Mirian E. Menjivar Sanchez v. Minga Wofford, Warden, Mesa Verde Immigrant Processing Center; Nancy Gonzalez, Acting Director of Bakersfield, CA Field Office, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement; Kristi Noem, Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security; and Pamela Bondi, Attorney General of the United States

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: October 17, 2025
• Docket: 1:25-cv-01187
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 7 8 9

10 11 MIRIAN E. MENJIVAR SANCHEZ, ) Case No.: 1:25-cv-01187-SKO (HC) ) 12 Petitioner, ) ) ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 13 v. ) TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 14 MINGA WOFFORD, Warden, Mesa Verde ) Immigrant Processing Center; NANCY ) (Doc. 12) 15 GONZALEZ, Acting Director of Bakersfield, ) CA Field Office, U.S. Immigration & Customs ) 16 Enforcement; KRISTI NOEM, Secretary of ) the U.S. Department of Homeland Security; ) 17 and PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General of ) the United States, ) 18 ) Respondents. ) 19 ) 20 21 Petitioner Miriam E. Menjivar Sanchez is an immigration detainee proceeding with counsel 22 with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. All parties having consented to 23 the jurisdiction of the Magistrate Judge, on September 26, 2025, the case was assigned to the 24 undersigned for all purposes, including trial and entry of final judgment. (Doc. 18.) Pending before 25 the Court is Petitioner’s motion for temporary restraining order dated September 23, 2025. (Doc. 12.) 26 Petitioner is a noncitizen who has lived in the United States for twenty years. On June 18, 27 2025, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) agents arrested Petitioner outside her place of 28 employment on a warrant issued pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226. On August 25, 2025, Petitioner was 1 granted conditional release on $3,000 bond by an immigration judge (“IJ”). The government appealed, 2 and on September 11, 2025, the IJ judge reversed her decision finding Petitioner ineligible for bond 3 based on the government’s new interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) as requiring mandatory 4 detention during removal proceedings for all noncitizens charged with entering the United States 5 without lawful admission. 6 On September 11, 2025, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus. (Doc. 1.) 7 Petitioner contends the IJ erred in concluding she was detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) as that 8 statute does not apply to her. Petitioner filed a motion for temporary restraining order on September 9 23, 2025, requesting the Court order her release on $3,000 bond under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) as initially 10 ordered by the IJ. 11 On October 8, 2025, Respondents filed an opposition, (Doc. 20), and on October 10, 2025, 12 Petitioner filed a reply, (Doc. 21). The parties have waived a hearing on the matter. For the reasons set 13 forth below, Petitioner’s motion for temporary restraining order is GRANTED. 14 BACKGROUND 15 Petitioner is a 44-year-old citizen of El Salvador who entered the United States without 16 admission in January 2005. (Doc. 20-1 at 6.) She was briefly detained approximately 10-15 days and 17 then released on her own recognizance. (Doc. 20-1 at 7.) In September of 2005, Petitioner was ordered 18 removed in abstentia. (Doc. 20-1 at 11-13.) Petitioner states she was unaware of immigration court 19 proceedings because at that time she was in an abusive relationship and was unable to receive her 20 mail. (Doc. 1-1 at 1.) 21 For the past twenty years, Petitioner has resided primarily in Santa Rosa, California. (Doc. 12- 22 1 at 16.) She has three children ages 19, 18, and 12. (Doc. 12-1 at 16.) She suffers from diabetes and is 23 dependent on insulin. (Doc 12-1 at 16.) Prior to her detention, she was being treated with twice-per- 24 day injections of insulin and the oral medication Metformin. (Doc. 1-1 at 2.) 25 On June 18, 2025, Petitioner was arrested by ICE officers outside of the dental office she had 26 been cleaning while employed by a janitorial service. (Doc. 20-1 at 19-20.) She was taken into custody 27 and transported to the Mesa Verde Detention Center where she has since remained in custody. (Doc. 28 20-1 at 19-20.) In that time, Petitioner has been transported to the Bakersfield hospital on three 1 occasions due to uncontrolled hyperglycemia. (Doc. 1-1 at 2.) According to Petitioner, she is often 2 only given one injection per day and her blood sugar has risen to very high levels. (Doc. 1-1 at 2.) 3 Counsel for Petitioner states he made a request with the ICE Field Office for humanitarian parole 4 based on Petitioner’s health condition. (Doc. 1-1 at 2.) The request was not granted or denied, but 5 Counsel was told Petitioner was receiving appropriate care. (Doc. 1-1 at 2.) 6 On June 18, 2025, a motion to reopen removal proceedings was filed. (Doc. 20-1 at 18-20.) On 7 July 8, 2025, the Immigration Court granted the request. (Doc. 1-7.) 