PER CURIAM ORDER
For reasons to be stated in an opinion later to be filed, the Court having heard oral argument in the above captioned case, and having concluded that the appellant has standing to seek judicial review, it is this 20th day of July, 2000,
ORDERED, by the Court of Appeals of Maryland, a majority of the Court concurring, that the judgment of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City be, and it is hereby, reversed, and [199]*199the case is remanded to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City for further proceedings, and it is further
ORDERED that the stays imposed by the Court in accordance with its Order dated June 30, 2000, on the judgment of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City dated April 21, 2000, and entered May 18, 2000, and on Order # 75757 of the Public Service Commission of Maryland filed November 10, 1999, be, and they are hereby, dissolved, without prejudice to applying to the Circuit Court for a stay pending judicial review, and it is further
ORDERED that the mandate shall issue forthwith; costs to be paid by the appellees.
OPINION
BELL, Chief Judge.
The issue this case presents is whether the appellant, Mid-Atlantic Power Supply Association (“MAPSA”), a trade association of companies who are interested in becoming suppliers of electricity in Maryland,1 and a party to the proceedings in the Public Service Commission, has standing to seek judicial review of the order, issued by the appellee Public Service Commission (“PSC”), approving the stipulation and settlement agreement, entered into by and between appellees Baltimore Gas and Electric Company (“BGE”), the Maryland Office of People’s Counsel (“OPC”), the Maryland Natural Resources-Maryland Energy Administration and the Power Plant Research Program (“DNR/MEA”) and others, collectively representing all customer classes, environmental interests and the public at large.2 The Circuit Court for Baltimore City determined that the appellant had no standing and, accordingly, [200]*200dismissed its petition for judicial review. We granted the appellant’s petition for writ of certiorari and, following oral argument on July 20, 2000, issued our decision reversing the judgment of the Circuit Court and remanding the case to that court to conduct judicial review. We now explain the reasons for that decision.
The seeds of this controversy were sown first when the PSC developed policy initiatives designed to restructure the electric industry in Maryland, i.e., develop a market capable of supporting competition for the sale of electricity in the BGE service area, and later when the Electric Customer Choice and Competition Act of 1999 was enacted by the General Assembly and signed into law by the Governor. See 1999 Md. Laws. Chap. 3. Pursuant to, and in accordance with, the PSC’s initiatives, BGE filed an application setting forth its restructuring plan. It was docketed in Commission Case 8794. The OPC also filed a petition to reduce the rates charged by BGE. That case, docketed as Case 8804, was consolidated with Case 8794.
The appellant is a Pennsylvania corporation which operates as a trade association for companies participating in both the wholesale and retail electric supply markets in Maryland, Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Ohio and the District of Columbia. In that capacity, it filed a petition to intervene in the OPC’s rate reduction action. That petition was granted.3 [201]*201When that occurred, because, as we have seen, that matter and the restructuring plan had been consolidated, the appellant was enabled to, and did, participate fully in the negotiations leading up to the settlement at issue. Obviously, its opposition, and that of two other parties, as to those provisions of the settlement addressing the stranded costs, the allocation of the rate reduction and the unbundling of rates, did not prevail and the appellant refused to sign the settlement agreement reached by BGE and several other parties, which was signed on June 29, 1999. Once the settlement had been reached, the appellant thereafter participated in the proceedings in the PSC, challenging those terms of the settlement that it earlier had opposed in negotiations. Its efforts in the PSC were no more successful than during negotiations. When the PSC approved the settlement, by Commission Order No. 75757, on November 10, 1999, the appellant filed its petition for judicial review.4
[202]*202BGE moved for summary judgment on the issue of the appellant’s standing to prosecute a judicial review proceeding. It argued in the motion and before the Circuit Court that the appellant was not “a party or person in interest,” pointing out that, as an association, operating only in a representative capacity, it had no interest in the proceedings separate and distinct from the interests of its members. Rejecting the appellant’s rebuttal — it was a party before the Commission, participating fully in the proceedings, it meets the definition of party, and, in any event, the controlling statute clearly and unambiguously gives it standing5 — the court agreed with BGE and thus granted the motion for summary judgment. In reaching its conclusion, it relied on the legislative history of the statute, rather than the clear import of the language:
“What [the appellant’s] argument ignores ... is that which came to the attention of the Court of Appeals, namely the [203]*203active legislative efforts to amend the Public Service Commission law then underway. In fact, an effort to establish appeal rights for the Office of People’s Counsel in the 1947 General Assembly had been defeated and that was one of the bases for the Court’s decision in Bosley v. Dorsey, 191 Md. [229,] 239-40[, 60 A.2d 691, 696 (1948) ]. Rather than misread the current statutory standard for judicial review for the purpose of historical consistency, this Court is persuaded by the historical significance of the fact that the current codification of the law abandons the reference to an ‘association’ as having the right to obtain judicial review of PSC orders. That entitlement is limited now, with statutory exceptions, to ‘a party or person in interest’ and this term of art is undefined in the statutory scheme. Whether the Court analogizes to an ‘aggrieved party in a contested case,’ who is entitled to judicial review of a final decision under the Maryland Administrative Procedure Act or merely looks to the language of the PSC cases cited in Bosley v. Dorsey, 191 Md. at 235-36[, 60 A.2d at 694], the inescapable result is that ‘party or person in interest’ is reasonably interpreted to be an entity having ‘an interest adversely affected by the order.’ ” Public Service Commission v. Byron, 153 Md. 464, 471 [, 138 A. 404, 407] (1927).
