FRANK, Circuit Judge.
1. Plaintiff with his complaint .'filed a jury demand which defendant moved to strike out. Defendant urges that the relief prayed in the complaint renders a jury trial inappropriate. We do not agree. Plaintiff did not ask for an injunction but solely for damages. Such a suit is an action at “law.” 1 That it is founded solely on a statute does not deprive either party of a right to a trial by jury;2 an action for treble damages under the Sherman Act is likewise purely statutory,3 but it is triable at “law” and by a jury as of right.4
2. The principal question on this appeal is whether the lower court, under Rule 56,
As to the first — copying—the evidence may consist (a) of defendant’s admission that he copied or (b) of circumstantial evidence — usually evidence of" access — from which the trier of the facts may reasonably infer copying. Of course, if there are no similarities, no amount of evidence of access will suffice to prove copying. If there is evidence of access and similarities exist, then the trier of the facts must determine whether the similarities are sufficient to prove copying. On this issue, analysis (“dissection”) is relevant, and the testimony of experts may be received to aid the trier of the facts. If evidence of access is absent, the similarities must be so striking as to preclude the possibility that plaintiff and defendant independently arrived at the same result.
If copying is established, then only does there arise the second issue, that of illicit copying (unlawful appropriation.).4b On that issue (as noted more in detail below) the test is the response of the ordinary lay hearer; accordingly, on that issue, “dissection” and expert testimony are irrelevant.
In some cases, the similarities be[469]*469tween the plaintiff’s and defendant’s work are so extensive and striking as, without more, both to justify an inference of copying and to prove improper appropriation. But such double-purpose evidence is not required; that is, if copying is otherwise shown, proof of improper appropriation need not consist of similarities which, standing alone, would support an inference of copying.
Each of these two issues— copying and improper appropriation — is an issue of fact. If there is a trial, the conclusions on those issues of the trier of the facts — of the judge if he sat without a jury, or of the jury if there was a jury trial — bind this court on appeal, provided the evidence supports those findings, regardless of whether we would ourselves have reached the same conclusions.4c But a case could occur in which the similarities were so striking that we would reverse a finding of no access, despite weak evidence of access (or no evidence thereof other than the similarities) ; and similarly as to a finding of no illicit appropriation.
3. We turn first to the issue of ■copying. After listening to the compositions as played in the phonograph recordings submitted by defendant, we find similarities ; but we hold that unquestionably, standing alone, they do not compel the conclusion, or permit the inference, that defendant copied. The similarities, however, •are sufficient so that, if there is enough evidence of access to permit the case to .go to the jury, the jury may properly infer •that the similarities did not result from coincidence.
Summary judgment was, then, proper if indubitably defendant did not have access to plaintiff’s compositions. Plainly that presents an issue of fact. On that issue, the district judge, who heard no oral testimony, had before him the depositions of plaintiff and defendant. The judge characterized plaintiff’s story as “fantastic”; and, in the light of the references in his opinion to defendant’s deposition, the judge obviously accepted defendant’s denial of access and copying. Although part of plaintiff’s testimony on deposition (as to “stooges” and the like) does seem “fantastic,” yet plaintiff’s credibility, even as to those improbabilities, should be left to the jury. If evidence is “of a kind that greatly taxes the credulity of the judge, he can say so, or, if he totally disbelieves it, he may announce that fact, leaving the jury free to believe it or not.” 5 If, said Win-slow, J., “evidence is to be always disbelieved because the story told seems remarkable or impossible, then a party whose rights depend on the proof of some facts out of the usual course of events will always be denied justice simply because his story is improbable.”6 We should not overlook the shrewd proverbial admonition that sometimes truth is stranger than fiction.
