KARWACKI, Judge.
These three cases require our construction of Maryland Code (1987, 1991 Cum.Supp.), § 16-205.1 of the Transportation Article, which under certain circumstances authorizes [457]*457the suspension of driving privileges when a licensee is detained on suspicion of drunken driving. Specifically, we are called upon to determine whether dismissal of an order of suspension is a proper sanction when the Motor Vehicle Administration (MVA)1 fails to comply with the provisions of § 16-205. l(f)(5)(i) by scheduling a hearing to challenge the suspension more than 30 days after its receipt of a hearing request submitted by the licensee.
I.
On June 17, 1990 at 3:07 a.m., Appellant, Jeffrey Paul Larkin, was stopped by a Maryland State Trooper in Prince George’s County for suspected drunken driving. Larkin was advised of his right under § 16-205.1 of the Transportation Article to take or refuse a chemical test to determine the concentration of alcohol in his blood, and of the consequences of his decision. After Larkin refused to submit to the test, the trooper confiscated Larkin’s driver’s license and issued him an officer’s certification and order of suspension, which also served as a temporary driver’s license, allowing Larkin to continue to drive for 45 days after its issuance, or until completion of an administrative hearing at which Larkin could demonstrate why his license should not be suspended.
Larkin timely completed a request for a hearing to challenge the suspension of his license and mailed it to the MVA. That request was received by the MVA on June 25, 1990. A hearing was scheduled before an administrative law judge of the OAH for July 27, 1990, 32 days after MVA’s receipt of Larkin’s hearing request. Larkin’s temporary license was scheduled to expire August 1, 1990, five days after his administrative hearing was held.
[458]*458On July 27, 1990, Larkin appeared for his administrative hearing and filed a motion to dismiss the suspension order on the basis of MVA’s failure to schedule a hearing date within 30 days from the date Larkin filed his hearing request, as required by § 16—205.1(f)(5)(i) of the Transportation Article. The administrative law judge denied Larkin’s motion and suspended his license to drive for 120 days.
Larkin filed an appeal to the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County and the suspension was stayed pending the outcome of the appeal. The circuit court judge affirmed both the denial of the motion to dismiss and the decision of the administrative law judge to suspend Larkin’s license.
The case involving Appellee, Bruce Clayton Shrader, followed a similar course. On the night of April 20, 1990 at 10:44 p.m., Shrader was detained by a police officer for suspected drunken driving in Harford County. Shrader was advised of his rights with regard to taking a chemical test and refused to submit to the test. As a result, the trooper seized Shrader’s driver’s license and served him an order of suspension and a temporary license authorizing him to drive for 45 days after its issuance, or until completion of an administrative hearing to determine whether the suspension was warranted.
Shrader filed a timely request for an administrative hearing which was received by MVA on April 24, 1990. The MVA scheduled the hearing regarding Shrader’s refusal to take the test on May 25, 1990, 31 days after MVA had received the request for hearing. At the administrative hearing, Shrader moved to dismiss the order of suspension on the basis that the hearing was not held within 30 days of the date that the request was received, as provided in § 16-205.1(f)(5)(i). The motion was denied by the administrative law judge, who stated that unless Shrader could show any harm, the untimely scheduling of the hearing did not require a dismissal. At the conclusion of the hearing, Shrader’s license was suspended for 120 days.
[459]*459Shrader filed a timely appeal to the Circuit Court for Harford County and the suspension was stayed pending the outcome of the appeal. On appeal, the circuit court ruled that the requirement that a hearing be scheduled within 30 days of receipt of the request was mandatory, and that although Shrader was not prejudiced, MVA’s non-compliance nevertheless required reversal of the suspension.
Similarly, late in the evening of April 20, 1990 and the early morning of April 21, 1990, Appellee, Sharon Lee Keller, was detained by a police officer for suspected drunken driving in Anne Arundel County. Keller was advised of her right to take or refuse a chemical test, and the attendant administrative consequences. She declined to take such a test, and as a result, her driver’s license was confiscated and she was presented an order of suspension and a temporary license, which authorized her to drive for 45 days or until completion of an administrative hearing to determine the validity of the suspension.
Keller timely requested an administrative hearing which was received by the MVA on April 23, 1990. Her hearing was scheduled for May 25, 1990, 32 days after MVA had received the request for hearing. At the administrative hearing, Keller moved to dismiss the suspension on the ground that the hearing had not been scheduled within the requisite 30 days, as provided in § 16-205. l(f)(5)(i). The motion was denied by the administrative law judge, and Keller’s license was suspended for 120 days.