(citation omitted).
The court accordingly dismissed the appellant’s petition for judicial review, -with prejudice. As already mentioned, we granted the appellant’s petition for writ of certiorari and reversed that judgment.
The canons of statutory construction are well settled. We recently reaffirmed those, relevant and dispositive of this case in Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Chase, 360 Md. 121, 128, 756 A.2d 987, 991 (2000). In that case, quoting Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co. of Md. v. Dir. of Fin. for Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 343 Md. 567, 578, 683 A.2d 512, 517-18 (1996), we said, in that regard, that in pursuing the real goal of statutory interpretation, the discernment of the intent of the Legislature, we begin our inquiry [204]*204with the words of the statute and, when they are clear and unambiguous, we end it there, as well. The point was made yet again that we neither add nor delete words to a clear and unambiguous statute to give it a meaning not reflected by the words the Legislature used or engage in forced or subtle interpretation in an attempt to extend or limit the statute’s meaning. Moreover, whenever possible, the statute should be read so that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered superfluous or nugatory.
We also reviewed those canons applicable when the statute to be interpreted is a part of a statutory scheme. Quoting GEICO v. Insurance Comm’r, 332 Md. 124, 131-32, 630 A.2d 713, 717-18 (1993), we noted the necessity of reading statutes on the same subject together, harmonizing them to the extent possible, and that such statutes are to be read to avoid rendering either of them, or “any portion, meaningless, surplusage, superfluous or nugatory.” Id. at 132, 630 A.2d at 717. While we acknowledged the role that legislative history plays in the interpretation of statutes, even when the words the Legislature used are clear and unambiguous, see Harris v. State, 331 Md. 137, 146, 626 A.2d 946, 950 (1993), indicating that, in the interest of completeness, we may, and sometimes will, review the legislative history of a clear statute, we explained, quoting Coleman v. State, 281 Md. 538, 546, 380 A.2d 49, 54 (1977) (“a court may not as a general rule surmise a legislative intention contrary to the plain language of a statute or insert exceptions not made by the legislature”), that “the resort to legislative history is a confirmatory process; it is not undertaken to contradict the plain meaning of the statute.” Chase, 360 Md. at 131, 756 A.2d at 993.
The right to judicial review of an order or decision of the Public Service Commission is controlled by Maryland Code (1999) § 3-202(a) of the Public Utility Companies Article. It provides:
“(a) In general. — Except for the staff of the Commission, a party or person in interest, including the People’s Counsel, that is dissatisfied by a final decision or order of the [205]*205Commission may seek judicial review of the decision or order as provided in this subtitle.”
The statute is clear and unambiguous. By its plain language, to be eligible to seek judicial review of a Commission order or decision, the petitioner must be a “party or person in interest” and be “dissatisfied” with the decision or order. We believe that the status test is fulfilled if the petitioner is either a party to the proceedings before the Commission or, if not a party, a “person in interest.” The appellant qualifies, we believe, under either status.
“Person” is a defined term under the Public Utility Companies Article. Section l-101(s) of that Article defines that term to mean “an individual, receiver, trustee, guardian, personal representative, fiduciary, or representative of any kind and any partnership, firm, association, corporation, or other entity.” Under this definition, as the parties agree, the appellant, an association, albeit a trade association, is a person.
The appellant was, as we have seen and the parties to these proceedings also agree, a party before the PSC. Because it moved, and was allowed, to intervene, Maryland Code (1998) § 3-106 of the Public Utility Companies Article, governing intervention in Commission proceedings, is implicated. Because § 3-106 defines the meaning of “party,” as used in § 3-202(a), it and § 3-202(a) must be read together. Section 3-106 provides that a person shall be permitted to intervene if the person makes timely application and the Commission concludes that the interests of that person are not being adequately represented and that the issue or issues the person seeks to raise are neither irrelevant nor immaterial. Thus, to become a party to a proceeding before the Commission, a party must have been determined, by the Commission, to have an interest in the proceeding that is not being adequately represented and that interest, in turn, has been determined not to be frivolous or of no consequence to the proceeding.6 [206]*206Once intervention has been granted, the person has all the rights of a party to the proceeding. In this case, having intervened, the appellant participated fully in the PSC proceedings at which the settlement agreement underlying the Commission order was approved by the Commission.