But even if we were to disregard the improbable aspects of plaintiff’s story, there remain parts by no means “fantastic.” On the record now before us, more than a million copies of one of his compositions were sold; copies of others were sold in smaller quantities or distributed to radio stations or band leaders or publishers, or the pieces were publicly performed.6a If, after hearing both parties testify, the jury disbelieves defendant’s denials, it can, from such facts, reasonably infer access. It follows that, as credibility is unavoidably involved, a genuine issue of material fact presents itself. With credibility a vital factor, plaintiff is entitled to a trial where the jury can observe the witnesses while testifying. Plaintiff must not be deprived of the invaluable privilege of cross-examining the defendant 7 — the “crucial test of credibility” — in the presence of the [470]*470jury.8 Plaintiff, or a lawyer on his behalf, on such examination may elicit damaging admissions from defendant; more important, plaintiff may persuade the jury, 'observing defendant’s manner when testifying, that defendant is unworthy of belief.9
To be sure, plaintiff examined defendant on deposition. But the right to use depositions for discovery, or for limited purposes at a trial,10 of course does not mean that they are to supplant the right to call and examine the adverse party, if he is available, before the jury. For the demeanor of witnesses is recognized as a highly useful, even if not an infallible, method of ascertaining the truth and accuracy of their narratives. As we have said, “a deposition has always been, and still is, treated as a substitute, a second-best, not to be used when the original is at hand” for it deprives “of the advantage of having the witness before the jury.” 11 It has been said that as “the appearance and manner of the witness” is often “a complete antidote” to what he testifies, “we cannot very well overestimate the importance of having the witness examined and .cross-examined in presence of the court and jury.”11a Judge Lumpkin remarked that “the oral testimony of the witness, in the presence of the Court and Jury, is much better evidence than his deposition can be * * * ” 12 Coxe, J., noted that “a witness may convince all who hear him testify that he is disingénuous and untruthful, and yet his testimony, when read, may convey a most favorable impression.”13 As a deposition “cannot give the look or manner of the witness: his hesitation, his doubts, his variations of language, his confidence or precipitancy, his calmness or consideration;” it “is * * * or it may be, the dead body of the evidence, without its spirit * * * ”14 “It is sometimes difficult and impossible to get so full, explicit, and perspicuous a statement of facts from the witness through a deposition as it is by his examination before court and jury.” 15 “The right of a party, therefore, to have a witness subjected to the personal view of the jury, is a valuable right, -of which he should not be deprived * * * except by necessity. And that necessity ceases whenever the witness is within the power of the court, and may be produced upon the trial.” 15a
With all that in mind, we cannot now say — as we think we must say to sustain a summary judgment — that at the close of a trial the judge could properly direct a verdict.16
We agree that there are cases in which a trial would be farcical. If, in a [471]*471suit oil a promissory note, the defendant, pleading payment, sets forth in an affidavit his cancelled check to the order of the plaintiff for the full amount due on the note and a written receipt in full signed by the plaintiff, while plaintiff in a reply affidavit merely states that he did not receive payment and suggests no other proof, then to require a trial would be absurd; for cross-examination of the defendant in such circumstances clearly would be futile.17 But where, as here, credibility, including that of the defendant, is crucial, summary judgment becomes improper and a trial indispensable. It will not do-, in such a case, to say that, since the plaintiff, in the matter presented by his affidavits, has offered nothing which discredits the honesty of the defendant, the latter’s deposition must be accepted as true. We think that Rule 56 was not designed thus to foreclose plaintiff’s privilege of examining defendant at a trial, especially as to matters peculiarly within defendant’s knowledge. Illustrative of the dangers, in this respect, of summary judgments, if not cautiously employed, is a recent case in the court below. There the judge refused to grant summary judgment for defendants, despite a mass of impressive affidavits, containing copies of corporate records, the accuracy of which plaintiffs did not deny in their affidavits, and which on their face made plaintiffs’ case seem nothing but a sham; at the trial, however, cross-examination of the defendants revealed facts, theretofore unknown by plaintiffs, that so riddled the defendants’ case as it had previously appeared on the summary judgment motion that the judge entered judgment against them for several million dollars, from which they did not appeal.