On appeal to the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, the court ruled that the requirement that a hearing be scheduled within 30 days of the receipt of the request was mandatory and that MVA’s non-compliance required a dismissal of the suspension, even though Keller had not been prejudiced by the delay.
We granted certiorari to review the judgments of the circuit courts in these cases to determine whether dismissal is the proper sanction for the MVA’s failure to provide a hearing to challenge the order of suspension within 30 days.
[460]*460II.
In 1988, the General Assembly established a Task Force on Drunk and Drugged Driving because “[t]he problem of drunk and drugged driving is of continuing concern to the citizens of the State of Maryland.” Joint Resolution No. 15 of the Acts of 1988. The Task Force was charged, inter alia, with:
“(1) Examining methods of increasing the effectiveness of the remedies currently available for combatting drunk and drugged driving;
“(2) Examining remedies developed by other states and jurisdictions to deal with the problem of drunk and drugged drivers; [and]
“(3) Recommending changes and additions to current laws and regulations dealing with drunk and drugged drivers.”
Id.
In its interim report issued in December of 1988, the Task Force recommended that the General Assembly enact what it referred to as an administrative per se law which would provide “for the prompt suspension of the driver’s license of an individual who, upon being detained by a police officer on suspicion of driving or attempting to drive while under the influence of alcohol or while intoxicated, either: 1) Refused to take a BAC [blood alcohol concentration] test; or 2) Submitted to the BAC test, and the results exceeded a statutorily defined limit.” Task Force on Drunk and Drugged Driving, Interim Report to the General Assembly, at 6 (1988). The General Assembly responded during its next session by amending § 16-205.1 of the Transportation Article, which generally provided that a person who drives on Maryland highways is deemed to have consented to take a chemical test to determine the alcohol content of his or her blood if detained on suspicion of driving while under the influence of alcohol. Ch. 284 of the Acts of 1989. Under that amendment to § 16-205.1, when an individual is detained for suspected drunken driving, the detaining police [461]*461officer is required to advise the person of the administrative sanctions that shall be imposed for refusal to take the test or for test results indicating a blood alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more. § 16-205. l(b)(2)(iii). If the driver refuses to take the test, the police officer shall confiscate the person’s Maryland driver’s license, personally serve an order of suspension on the person, and issue a temporary license to drive. § 16-205.1(b)(3). The temporary license which the detaining police officer is required to issue to the driver expires on the 46th day after the driver was detained. Id. This section, until amended during the 1990 session of the General Assembly, permitted the driver who refused the test to request an administrative hearing to challenge the suspension by filing a request with the MVA within 10 days after he or she was detained by the police officer.2 Failure to request a hearing within 10 days from detention precludes the driver from having an administrative hearing,3 and allows MVA to issue an order suspending the driver’s license for 120 days for a first offense. § 16-205.-l(b)(l)(i)2.A.
[462]*462Section 16-205.1(f)(5)(i) of the Transportation Article provides that:
“If the person requests a hearing at the time of or within 10 days after the issuance of the order of suspension ... the Administration shall set a hearing for a date within 30 days of the receipt of the request.”
The licensees in the instant cases filed a hearing request within 10 days of the issuance of the order of suspension and were provided a hearing 31 or 32 days after the MVA received the requests, rather than within 30 days. The MVA admits that although it formerly made, and OAH now makes, every effort to comply with the mandatory duty to schedule a hearing within 30 days, occasionally, due to a backlog in scheduling or administrative oversight, the 30 day requirement cannot be met.
III.
While a statute or rule may dictate a mandatory duty on the part of any agency or party, non-compliance with that statute or rule does not necessarily require a dismissal of the case. In re Keith W, 310 Md. 99, 104, 527 A.2d 35, 37 (1987). Thus, we must examine the provisions of § 16-205.1 which are silent as to any sanctions to be imposed for non-compliance with the 30 day scheduling requirement, to determine whether dismissal of the order of suspension is a proper sanction when the MVA fails to schedule a hearing date within 30 days of its receipt of a hearing request.
The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent. Jones v. State, 311 Md. 398, 405, 535 A.2d 471, 474 (1988). Because the language of the statute is the primary source of legislative intent, State v. Fabritz, 276 Md. 416, 421, 348 A.2d 275, 278 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 942, 96 S.Ct. 1680, 48 L.Ed.2d 185 (1976), the words of the statute must be given their ordinary and natural meaning. NCR Corp. v. Comptroller, 313 Md. 118, 124, 544 A.2d 764, 767 (1988).
