J-A07022-23
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : NIRAN L. WILLIAMS : : Appellant : No. 176 EDA 2022
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered December 15, 2021 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0001887-2016
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : NIRAN L. WILLIAMS : : Appellant : No. 177 EDA 2022
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered December 15, 2021 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0001889-2016
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : NIRAN L. WILLIAMS : : Appellant : No. 178 EDA 2022
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered December 15, 2021 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0001890-2016
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA J-A07022-23
: v. : : : NIRAN L. WILLIAMS : : Appellant : No. 179 EDA 2022
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered December 15, 2021 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0001891-2016
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : NIRAN L. WILLIAMS : : Appellant : No. 180 EDA 2022
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered December 15, 2021 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0001892-2016
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : NIRAN L. WILLIAMS : : Appellant : No. 181 EDA 2022
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered December 15, 2021 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0001893-2016
BEFORE: DUBOW, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and McCAFFERY, J.
MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED JULY 12, 2023
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Niran L. Williams appeals the denial of his Post Conviction Relief Act
(“PCRA”) petition. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. He maintains that the
court erred in denying his PCRA petition because he raised meritorious
ineffectiveness, constitutional, and sentencing claims. He also contends that
the court erred by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing. We vacate the PCRA
order to the extent it denied Williams’ challenge to the constitutionality of his
Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”) registration
requirements and remand for further proceedings.1 We affirm the remainder
of the order denying Williams relief.
A jury found Williams guilty in June 2017, of six counts of robbery, two
counts each of rape, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse (IDSI), and sexual
assault, and three counts each of possessing an instrument of crime (PIC),
possessing a firearm without a license, and carrying a firearm on public streets
in Philadelphia.2 In a separate bench trial following the jury’s verdict, the court
found Williams guilty of three counts of persons not to possess a firearm.3 See
Commonwealth v. Williams, No. 1118 EDA 2018, 2019 WL 1522643, at *1
n.1 (Pa.Super. filed Apr. 5, 2019). The court deferred sentencing to
September 2017, to obtain a presentence investigation (“PSI”) report and
mental health evaluation, with no objection from counsel. See Tr. Ct. Docket ____________________________________________
1 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.51-9799.75.
2See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3701(a)(1), 3121(a)(1), 3123(a)(1), 3124.1, 907(a), 6106, and 6108, respectively.
3 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105.
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Entry No. 125. Before sentencing, counsel requested a continuance for further
investigation and waived the issue of speedy sentencing. See Tr. Ct. Docket
Entry No. 129; Pa.R.Crim.P. 704. The court continued sentencing to December
1, at which time it held a hearing. See Tr. Ct. Docket Entry No. 129. The trial
court sentenced Williams to an aggregate term of 36 to 73 years’
incarceration. We affirmed the judgment of sentence, and our Supreme Court
denied Williams’ petition for allowance of appeal. Williams, No. 1118 EDA
2018, 2019 WL 1522643, appeal denied, 217 A.3d 1209 (Pa. filed Sept. 17,
2019).
Williams filed the instant PCRA petition, his first, in August 2020. The
court appointed counsel who filed an amended petition. Williams claimed
ineffective assistance of counsel for several issues, a violation of his
constitutional rights based on the sufficiency and weight of the evidence, the
imposition of an illegal sentence, and a violation of his due process rights due
to his lifetime registration as a sexual offender pursuant to SORNA.
The PCRA court issued a Rule 907 notice of its intent to dismiss the
petition without a hearing. It concluded that Williams failed “to state a claim
upon which post-conviction relief could be granted.” Notice of Court’s Intent
to Dismiss Without Hearing Defendant’s Petition for Post-Conviction Relief
Pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, filed 11/22/21, at ¶ 10; Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1).
The court stated that Williams had not presented evidence to support his
ineffectiveness claims and failed to show prejudice. The court also concluded
that Williams’ claims regarding the weight and sufficiency of the evidence were
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both previously litigated on direct appeal and without merit. Williams did not
file a response, and the court denied the petition. Order Dismissing PCRA
Petition, filed 12/15/21. This timely appeal followed.4
Williams presents the following claims:
1. Whether the PCRA court erred by dismissing the PCRA petition when clear and convincing evidence was presented to establish that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to protect [Williams’] constitutional rights and the application of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure on multiple occasions; investigate or interview potential witnesses, including alibi witnesses; adequately prepare for trial or properly object to the introduction of prejudicial evidence and improper amendment of the bills of information; protect [Williams’] speedy trial rights; and appeal the pre-trial hearing decision granting joinder of the cases, or file a motion to sever prior to trial.
