OPINION OF THE COURT
FLAHERTY, Justice.
This is an appeal, by allowance, from a memorandum opinion and order of the Superior Court which affirmed an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County upholding the validity of a transfer in ownership of a certain bank account 392 Pa.Super. 660, 564 A.2d 267. At issue is whether the transfer of the bank account, by an elderly man and his wife, was attributable to undue influence, fraud, or lack of mental capacity. The factual background of this case is as follows.
The appellant, Ann C. Moser, is the administratrix for the estate of her late husband, John Moser, Jr. Mr. and Mrs. Moser were married in 1948. Mr. Moser worked as a coal miner until his retirement. The Mosers never had any children, and, as of 1985, had accumulated approximately $115,000 in lifetime savings. In March of 1985, when he was nearly seventy-eight years of age, Mr. Moser was diagnosed as being afflicted with cerebral arteriosclerosis. The physician who made this diagnosis observed that Mr. [160]*160Moser was suffering from confusion, memory loss, and other symptoms of senility. Mr. Moser did not know his own name, age, surroundings, or actions, and did not know the time, date, etc. The physician believed that Mr. Moser was unable to take care of his own affairs and advised him to move into a boarding home or nursing home. He continued to reside, however, in his own home with his wife.
According to Mrs. Moser, her husband did not recognize her at all during the spring, summer, and fall of 1985. She described him as repeatedly falling down and as becoming very violent towards her.
Early in August of 1985 one of Mr. Moser’s sisters, Helen DeSetta, the appellee herein, came to Pennsylvania from Florida to visit her family. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Moser told DeSetta that he wanted to use his lifetime savings to start a new business. DeSetta claims that she discouraged him from pursuing this idea.
Between August 22 and 24, 1985, Mr. Moser, accompanied by DeSetta, visited an attorney to discuss divorce laws and powers of attorney. Mr. Moser then concluded that he did not have grounds to pursue a divorce. On August 30, 1985, Mr. Moser, again accompanied by DeSetta, went to the attorney’s office and executed a general power of attorney giving DeSetta authority to manage his affairs. In the opinion of the attorney, Mr. Moser appeared lucid and did not have difficulty understanding what was said regarding the divorce laws and the power of attorney.
On September 4, 1985, DeSetta took Mr. Moser to the Gallatin Bank and assisted in placing the Mosers’ funds into Treasury bills registered jointly in the names of Mr. and Mrs. Moser. Several days later, on September 9, 1985, Mr. Moser moved out of his home and into the residence of one of his other sisters, Ethel Moser. The move was accomplished with the assistance of DeSetta, who, during her visit in Pennsylvania, was staying at the Ethel Moser residence.
On September 16, 1985, DeSetta took Mr. Moser to meet Mrs. Moser at the Gallatin Bank. Mr. Moser, acting for [161]*161himself and not through the power of attorney, and his wife executed certain documents which transferred their funds, to wit, approximately $115,000, into a checking account bearing the names of Mr. Moser and Ethel Moser. Mrs. Moser, who, like her husband, was then in her late seventies in age, now claims that she did not understand that her interest in the funds was being transferred to Ethel Moser.
On October 10, 1985, DeSetta took Mr. Moser to a hospital emergency room because he was complaining of a stomach problem. The physician who examined him was the same one that diagnosed him as having cerebral arteriosclerosis in March of 1985. In the opinion of the physician, Mr. Moser was clearly still suffering from this condition in October of 1985. Mr. Moser was quite disoriented and was suffering from memory loss when he was examined at the hospital. For example, he did not remember his age or the nature of the problem that caused him to be brought to the emergency room. The physician believed that Mr. Moser continued to be incapable of managing his own affairs. He later formed an opinion that, in the months preceding that examination, Mr. Moser would not have been capable of overseeing his own money and property, or of reading and understanding legal documents such as the power of attorney executed on August 30, 1985.
On November 1, 1985, Mr. and Mrs. Moser entered into a consent order in the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County. The consent order required Mr. Moser, through his attorney-in-fact DeSetta, to pay to his wife one-half of the balance in the checking account that had been established between himself and Ethel Moser. Hence, Mr. Moser was required to pay approximately $58,000, such being roughly one-half of the amount that had been transferred into the account in question through the transaction at the Gallatin Bank on September 16, 1985. The consent order also provided that Mr. and Mrs. Moser released each other from all duties of maintenance and support, but specified that Mrs. Moser would continue to receive health and retirement benefits under Mr. Moser’s coal miner pension plan. [162]*162Further, Mrs. Moser agreed to withdraw a complaint which she had filed seeking support. The parties also agreed to negotiate a settlement of all of their remaining assets.