[463]*463On the other hand, the plain meaning rule is not rigid and does not force us to read legislative provisions in rote fashion and in isolation, Kaczorowski v. City of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 514, 525 A.2d 628, 632 (1987). One equally well-settled principle of statutory interpretation is that a statute is to be construed reasonably with reference to the purpose, aim or policy of the legislature reflected in that statute. Id. at 513, 525 A.2d at 632. Additionally, a statute must be construed in context; “[t]he ‘meaning of the plainest language’ is controlled by the context in which it appears.” Id. at 514, 525 A.2d at 632 (quoting Guardian Life Ins. v. Ins. Comm’r, 293 Md. 629, 642, 446 A.2d 1140, 1147 (1982)); NCR Corp., 313 Md. at 125, 544 A.2d at 767. Thus, when construing a provision that is part of a single statutory scheme, the legislative intent must be gleaned from the entire statute, rather than from only one part. Jones, 311 Md. at 405, 535 A.2d at 474. Also, legislative reports and other pertinent legislative history may help to provide the appropriate context. Kaczorowski, 309 Md. at 515, 525 A.2d at 632-33.
In any event, “results that are unreasonable, illogical or inconsistent with common sense should be avoided whenever possible consistent with the statutory language, with the real legislative intention prevailing over the intention indicated by the literal meaning.” Potter v. Bethesda Fire Dep’t. 309 Md. 347, 353, 524 A.2d 61, 64 (1987) (quoting Fabritz, 276 Md. at 422, 348 A.2d at 279).
Furthermore, when determining whether a case should be dismissed for non-compliance with a statute or rule, we have established a number of factors to be included in the analysis. First and foremost, the purpose and policy of the statute or rule must be considered in determining the appropriate sanction. Gaetano v. Calvert County, 310 Md. 121, 125-26, 527 A.2d 46, 48 (1987); State v. Werkheiser, 299 Md. 529, 533, 474 A.2d 898, 900 (1984); Maryland St. Bar Ass’n v. Frank, 272 Md. 528, 533, 325 A.2d 718, 721 (1974).
[464]*464We have consistently recognized that the statutory provisions enacted to enforce the State’s fight against drunken driving, namely Md.Code (1989, 1991 Cum.Supp.), § 10-302 to -309 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article and § 16-205.1 of the Transportation Article, were enacted for the protection of the public and not primarily for the protection of the accused. State v. Moon, 291 Md. 463, 477, 436 A.2d 420, 427 (1981); Werkheiser, 299 Md. at 536-37, 474 A.2d at 902. The General Assembly’s goal in enacting the drunk driving laws, as stated by Judge Cole in Willis v. State, 302 Md. 363, 488 A.2d 171 (1985), is “to meet the considerable challenge created by this problem by enacting a series of measures to rid our highways of the drunk driver menace. These measures, some of which are decades old, are primarily designed to enhance the ability of prosecutors to deal effectively with the drunk driver problem.” Id. at 369-70, 488 A.2d at 175.
In 1989, the General Assembly enacted the administrative per se law recommended by the Task Force, rewriting § 16-205.1 of the Transportation Article to allow a person’s driver’s license to be promptly suspended for suspected drunken driving if the person refused a test for blood alcohol concentration. Ch. 284 of the Acts of 1989. The legislative history of Chapter 284 (House Bill 556) indicates that the General Assembly’s desire for swift and certain action against drunk drivers was balanced with concern for the administrative needs of the MVA. While House Bill 556 was under consideration, Delegate David B. Shapiro requested advice on the validity of the summary suspension provisions of the bill from the Attorney General’s Office of Counsel to the General Assembly. In response, Assistant Attorney General Kathryn M. Rowe wrote:
“You have ... asked whether any provision is made for a stay of suspension if the hearing cannot be held within 45 days____ [N]o stay of suspension is provided if the hearing cannot be held within 45 days because the licensee is unable to attend. A stay is available, however, if the Administration is unable to provide a hearing within [465]*46545 days____ The administration ‘shall’ set the hearing for a date within 30 days of the receipt of the request, but if a hearing cannot be provided within 30 days, the suspension is stayed until a hearing is provided.”
Letter from Assistant Attorney General Kathryn M. Rowe to Delegate David B. Shapiro (Feb. 10, 1989), on file with the Department of Legislative Reference, Annapolis, Legislative History file of House Bill 556. This letter strongly indicates that the General Assembly contemplated the possibility that the MVA would not be able to schedule a hearing within 30 days, but only meant to provide a remedy (a stay of suspension) where prejudice would arise to the licensee.