2. Whether the PCRA court erred by dismissing the PCRA petition when clear and convincing evidence was presented to establish violations of [Williams’] constitutional rights under the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions, including Fourth Amendment violations based on the inclusion of knowingly false information on the affidavits of probable cause for arrest; due process violations based on the improper amendment of the bills of information; admission of prejudicial evidence; a violation of his speedy trial rights; a conviction based on insufficient evidence; a verdict against the weight of the evidence; and the Sixth
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4 When a single order resolves issues arising on more than one docket, separate notices of appeal must be filed from that order at each docket. See Commonwealth v. Young, 265 A.3d 462, 477 (Pa. 2021). Williams filed a notice of appeal at each separate trial court docket number, listing all six docket numbers on each notice. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 236 A.3d 1141, 1148 (Pa.Super. 2020) (en banc). We consolidated the appeals sua sponte.
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Amendment violation established by counsel’s ineffectiveness.
3. Whether the trial court imposed an illegal sentence in excess of the statutory maximum.
4. Whether the PCRA court erred by failing to grant an evidentiary hearing.
Williams’ Br. at 9.
“Our standard of review of the denial of a PCRA petition is limited to
examining whether the evidence of record supports the court’s determination
and whether its decision is free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Beatty,
207 A.3d 957, 960-61 (Pa.Super. 2019).
Within his first issue, Williams raises several ineffectiveness claims. A
petitioner claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must overcome the
presumption of effectiveness. See Commonwealth v. Mason, 130 A.3d 601,
618 (Pa. 2015). The petitioner may do so by pleading and proving: “(1) the
legal claim underlying the ineffectiveness claim has arguable merit; (2)
counsel’s action or inaction lacked any reasonable basis designed to effectuate
petitioner's interest; and (3) counsel’s action or inaction resulted in prejudice
to petitioner.” Id. (citation omitted). Prejudice in this context means “that
there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would
have been different but for counsel’s action or inaction.” Commonwealth v.
Johnson, 139 A.3d 1257, 1272 (Pa. 2016) (citation omitted). Counsel will not
be deemed ineffective for failing to raise meritless claims. See id.
Furthermore, a failure to establish any of the prongs of an ineffectiveness
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claim will result in rejection of the claim. See Commonwealth v. Basemore,
744 A.2d 717, 738 n.23 (Pa. 2000).
Williams raises multiple ineffectiveness claims within his first issue; we
address each separately. We note that collectively for the prejudice prong,
Williams maintains that counsel’s actions or inactions “adversely affected the
outcome of the trial” and denied him the opportunity to prove his innocence.
Williams’ Br. at 18. He also claims that counsel’s failures prejudiced him by
“undermin[ing] the jury’s ability to make a reliable determination of guilt or
innocence.” Id. at 19.
Failure to Object to Commonwealth’s Noncompliance with Rule 556(B)
Williams argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to,
or file a motion to quash, the indictment due to the Commonwealth’s failure
to comply with Rule 556(B) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure.
He maintains that the Commonwealth failed to comply with Rule 556 because
it did not provide proof that the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas petitioned
our Supreme Court to resume an indicting grand jury.
This claim of ineffectiveness fails as it lacks arguable merit. Williams
confuses the Court of Common Pleas’ responsibility pursuant to Rule 556(B)
with the Commonwealth’s responsibility under Rule 556.2(A) as it relates to
indicting grand juries. Pursuant to Rule 556(B), the Court of Common Pleas,
not the Commonwealth, petitioned the Supreme Court to resume indicting
grand juries and was granted that ability “on or after December 18, 2012.” In
re Empanelment of Indicting Grand Jury, 54 A.3d 13, 14 (Pa. 2012);
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Pa.R.Crim.P. 556(B). In comparison, Rule 556.2 requires that when the
Commonwealth wishes to proceed by way of a grand jury, it files a motion to
“present the matter to an indicting grand jury instead of proceeding to a
preliminary hearing.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 556.2(A). Upon receiving this motion, “the
president judge, or the president judge’s designee” reviews the motion and
determines whether to grant the motion. Id. at 556.2(A)(3). Here the
Commonwealth motioned for a grand jury before the president judge in the
instant case in 2016, more than three years after our Supreme Court’s 2012
order. See Docket Entry No. 6. Counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise
this meritless claim. Johnson, 139 A.3d at 1272.
