Morrow v. De Vitt

160 S.W.2d 977
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedMarch 2, 1942
DocketNos. 5432, 5433.
StatusPublished
Cited by27 cases

This text of 160 S.W.2d 977 (Morrow v. De Vitt) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Morrow v. De Vitt, 160 S.W.2d 977 (Tex. Ct. App. 1942).

Opinion

JACKSON, Chief Justice.

The two above styled and numbered cases were tried together by the court below who refused to grant a motion to try them separately and by his order one statement of facts only was made and filed in this court to be considered as a part of each of the records.

There are two appeals, one from the refusal of the trial court to confirm an oil, gas and mineral lease made by Sam C. Arnett, the receiver of the Mallet Land and Cattle Company, a Missouri corporation, with T. F. Morrow, lessee, on certain oil, gas and mineral lands, and a lease on certain oil, gas and mineral rights on other lands made by the receiver and J. C. Hawkins.

On August 27, 1941 the Seventy-second District Court of Lubbock County appointed Sam C. Arnett receiver of all. the property of the Mallet Land and Cattle Company situated in Texas on the ex parte application of J. Lee Johnson, Jr., one of the directors of said company, for himself and as trustee for Mary Louise and Katherine Frances Johnson, each of whom is a feme sole, and as attorney in fact for Mrs. Floy Johnson North, Mrs. Clay Parker and Mrs. Pattie Byars. The Mallet Land and Cattle Company, hereinafter called the company, has a permit to do business in Texas and the oil and gas leases to Morrow and to Hawkins covered lands owned by the company.

The court set for hearing this ex parte order on September 5, 1941 and had all the stockholders notified thereof and on said date all the stockholders not named as plaintiffs in the application for receiver answered and each agreed that the appointment of the receiver theretofore ordered should be made permanent, which included all the stockholders of the company, the court confirmed such ex parte order and continued the receivership and Sam C. Arnett as receiver. From this order an appeal was later prosecuted by Miss Christine DeVitt attacking the jurisdiction of the trial court to appoint a receiver and this court after consideration of the appeal affirmed the court below in an opinion this day announced, De Vitt v. Johnson, to be published in 160 S.W.2d 974 to which we refer to avoid the repetition here of the pertinent facts therein contained.

Much of the land owned by the company in Texas was leased and producing oil and the directors of the company, to facilitate the handling of the unleased land, had appointed from their number what they designated as an oil committee. Through this committee the company kept in touch with the field and its development and also with the independent operators and major companies. With many of these, negotiations *979 were had by the company to lease land it still retained but on account of internal dissension and the suit in the State of Missouri instituted by one of the stockholders and directors, Miss Christine DeVitt, the oil committee and the directors of the company ceased to function and negotiations and efforts to lease the remaining land of the company terminated. Numerous producing wells had been drilled by the owners of the land adjacent to the unleased land of the company and such wells were draining the oil from under such unleased lands. The court found in the judgment continuing the ex parte appointment of the receiver that the stockholders and directors of the company had been in a deadlock for many months and unable to function and discharge their duties to the corporation ; that much of the land involved in the receivership contained oil and gas in commercial quantities and such lands were not being developed nor the oil nor gas produced therefrom; that the acreage of the company was thereby being drained of the oil and gas which was resulting in irreparable injury, waste and loss; that the company had opportunities to lease the land and secure drilling contracts on favorable terms; that an emergency existed making it imperative that a receiver be appointed to take charge of the property and make leases, enter into drilling contracts and exercise and perform all the duties in connection therewith and followed such findings by this order: “That Sam C. Arnett, a bona fide citizen of Lubbock County, Texas, and a qualified voter of this State, and not a party or attorney or in any way interested in the action for the appointment of this receiver, and not in any way disqualified, be, and he is, hereby appointed receiver for all of the property, real, personal or mixed, that the defendant Mallet Land and Cattle Company has in the State of Texas, and he is hereby authorized and directed as such receiver * * * to execute such acquittances or releases as may be pertinent or necessary in the premises; to sign division orders for the collection of any oil runs that may be due said corporation ; to negotiate, make and enter into oil, gas leases and mining contracts on the lands of said corporation lying in the State of Texas; to buy and sell cattle; to render property for taxation purposes and pay said taxes; and to do any and all other things necessary for the proper conduct of the business of said corporation within the State of Texas, whether such business relates to cattle or oil; to employ such agents, attorneys, assistants or servants as in his judgment may be necessary properly to conduct such business'; and to make and enter into such contracts and agreements under the supervision of this Court as may be necessary both to preserve the assets of the corporation and prevent the same from loss by virtue of drainage; and to do and perform all and any other acts necessary for the proper and orderly conduct of, and the conservation of, the business and assets of said corporation lying within the State of Texas.”

Sam C. Arnett qualified as receiver on September 6, 1941 and immediately entered upon his duties as such. On September 8, 1941 he received- in the form of a written lease the proposition of T. F. Morrow to lease Labors Nos. 1, 2, 3, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23 in League 48, Hockley County, Texas. The consideration the lessee Morrow agrees to pay the lessor is ⅜ of the oil and gas, including casing-head gas, produced, saved and marketed from each well with an obligation to begin drilling with at least two adequate strings of drilling tools within 30 days after the confirmation by the court of the lease and to continue such operations with diligence and dispatch until the acreage should be fully developed. This was the first proposition from a prospective lessee presented to the receiver for any of the lands.

The receiver discussed with, and consulted W. D. Johnson, who was president of the company, J. Lee Johnson, who was a director of the company, and Mr. Secrest, the divorced husband of Mrs. Helen De-Vitt Secrest, who had gotten permission from the receiver for her former husband to be present at the negotiations, all of whom advised that in their judgment the proposition of Morrow was a good one and should be accepted. They also informed Mr. Arnett that Mr. Morrow had been negotiating with the company for some months for the acquisition of the labors described in his lease previous to the appointment of the receiver; that a lease contract had been agreed upon by the stockholders and Mr. Morrow which was not so favorable to the company as the contract presented to the receiver but on account of internal dissension no lease was executed to the property by the company to Mr. Morrow. During the trial the court stated that in his opinion the testimony disclosed that all the stockholders except Christine- *980

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Michael Don Brown v. State
Court of Appeals of Texas, 2009
Opinion No.
Texas Attorney General Reports, 1999
Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion
Texas Attorney General Reports, 1999
Knowlton v. United States Brass Corp.
864 S.W.2d 585 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1993)
Baldwin v. New
736 S.W.2d 148 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1987)
L & M Oil Co. v. Richey
618 S.W.2d 956 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1981)
Wild v. Hargrave
565 S.W.2d 558 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1978)
Douglass v. Panama, Inc.
504 S.W.2d 776 (Texas Supreme Court, 1974)
Douglass v. Panama, Inc.
487 S.W.2d 228 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1972)
Edmunds v. Houston Lighting & Power Company
472 S.W.2d 797 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1971)
National Furniture Manufacturing Co. v. Center Plywood Co.
405 S.W.2d 115 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1966)
Odom's Transfer & Storage Co. v. Rochford
283 S.W.2d 101 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1955)
Perren v. Baker Hotel of Dallas, Inc.
228 S.W.2d 311 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1950)
Smith v. Wayman
224 S.W.2d 211 (Texas Supreme Court, 1949)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
160 S.W.2d 977, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/morrow-v-de-vitt-texapp-1942.