On behalf of the Mayor of Baltimore’s Task Force for Liaison with the General Assembly, Colonel Joseph Cooke of the Baltimore City Police Department wrote to the House Judiciary Committee to express Baltimore City’s support for House Bill 556. Cooke indicated that:
“Previous legislative efforts in this area have raised questions regarding the administration of our on the site confiscation program. Our department has contacted ... the Nevada Highway Patrol regarding their license confiscation programs, similar to the one proposed in House Bill 556____ Nevada officials indicated that their seven day temporary license is too short and has caused administrative problems for them. They indicated that the proposed 45 day validity period is more appropriate to meet the administrative needs of the Motor Vehicle Administration.”
Letter from Colonel Joseph Cooke to the House Judiciary Committee (Feb. 15, 1989), on file with the Department of Legislative Reference, Annapolis, Legislative History file of House Bill 556. Thus, the 45 day period was contemplated as part of an overall administrative plan. This conclusion is logical when viewed in the context of the entire scheme of § 16-205.1(f).
The General Assembly, in determining the appropriate period for driving on the temporary license, recognized that not all hearing requests would be received by the 10th day, [466]*466but rather that many of the requests would be mailed on the 10th day. As a result, the General Assembly calculated an additional five days for the request to be carried by the postal authorities to the MVA. Obviously, the General Assembly was expecting that it might take as many as 15 days from the date of detention for the driver’s request for a hearing to be received by the MVA. The General Assembly then expected the MVA to schedule an administrative hearing for the driver in the 30 days that followed MVA’s receipt of the request for a hearing. The General Assembly was aware that, unless the driver had his or her hearing within the 45 days that followed his or her detention, the licensee’s privilege to drive would be automatically suspended on the 46th day without due process of law.
This intent is explicit in the 1990 amendment to § 16-205.1, which was enacted by Ch. 413 of the Acts of 1990, for the purpose of “defining certain terms; making stylistic changes; clarifying language; making technical corrections; and generally relating to the revision of laws pertaining to certain alcohol- or drug-related driving offenses,” and states:
“If the person refuses to take the test or takes a test which results in an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more at the time of testing, the police officer shall ... [i]nform the person that ... the hearing will be scheduled within 45 days ...”
Md.Code (1987,1991 Cum.Supp.), § 16-205.1(b)(3)(v)l. of the Transportation Article. Clearly, then the General Assembly intended that the hearing would be held within 45 days from the driver’s detention. Larkin, Shrader, and Keller’s administrative hearings were held 40 to 41 days after their detentions, a time well within the 45 day period for holding a hearing.
In this context, it is inappropriate to invoke a dismissal sanction because a hearing was held 31 or 32 days, instead of 30 days, after receipt of the licensee’s request for a hearing. The reason for the prompt hearing is not for the benefit of the licensee; rather, the expedited hearing is [467]*467required to promptly remove the driver from the highway. Dismissing the suspension because of either a backlog in the scheduling of administrative hearings or an administrative oversight, in no way enhances the protection of the public. In fact, dismissing a suspension under these circumstances would be inimical to the interests of the public and would enhance the interests of the presumptively drunken driver, an outcome that is contrary to our holdings and to the General Assembly’s expressed sentiments.
IV.
We have previously held that dismissal is not the required sanction if a statute or rule does not state that dismissal will result from non-compliance; the statute or rule must be reviewed to determine whether a sanction for non-compliance is specified. Gaetano, 810 Md. at 125, 527 A.2d at 48; Werkheiser, 299 Md. at 537, 474 A.2d at 902; Resetar v. State Bd. of Education, 284 Md. 537, 548, 399 A.2d 225, 231 (1979); Maryland St. Bar Ass’n v. Frank, 272 Md. at 533, 325 A.2d at 721; Director v. Cash, 269 Md. 331, 345, 305 A.2d 833, 841 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1136, 94 S.Ct. 881, 38 L.Ed.2d 762 (1974).
The MVA argues that § 16-205.1(f)(5)(iii)2. provides a penalty for violation of the mandatory time requirements in the instant case. That section of the Transportation Article provides in pertinent part:
“A postponement of a hearing described under this paragraph shall extend the period for which the person is authorized to drive if:
1. Both the person and the Administration agree to the postponement;
2. The Administration cannot provide a hearing within the period required under this paragraph; or ...”
Thus, the MVA asserts that failure to provide a hearing within 30 days from receipt of the request for hearing is sanctioned by extending the period for which the person is authorized to drive.