Around the same time, in late October or early November, 1985, Mr. Moser was moved from the residence of Ethel Moser to a nursing home. DeSetta claims that during the fall of 1985 Mr. Moser had at all times remained coherent and that his move to the nursing home was necessary, not because of his mental state, but rather to facilitate her return to Florida. Before being moved to the nursing home, Mr. Moser amended his life insurance policies to designate DeSetta as the beneficiary. On January 13, 1986, Mr. Moser died of pneumonia. Soon thereafter, the checking account that had been in his and Ethel Moser’s names was changed to the ownership of DeSetta and Ethel Moser.
In 1986, Mrs. Moser instituted the present action in equity seeking, inter alia, to set aside the transfer of funds that occurred at the Gallatin Bank on September 16, 1985. The Court of Common Pleas denied relief. The Superior Court affirmed.
The scope of appellate review in a case such as this is quite limited. As stated in Sack v. Feinman, 489 Pa. 152, 165-66, 413 A.2d 1059, 1066 (1980), “[n]ormally, appellate review of equity matters is limited to a determination of whether the chancellor committed an error of law or abused his discretion.” A final decree in equity will not be disturbed unless it is unsupported by the evidence or demonstrably capricious. Id. Further, “[t]he test is not whether we, the appellate court, would have reached the same result had we been acting as the hearing judge who saw and heard the witnesses, ‘ “but rather whether a judicial mind, on due consideration of the evidence, as a whole, could reasonably have reached the conclusion of the chancellor” ’.” Masciantonio Will, 392 Pa. 362, 367, 141 A.2d 362, 365 (1958) (citation omitted).
Mrs. Moser claims that DeSetta abused an alleged confidential relationship with Mr. Moser by receiving from [163]*163him a substantial benefit, i.e., an interest in the bank account, through undue influence. See generally
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OPINION OF THE COURT
FLAHERTY, Justice.
This is an appeal, by allowance, from a memorandum opinion and order of the Superior Court which affirmed an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County upholding the validity of a transfer in ownership of a certain bank account 392 Pa.Super. 660, 564 A.2d 267. At issue is whether the transfer of the bank account, by an elderly man and his wife, was attributable to undue influence, fraud, or lack of mental capacity. The factual background of this case is as follows.
The appellant, Ann C. Moser, is the administratrix for the estate of her late husband, John Moser, Jr. Mr. and Mrs. Moser were married in 1948. Mr. Moser worked as a coal miner until his retirement. The Mosers never had any children, and, as of 1985, had accumulated approximately $115,000 in lifetime savings. In March of 1985, when he was nearly seventy-eight years of age, Mr. Moser was diagnosed as being afflicted with cerebral arteriosclerosis. The physician who made this diagnosis observed that Mr. [160]*160Moser was suffering from confusion, memory loss, and other symptoms of senility. Mr. Moser did not know his own name, age, surroundings, or actions, and did not know the time, date, etc. The physician believed that Mr. Moser was unable to take care of his own affairs and advised him to move into a boarding home or nursing home. He continued to reside, however, in his own home with his wife.
According to Mrs. Moser, her husband did not recognize her at all during the spring, summer, and fall of 1985. She described him as repeatedly falling down and as becoming very violent towards her.
Early in August of 1985 one of Mr. Moser’s sisters, Helen DeSetta, the appellee herein, came to Pennsylvania from Florida to visit her family. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Moser told DeSetta that he wanted to use his lifetime savings to start a new business. DeSetta claims that she discouraged him from pursuing this idea.
Between August 22 and 24, 1985, Mr. Moser, accompanied by DeSetta, visited an attorney to discuss divorce laws and powers of attorney. Mr. Moser then concluded that he did not have grounds to pursue a divorce. On August 30, 1985, Mr. Moser, again accompanied by DeSetta, went to the attorney’s office and executed a general power of attorney giving DeSetta authority to manage his affairs. In the opinion of the attorney, Mr. Moser appeared lucid and did not have difficulty understanding what was said regarding the divorce laws and the power of attorney.
On September 4, 1985, DeSetta took Mr. Moser to the Gallatin Bank and assisted in placing the Mosers’ funds into Treasury bills registered jointly in the names of Mr. and Mrs. Moser. Several days later, on September 9, 1985, Mr. Moser moved out of his home and into the residence of one of his other sisters, Ethel Moser. The move was accomplished with the assistance of DeSetta, who, during her visit in Pennsylvania, was staying at the Ethel Moser residence.
