HUNSTEIN, Chief Justice.
Fredrico Shenard Mikell was convicted of felony murder and multiple counts of armed robbery and aggravated assault arising out of an attack on six people in a home in Statesboro. He appeals from the denial of his motion for new trial1 challenging the sufficiency of [435]*435the evidence and asserting other errors. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
1. The evidence authorized the jury to find that appellant guided Kendall Worthy, Marcus Benbow and a third man to a home in Statesboro where six people were inside playing or watching a dice game. Appellant went alone to the door and, after identifying himself, asked to speak to the murder victim, Corey Walker. Visible on the floor was the money paid in by Walker and the other participants in the dice game. Appellant was well known to Walker and others in the room, including Chalandria McClouden, with whose family appellant had frequently dined. Appellant asked Walker about purchasing drugs and left after learning Walker had none. Thirty to forty-five minutes later, dice game participant James Williams answered a knock on the door and was shot in the knee with a handgun as he struggled to keep out of the home a man Williams later identified as Benbow. Co-indictee Worthy then entered the home with an AK-47 assault rifle. He shot Williams in the other knee with the rifle and, as the home’s unarmed inhabitants fled the gunmen, shot McClouden in the back and legs and fatally wounded Walker. McClouden testified that, after the shots were fired, she turned toward the front door and “could see [appellant] and he stood there looking at me and then he took out running.” Benbow picked up the dice game money, shot Williams in the knee yet again, and then he and Worthy fled the scene, driving off without appellant.
Worthy, as part of a negotiated guilty plea deal pursuant to which he was to receive a single life sentence, testified that appellant and the other indictees came to Statesboro to commit a robbery; that appellant approached several individuals under the ruse of wanting to purchase a large amount of drugs as a means of finding someone to rob; and that Benbow, upon hearing of the victims’ gambling money, proposed robbing the victims, to which appellant agreed. Worthy testified that appellant carried the assault rifle up to the door but dropped it and ran away as Benbow struggled to get inside the home; that Worthy then joined Benbow, picked up the rifle and fired it in the home after Benbow shot victim Williams at the door; and that Worthy then ran to the car, followed by Benbow with the money from the dice game, and left town.
Appellant was identified by the surviving victims and, after [436]*436being taken into custody, gave both a recorded statement, heard by the jury, and a written statement, read into evidence, in which he admitted his knowledge of and participation in the plan to commit armed robbery, including accompanying Benbow to the door, knocking on it and giving his name to gain entry into the home. However, he claimed he then hesitated and abandoned the enterprise by running away after Benbow got inside and kept on running as he heard the shots being fired.
In light of McClouden’s testimony that she saw appellant in the doorway after the shots had been fired, we find no merit in appellant’s contention that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions because the State failed to disprove beyond a reasonable doubt his affirmative defense of abandonment. See OCGA § 16-4-5 (a) (circumstances must manifest complete renunciation of the criminal purpose to constitute affirmative defense of abandonment); Johnson v. State, 276 Ga. 368 (1) (578 SE2d 885) (2003). See generally Bentley v. State, 261 Ga. 229 (2) (404 SE2d 101) (1991) (determination whether State has met its burden to disprove an affirmative defense is for the jury). Furthermore, whether the deal made by Worthy with the State rendered his testimony biased to a degree that left him less creditworthy was a determination to be made by the jury. See Yat v. State, 279 Ga. 611 (1) (619 SE2d 637) (2005). The evidence adduced was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was guilty as a party to the charged crimes. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). See also OCGA § 16-2-20 (a) (party to a crime is as guilty of crime’s commission as the principal).
2. The transcript reveals that the trial court permitted appellant to question Worthy exhaustively about his knowledge of his possible punishment, thereby allowing appellant to fully explore the possible motivation for Worthy’s testimony. See State v. Vogleson, 275 Ga. 637 (1) (571 SE2d 752) (2002). Because the trial court did not violate appellant’s right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment by not allowing appellant to delve into the issue of Worthy’s parole eligibility, see Hewitt v. State, 277 Ga. 327 (2) (588 SE2d 722) (2003) (because authority to grant parole rests with Board of Pardons and Paroles and not the district attorney’s office, cross-examination regarding parole is irrelevant on question of witness’s potential bias in testifying favorably for the State), no further analysis of this issue is necessary to the determination of the case at hand. See generally Zepp v. Brannen, 283 Ga. 395, 397 (658 SE2d 567) (2008) (discussing “obiter dicta”).