[468]*468Counsel for the licensees in the instant case suggest that this section is inapplicable for two reasons: (1) because it requires that MVA and the licensee agree to any postponement, and (2) because this section pertains only to “postponements” and there was no previously scheduled administrative hearing in this case. We find both of these arguments unpersuasive and inconsistent with the legislative history of this section.
First, legislative history indicates that subsections 1. and 2. should be read disjunctively, not conjunctively; when the MVA cannot provide a hearing within the prescribed period, it may postpone the hearing despite the licensee’s objection. The Floor Report on House Bill 556 by the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee indicates that “[any] postponement of the hearing does not extend the period for which the person may drive under the 45-day temporary license unless (1) the MVA cannot provide a hearing within the prescribed period, or (2) the MVA and the person both agree to the postponement.” 4 Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee, Floor Report on House Bill 556 to the General Assembly of 1989, at 1-2 (emphasis added). See also Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee, Bill Analysis on House Bill 556 to the General Assembly of 1989, at 1. Thus, the fact that a licensee did not agree that the delay was acceptable to him or her does not prevent the MVA obtaining a postponement when it cannot provide a hearing within the prescribed period.
Moreover, in this case, the term “postponement” should not be read narrowly. A postponement means to “put off; defer; delay ... as when a hearing is postponed.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1168 (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis in original). Indeed, in the context of § 16—205.1(f)(5)(iii)2., the term cannot be premised on a previously scheduled hearing date. The very need for the postponement arises because the [469]*469MVA could not provide the initial hearing date within the 30 day period required under § 16-205.1(f)(5)(i).
It would be ludicrous for us to read § 16—205.1(f)(5)(iii)2. as requiring the MVA to go through the charade of scheduling the hearing for a date within the 30 day period—which it knows cannot be met—and then rescheduling the hearing for a date beyond the 30 day period. Such a reading would exalt form over substance.5 Rather, § 16—205.1(f)(5)(iii)2. reasonably means that if a hearing cannot be scheduled within the 30 day period, and if, for that reason, the hearing is delayed or deferred beyond the period required under § 16—205.1(f)(5)(i), the MVA shall extend the period during which the person is authorized to drive until the hearing is held, by staying the suspension which would otherwise become effective on the 46th day after the issuance of the order of suspension.
V.
Finally, the sanction to be imposed for non-compliance in a specific case may depend upon whether the party seeking dismissal can demonstrate prejudice from the noncompliance. Gaetano, 310 Md. at 127, 527 A.2d at 49; Resetar, 284 Md. at 550, 399 A.2d at 232.
In Resetar, the appellant was terminated by the Montgomery County Board of Education. He argued that the case should have been dismissed because the Board did not render its decision within 30 days of receiving the hearing examiner’s findings, as was required by the Board’s own rule. As one of its reasons not to dismiss the case, we stated:
[470]*470“The County Board’s regulation provides no penalty and makes no provision in the event of a violation of the limit imposed. Resetar has suffered no prejudice. He received pay which he might not otherwise have received. The delay was brief. We are of the view that neither the delay nor the temporary reinstatement had the effect of stripping the County Board of authority to dismiss Resetar. The purpose of the provision no doubt was, as said by the Court in McCall’s Ferry [Power Co. v. Price, 108 Md. 96, 69 A. 832 (1908)], ‘to have prompt decisions of causes.’ ”
Id. at 550, 399 A.2d at 232.
Likewise, in the cases at bar, the delay in scheduling the administrative hearing beyond the 30 days had no prejudicial impact on the licensees. Our predecessors observed that:
“Just what amounts to prejudice ... naturally depends upon the facts of the particular case, but, generally speaking, it may be said to be anything which places the person affected in a more unfavorable or disadvantageous position than he would otherwise have occupied.”
Roberto v. Catino, 140 Md. 38, 43-44, 116 A. 873, 875 (1922). These licensees were not placed in a more unfavorable or disadvantageous position; instead, they benefitted in that they were permitted to drive for a period of time that they might not otherwise have been allowed.
For these reasons, the administrative law judges who heard the instant cases properly ruled that dismissal of the suspension was not the appropriate sanction for the MVA’s non-compliance with § 16-205. l(f)(5)(i) of the Transportation Article.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY IN No. 49 AFFIRMED; COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.
[471]*471JUDGMENTS OF THE CIRCUIT COURTS FOR ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY IN No. 5 AND HARFORD COUNTY IN No. 4 REVERSED; CASES REMANDED TO THOSE COURTS WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO AFFIRM THE JUDGMENTS OF THE OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS; COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN THE CIRCUIT COURTS FOR ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY AND HARFORD COUNTY TO BE PAID BY APPELLEES.