On September 16, 1985, DeSetta took Mr. Moser to meet Mrs. Moser at the Gallatin Bank. Mr. Moser, acting for [161]*161himself and not through the power of attorney, and his wife executed certain documents which transferred their funds, to wit, approximately $115,000, into a checking account bearing the names of Mr. Moser and Ethel Moser. Mrs. Moser, who, like her husband, was then in her late seventies in age, now claims that she did not understand that her interest in the funds was being transferred to Ethel Moser.
On October 10, 1985, DeSetta took Mr. Moser to a hospital emergency room because he was complaining of a stomach problem. The physician who examined him was the same one that diagnosed him as having cerebral arteriosclerosis in March of 1985. In the opinion of the physician, Mr. Moser was clearly still suffering from this condition in October of 1985. Mr. Moser was quite disoriented and was suffering from memory loss when he was examined at the hospital. For example, he did not remember his age or the nature of the problem that caused him to be brought to the emergency room. The physician believed that Mr. Moser continued to be incapable of managing his own affairs. He later formed an opinion that, in the months preceding that examination, Mr. Moser would not have been capable of overseeing his own money and property, or of reading and understanding legal documents such as the power of attorney executed on August 30, 1985.
On November 1, 1985, Mr. and Mrs. Moser entered into a consent order in the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County. The consent order required Mr. Moser, through his attorney-in-fact DeSetta, to pay to his wife one-half of the balance in the checking account that had been established between himself and Ethel Moser. Hence, Mr. Moser was required to pay approximately $58,000, such being roughly one-half of the amount that had been transferred into the account in question through the transaction at the Gallatin Bank on September 16, 1985. The consent order also provided that Mr. and Mrs. Moser released each other from all duties of maintenance and support, but specified that Mrs. Moser would continue to receive health and retirement benefits under Mr. Moser’s coal miner pension plan. [162]*162Further, Mrs. Moser agreed to withdraw a complaint which she had filed seeking support. The parties also agreed to negotiate a settlement of all of their remaining assets.
Around the same time, in late October or early November, 1985, Mr. Moser was moved from the residence of Ethel Moser to a nursing home. DeSetta claims that during the fall of 1985 Mr. Moser had at all times remained coherent and that his move to the nursing home was necessary, not because of his mental state, but rather to facilitate her return to Florida. Before being moved to the nursing home, Mr. Moser amended his life insurance policies to designate DeSetta as the beneficiary. On January 13, 1986, Mr. Moser died of pneumonia. Soon thereafter, the checking account that had been in his and Ethel Moser’s names was changed to the ownership of DeSetta and Ethel Moser.
In 1986, Mrs. Moser instituted the present action in equity seeking, inter alia, to set aside the transfer of funds that occurred at the Gallatin Bank on September 16, 1985. The Court of Common Pleas denied relief. The Superior Court affirmed.
The scope of appellate review in a case such as this is quite limited. As stated in Sack v. Feinman, 489 Pa. 152, 165-66, 413 A.2d 1059, 1066 (1980), “[n]ormally, appellate review of equity matters is limited to a determination of whether the chancellor committed an error of law or abused his discretion.” A final decree in equity will not be disturbed unless it is unsupported by the evidence or demonstrably capricious. Id. Further, “[t]he test is not whether we, the appellate court, would have reached the same result had we been acting as the hearing judge who saw and heard the witnesses, ‘ “but rather whether a judicial mind, on due consideration of the evidence, as a whole, could reasonably have reached the conclusion of the chancellor” ’.” Masciantonio Will, 392 Pa. 362, 367, 141 A.2d 362, 365 (1958) (citation omitted).
Mrs. Moser claims that DeSetta abused an alleged confidential relationship with Mr. Moser by receiving from [163]*163him a substantial benefit, i.e., an interest in the bank account, through undue influence. See generally Estate of Shelly, 484 Pa. 322, 332, 399 A.2d 98, 103 (1979). This claim is without merit. The record plainly demonstrates that DeSetta did not receive from Mr. Moser an interest in the bank account. Indeed, it was not until after Mr. Moser’s death that DeSetta obtained any rights whatsoever in the bank account. Further, the record contains no evidence that DeSetta acted pursuant to an understanding that funds in the account would be transferred to her after Mr. Mos-er’s death. The record simply does not contain any evidence of undue influence. To conclude that undue influence was present would be mere speculation. The trial court had ample basis, therefore, for not making a finding of undue influence.
