Morris
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Opinion
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Pierre, SD 57501-2596
HTML Code © State Bar of South Dakota, 1999
MORRIS, INC.,
a corporation with its principal place of business at Fort Pierre,
Stanley County, South Dakota,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA
BY AND THROUGH THE
SOUTH DAKOTA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
a state agency located at Pierre, Hughes County, South Dakota,
Defendant and Appellee.
[1999 SD 45]
South Dakota Supreme Court
Appeal from the Third Judicial Circuit, Hand County, SD
Hon. Eugene L. Martin, Judge
#20362--Reversed
Ronald G. Schmidt, Schmidt, Schroyer & Moreno, Pierre, SD
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Barton R. Banks, Banks, Johnson, Colbath & Kerr, Rapid City, SD
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellee.
Considered on Briefs Sep 17, 1998; Reassigned Mar 24, 1999
Opinion Filed Jul 21, 1999
AMUNDSON, Justice (on reassignment).
[¶1] Morris, Inc. (Morris) held a subcontract with the South Dakota Department of Transportation (DOT) for a highway paving project in Hand County, South Dakota. Morris incurred unforeseen additional expenses due to difficulties in extracting the necessary aggregate from a state option gravel pit. Morris filed an administrative claim for reimbursement for these expenses. DOT denied reimbursement. Morris brought suit in circuit court. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of DOT. Morris appeals. We reverse and remand.
FACTS
[¶2] Morris is an aggregate materials supplier and construction contractor with its principal place of business in Fort Pierre, South Dakota. In July 1994, DOT gave notice to prospective bidders regarding a highway paving project near Ree Heights in Hand County, South Dakota (Ree Heights project). The deadline for the bids was scheduled for August 17, 1994.
[¶3] Approximately thirty days prior to the deadline for bid letting, DOT furnished plans and proposals for the work to interested asphalt contractors and aggregate material suppliers, such as Morris. The plans included data on a state option pit owned by and leased from Leonard Fawcett (Fawcett Pit). The plans included pit bore data representing the quantity and quality of material available for purposes of obtaining the aggregates required to construct this specific project. In the pit data supplied to prospective contractors, DOT did not identify the date the pit borings were conducted. A general disclaimer was included in the package of materials, regarding the accuracy of the data. (fn1) Morris used the data supplied by DOT for purposes of quoting the supply of necessary aggregate materials to interested asphalt paving contractors, who used these quotes to complete and submit their bids to DOT.
[¶4] DOT awarded the contract to McLaughlin & Schultz, Inc. McLaughlin & Schultz, Inc., in turn, subcontracted with Morris to provide the aggregate based on the quote.
[¶5] Morris used the Fawcett Pit as the source for the aggregate material to fulfill the subcontract. However, once production began at the Fawcett Pit, Morris was unable to produce the required aggregate due to clay seams running throughout the material. These clay seams were not indicated on the pit data supplied by DOT. Morris contacted DOT and several options were discussed. Eventually, after Morris was still unable to produce the needed material, DOT agreed with Morris that the required material was not in the pit. DOT and Morris then entered into a construction change order whereby DOT agreed to haul in add rock from another source to blend with the Fawcett Pit material in an attempt to meet project specifications.
[¶6] It was later learned that the pit data provided by DOT was from pit borings conducted on October 10, 1985, approximately ten years prior to the bid letting on the Ree Heights project. It was also learned that DOT had not visited the pit site since the 1985 pit borings. In fact, the aggregate material identified in the pit data furnished by DOT had been removed by third parties sometime between the 1985 pit borings and the 1994 bid letting.
[¶7] DOT compensated Morris for the additional haul under the construction change order, however, it would not compensate for the delays and extra costs incurred when trying to obtain the necessary material from the Fawcett Pit. Morris filed an administrative claim for additional compensation. DOT denied the claim. Morris then filed suit in circuit court on November 1, 1996. Both parties moved for summary judgment, which the trial court awarded in favor of DOT.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[¶8] "In reviewing a grant ... of summary judgment ... we must determine whether the moving party demonstrated the absence of any genuine issue of material fact and showed entitlement to judgment on the merits as a matter of law." Specialty Mills, Inc. v. Citizens State Bank, 1997 SD 7, ¶7, 558 NW2d 617, 620. "The evidence must be viewed most favorably to the nonmoving party and reasonable doubts should be resolved against the moving party." Lamp v. First Nat'l Bank of Garretson, 496 NW2d 581, 583 (SD 1993) (citations omitted). The movant has the burden of proof to clearly show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. State, Dep't of Revenue v. Thiewes, 448 NW2d 1, 2 (SD 1989). "If there exists any basis which supports the ruling of the trial court, affirmance of a summary judgment is proper." Garrett v. BankWest, Inc., 459 NW2d 833, 837 (SD 1990). Contract interpretation is reviewed de novo as a question of law. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Vostad, 520 NW2d 273, 275 (SD 1994).
DECISION
[¶9] Whether a genuine issue of material fact exists supporting Morris' claim that DOT, by concealment or false statements, misrepresented material facts regarding the Fawcett Pit so as to give rise to an implied warranty of accuracy.
[¶10] In Mooney's, Inc. v. SD Dept of Transp., 482 NW2d 43, 46 (SD 1992), this Court provided the general rule with regard to a claim against the government for an implied warranty of accuracy.
[C]ourts have universally applied a rule first expounded in a line of Supreme Court cases. The rule provides that the government is not liable to a contractor for breach of an implied warranty unless it misrepresents material facts through concealment or false statements. In essence, this rule established that no implied warranty will arise when the government, in good faith, presents all the information it has on subsurface conditions to the contractor.
Mooney's, 482 NW2d at 46 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted) (quoting Midwest Dredging Co. v. McAninch Corp., 424 NW2d 216, 221 (Iowa 1988)). In other words, "the government is liable to the contractor when it makes positive statements of material facts concerning the nature of the work in question, when those facts are false." Robert E. McKee, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 414 FSupp 957, 959 (NDGa 1976) (citing United States v. Spearin, 248 US 132, 39 SCt 59, 63 LEd 166 (1918); Christie v. United States, 237 US 234, 35 SCt 565, 59 LEd 933 (1915); Hollerbach v. United States, 233 US 165, 34 SCt 553, 58 LEd 898 (1914)).
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