8 On August 25, 2025, the IJ determined that Petitioner was detained under the authority of 8 9 U.S.C. § 1226(a), not 8 U.S.C. § 1225. (Doc. 1-2 at 1-3.) The IJ weighed the evidence of danger to the 10 community and flight risk and determined that Petitioner was not a danger and only a minimal flight 11 risk. (Doc. 1-2 at 1-3.) The IJ granted Petitioner conditional release on a $3,000 bond. (Doc. 1-2 at 1.) 12 The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) then filed a notice of intent to appeal which triggered 13 an automatic stay. (Doc. 1-4 at 1.) 14 On September 11, 2025, the IJ reversed the decision to grant conditional release. (Doc. 20-1 at 15 22.) The IJ noted that the recent Bureau of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision in Matter of Yajure 16 Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025) deprived the IJ of the authority to set bond for Petitioner’s 17 release. (Doc. 20-1 at 22.) The appeal remains pending at the BIA. 18 DISCUSSION 19 I. Legal Standard 20 The standards for issuing a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction are 21 “substantially identical.” See Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Bush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 22 (9th Cir. 2001). “A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.” 23 Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008) (citing Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 24 689–90 (2008)). “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to 25 succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, 26 that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Id. at 20 27 (citing Munaf, 553 U.S. at 689–90; Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, AK, 480 U.S. 531, 542 28 (1987); Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311–12 (1982)). “Likelihood of success on the 1 merits is a threshold inquiry and is the most important factor.” Simon v. City & Cnty. of San 2 Francisco, 135 F.4th 784, 797 (9th Cir. 2025) (quoting Env’t Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Carlson, 968 F.3d 985, 3 989 (9th Cir. 2020)). “[I]f a plaintiff can only show that there are serious questions going to the 4 merits—a lesser showing than likelihood of success on the merits—then a preliminary injunction may 5 still issue if the balance of hardships tips sharply in the plaintiff’s favor, and the other two Winter 6 factors are satisfied.” Friends of the Wild Swan v. Weber, 767 F.3d 936, 942 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal 7 quotation marks and citations omitted). 8 II. Likelihood of Success on the Merits 9 Petitioner contends that the immigration judge erred in reversing her earlier decision to 10 conditionally release Petitioner, concluding that Petitioner is mandatorily detained pursuant to 8 11 U.S.C. § 1225(b) rather than § 1226. (Doc. 1 at 3.) This case is one of statutory interpretation, and the 12 Court’s analysis begins with the text of the statute. See Lackey v. Stinnie, 604 U.S. 192, 199 (2025). 13 A. Statutory Framework 14 Two statutory sections govern the detention of noncitizens prior to a final order of removal: 8 15 U.S.C. §§ 1225 and 1226. Section 1225 governs the detention of noncitizens seeking admission into 16 the United States. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 289 (2018). As relevant here, section 17 1225(b)(2)(A) provides that “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the 18 examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a 19 doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding under section 1229a of this 20 title.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). “A noncitizen detained under [s]ection 1225(b)(2) may be released 21 only if he is paroled ‘for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit’ pursuant to 8 22 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A).” Gomes v. Hyde, 25 Civ. 11571, 2025 WL 1869299, at *2 (D. Mass. July 7, 23 2025). “Other than this limited exception[,] . . . detention under § 1225(b)(2) is considered mandatory . 24 . . [and] [i]ndividuals detained under § 1225 are not entitled to a bond hearing.” Lopez Benitez v. 25 Francis, No. 25 CIV. 5937 (DEH), 2025 WL 2371588, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2025). Further, under 26 § 1225(b)(2)(A), detention is mandatory “until removal proceedings have concluded.” 27 While section 1225 “authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens seeking admission into 28 the country,” section 1226 “authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens already in the country 1 pending the outcome of removal proceedings.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289 (emphasis added). Section 2 1226(a) sets out the “default rule” for noncitizens already present in the country. Id. at 288. It 3 provides: 4 On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States. . . . [T]he Attorney 5 General-- (1) may continue to detain the arrested alien; and 6 (2) may release the alien on-- (A) bond . . . ; or 7 (B) conditional parole . . . .