Failure to Object to Amendment of Bills of Information
Williams maintains that the Commonwealth “amended the bills on the
day jury selection was to begin, without objection from trial counsel.” Williams’
Br. at 16. He states that he did not know the additional charges and was not
able to “prepare a defense against the new claims.” Id. He argues that this
amendment was not proper and counsel’s failure to object “equates to a failure
to protect [Williams’] constitutional right to due process and satisfies the
arguable merit standard.” Id.
This claim is also meritless. A review of the record reveals that on June
5, 2017, the Commonwealth moved to amend the charge of Section 6105
from a felony of the second degree to a misdemeanor of the first degree. See
Docket Entry No. 65. It made this amendment on the day of jury selection
with no objection from trial counsel. However, the record does not reflect that
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the Commonwealth moved to amend for additional charges. See Pa.R.Crim.P.
564 (an amendment to an information may be made “provided that the
information as amended does not charge offenses arising from a different set
of events and that the amended charges are not so materially different from
the original charge” as to unfairly prejudice the defendant). Furthermore,
Williams fails to explain what charges the Commonwealth added, and does
not explain how he was prejudiced by such. See Commonwealth v.
Picchianti, 600 A.2d 597, 599 (Pa.Super. 1991) (stating an amendment may
be proper even on the day of trial where “there is no showing of prejudice” to
the defendant). The court did not err in rejecting this meritless claim.
Johnson, 139 A.3d at 1272; Basemore, 744 A.2d at 738.
Failure to Request Franks Hearing
Williams also argues that counsel should have filed a motion to suppress
and requested a Franks hearing. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154,
155-56 (1978) (holding a defendant may request a hearing to attack the
validity of a warrant on the basis that the affiant knowingly and intentionally,
or recklessly, included a false statement in the affidavit). He claims the
affidavits of probable cause contained “patently false” information and were
“made with disregard for the truth.” Williams’ Br. at 16. He maintains the
allegedly false statements in the affidavits invalidate the arrest warrants
because the statements “w[ere] never corroborated by additional evidence,
nor the veracity confirmed by additional witnesses or documentation.” Id.
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Williams’ claim is underdeveloped, and he fails to cite any statements
within the affidavit that would be deemed false. His brief never identifies the
allegedly false statements. See Commonwealth v. James, 69 A.3d 180, 188
(Pa. 2013) (allegations of false statements in warrant affidavit must be “more
than conclusory and must be supported by more than a mere desire to cross-
examine”) (citation omitted). This claim is waived. See Commonwealth v.
Brown, 200 A.3d 986, 992 (Pa.Super. 2018).
Failure to Present Alibi Witnesses
Williams alleges that counsel failed to present testimony from alibi
witnesses, Cassandra Torres and Yusef Davis. He claims both witnesses “were
prepared to testify at trial that [Williams] was with them at the time of alleged
incidents, and was nowhere near the vicinity where the criminal acts are
alleged to have occurred.” Williams’ Br. at 17. He maintains that this testimony
would have been admissible and would have established a defense. Without
this testimony, “the jury was not afforded the opportunity to hear certain facts
that would definitively establish [Williams’] actual innocence.” Id. at 16-17.
Beyond his own suggestion, Williams provides nothing to show that
these witnesses were available and willing to testify on his behalf. See
Commonwealth v. Cousar, 154 A.3d 287, 312 (Pa. 2017) (stating
requirements of establishing ineffectiveness claim for failure to call witness,
including but not limited to proof that witness was available and willing to
testify on appellant’s behalf). Williams did not provide a signed certification or
affidavit to substantiate his claim that either witness would testify that he was
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not in the vicinity of the area where any of the crimes occurred or otherwise
substantiate his claim. See Commonwealth v. Lopez, 739 A.2d 485, 496
(Pa. 1999) (rejecting ineffectiveness claim for failure to call witnesses where
the witnesses’ existence and willingness to testify on defendant’s behalf is
based solely on defendant’s “unsubstantiated allegations”). This claim is
meritless.
Failure to Appeal Consolidation of Cases or Move to Sever
Williams claims that counsel should have filed a motion to sever
Williams’ cases, and the failure to do so resulted in a denial of his due process
rights. He maintains that the joinder of the cases “created bias” and that there
was no nexus between the allegations of each complainant. Williams’ Br. at
17. He also maintains that “the allegations are not part of the same sequence
of events.” Id.