We do not believe that, in a case in which the decision must turn on the reliability of witnesses, the Supreme Court, by authorizing summary judgments, intended to permit a “trial by affidavits,” if either party objects. That procedure which, so the historians tell us, began to be outmoded at common law in the 16th century, would, if now revived, often favor unduly the party with the more ingenious and better paid lawyer. Grave injustice might easily result.
In the equity practice in the federal courts before 1912, extensive use had been made of deposition testimony. But Rules 46 and 47 of the Equity Rules of 1912, 28 U.S.C.A. § 723 Appendix, expressly provided' that in “all trials in equity the testimony of witnesses shall be taken orally in open court” unless there was a “good and exceptional cause for departing from the general rule.” The purpose was to ensure that the trial judge should have “the opportunity to see, hear and observe the actions of the witnesses.” 17a Surely the aim of present Rule 56 was not to restore in equity and introduce at “law” the old practices abolished in equity in 1912. That such was not the purpose appears from Rulc43 (a) which provides that “the testimony of witnesses shall be taken orally in open court” except in unusual circumstances. Moore reports that this rule “has the obvious advantage of permitting the judge or jury to observe the appearance and demean- or of witnesses so as to determine more readily their veracity (or lack thereof) and [472]*472the weight to be given their testimony”; and states that “in the interest of oral testimony in open court, the use of depositions has been confined to situations that warrant departure from oral testimony.” 17b He writes ‘that where it appears that “the moving party [if he be a plaintiff] has exclusive knowledge of the facts” the judge may deny a motion for summary judgment so that “the adverse party may be able to establish a defense if afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the moving party in court.” 17c
Moore discusses in detail the provision of Clause 5 of Rule 26(d) (3), that, where a witness, including a party, is alive, does not reside more than a hundred miles from the place of trial, is not unable to attend the trial — because’ of age, sickness, infirmity or imprisonment — and there is no inability to subpoena him, then it is only upon a showing “that such exceptional circumstances exist as to make it desirable, in the interest of justice and with due regard to the importance of presenting the testimony of witnesses orally in open court” 17d that his deposition may be used. Moore says that the words we have italicized “are a warning that this provision is not to be used as authority for trying cases generally upon depositions in the manner in which all equity cases were tried prior to the adoption of the Equity Rules of 1912. In the Advisory Committee’s Preliminary Draft there was a provision that a deposition could be used for any purpose at the trial ‘if the .parties affected thereby consent thereto with the approval of the court.’ This provision was dropped and the present provision was substituted therefor apparently because it was feared that the court would grant its approval whenever the parties consented to the use of depositions, and thereby to that extent nullify the salutary rule that testimony of witnesses shall be taken orally in open court.” 17e
If defendant, who resides in the district and within a few miles of the place of trial,17f should seek to substitute his own deposition for his testimony on the stand at the trial, he could not do so under clause 2 of Rule 26(d) (3),17g but would be obliged to show “exceptional circumstances” under clause S. Consequently, mere business convenience prompting his absence would be insufficient; the use of his deposition would have to be justified as desirable “with due regard to the importance of presenting the testimony * * * orally in open court.” But no such question is now before us. As no one has suggested that defendant is likely to be absent, we cannot,, on the record in this appeal, assume that “exceptional circumstances” will exist when this case comes to trial; no facts appeared to the court below which made it proper for it to proceed on that assumption and to shut off the plaintiff from open-court examination of defendant.
4. Assuming that adequate proof is made of copying, that is not enough; for there can be “permissible copying,”18 copying which is not illicit. Whether (if he copied) defendant unlaw[473]*473fully appropriated presents, too, an issue of fact. The proper criterion on that issue is not an analytic or other comparison of the respective musical compositions as they appear on paper or in the judgment of trained musicians.19 The plaintiff’s legally protected interest is not, as such, his reputation as a musician but his interest in the potential financial returns from his compositions which derive from the lay public’s approbation of his efforts.20 The question, therefore, is whether defendant took from plaintiff’s works so much of what is pleasing to the ears of lay listeners, who comprise the audience for whom such popular music is composed, that defendant wrongfully appropriated something which belongs to the plaintiff.21
Surely, then, we have an issue of fact which a jury is peculiarly fitted to determine.22 Indeed, even if there were to be a trial before a judge, it would be desirable (although not necessary) for him to summon an advisory jury on this question.