8 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). “Section 1226(a), therefore, establishes a discretionary detention framework.” 9 Lopez Benitez, 2025 WL 2371588, at *3 (internal citations omitted). An immigration officer makes 10 the initial determination to either detain or release the noncitizen, but after that decision has been 11 made, the noncitizen may request a bond hearing before an immigration judge. 8 C.F.R. § 12 1236.1(c)(8), (d)(1). At this bond hearing, “the burden is on the non-citizen to ‘establish to the 13 satisfaction of the Immigration Judge . . . that he or she does not present a danger to persons or 14 property, is not a threat to the national security, and does not pose a risk of flight.’” Hernandez v. 15 Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing In re Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 38 (BIA 2006)). 16 Here, the IJ initially determined that Petitioner was being detained under Section 1226. The IJ 17 found Petitioner did not present a risk of danger to the public and was only a minimal flight risk. 18 Accordingly, the IJ granted conditional release on posting of a $3,000 bond. As noted above, the IJ 19 subsequently reversed her decision finding Petitioner ineligible for release after determining Petitioner 20 was detained under § 1225(b). 21 B. Section 1225(b) Does Not Apply to Petitioner. 22 The government contends that the applicable detention authority in this case is section 1225(b), 23 as the immigration judge concluded, because Petitioner is an “applicant for admission.” (Doc. 20 at 9- 24 17.) The statute defines an “applicant for admission” as “[a]n alien present in the United States who 25 has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States (whether or not at a designated port of 26 arrival and including an alien who is brought to the United States after having been interdicted in 27 international or United States waters).” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). The government relies primarily on a 28 recent decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 26 I&N Dec. 1 216 (BIA 2025). (Doc. 20 at 18-20.) In that case, the BIA held that noncitizens who are present in the 2 United States without admission and are arrested on a warrant are subject to section 1225(b)(2)(A). 3 Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (B.I.A. 2025). 4 This Court is not bound by the BIA’s interpretation of sections 1225 and 1226. A federal court 5 “may look to [the BIA’s] interpretations [of the INA] for guidance, but [must not] defer to the agency. 6 Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 394, 413 (2024). For reasons that follow, the Court 7 finds Yajure Hurtado unpersuasive. 8 The government’s argument that section 1225(b) applies to all noncitizens present in the 9 United States without admission is implausible. The government’s proposed interpretation of the 10 statute (1) disregards the plain meaning of section 1225(b)(2)(A); (2) disregards the relationship 11 between sections 1225 and 1226; (3) would render a recent amendment to section 1226(c) superfluous; 12 and (4) is inconsistent with decades of prior statutory interpretation and practice. As previously noted, 13 this Court reached this conclusion in Guerrero Lepe v. Andrews, 25-cv-01163-KES-SKO (E.D. Ca. 14 Sept. 23, 2025). Other district courts have also reached a similar conclusion. See, e.g., Lopez Benitez 15 v. Francis, No. 25-Civ-5937, 2025 WL 2267803 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2025); Martinez v. Hyde, No. CV 16 25-11613-BEM, 2025 WL 2084238, at *9 (D. Mass. July 24, 2025); Gomes v. Hyde, No. 1:25-cv- 17 11571-JEK, 2025 WL 1869299, at *8 (D. Mass. July 7, 2025); Vasquez Garcia v. Noem, 2025 WL 18 2549431 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2025); Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, No. 