It is also alleged by Mrs. Moser that she was fraudulently induced by DeSetta to participate in the transfer of funds at the Gallatin Bank on September 16, 1985. We have thoroughly reviewed the record, however, and find that the claim of fraud is unsubstantiated. Hence, the trial court properly determined that fraud was not established.
It is well established that fraud consists of anything calculated to deceive, whether by single act or combination, or by suppression of truth, or suggestion of what is false, whether it be by direct falsehood or by innuendo, by speech or silence, word of mouth, or look or gesture. Frowen v. Blank, 493 Pa. 137, 143, 425 A.2d 412, 415 (1981). We have held that “[f]raud is composed of a misrepresentation fraudulently uttered with the intent to induce the action undertaken in reliance upon it, to the damage of its victim.” Thomas v. Seaman, 451 Pa. 347, 350, 304 A.2d 134, 137 (1973). The concealment of a material fact can amount to a culpable misrepresentation no less than does an intentional false statement. Commonwealth v. Monumental Properties, Inc., 459 Pa. 450, 484, 329 A.2d 812, 829 (1974). Nevertheless, a party alleging fraud has the burden of proving the same by clear and convincing evidence. Estate of Bosico, 488 Pa. 274, 278, 412 A.2d 505, 506 (1980).
[164]*164The record contains no evidence whatsoever that DeSetta made any sort of misrepresentation to Mrs. Moser regarding the transaction at the Gallatin Bank. Even Mrs. Mos-er’s own testimony does not give any indication of how she might have been deceived or misled. There is simply nothing to indicate that DeSetta or anyone else said or did anything to deceive Mrs. Moser.
The record indicates, at most, that Mrs. Moser may not have understood the full effect of the transaction at the Gallatin Bank. Not fully understanding the transaction is clearly not, however, the same as being defrauded. Mrs. Moser’s testimony reveals that she was in her late seventies in age at the time of the transaction, and that she is at times rather confused. Her testimony is unclear as to whether she knew before signing the documents at the bank that funds would be transferred thereby to Ethel Moser. Nevertheless, nothing in her testimony indicates that DeSetta made any misrepresentations to her.1 Fur[166]*166ther, testimony that the transaction was fully explained to Mrs. Moser was provided by DeSetta.2
It would indeed be unfortunate if Mrs. Moser signed away her interest without fully comprehending the consequences of her actions. The record, however, demonstrates nothing more than a possibility that she lacked a full understanding of the transaction and falls far short of what would be required as proof of fraud. We find no basis, therefore, to overturn the chancellor’s determination that fraud was not established.
Finally, Mrs. Moser alleges that her husband lacked the mental capacity to make a gift of his savings to Ethel Moser on September 16, 1985. See generally Sobel v. Sobel, 435 Pa. 80, 82-83, 254 A.2d 649, 651 (1969) (mental [167]*167competency to make a gift). She further alleges that the trial court erred in not making any finding as to whether her husband was competent on that date.
The trial court focused solely on the power of attorney executed by Mr. Moser on August 30, 1985, and held that Mr. Moser was then competent. In reaching that determination the testimony of the attorney who prepared the power of attorney, who said that Mr. Moser appeared lucid, was viewed by the trial court as more persuasive than the testimony of the physician who testified that Mr. Moser was mentally incapable of managing his affairs. It was reasoned that more weight should be given to evidence regarding Mr. Moser’s condition on the day he executed the document than to the testimony of a physician who examined him five months before and six weeks after the power of attorney was executed. Compare Masciantonio Will, 392 Pa. at 381-88, 141 A.2d at 372-75 (opinions of physicians who were not present at the execution of a document, but who observed the scrivener quite near the time of execution, should be regarded as being of the same quality as testimony of witnesses who were present when the document was executed).
Although a determination of whether the power of attorney was valid may have been necessary to resolve other claims raised by Mrs. Moser, it was plainly not determinative as to whether Mr. Moser was competent seventeen days after the power of attorney was executed, i.e., when the transaction at the Gallatin Bank occurred on September 16, 1985. Both parties concede that the power of attorney was not used in the transaction, and that Mr. Moser acted in his own behalf on that date. A remand to the Court of Common Pleas is necessary, therefore, so that the crucial factual issue of competency on the date in question can be resolved.
We are in agreement, therefore, with the determination of the courts below that Mrs. Moser is not entitled to invalidate the bank account transfer on the basis of alleged undue influence and fraud. The issue of Mr. Moser’s [168]*168competency on September 16, 1985 must, however, be resolved by the trial court.
Order of the Superior Court affirmed in part, and case remanded to the Court of Common Pleas.
PAPADAKOS, J., concurs in the result.
LARSEN, J., files a dissenting opinion.