We should not be taken as saying that a plagiarism case can never arise in which absence of similarities is so patent that a summary judgment for defendant would be correct. Thus suppose that Ravel’s “Bolero” or Shostakovitch’s “Fifth Symphony” were alleged to infringe “When Irish Eyes Are Smiling.”23 But this is not such a case. For, after listening to the playing of the respective compositions, we are, at this time, unable to conclude that the likenesses are so trifling that, on the issue of misappropriation, a trial judge could legitimately direct a verdict for defendant.
At the trial, plaintiff may play, or cause to be played, the pieces in such manner that they may seem to a jury to be inexcusably alike, in terms of the way in which lay listeners of such music would be likely to react. The plaintiff may call witnesses whose testimony may aid the jury in reaching its conclusion as to the responses of such audiences. Expert testimony of musicians may also be received, but it will in no way be controlling on the issue of illicit copying, and should be utilized only to assist in determining the reactions of lay auditors. The impression made on the refined ears of musical experts or their views as to the musical excellence of plaintiff’s or defendant’s works are utterly immaterial on the issue of misappropriation ;24 for the views of such persons are caviar to the general — and plaintiff’s and defendant’s compositions are not caviar.25
5. In copyright infringement cases cited by defendant,26 we have sustained judgments in favor of defendants based on findings of fact made by trial judges after trials, findings we held not to be “clearly erroneous.” There we did not attempt to pass on the veracity or credibility of wit[474]*474nesses. To do so here would be to convert an appellate court into a trial court. The avowed purpose of those who sponsored the summary judgment practice was to eliminate needless trials where by affidavits it could be shown beyond possible question that the facts were not actually in dispute. In the attempt to apply that reform — to avoid what is alleged to be a needless trial in a trial court — we should not conduct a trial in this court. Where the facts are thus in real dispute, it is our function, after a trial in the lower court, to review its legal conclusions and, with reference to its findings of fact, to determine not whether we would ourselves have made them, but merely whether they rest on sufficient evidence in the record.27 When the trial occurs before a judge without a jury, we have his findings of fact separated from his legal conclusions; when it occurs before a jury, our task is somewhat different, especially when the jury returns a general (i.e., composite) verdict.28 But in reviewing a judgment after either type of trial, ours must be a limited function. This is not, and must not be, a trial court. Such a court has a duty more difficult and important than ours. We begin our task where it leaves off. Until the Supreme Court tells us that we err,'we shall therefore adhere to the views stated in Doehler Metal Furniture Co. v. United States, supra,29 and to our belief, expressed in Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 2 Cir., 104 F.2d 661, 662 and MacDonald v. Du Maurier, 2 Cir., 144 F.2d 696, that generally there) should be trials in plagiarism suits.
6. Plaintiff has not copyrighted two of his compositions, “Twilight Waltz” and “Duet” from “Song of David.” Accordingly, the judgment to that extent should be changed to one of dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. The same is true of the judgment concerning the alleged copying of the titles of plaintiff’s songs, “What Is Love” and “Night and Day.” A title cannot be copyrighted.30 The facts do not permit the joinder of these non-federal causes of action with the action for infringement of copyrights.31
7. Defendant’s motion papers showed that plaintiff had assigned his copyright to his composition “A Mother’s Prayer” to another person. Plaintiff alleged that, by an oral agreement with the assignee, the copyright was to revert to plaintiff on the assignee’s death, and that the assignee was dead. Defendant contended that the parol evidence rule barred proof of such an oral agreement, and that, therefore, plaintiff, not being able to show his ownership of the copyright, could not maintain suit for its infringement. Defendant asked the judge to take judicial notice of the record of another infringement suit in the same court, Arnstein v. American Soc. of Composers, D.C., 29 F.Supp. 388, involving the same issue as to the same composition, brought by plaintiff against another person, not in privity with the defendant here, in which decision on that issue had been adverse to plaintiff. On that ground, the judge held that the present action, so far as based on “A Mother’s Prayer,” must be dismissed. In so holding, the judge erred. As no one in the assignee’s chain of title is a party to this suit, the parol evidence rule does not apply. The adjudication in the previous suit is entirely irrelevant.