2:25-cv-12486, 2025 WL 2496379 19 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025); Kostak v. Trump, No. 3:25-cv-01093-JE, Doc. 20 (W.D. La. Aug. 27, 20 2025); Doc. 11, Benitez v. Noem, No. 5:25-cv-02190 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2025); Leal-Hernandez v. 21 Noem, No. 1:25-cv-02428-JRR, 2025 WL 2430025 (D. Md. Aug. 24, 2025); Romero v. Hyde, No. 25- 22 11631-BEM, 2025 WL 2403827 (D. Mass. Aug. 19, 2025); Arrazola-Gonzalez v. Noem, No. 5:25-cv- 23 01789-ODW, 2025 WL 2379285 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2025); Aguilar Maldonado v. Olson, No. 25-cv- 24 3142, 2025 WL 2374411 (D. Minn. Aug. 15, 2025); Dos Santos v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-12052-JEK, 25 2025 WL 2370988 (D. Mass. Aug. 14, 2025); Rocha Rosado v. Figueroa, No. CV 25-02157, 2025 WL 26 2337099 (D. Ariz. Aug. 11, 2025), report and recommendation adopted 2025 WL 2349133 (D. Ariz. 27 Aug. 13, 2025); Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz, No. 5:25-cv-01874-SSS-BFM, *13 (C.D. Cal. July 28 28, 2025). Other than the BIA’s recent decision in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, there is no authority for 1 the position that noncitizens such as Petitioner who have been present in the United States for many 2 years are now subject to section 1225(b). 3 The government contends that section 1225(b) applies to all noncitizens living in this county 4 who did not enter lawfully, regardless of how long they have lived here or whether they ever took any 5 affirmative step to seek admission. The government’s proposed interpretation of the statute ignores the 6 plain meaning of the phrase “seeking admission.” Martinez, 2025 WL 2084238, at *6. “Seeking” 7 means “asking for” or “trying to acquire or gain.” Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://www.merriam- 8 webster.com/dictionary/seeking. And the use of a present participle, “seeking,” “necessarily implies 9 some sort of present-tense action.” Martinez, 2025 WL 2084238, at *6. The term “admission” is 10 defined as “the lawful entry of the alien into the United States after inspection and authorization by an 11 immigration officer.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A). And “entry” has long been understood to mean “a 12 crossing into the territorial limits of the United States.” Hing Sum v. Holder, 602 F.3d 1092, 1100–01 13 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Matter of Pierre, 14 I & N Dec. 467, 468 (1973)). To piece this together, the 14 phrase “seeking admission” means that one must be actively “seeking” “lawful entry.” See Lopez 15 Benitez, 2025 WL 2371588, at *7. 16 In this case, Petitioner is not actively “seeking” “lawful entry.” She affected entry into the 17 United States twenty years ago. Rather than seeking entry, Petitioner is present in the United States 18 and seeking to remain. The Lopez Benitez court analogized the difference as follows: 19 [S]omeone who enters a movie theater without purchasing a ticket and then proceeds to sit through the first few minutes of a film would not ordinarily then be described as “seeking 20 admission” to the theater. Rather, that person would be described as already present there. Even if that person, after being detected, offered to pay for a ticket, one would not ordinarily 21 describe them as “seeking admission” (or “seeking” “lawful entry”) at that point—one would say that they had entered unlawfully but now seek a lawful means of remaining there. As § 22 1225(b)(2)(A) applies only to those noncitizens who are actively “seeking admission” to the United States, it cannot, according to its ordinary meaning, apply to [petitioner], because he 23 has already been residing in the United States for more than two years.

