Mitchell v. The City of New York

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided July 1, 2019·No. 1:19-cv-02785·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK SETH MITCHELL, Plaintiff, -against- THE CITY OF NEW YORK; NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING PRESERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT; 19-CV-2785 (CM) HOUSING PARTNERSHIP DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION; MR. ERIC ENDERLIN; MR. ORDER TO AMEND NICK LUNDGREN, ESQ.; MR. MATT MURPHY; MS. EVA TRIMBLE; MS. NIDIA DORMI; MR. DANIEL MARTIN; MS. ABIGAIL PATTERSON, ESQ.; MS. EBONY MOSURO; MR. THOMAS MELO; JOHN & JANE DOES 1 – 1000;, Defendants. COLLEEN McMAHON, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, appearing pro se, brings this action under the Fair Housing Act (FHA), the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, alleging that Defendants “unconscionably denied him rightful residential accommodation.” By order dated June 3, 2019, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis (IFP). For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within sixty days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or portion thereof, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474-75

(2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). Although pro se litigants enjoy the Court’s “special solicitude,” Ruotolo v. I.R.S., 28 F.3d 6, 8 (2d Cir. 1994) (per curiam), their pleadings must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. A complaint states a claim for relief if the claim is plausible. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To review a complaint for plausibility, the Court accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in the pleader’s favor. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). But the Court need not accept “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially legal conclusions. Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550

U.S. at 555). As set forth in Iqbal: [T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require detailed factual allegations, but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. A pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement. Id. (internal citations, quotation marks, and alteration omitted). After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND Plaintiff Seth Mitchell identifies himself as a “Single, White, Naturally-born United States Person who maintains certain permanent disabilities and is a crime victim as defined by VAWA,1 and who plans to increase His family size in 2019 to two (2) from one (1).” (Compl. at 7). Plaintiff alleges the following facts. On April 19, 2018, Plaintiff filed an application for housing at The Exhibit at 60 Fulton Street Affordable Housing, via NYC Housing Connect. On October 19, 2018, Plaintiff received

an email from Housing Partnership Development Corporation (HPDC) for an interview for further processing of his April 19, 2018 application. Plaintiff met with Defendant Melo on October 29, 2018, and he provided all necessary documentation to complete his application. Plaintiff received an email from Defendant Melo on December 26, 2018, however, that included a Notice of Ineligibility, thereby denying Plaintiff’s housing application. In response, on January 1, 2019, Plaintiff submitted his appeal documentation to Defendant Melo to substantiate that he meets all requirements for tenancy at 60 Fulton Street, and to request that the denial be overturned. On February 5, 2019, Plaintiff emailed Defendant Martin, the Chief Executive Officer of HPDC, requesting his help, but Plaintiff never received a response. Plaintiff received a final

determination letter on February 6, 2019, denying Plaintiff’s application for housing. The next day, Plaintiff filed a formal written complaint, and on February 11, 2019, Plaintiff received an email from Defendant Murphy, denying Plaintiff’s request to meet. On February 26, 2019, Plaintiff received, via email, a letter from Defendant Dormi that Plaintiff describes as “HPD formally ‘support[ing]’ HPDC’s blatantly discriminatory actions

1 The Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) entitles any person injured by gender- motivated violence to sue the perpetrator in federal court. See Ericson v. Syracuse Univ., 45 F. Supp. 2d 344, 345 (1999). It is unclear what, if any, claims Plaintiff purports to bring under VAWA, but he indicates “Women Against Violence Act of 1994” on the first page of his complaint. In the relief section of his complaint, however, he indicates that he seeks relief under the FHA, ADA, and the Civil Rights Act. regarding the illicit denial of rightful housing accommodation.” (Id. at 6.) Defendant Lungren, on March 22, 2019, denied via email Plaintiff’s demand for settlement. Plaintiff avers that this is Defendants’ second violation of his rights. He asserts that the first violation occurred “in 2016-2017, where, after lease signing, accepting His first month’s rent and security deposit, and providing Him with keys to residential unit 3F1 at 300 West 46th

Street, New York County, New York, 10018, CHDC then refused Him access to said residential unit in February 2017 and refused to refund Him the upfront monies paid to CHDC; no Prosecution was commenced against CHDC and no private resolution to that controversy was ever achieved.” (Id.) Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief and unspecified monetary damages. DISCUSSION A.

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Mitchell v. The City of New York, (S.D.N.Y. 2019).

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