Williams’ claim is meritless. On direct appeal, this Court determined that
the trial court did not err by granting the Commonwealth’s motion to
consolidate. We determined that “the crimes were not just ‘of the same class’”
but “[t]he methods employed in carrying out the crimes were remarkably
similar.” Williams, 2019 WL 1522643 at *5. We noted that Williams “targeted
prostitutes who were soliciting their services on Backpage and who lived in
proximity to one another.” Id. “After engaging in consensual sex for money,
the victims were held up at gunpoint, forced to perform oral sex, raped
vaginally from behind, and robbed.” Id. Because this Court previously
concluded that the trial court did not err in granting the motion to consolidate,
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we cannot now say that a motion for severance would have had arguable merit
or that Williams was prejudiced by counsel’s omission. No relief is due.
Failure to Ensure Timely Sentencing
Williams next argues that counsel ought to have ensured that the court
sentenced him within 90 days, as required by Rule 704 of the Pennsylvania
Rules of Criminal Procedure. He states that the court sentenced him almost 6
months after the jury found him guilty.
“[A] defendant who is sentenced in violation of [Rule 704] is entitled to
a discharge only where the defendant can demonstrate that the delay
in sentencing prejudiced him or her.” See Commonwealth v. Anders,
725 A.2d 170, 173 (Pa. 1999) (emphasis added).5 The 90-day deadline can
be extended for good cause. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 704(A)(2). The court sentenced
Williams on December 1, 2017, 79 days beyond the 90-day limit. See
Pa.R.Crim.P. 704(A)(1). This deferment of sentencing was based on good
cause, as the court needed to obtain a PSI and a mental health report. Counsel
also requested a continuance to obtain the reports. Moreover, Williams fails
to identify any prejudice. This issue, and all of Williams’ first issue, fails.
In his second issue, Williams argues that his constitutional rights were
violated. As with his first issue, Williams’ second issue contains multiple sub-
claims. We address each separately.
Rule 600 Violation ____________________________________________
5Anders references the previous version of Rule 704, Rule 1405, which was not materially different from Rule 704. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 704, Note.
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Williams maintains that the Commonwealth violated his right to a
speedy trial, and argues a violation of Rule 600 of the Pennsylvania Rules of
Criminal Procedure. He states that he was arrested on January 15, 2016, but
his trial did not commence until June 5, 2017, beyond the 365 days required
by Rule 600. He claims that trial counsel therefore should have filed a motion
to dismiss, and the court should have granted the motion.
Williams conflates two related but separate issues. To the extent he
claims a constitutional violation, but fails to make a constitutional argument,
this issue is waived as undeveloped. To the extent he is arguing a Rule 600
violation, the claim fails for lack of merit. Considering the 188 days of
excludable time, this claim fails. 47 days between October 20, 2016, and
December 5, 2016, are excludable due to a defense continuance. See Docket
Entry No. 35. 56 days between January 17, 2017, and March 13, 2017, are
excludable due to a continuance request by the Commonwealth to obtain DNA
results. See Docket Entry No. 49; Commonwealth v. Frye, 909 A.2d 853,
858-59 (Pa.Super. 2006) (concluding continuance request from
Commonwealth due to unavailability of DNA constituted excusable delay). 85
days between March 13, 2017, and June 5, 2017, are also excludable because
the Commonwealth requested a continuance due to the unavailability of
necessary witnesses. See Commonwealth v. Wendel, 165 A.3d 952, 957
(Pa.Super. 2017) (concluding continuance request from Commonwealth due
to unavailability of witness that was “beyond the Commonwealth’s control”
constituted excusable delay). Taking these days into account, the
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Commonwealth brought Williams’ case to trial within 320 days, well within the
time required by Rule 600.
Sufficiency and Weight of Evidence
Williams claims that his due process rights were violated because the
Commonwealth presented insufficient evidence and because the jury’s verdict
was against the weight of the evidence. To the extent he is asserting
sufficiency and weight claims, he is not entitled to relief because he previously
litigated those issues on direct appeal. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(3) (stating
to be eligible for relief, a petitioner must show “[t]hat the allegation of error
has not been previously litigated or waived”). Furthermore, sufficiency and
weight claims are not cognizable under the PCRA. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
9543(a)(2) (listing cognizable claims under PCRA). To the extent he attempts
to refashion his sufficiency and weight claims as constitutional violations, even
if they are not properly deemed previously litigated, they fail for the reasons
we set forth in our decision on direct appeal.