24 Lopez Benitez, 2025 WL 2371588, at *7; see also Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, No. 2:25-CV-12486, 25 2025 WL 2496379, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025) (“[S]eeking admission’ implies action – 26 something that is currently occurring, and in this instance, would most logically occur at the border 27 upon inspection.”). 28 1 While Petitioner could be considered an “applicant for admission” because she is allegedly an 2 “alien present in the United States who has not been admitted,” as defined at 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1), 3 the government has failed to show that, over 20 years after she entered the country, Petitioner was 4 actively “seeking admission.” The government’s “selective reading of the statute . . . ignores its 5 ‘seeking admission’ language.” Martinez, 2025 WL 2084238, at *6. “If, as the government argues, 6 [section] 1225(b)(2)(A) was intended to apply to all ‘applicant[s] for admission,’ there would be no 7 need to include the phrase ‘seeking admission’ in the statute.” Lopez Benitez, 2025 WL 2371588, at 8 *6. “That is, rather than stating that mandatory detention is required for any ‘applicant for admission, 9 if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and 10 beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted,’ the statute would instead provide for mandatory detention for 11 any ‘applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that [the] alien seeking 12 admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.’” Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 13 1225(b)(2)(A)). The rule against surplusage counsels that “‘every clause and word of a statute’ should 14 have meaning.” See United States, ex rel. Polansky v. Exec. Health Res., Inc., 599 U.S. 419, 432 15 (2023) (quoting Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1883)); League of California Cities v. Fed. 16 Commc’ns Comm’n, 118 F.4th 995, 1019 (9th Cir. 2024) (“The rule against surplusage generally 17 prohibits [a court] from interpreting [a statute] in a way that ‘mak[es] a part of it unnecessary.’” 18 (quoting NLRB v. Aakash, Inc., 58 F.4th 1099, 1105 (9th Cir. 2023)). The government’s position 19 would make the “seeking admission” language meaningless and violate the rule against surplusage. 20 Martinez, 2025 WL 2084238, at *6; Lopez Benitez, 2025 WL 2371588, at *6. 21 The government’s argument also disregards the context of sections 1225 and 1226 and the 22 broader statutory scheme. As the Supreme Court noted in Jennings, section 1225 applies “at the 23 Nation’s borders and ports of entry, where the Government must determine whether an alien seeking 24 to enter the country is admissible.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287. Section 1225 “authorizes the 25 Government to detain certain aliens seeking admission into the country,” whereas section 1226 26 “authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens already in the country pending the outcome of 27 removal proceedings.” Id., 583 U.S. at 289 (emphasis added). 28 1 “It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in 2 their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.” Davis v. Michigan Dep’t 3 of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989). The title of section 1225 is “Inspection by immigration 4 officers; expedited removal of inadmissible arriving aliens; referral for hearing.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225. 5 “Inspection” is a process that occurs at the border or other ports of entry. See Posos-Sanchez v. 6 Garland, 3 F.4th 1176, 1183 (9th Cir. 2021) (explaining that “inspection and authorization” must “take 7 place at a ‘port of entry’” for one to be considered to have “lawfully entered”); 8 C.F.R § 235.1(a) 8 (“Application to lawfully enter the United States shall be made in person to an immigration officer at a 9 U.S. port-of-entry when the port is open for inspection.”). The title of section 1225 also refers to 10 “expedited removal,” which applies to a noncitizen “who is arriving in the United States” and “is 11 inadmissible.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A). Additionally, section 1225(a)(2) prohibits the admission 12 of “stowaways”—noncitizens “who obtain[] transportation without the consent of the owner . . . of any 13 vessel or aircraft through concealment aboard such vessel or aircraft,” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(49)—who 14 would be discovered at the border or a port of entry. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(2).1 15 The third problem with the government’s argument is that application of section 1225(b)(2)(A) 16 to noncitizens already in the country would render superfluous a recent amendment to section 1226(c). 17 See Gomes, 2025 WL 1869299, at *5. Although section 1226(a) sets out a discretionary detention 18 scheme, section 1226(c) provides an exception which mandates detention for certain criminal 19 noncitizens. