Murray County v. Pickering

157 S.E. 343, 42 Ga. App. 739, 1931 Ga. App. LEXIS 124
CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia
DecidedFebruary 18, 1931
Docket20489
StatusPublished
Cited by14 cases

This text of 157 S.E. 343 (Murray County v. Pickering) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Murray County v. Pickering, 157 S.E. 343, 42 Ga. App. 739, 1931 Ga. App. LEXIS 124 (Ga. Ct. App. 1931).

Opinion

Bell, J.

1. Under the provisions of section 386 of the Civil Code, all contracts made by county authorities “in behalf of the county must be in writing and entered on their minutes.” Laurens County v. Thomas, 6 Ga. App. 568 (65 S. E. 302) ; Spalding County v. Chamberlin, 130 Ga. 649 (61 S. E. 533) ; Wagener v. Forsyth County, 135 Ga. 162 (68 S. E. 1115) ; Milburn v. Glynn County, 109 Ga. 473 (34 S. E. 848). A mere oral agreement is unenforceable even though it be embodied or recited in a resolution adopted by the county commissioners and entered on the minutes. Thus, a resolution that a named attorney “is hereby employed” to represent the county in a certain cause, upon terms and conditions therein stipulated, is insufficient, without more, to constitute a binding contract between the county and such attorney, although the resolution is entered upon the minutes and the attorney signifies his acceptance of the employment by tendering performance. Jones v. Bank of Cumming, 131 Ga. 191, 615 (62 S. E. 68, 63 S. E. 36) ; Holliday v. Jackson County, 121 Ga. 310 (48 S. E. 947).

2. A suit filed by an attorney in behalf of a county and thereafter sought to be dismissed by the county authorities can not be controlled and prosecuted by such attorney merely for the purpose of recovering of the defendant fees to which the attorney claims to be entitled by virtue of a contract between himself and the county authorities, when, as appears from the petition, such contract is unenforceable because it was not in writing and entered upon the minutes as required by law.

3. Upon application of the above principles to the facts of this case, the court did not err in sustaining the general demurrer and dismissing the petition as amended.

Judgment affirmed.

Jenkins, P. J., and Stephens, J., concur.

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Bluebook (online)
157 S.E. 343, 42 Ga. App. 739, 1931 Ga. App. LEXIS 124, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/murray-county-v-pickering-gactapp-1931.