3. The trial transcript clearly reflects that appellant acted in compliance with OCGA § 17-8-58 at the time he objected to the trial court’s failure to give his requested charge on withdrawal from a [437]*437conspiracy.2 However, it is reversible error for the trial court to decline to give a requested charge on an affirmative defense only where the charge is both a correct statement of the law and is adjusted to the evidence in the case. See Bishop u. State, 271 Ga. 291 (2) (519 SE2d 206) (1999). Appellant’s requested charge tracked the language of OCGA § 16-4-9, which provides that withdrawal is a defense if the defendant can show that he withdrew “before [any] overt act [to effect the object of the conspiracy] occurred.” (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 16-4-9. See also OCGA § 16-4-8 (person commits offense of conspiracy to commit a crime “when he together with one or more persons conspires to commit any crime and any one or more of such persons does any overt act to effect the object of the conspiracy”).
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HUNSTEIN, Chief Justice.
Fredrico Shenard Mikell was convicted of felony murder and multiple counts of armed robbery and aggravated assault arising out of an attack on six people in a home in Statesboro. He appeals from the denial of his motion for new trial1 challenging the sufficiency of [435]*435the evidence and asserting other errors. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
1. The evidence authorized the jury to find that appellant guided Kendall Worthy, Marcus Benbow and a third man to a home in Statesboro where six people were inside playing or watching a dice game. Appellant went alone to the door and, after identifying himself, asked to speak to the murder victim, Corey Walker. Visible on the floor was the money paid in by Walker and the other participants in the dice game. Appellant was well known to Walker and others in the room, including Chalandria McClouden, with whose family appellant had frequently dined. Appellant asked Walker about purchasing drugs and left after learning Walker had none. Thirty to forty-five minutes later, dice game participant James Williams answered a knock on the door and was shot in the knee with a handgun as he struggled to keep out of the home a man Williams later identified as Benbow. Co-indictee Worthy then entered the home with an AK-47 assault rifle. He shot Williams in the other knee with the rifle and, as the home’s unarmed inhabitants fled the gunmen, shot McClouden in the back and legs and fatally wounded Walker. McClouden testified that, after the shots were fired, she turned toward the front door and “could see [appellant] and he stood there looking at me and then he took out running.” Benbow picked up the dice game money, shot Williams in the knee yet again, and then he and Worthy fled the scene, driving off without appellant.
Worthy, as part of a negotiated guilty plea deal pursuant to which he was to receive a single life sentence, testified that appellant and the other indictees came to Statesboro to commit a robbery; that appellant approached several individuals under the ruse of wanting to purchase a large amount of drugs as a means of finding someone to rob; and that Benbow, upon hearing of the victims’ gambling money, proposed robbing the victims, to which appellant agreed. Worthy testified that appellant carried the assault rifle up to the door but dropped it and ran away as Benbow struggled to get inside the home; that Worthy then joined Benbow, picked up the rifle and fired it in the home after Benbow shot victim Williams at the door; and that Worthy then ran to the car, followed by Benbow with the money from the dice game, and left town.
Appellant was identified by the surviving victims and, after [436]*436being taken into custody, gave both a recorded statement, heard by the jury, and a written statement, read into evidence, in which he admitted his knowledge of and participation in the plan to commit armed robbery, including accompanying Benbow to the door, knocking on it and giving his name to gain entry into the home. However, he claimed he then hesitated and abandoned the enterprise by running away after Benbow got inside and kept on running as he heard the shots being fired.
In light of McClouden’s testimony that she saw appellant in the doorway after the shots had been fired, we find no merit in appellant’s contention that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions because the State failed to disprove beyond a reasonable doubt his affirmative defense of abandonment. See OCGA § 16-4-5 (a) (circumstances must manifest complete renunciation of the criminal purpose to constitute affirmative defense of abandonment); Johnson v. State, 276 Ga. 368 (1) (578 SE2d 885) (2003). See generally Bentley v. State, 261 Ga. 229 (2) (404 SE2d 101) (1991) (determination whether State has met its burden to disprove an affirmative defense is for the jury). Furthermore, whether the deal made by Worthy with the State rendered his testimony biased to a degree that left him less creditworthy was a determination to be made by the jury. See Yat v. State, 279 Ga. 611 (1) (619 SE2d 637) (2005). The evidence adduced was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was guilty as a party to the charged crimes. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). See also OCGA § 16-2-20 (a) (party to a crime is as guilty of crime’s commission as the principal).
2. The transcript reveals that the trial court permitted appellant to question Worthy exhaustively about his knowledge of his possible punishment, thereby allowing appellant to fully explore the possible motivation for Worthy’s testimony. See State v. Vogleson, 275 Ga. 637 (1) (571 SE2d 752) (2002). Because the trial court did not violate appellant’s right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment by not allowing appellant to delve into the issue of Worthy’s parole eligibility, see Hewitt v. State, 277 Ga. 327 (2) (588 SE2d 722) (2003) (because authority to grant parole rests with Board of Pardons and Paroles and not the district attorney’s office, cross-examination regarding parole is irrelevant on question of witness’s potential bias in testifying favorably for the State), no further analysis of this issue is necessary to the determination of the case at hand. See generally Zepp v. Brannen, 283 Ga. 395, 397 (658 SE2d 567) (2008) (discussing “obiter dicta”).