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E). Section 1226(c)(1)(E), which was added to the statute in 20 2025 by the Laken Riley Act, mandates detention for any noncitizen (i) who is inadmissible under 21 section 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) as an “alien present in the United States without being admitted or paroled,” 22 and (ii) who “is charged with, arrested for, convicted of, or admits” to committing certain crimes. 8 23 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E) (emphasis added); see Gomes, 2025 WL 1869299, at *5 (explaining statutory 24 section). 25 26 1 There are no similar references in section 1226. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226. Section 1226 references circumstances 27 that logically would occur inside the country, such as the detention of certain “criminal aliens” upon their release from a correctional facility and the issuance of detainers to “State [or] local officials.” See 8 U.S.C. § 28 1226(c)(1), (3). 1 If every “applicant for admission”—which is defined as an “alien present in the United States 2 who has not been admitted,” see 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(1)—is already subject to mandatory detention 3 under section 1225(b)(2)(A), as the government contends, there would have been no need for the new 4 section 1226(c)(1)(E), which mandates detention for every noncitizen who is “present in the United 5 States without being admitted or paroled” and who has been “charged with, arrested for, or admits to” 6 committing certain crimes, see 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E). Reading § 1225 as the government proposes 7 would thus render § 1226(c)(1)(E) superfluous. See Gomes, 2025 WL 1869299, at *5; Lopez Benitez, 8 2025 WL 2371588, at *7; Romero v. Hyde, No. CV 25-11631-BEM, 2025 WL 2403827, at *11 (D. 9 Mass. Aug. 19, 2025). The passage of the Laken Riley Act provision shows that Congress understood 10 that not all noncitizens present in the United States who entered without lawful admission were subject 11 to mandatory detention under section 1225(b)(2)(A), and Congress wanted to ensure that those who 12 had certain criminal histories would be detained. Maldonado v. Olson, No. 25-cv-3142, 2025 WL 13 2374411, *12 (D. Minn. Aug. 15, 2025) (“[C]ourts ‘do not lightly’ find that Congress adopted ‘two 14 separate clauses in the same law to perform the same work.’ The Court will not find that Congress 15 passed the Laken Riley Act to ‘perform the same work’ that was already covered by § 1225(b)(2).” 16 (quoting United States v. Taylor, 596 U.S. 845, 857 (2022)). 17 “When Congress acts to amend a statute, [the Court] presume[s] it intends its amendment to 18 have real and substantial effect.” See Stone v. I.N.S., 514 U.S. 386, 397 (1995); Marx v. Gen. Revenue 19 Corp., 568 U.S. 371, 386 (2013) (“[T]he canon against surplusage is strongest when an interpretation 20 would render superfluous another part of the same statutory scheme.”). Section 1226(c)(1)(E) is a 21 detention provision; it has no other purpose. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E). If all noncitizens present in 22 the United States without lawful admission were subject to mandatory detention under section 23 1225(b)(2)(A) already—as the government argues—section 1226(c)(1)(E) would be superfluous. 24 Maldonado, 2025 WL 237441, at *12 (“If § 1225(b)(2) already mandated detention of any alien who 25 has not been admitted, regardless of how long they have been here, then adding § 1226(c)(1)(E) to the 26 statutory scheme was pointless.”). 27 Respondents also cite § 1225(c)(3) in support of its argument that all applicants for admission 28 are “seeking admission” under § 1225(b)(2)(A). (Doc. 20 at 20-22.) Section § 1225(c)(3) provides: 1 All aliens (including alien crewmen) who are applicants for admission or otherwise seeking admission or readmission to or transit through the United States shall be inspected by 2 immigration officers.

3 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(3) (emphasis added). Respondent contends that the use of “or otherwise” operates 4 as a catch-all to indicate that all applicants for admission are “seeking admission.” But the phrase 5 “seeking admission” in § 1225(a)(1) implies affirmative action toward admission, such as presenting 6 at a port of entry, not passive presence after unlawful entry. See Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 138 7 (distinguishing “applicants” as those inspected or paroled). The term “or otherwise” does not expand 8 this definition to all unadmitted noncitizens; it addresses those evading inspection. In addition, 9 Congress used the term “arriving alien” narrowly elsewhere in § 1225, suggesting § 1225(b)(2)(A) 10 does not apply broadly to inland apprehendees. See 8 C.F.R. § 1001.1(q) (defining “arriving alien” as 11 one at a port or recently entered). 