Morse v. Fields

127 F. Supp. 63, 104 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 54, 1954 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2352
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedDecember 16, 1954
StatusPublished
Cited by16 cases

This text of 127 F. Supp. 63 (Morse v. Fields) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Morse v. Fields, 127 F. Supp. 63, 104 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 54, 1954 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2352 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).

Opinion

IRVING R. KAUFMAN, District Judge.

This is an action for damages for copyright infringement which has been tried by the Court without a jury. 1 The plaintiff is the author of an article entitled “ ‘Hopalong’ Abramowitz”, which appeared in the September 30, 1950 issue of Collier’s Magazine. Defendant Fields was the author of a column entitled “H. Hopalong Abramowitz: Cowboy in the Bronx”, which was published by the defendant Hearst Corporation on September 17, 1951 in its newspaper, the Daily Mirror. Plaintiff claims that Fields’ article infringed his copyrighted article.

Both articles concern themselves with the life and exploits of Abramowitz. Abramowitz is a very colorful individual who owns a stable in the Bronx which houses a vast array of horses and every conceivable type of carriage and stagecoach, all of which are used for advertising everything from an aspiring politician’s candidacy to the opening of a neighborhood delicatessen. Some of the incidents in Abramowitz’ life are very homely and humorous and are reflected in both articles.

The defendants’ answer directly puts in issue the originality of plaintiff’s work and the. procedural regularity of the registration of the copyright on plaintiff's work. Defendants, in addition to a denial of copying, contend that if there was any copying that such copying constituted a fair use of plaintiff's work. They also maintain that the plaintiff is estopped from raising any alleged infringement.

I shall first dispose of defendants’ contention as to the procedural irregularity of the copyright registration which, I believe, has no merit. The defendants admit, and the proof establishes (Plaintiff’s Exhibits 5 and 6), that Collier’s Magazine obtained a registered copyright in its name on September 25, 1950 for its September 30th issue, and that it assigned all its right, including infringement claims, in plaintiff’s article to the plaintiff on October 17, 1951. The nub of the defendants’ claim, is that plaintiff never assigned all of his rights to Collier’s before the latter obtained its copyright. The legal theory of this claim is clear and correct: that only the “proprietor” of a work may copyright it; that a person to whom the right to copyright is assigned is á proprietor, American Tobacco Co. *65 v. Werckmeister, 1907, 207 U.S. 284, 296, 28 S.Ct. 72, 52 L.Ed. 208, but a mere licensee cannot copyright a work. Egner v. Schirmer Music Co., 1 Cir., 1943, 139 F.2d 398. Cf. Mifflin v. R. H. White Co., 1903, 190 U.S. 260, 263, 23 S.Ct. 769, 49 L.Ed. 1040. Moreover, a general copyright in an issue of a periodical (a “blanket” copyright) does not protect the rights in a particular contributed article unless such rights had been previously assigned to the publisher. Mail & Express Co. v. Life Pub. Co., 2 Cir., 1912, 192 F. 899.

I find here, however, that the plaintiff did assign his right to copyright to Collier’s before the latter obtained its copyright. Plaintiff’s testimony establishes that the firm of Pritchett and Brandt were his general agents with full power to negotiate the sale of his article to interested publishers and to arrange, by any method deemed feasible to his agents, to grant only first publication rights to such publishers. It is apparent that the method employed and the practice followed by his agents was to assign all rights to Collier’s in the first instance under the express condition that, after registration of the copyright in its own name, Collier’s would reassign all rights to the plaintiff. This is unequivocally confirmed by the memorandum attached to the cheek received by plaintiff from Collier’s on November 28, 1949 (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 7). 2 Ultimately,- Collier’s formally assigned all rights in the copyright to plaintiff.

