1983). National’s complaint alleged that the tribal court violated the federal constitution and the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-41 (1976) (ICRA), by asserting jurisdiction over the school district. The district court declined to decide whether allegations of deprivation of constitutional rights or violations of the Indian Civil Rights Act stated a claim for federal relief. See 560 F.Supp. at 215 & n. 1. Instead, the court ruled that the allegation that a tribal court had improperly exercised its jurisdiction stated a federal common law claim, because “[t]he necessity of a proper forum wherein the extent of tribal court jurisdiction can be determined can hardly be overemphasized.” Id. at 215. Proceeding to the merits of National’s claim, the court held that the Crow Tribal Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Sage’s suit and, therefore, entered a permanent injunction.³

In R.J. Williams Co. v. Fort Belknap Housing Authority, 719 F.2d 979, 981-82 (9th Cir.1983), decided after the district court’s decision in this case, we held that a complaint challenging a tribal court’s assertion of jurisdiction over a non-Indian defendant in a civil suit stated no federal claim for relief. We conclude that R.J. Williams controls this case. Accordingly, we reverse.

DISCUSSION

National’s complaint, as amended, alleges that the tribal court’s exercise of jurisdiction over its insured deprived it of due process and equal protection. Indian Tribes are not constrained by the provisions of the fourteenth amendment. See R.J. Williams, 719 F.2d at 982; Trans-Canada Enterprises, Ltd. v. Muckleshoot Indian Tribe, 634 F.2d 474, 476-77 (9th Cir.1980). National’s due process and equal protection claims cannot, therefore, arise under the Constitution. R.J. Williams, 719 F.2d at 981. Tribes are, however, bound by the provisions of the ICRA. Id. The ICRA requires tribal courts to exercise their jurisdiction in a manner consistent with due process and equal protection. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8). Congress has expressly limited federal court review of a claimed violation of the ICRA to encompass a single remedy: the writ of habeas corpus. 25 U.S.C. § 1303. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 66-70, 98 S.Ct. 1670, 1681-1683, 56 L.Ed.2d 106 (1977); Boe v. Fort Belknap Indian Community, 642 F.2d 276, 278 (9th Cir.1981). A civil suit to enjoin violations of the ICRA is not cognizable in federal court. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 67-70, 98 S.Ct. at 1681-1683; accord R.J. Williams, 719 F.2d at 981. Neither the constitution nor the ICRA provides a basis for a federal cause of action.

National urges us, however, to recognize a cause of action arising under federal common law that would permit a civil suit to enjoin the proceedings of a tribal court. National’s argument has superficial appeal. It invokes authority holding that a complaint challenging tribal abuse of its civil regulatory jurisdiction states a claim arising under federal common law. See, e.g., Babbitt Ford, Inc. v. Navajo Indian Tribe, 710 F.2d 587, 591 (9th Cir.1983), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 104 S.Ct. 1707, 80 L.Ed.2d 180 (1984); Cardin v. De La Cruz, 671 F.2d 363, 365, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 967, 103 S.Ct. 293, 74 L.Ed.2d 277 (1982). The Supreme Court relied on principles of federal common law to determine whether a tribal court had exceeded its jurisdiction in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 98 S.Ct. 1011, 55 L.Ed.2d 209 (1978). The question whether a tribe has abused its adjudicatory jurisdiction seems, at first glance, to be as appropriate as a question involving tribal regulatory jurisdiction for resolution in a suit brought in federal court.

Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, however, came to the federal courts by way of a petition for habeas corpus. See 435 U.S. at 194, 98 S.Ct. at 1013. Congress, when it enacted the ICRA, purposefully restricted federal court interference with the proceedings of tribal courts to review on petitions for habeas corpus. See Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 67-70, 98 S.Ct. at 1681-1683. In asking that we recognize a civil cause of action arising under federal common law, National is requesting that we supplement a remedy Congress intended to be exclusive, and that we do so without statutory authority.⁴

The judicial recognition of a cause of action arising under federal common law is an unusual course, to be approached cautiously. Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 312-14, 101 S.Ct. 1784, 1789-91, 68 L.Ed.2d 114 (1981). In view of Congress’s manifest purpose to limit the intrusion of federal courts upon tribal adjudication, see Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 67-70, 98 S.Ct. at 1681-1683, we decline to recognize a common law cause of action in addition to the limited remedies available under the ICRA. We conclude that National may not assert its claim as one arising under common law. National’s complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a claim for federal relief.⁵

The district court was rightly concerned that there must be a “proper forum wherein the extent of tribal court jurisdiction can be determined ____” 560 F.Supp. at 215. However, the proper forum for this determination, at least in the first instance,⁶ is not a federal court but a tribal court. See Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 65, 98 5. Ct. at 1680; R.J. Williams, 719 F.2d at 983.

REVERSED.

1 . The parties later stipulated to the joinder of Sage and Not Afraid as additional defendants.

2 . As we noted in RJ. Williams Co. v. Fort Belknap Housing Authority, 719 F.2d 979, 981 (9th Cir.1983), a court may take jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 if it must make a determination of law in order to determine whether plaintiff has stated a federal claim.

3 . The district court’s analysis of subject matter jurisdiction assumed that the tribe’s adjudicatory authority must be coextensive with its regulatory authority. Although our disposition of the case makes it unnecessary to reach the merits of National’s jurisdictional argument, we find this assumption untenable. Cases are commonly adjudicated in forums that would lack the authority to regulate the subject matter of the disputes. See generally Allstate Insurance Company v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 101 S.Ct. 633, 66 L.Ed.2d 521 (1981). In analyzing whether a dispute may be decided in a particular state or federal court, we have inquired only whether the court’s exercise of jurisdiction is authorized by applicable forum law and whether it comports with due process. See, e.g., Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, — U.S. —, 104 S.Ct. 1473, 79 L.Ed.2d 790 (1984). The jurisdictional question is not controlled by whether it would be appropriate to apply the forum’s substantive law to the dispute. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 215, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 2585, 53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977). The tribal character of a challenged forum does not alter the essential nature of this inquiry. "Tribal courts have repeatedly been recognized as appropriate forums for the exclusive adjudication of disputes affecting important personal and property interests of both Indians and non-Indians." Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 65, 98 S.Ct. 1670, 1680, 56 L.Ed.2d 106 (1978).

4 . National’s arguments for a common law cause of action are also not advanced by Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 101 S.Ct. 1245, 67 L.Ed.2d 493 (1981). Montana arose as a declaratory judgment action brought by the United States in its trusteeship capacity. 450 U.S. at 549, 101 S.Ct. at 1250. The district court had jurisdiction of the suit under 28 U.S.C. § 1345 (1976). Moreover, Montana involved limitations of an Indian tribe’s regulatory jurisdiction. 450 U.S. at 557-67, 101 S.Ct. at 1254-59. As noted above, a tribe’s abuse of regulatory jurisdiction may create a federal cause of action. A tribe’s assumption of adjudicatory jurisdiction, however, does not.

5 . Because we conclude that National’s complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a federal claim, we need not reach the other issues raised by the parties. We intimate no views on questions involving sovereign immunity, exhaustion of tribal remedies, state court jurisdiction over Sage’s negligence suit or the merits of National’s jurisdictional challenge.

6 . Should Sage seek to enforce his default judgment in the courts of Montana, National may, of course, challenge the tribal court's jurisdiction in the collateral proceedings. See generally Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 84 S.Ct. 242, 11 L.Ed.2d 186 (1963).