12 In addition, the order releasing Petitioner from detention in 2005 indicates she was placed in 13 removal proceedings and released on her own recognizance pursuant to Section 236 of the 14 Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). (Doc. 20-1 at 9.) This further undermines the 15 government’s argument that she is subject to mandatory detention under section 1225(b). Section 16 1226(a) “authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens already in the country pending the 17 outcome of removal proceedings,” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289, “and it applies when a noncitizen is 18 ‘arrested and detained’ ‘[o]n a warrant issued by the Attorney General.’” Gomes, 2025 WL 1869299, 19 at *5 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)). There is nothing in the record to indicate Petitioner has ever been 20 detained, either in 2005 or 2025, pursuant to § 1225(b). That is the only provision that could have 21 applied under the plain terms of the statute. See also Jennings, 583 U.S. at 281 (explaining that section 22 1226(a) applies to those “already in the country”); Gomes, 2025 WL 1869299, at *5 (reaching the 23 same conclusion); Lopez Benitez, 2025 WL 2371588, at *10 (holding that the government’s initial 24 release of a noncitizen pursuant to section 1226 indicated he was not subject to mandatory detention 25 under section 1225). 26 The government previously applied section 1226(a) to noncitizens, such as Petitioner, who 27 entered the country without admission. See Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 n.6 (B.I.A. 28 2025) (“We acknowledge that for years Immigration Judges have conducted [section 1226(a)] bond 1 hearings for aliens who entered the United States without inspection.”); Martinez, 2025 WL 2084238, 2 at *6. While divining the meaning of a statute belongs to the “independent judgment” of the courts, 3 “‘the longstanding practice of the government’—like any other interpretive aid—‘can inform [a 4 court’s] determination of what the law is.’” Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 385–86, 5 412 (2024) (quoting NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 525 (2014)). For decades, DHS has 6 applied § 1226(a) to noncitizens who entered without inspection but were apprehended inland, 7 acknowledging they are not “arriving aliens” at a port of entry. Ortega-Cervantes v. Gonzales, 501 8 F.3d 1111, 1116 (9th Cir. 2007). This is “powerful evidence” of a “natural and reasonable” reading of 9 the statute. Abramski v. United States, 573 U.S. 169, 203 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting). The Court 10 finds that the government’s longstanding practice, under which section 1225(b)(2)(A) would not have 11 applied to Petitioner’s circumstances, is consistent with the text and statutory scheme. See, e.g., Lopez 12 Benitez, 2025 WL 2371588, at *8 (reaching same conclusion).2 13 The government also makes the policy argument that subjecting those who are detained at the 14 border to mandatory detention, while allowing those who entered the United States without permission 15 to be released on bond, “would create the perverse incentive for aliens to enter the country unlawfully 16 – or surreptitiously get access to the country’s interior – rather than enter at a lawful location.” (Doc. 17 20 at 26.) This argument disregards the different due process considerations at issue for noncitizens 18 encountered at the border or ports of entry, versus for noncitizens who have established residence in 19 this country. As the court in Romero noted: 20 The relevant distinction . . . is between persons inside the United States and persons outside the United States. That distinction is consistent with the long history of our immigration laws and 21 with the Constitution. “[O]nce an alien enters the country, the legal circumstance changes, for the Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, 22 whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693, 121 S. Ct. 2491, 150 L. Ed.2d 653 (2001). 23

24 25 26

27 2 The fact that the government’s new interpretation of statute conflicts with years of prior interpretation also supports that Petitioner, at a minimum, has shown that there are serious questions concerning the merits of its 28 claims regarding the statute’s interpretation. 1 Romero, 2025 WL 2403827, at *12–13; cf. Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *9–10 (finding that 2 the government’s application of section 1225(b)(2)(A) in similar circumstances violated detainee’s 3 due process rights). 4 Civil immigration detention, which is “nonpunitive in purpose and effect[,]” is typically 5 justified under the Due Process Clause only when a noncitizen presents a risk of flight or danger to the 6 community. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690; Padilla v. ICE, 704 F. Supp. 3d 1163, 1172 (W.D. Wash. 7 2023). “It is therefore reasonable to read these statutes ‘against [that] backdrop.’” Romero, 2025 WL 8 2403827, at *13 (quoting Hewitt v. United States, 145 S. Ct. 2165, 2173 (2025)). Moreover, policy 9 arguments cannot override the plain meaning of the text. See also Romero, 2025 WL 2403827, at *12. 