The next contention of the defendants is that the plaintiff’s work was not copyrightable because it was not original. Viewing plaintiff’s work as a unit, this contention cannot be maintained. Although plaintiff admits that some newspaper articles had been written about Abramowitz prior to his work, it is clear from his testimony that he did not copy these works but that his article was based upon information received from at least fifteen hours devoted to interviewing Abramowitz and upon 35 hours consumed in the actual writing process.The cryptic and laconic notes which plaintiff took during the interviews were received in evidence. (Exhibits 1-A, 1-R and 1-C). A comparison of these notes with plaintiff’s finished product as a unit clearly indicates that the plaintiff has implanted his own writing style and form of expression upon the latter. Baker v. Selden, 1879, 101 U.S. 99, 25 L.Ed. 841; Jewelers Circular Pub. Co. v. Keystone Pub. Co., 2 Cir., 1922, 281 F. 83, 88, 26 A.L.R. 571; Gerlach-Barklow Co. v. Morris & Bendien, 2 Cir., 1927, 23 F. 2d 159. The defendants urge that the Court should not view the plaintiff’s article as a unit in determining its originality but should first consider each part, separately and determine whether each particular part is original and copyrightable, and then exclude the unoriginal parts in determining the issue of infringement. In this connection the Court now refers to the Appendix to this opinion which includes, in columns A and B, a parallel column analysis of the parts of plaintiff’s work which he claims the defendants infringed.

It is clear that the copyright laws only protect those parts of plaintiff’s work which are original and copyrightable, and that bare facts or “news” are not protected. However, the style and form of their presentation is protected. International News Service v. Associated Press, 1918, 248 U.S. 215, 234, 39 S.Ct. 68, 63 L.Ed. 211; Chicago Record-Herald Co. v. Tribune Ass’n, 7 Cir., 1921, 275 F. 797; see Dymow v. Bolton, 2 Cir., 1926, 11 F.2d 690, 691; Oxford Book Co. v. College Entrance Book Co., 2 Cir., 1938, 98 F.2d 688, 691. And that this should be so is grounded upon sound reason. *66 For, the law seeks to encourage creative minds. The Court has summarized in its Appendix, column D, the defendants’ contentions with respect to the designated summaries of plaintiff’s assertions carried in column C. On the other hand, it is just as clear that the fact of copying may be proven by similarity between both the protected and unprotected parts of plaintiff’s and defendant Fields’ work. 3 The Court should reach the problem of eliminating from consideration the unprotected part of a plaintiff’s work only if and when it finds that the defendant has copied and the issue of improper appropriation — substantiality or materiality — is properly before it.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Goodis v. United Artists Television, Inc.
425 F.2d 397 (Second Circuit, 1970)
Goodis v. United Artists Television, Inc.
278 F. Supp. 122 (S.D. New York, 1968)
Kinelow Publishing Co. v. Photography in Business, Inc.
270 F. Supp. 851 (S.D. New York, 1967)
Davis v. E. I. DuPont de Nemqurs & Co.
257 F. Supp. 729 (S.D. New York, 1966)
Davis v. EI DuPONT De NEMOURS & COMPANY
257 F. Supp. 729 (S.D. New York, 1966)
Pottstown Daily News Publishing Co. v. Pottstown Broadcasting Co.
192 A.2d 657 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1963)
Burnett v. Lambino
204 F. Supp. 327 (S.D. New York, 1962)
Florida Lime and Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul
197 F. Supp. 780 (N.D. California, 1961)
Whitney v. Ross Jungnickel, Inc.
179 F. Supp. 751 (S.D. New York, 1960)
Barton Candy Corp. v. Tell Chocolate Novelties Corp.
178 F. Supp. 577 (E.D. New York, 1959)
Inter-City Press, Inc. v. Siegfried
172 F. Supp. 37 (W.D. Missouri, 1958)
Cloth v. Hyman
146 F. Supp. 185 (S.D. New York, 1956)
Ilyin v. Avon Publications, Inc.
144 F. Supp. 368 (S.D. New York, 1956)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
127 F. Supp. 63, 104 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 54, 1954 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2352, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/morse-v-fields-nysd-1954.