3. The trial transcript clearly reflects that appellant acted in compliance with OCGA § 17-8-58 at the time he objected to the trial court’s failure to give his requested charge on withdrawal from a [437]*437conspiracy.2 However, it is reversible error for the trial court to decline to give a requested charge on an affirmative defense only where the charge is both a correct statement of the law and is adjusted to the evidence in the case. See Bishop u. State, 271 Ga. 291 (2) (519 SE2d 206) (1999). Appellant’s requested charge tracked the language of OCGA § 16-4-9, which provides that withdrawal is a defense if the defendant can show that he withdrew “before [any] overt act [to effect the object of the conspiracy] occurred.” (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 16-4-9. See also OCGA § 16-4-8 (person commits offense of conspiracy to commit a crime “when he together with one or more persons conspires to commit any crime and any one or more of such persons does any overt act to effect the object of the conspiracy”). As appellant himself admitted, prior to his alleged withdrawal from the conspiracy, he acted to lead his co-indictees to the home where the victims were present; told his co-indictees, who were seeking victims to rob, about the dice game money he observed on the floor of the home; accompanied an armed co-indictee to the home and knocked on the door; and gave his name so as to enable his armed co-indictee to gain entry when the door was opened in response to appellant’s words. The conspiracy to rob the victims could not have been effected without appellant’s performance of these overt acts. See generally Bradford v. State, 285 Ga. 1 (2) (673 SE2d 201) (2009) (“overt act” in OCGA § 16-4-8 refers to an open or manifest act made in furtherance of a conspiracy to commit a crime). Accordingly, because appellant’s requested charge was not authorized by the evidence in the case, it was not error for the trial court to refuse to give it. See generally State v. Johnson, 280 Ga. 511 (630 SE2d 377) (2006) (requested jury charge must be legal, apt, adjusted to some principle involved in the case and authorized by the evidence).
4. Appellant failed to make a proper objection pursuant to OCGA § 17-8-58 (a) regarding the trial court’s failure to charge his supplemental requests to charge numbers 1 and 2, which identified abandonment and withdrawal as affirmative defenses that the State had the burden of disproving beyond a reasonable doubt. In light of the trial court’s separate instructions to the jury that “it is an affirmative defense that [a person] abandoned his efforts to commit the crime,” and that “[w]hen a defense is raised by the evidence the burden is on the State to negate or disprove it beyond a reasonable doubt,” we conclude that the trial court’s failure to give the requested supplemental charges cannot be considered such plain [438]*438error under OCGA § 17-8-58 (b) as to offset appellant’s failure to object. See Givens v. State, 264 Ga. 522 (3) (448 SE2d 687) (1994) (when properly requested, trial court is required to give specific charge on State’s burden of proof with respect to an affirmative defense). Appellate review of this enumeration is thus precluded. OCGA § 17-8-58 (b).
5. Appellant contends the prosecutor during closing argument improperly commented on appellant’s pre-arrest silence in violation of Mallory v. State, 261 Ga. 625 (5) (409 SE2d 839) (1991) (comment upon a defendant’s silence or failure to come forward is more prejudicial than probative). Under the unique situation present in this case, we find no error. The transcript reveals that, five days after the crimes were committed, police officers sought out appellant and questioned him regarding the crimes. Appellant gave a statement in which he admitted he knew of and participated in the plan to commit the armed robbery of the victims but claimed he then hesitated because of his friendship with the victims and abandoned the enterprise by running away. See Division 1, supra. During the course of this statement, appellant specifically told the interrogating detective that he was “going to call you all next week” to report what Benbow and Worthy had done to the victims. In her closing argument, the prosecutor reiterated this comment appellant had made to the interrogating detective when she argued that appellant could have but did not call the police in the days following the crimes. We hold that appellant invited the prosecutor’s comment about his pretrial silence by making the statement to the interrogating officer that he had intended to call the police “next week” and thereby raised an issue regarding his failure to come forward before the interrogation that the prosecutor was legitimately authorized to address in her closing argument. Moreover, we note that the prosecutor’s comments in closing argument did not exceed the scope of the invited response. Under these circumstances, we find no erroneous prosecutorial comment on silence. See generally Morgan v. State, 267 Ga. 203 (3) (476 SE2d 747) (1996) (closing argument is appropriate as long as it is derived from evidence properly before the factfinder).
Judgment affirmed.
All the Justices concur, except Melton and Nahmias, JJ., who concur specially.