10 In sum, the Court concludes that Petitioner is likely to succeed on the merits of her claim that 11 she is not subject to mandatory detention under section 1225(b)(2)(A) and that she was wrongfully 12 denied release on bond under section 1226(a), as initially determined by the IJ. 13 III. Irreparable Harm 14 Turning to the second Winter factor, the Ninth Circuit has recognized that there may be 15 numerous “irreparable harms imposed on anyone subject to immigration detention,” such as “subpar 16 medical and psychiatric care in ICE detention facilities [and] the economic burdens imposed on 17 detainees and their families as a result of detention.” Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 995. 18 Petitioner has established that she has been suffering and will continue to suffer irreparable 19 harm in the absence of injunctive relief. Petitioner remains in need of treatment and medication for her 20 diabetic condition. Petitioner states she has already been rushed to the hospital on three occasions due 21 to inadequate care (only one injection per day vs. her normal two-a-day injections). According to 22 Petitioner’s doctor, Petitioner is insulin dependent, and “[w]ithout significant attention to her diabetes 23 she will certainly wind up in DKA and likely hospitalization or death.” (Doc. 1-6 at 1.) 24 The government does not dispute Petitioner’s evidence that her medical needs are substantial 25 or that her detention increases her risk of further medical complications. However, Respondents 26 contend that her claim of inadequate health care is unsupported. Respondents claim Petitioner is being 27 provided proper care under the circumstances, and that when she was taken into custody, she advised 28 officers she was in good health. (Doc. 20 at 28.) Respondents ignore the fact that Petitioner has 1 already been transported to the hospital for hyperglycemia on three occasions while in detention, 2 which supports her claim that her diabetic condition is not being treated adequately. 3 Respondent also contends that Petitioner’s “unlawful deprivation of physical liberty” is a harm 4 that “is essentially inherent in detention,” and thus “the Court cannot weigh this strongly in favor of” 5 Petitioner. (Doc. 20 at 28.) This argument is flawed because the government is attempting to enforce 6 the immigration laws based on a misreading of the statutes, as noted above. As other courts that have 7 faced this issue have explained, the violation of Petitioner’s statutory rights causes “immediate and 8 irreparable injury.” Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz, No. 5:25-cv-01874-SSS-BFM (C.D. Cal. July 9 28, 2025). 10 IV. Balance of Hardships and Public Interest 11 When the government is the nonmoving party, “the last two Winter factors merge.” Baird v. 12 Bonta, 81 F.4th 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2023) (internal citations omitted). Here, the balance of equities 13 tips in Petitioner’s favor. As the IJ determined in the initial custody hearing, she poses no risk, and her 14 release would allow family support. The public interest favors family unity over unchecked detention. 15 See Singh v. Lewis, 2025 WL 2699219, at *4 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 22, 2025). The government has a 16 minimal burden in releasing one person, and the costs to the public for immigration detention are high. 17 Diaz v. Kaiser, No. 3:25-CV-05071, 2025 WL 1676854, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2025). Furthermore, 18 the government’s interests are not undermined because Petitioner remains in removal proceedings. 19 These factors support relief. 20 V. Remedy 21 The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to return the parties to the status quo ante, which is 22 “not simply [] any situation before the filing of a lawsuit, but instead [] ‘the last uncontested status 23 which preceded the pending controversy.’” GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 1210 24 (9th Cir. 2000). Petitioner seeks immediate release on a $3,000 bond as initially ordered by the IJ. The 25 government does not argue that Petitioner presents a flight risk or danger to the community. As section 26 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to her, Petitioner has shown a likelihood of success on her claim that the 27 government may not detain her under section 1225(b)(2)(A). The appropriate remedy is Petitioner’s 28 immediate release on a $3,000 bond. 1 ORDER 2 Based on the foregoing, Petitioner’s motion for temporary restraining order, (Doc. 12), is 3 GRANTED. The Court ORDERS that Respondents release Petitioner on the $3,000 bond issued by 4 the IJ at the initial custody hearing. 5 In addition, within ten (10) days, the parties are DIRECTED to file a stipulation to conversion 6 of the temporary restraining order into a preliminary injunction based on the prior submissions of the 7 parties, or advise the Court that the parties wish to submit additional briefing. 8 9 IT IS SO ORDERED.

10 Dated: October 17, 2025 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto . 11 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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