In his third issue, Williams maintains that the trial court imposed an
illegal sentence. He argues that the court’s imposition of consecutive
sentences exceeded the statutory maximum. He claims his robbery and rape
convictions should have merged because they allegedly arose from one single
criminal act.
“A claim that crimes should merge for sentencing purposes raises a non-
waivable challenge to the legality of the sentence; thus, our standard of review
is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Edwards,
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256 A.3d 1130, 1136 (Pa. 2021). Crimes merge for sentencing purposes when
“the crimes arise from a single criminal act and all of the statutory elements
of one offense are included in the statutory elements of the other offense.” 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9765 (emphasis added).
Here, even if Williams’ convictions arose from a single criminal act,
which they did not, the crimes of robbery and rape would not have merged.
Section 3701(a)(1) of the Crimes Code defines robbery as follows: “[a] person
is guilty of robbery if, in the course of committing a theft, he: inflicts serious
bodily injury upon another.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701(a)(1). The crime of rape
occurs when “[a] person engages in sexual intercourse with a complainant:
by forcible compulsion.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. 3121(a)(1). All the statutory elements
of robbery are not included in the statutory elements of rape. The offenses do
not merge. Further, as the PCRA court explained, Williams’ crimes “did not
derive from a single criminal act or episode.” Opinion, filed 8/3/22, at 17.
[Williams] was found guilty of six counts of robbery for robbing six different victims over the course of three days. The six robbery convictions rose from six distinct criminal acts that had distinct differences to threats made and how the crime was carried out. [Williams] was also found guilty of two counts of rape for raping two different victims on two different days. [Williams’] rape convictions arose from distinct criminal acts on two different days and two different locations[.]
Id.
Williams also alleges that his lifetime registration under SORNA
amounted to lifetime punishment and constitutes an illegal sentence. Williams’
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Br. at 23. He maintains that his registration violates his due process rights
“based on the Act’s declaration that registrants are highly likely to repeat their
behavior and are dangerous.” Id. at 24. He also claims that his registration
presumes “that he is dangerous and a high risk to repeat sexually criminal
behavior.” Id.
Williams’ argument poses a question of law. Our standard of review is
de novo, and our scope of review is plenary. Commonwealth v. Torsilieri,
232 A.3d 567, 575 (Pa. 2020). Because his challenge implicates the legality
of his sentence, it is nonwaivable. Commonwealth v. Thorne, 276 A.3d
1192, 1194, 1198 (Pa. 2022). Where such a challenge is raised for the first
time on appeal, remand is appropriate “to allow the parties to address whether
a consensus has developed to call into question the relevant legislative policy
decisions impacting offenders’ constitutional rights.” Torsilieri, 232 A.3d at
595.
Williams’ claims are identical to those presented in Torsilieri. In
Torsilieri, the appellant challenged the constitutionality of the registration
requirements of Revised Subchapter H of SORNA, claiming that it presumed
“that all sexual offenders are dangerous and pose a high risk of recidivation,
necessitating registration and notification procedures to protect the public
from recidivist sexual offenders.” Id. at 573. The Torsilieri court remanded
the case, determining that the record was not sufficient to address the issue
on appeal. Pursuant to Torsilieri, we will therefore remand. See
Commonwealth v. Boyd, 287 A.3d 957, 960 (Pa.Super. 2022) (remanding
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for “trial court to hold evidentiary hearing on the constitutional challenges to
SORNA II, Revised Subchapter H” raised on appeal where record was
underdeveloped).
In his final issue, Williams argues that because he raised “legitimate”
claims the court erred by not granting an evidentiary hearing. Williams’ Br. at
25. We review the denial of an evidentiary hearing in a PCRA case for abuse
of discretion. See Commonwealth v. Mason, 130 A.3d 601, 617 (Pa. 2015).
As referenced above, all but one of Williams’ claims raised in his PCRA petition
were meritless. To the extent that Williams raised a challenge to the
constitutionality of SORNA, the PCRA court erred in denying an evidentiary
hearing on this sole issue. Therefore, we vacate the PCRA order in part and
remand as to the Torsilieri claim. We affirm as to the remaining issues.
Order affirmed in part and vacated in part. Case remanded for
proceedings consistent with this memorandum. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 7/12/2023
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