8. Defendant disregarded that sort of irrelevance in moving in the court below not only for summary judgment but also fdr dismissal of plaintiff’s action as “vexatious.” For in aid of that latter motion, defendant asked the judge to take judicial" notice of five previous copyright infringement actions, including the one just mentioned above, brought by the plaintiff in the same court against other persons, in which plaintiff had advanced some legal arguments like those he advances here, and in which he had been defeated. The judge in his opinion referred to but one of those suits, Arnstein v. American Soc. of Composers, and purported not to pass on the motion to dismiss for vexatiousness. But in his order for final judgment he specifically referred to the “records” of the court in the five cases, naming them, as constituting in part the basis of the judgment.
[475]*475Defendant, in his brief in this court says, “This is perhaps the most significant” argument in “this case/’ and presses us to hold that affirmance of the dismissal should be based thereon. Coupled with this request is an implied suggestion that, with respect to the summary judgment, we should not so concern ourselves with fear of creating a “bad” precedent for the future that we reach an unjust decision in this particular case. With that suggestion we are in thorough accord.32 We decide against summary judgment here because we consider it improper in this case. Our decision to that effect will have precedential significance only to the extent that, in any future case, summary judgment is sought when the facts are not beyond the range of actual dispute.
But, in the spirit of that suggestion, we regard it as entirely improper to give any weight to other actions lost by plaintiff. Although, as stated above, the judge in his opinion, except as to one of the previous actions, did not say that he rested his decision on those other suits, the language of his final judgment order indicates that he was probably affected by them.33 If so, he erred. Absent the factors which make up res judicata (not present here), each case must stand on its own bottom, subject, of course, to the doctrine of stare decisis. Succumbing to the temptation to consider other defeats suffered by a party may lead a court astray; see, e.g., Southern Pacific Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483, 489, 39 S.Ct. 533, 63 L.Ed. 1099, note 1. When a particular suit is vexatious, sometimes at its conclusion the court can give some redress to the victorious party. Perhaps the Legislature can and should meet this problem more effectively. But we surely must not do so, as defendant here would have us do, by prejudging the merits of the case before us.34
Modified in part; otherwise reversed and remanded.
Appendix
1. In the following cases, after a trial before a judge without a jury, the decision was for defendant because there was no copying, so that the issue of illicit copying was not reached. The judge found no access. On appeal the decision was affirmed for the following reasons: (a) The finding of no copying was supported by sufficient evidence so that it was not clearly erroneous. (b) The similarities were not sufficient to preclude coincidence since (1) there was no resemblance to the ear of the lay listener and/or (2) the plaintiff’s contribution was too banal. Arnstein v. Edward B. Marks Music Corp., 2 Cir., 82 F.2d 275; Darrell v. Joe Morris Music Co., Inc., 2 Cir., 113 F.2d 80; Arnstein v. Broadcast Music, Inc., 2 Cir., 137 F.2d 410, affirming, D.C., 46 F.Supp. 379.
2. In Wilkie v. Santly Bros., 2 Cir., 91 F.2d 978, affirming, D.C., 13 F.Supp. 136, after a trial before a judge without a jury, the decision was for plaintiff. On appeal, this decision was affirmed for the following reasons: Although there was no proof of access, the similarities, both to the ear and on analysis, were striking, and plaintiff’s contribution was so unique that the trial judge’s conclusion of absence of coincidence could not be reversed. Copying having been thus established, the trial judge’s conclusion as to illicit copying was supported by enough evidence.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c, are applicable to copyright actions; see amendment, adopted June 5, 1939, to Rule 1 of Rules" of Practice under § 25 of the Copyright Act.