Mountain States Contractors v. Thomas Perez

825 F.3d 274, 2016 FED App. 0132P, 2016 CCH OSHD 33,521, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 10099, 2016 WL 3125881
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
DecidedJune 3, 2016
Docket15-3782
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 825 F.3d 274 (Mountain States Contractors v. Thomas Perez) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Mountain States Contractors v. Thomas Perez, 825 F.3d 274, 2016 FED App. 0132P, 2016 CCH OSHD 33,521, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 10099, 2016 WL 3125881 (6th Cir. 2016).

Opinion

OPINION

JANE B. STRANCH, Circuit Judge.

During construction of a bridge over the Cumberland River, a crane’s boom cable snapped and the crane collapsed, shattering the glass enclosing the operator’s compartment and damaging' a vehicle on the adjacent highway. Mountain States Contractors, LLC challenges the affirmance of a citation and penalty issued against it by the Occupational Safety and Health Commission (OSHC) following the incident. At a trial on the merits, the Administrative Law Judge determined that Mountain States had committed a willful violation of the wire rope inspection standard set forth in the Occupational Safety and Health Administration Act of 1970 (the Act). The ALJ found a violation of the Act because, prior to the accident, the crane’s boom cable had “visible broken wires” within the meaning of the provision requiring repair or replacement before further use, and that Mountain States had knowledge of this deficiency. For the following reasons, we deny the petition for review.

I. BACKGROUND

The Tennessee Department of Transportation engaged Mountain States, a construction contractor based in Nashville, Tennessee, to build two bridges over the Cumberland River at its intersection with *277 Highway 109 in Gallatin, Tennessee. (Appendix at 9.) 1

On May 21, 2013, the boom cable of a Terex HC 165 crane snapped while the crane operator was “clamming,” or excavating material from under water, causing the boom — -the extendable overhead arm of the crane controlled by the load-bearing wire boom cable — to collapse onto the adjacent highway. (Id. at 10-11, 13.) As the cable broke under tension, it whipped back to shatter the windows of the crane operator’s cab, (Id. at 29-30), and the boom hit a passing vehicle, (Supp. Appendix at 1177.) Though no person was injured, the subsequent Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) investigation determined that at least four people were exposed to risk as a result of the accident. (Appendix at 156.) After completion of the investigation, a complaint was filed against Mountain States alleging, among other things, violation of the wire rope inspection standard, 29 C.F.R. § 1926.1413(a)(2)(ii)(A). (Id. at 90.)

A. Wire Rope Inspection Standard and Worksite Safety Policies

The Act requires that employers “comply with occupational safety and health standards promulgated under this chapter.” 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(2). Subpart CC of the Act pertains to the use of cranes in construction, including the inspection standard for “wire rope” like the boom cable at issue. 29 C.F.R. § 1926.1401 et seq. The standard requires that a “competent person” perform “a visual inspection prior to each shift the [crane] is used” that includes “observation of wire ropes ... that are likely to be in use during the shift for apparent deficiencies.” 29 C.F.R. § 1926.1413(a)(1). A “competent person” is “one who is capable of identifying existing and predictable hazards in the surroundings or working conditions which are ... hazardous, or dangerous to employees, and who has authorization to take prompt corrective measures to eliminate them.” 29 C.F.R. § 1926.1401.

The boom cable, which runs through steel sheaves to adjust the height of the boom, is composed of multiple steel wires wound into strands and wrapped around a core. Id. According to Category II of the wire rope inspection standard, the crane must be taken out of service for repair if a cable has “visible broken wires” defined as either (1) “[s]ix randomly distributed broken wires in one rope lay,” or (2) “three broken wires in one strand in a rope lay.” 29 C.F.R. §§ 1926.1413(a)(2)(ii)(A)(1), (a)(4). These conditions are referred to as the “out-of-service criteria” or the “3 and 6 criteria.” (Appendix at 21, 28.) A “rope lay” is “the length along the rope in which one strand makes a complete revolution around the rope.” 29 C.F.R. § 1926.1413(a)(2)(ii)(A)(1).

Mountain States considered its crane operators “competent persons” within the meaning of the Act and delegated the task of pre-shift inspections of the crane to them. (Petitioner Br. at 10.) The crane operators were empowered to remove a crane from service pursuant to the requirements of the Act and in conformity with Mountain States’ policy that “equipment found to have defects in any critical area which could affect the safe operation of the equipment shall be tagged accordingly and taken out of service until proper repairs have been made.” (Appendix at 222.)

*278 The crane operators documented the results of their inspections on a Daily Inspection Form. The Form contained a checklist for components of the crane separated into two sections based on whether the component could be inspected in a “walk around inspection” or required the operator to “climb up onto machine.” (Id. at 171-99). As the operator inspected each component on the list, he checked one of three options defined in the Form’s “explanation of terms” section: (1) “satisfactory” if the item was “in good working condition,” (2) “adjust” if the “item needs minor adjustment at first opportunity,” and (3) “repair” if the item “needs to be repaired before further operation.” (Id.) (emphasis added). The Form also included a “remarks or comments” section for notes on components that needed to be replaced, specific care instructions and the like (e.g., “2nd line needs to be replaced. Crane fully greased”) (Id. at 171.) An instruction to “submit yellow copy [of Daily Inspection Form] to project office at end of each week” appeared at the bottom of the Form. (Id. at 171-99.) In practice, however, the Forms were maintained in the inspection book in the crane’s cab until full and then they were shipped to a storage facility without any review. (Id. at 19-20, 28, 164.)

Beyond these measures pertaining specifically to the crane, other safety practices instituted by Mountain States included daily “pre-work huddles” during which supervisors reviewed the day’s tasks and related safety issues, (id. at 572), and weekly safety training sessions, (id. at 54, 412.) Weekly in-house site safety audits were supplemented by regular safety audits conducted by a third party. (Id. at 728.)

B. The OSHA Inspection and Trial

The accident was reported to OSHA, which launched an investigation of the worksite led by Compliance Safety and Health Officer Michelle Sotak. (Id.

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825 F.3d 274, 2016 FED App. 0132P, 2016 CCH OSHD 33,521, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 10099, 2016 WL 3125881, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mountain-states-contractors-v-thomas-perez-ca6-2016.