Section 3-106 also informs the meaning of the phrase, “person in interest.” As we have seen, to intervene requires that there be an interest that the person seeking to intervene has that is not being adequately represented. It follows that, once intervention has been granted, the interest that the Commission has found the person to have had is not dissipated.
The requirement that there be dissatisfaction with the order or decision sought to be reviewed is fulfilled when the party or person in interest seeks judicial review, proffering reasons for the court to reverse the order or decision. In this case, the appellant has sought judicial review and, more to the point, it has advanced a rational basis for the overturning of the order,7 ie., that the settlement agreement approved by the Commission does not comply with the mandate of the Electric Customer Choice and Competition Act.8 In any event, there is [207]*207no serious dispute that the appellant is “dissatisfied” with the decision and order of the PSC.
The appellees view the issue quite differently. As they see it, and argue, rather than dissatisfaction, the applicable test for standing is “aggrievement.” In support of this conclusion, the appellees rely on the “modifying phrase ‘in interest,’” used in § 3-202(a), the legislative history of § 3-202(a), language in cases applying § 3-202(a),9 and the fact that “this Court has consistently held, in analogous contexts, that an association is not aggrieved or entitled to judicial review unless the association itself has an interest at stake that is separate and distinct from the interests of its members.”
As to the phrase, “in interest,” citing Bosley v. Dorsey, 191 Md. at 236, 60 A.2d at 694 (1948), Public Service Comm’n v. Byron, 153 Md. 464, 471, 138 A. 404, 406 (1927) and Gregg v. Laird, 121 Md. 1, 32, 87 A. 1111, 1114 (1913), the appellees assert that this Court has interpreted it to mean “having an interest adversely affected by the order [of the Commission].” To be sure, the Court made the statements attributed to it in those cases; however, context is critical. In Bosley, for example, the issue had nothing to do with the standing of an association to seek judicial review of an order as to which it was dissatisfied. The question before the Court was whether the People’s Counsel had standing to seek judicial review, in [208]*208his own right, under the applicable provisions of the Public Service Commission Law then in effect, see note 5, supra, where Maryland Code (1939) Article 23, §§ 359 and 425, the applicable provisions, are set out,, that is, “whether the People’s Counsel is a ‘person in interest’ within the contemplation of the statute.” Id. at 233, 60 A.2d at 693. The Court, having noted that “[ojrdinarily an attorney is not a party to a suit in which he merely acts in a professional capacity in representing a litigant,” id. at 234, 60 A.2d at 693, citing Pressman v. Elgin, 187 Md. 446, 50 A.2d 560 (1947), set out People’s Counsel’s contention, that his right to seek judicial review was as the agent of the persons affected by the Commission’s order, not that he was injuriously affected by that order. Id. It was in this context that the Court addressed the meaning of a person in interest.
After tracing the development of the Office of People’s Counsel, the Court addressed who was authorized to seek judicial review under §§ 359 and 425:
“In Gregg v. [Laird] Public Service Commission, 121 Md. 1, 32, 87 A. 1111, 1114 [ (1913) ], the first test of the Public Service Commission Law, the Court of Appeals held that, while the statute did not use the word ‘appeal’ in connection with the right to challenge an order of the Commission, the rights of any parties aggrieved by any action of the Commission were fully safeguarded by the provision that any corporation subject to the statute and ‘any person in interest being dissatisfied with any order’ may commence a suit against the Commission. Appeals from an order of the Commission may be taken either by a regulated public utility or by any individuals or corporations having an interest adversely affected by the order. Public Service Commission v. Byron, 153 Md. 464, 471, 138 A. 404 [, 407 (1927) ].[10]”
[209]*209The Court held that People’s Counsel was a “person in interest” under Art. 28, §§ 359 and 415. Id, In addition to pointing out the duties of People’s Counsel were the same as those of the former Assistant Attorney, id. at 236, 60 A.2d at 694, it reasoned:
“It is conceded that at no time from 1912 to 1922 did the Assistant General Counsel have the privilege to appeal from orders of the Commission. But complainant earnestly contended that the statute gives him the right to appeal by implication. He argued that the People’s Counsel is not a subordinate of the General Counsel, as was the Assistant General Counsel, but is an appointee of the Governor and an agent for the customers of the utilities with no allegiance to the Commission. We cannot, however, brush aside the fact that the Legislature, in transferring the functions of Assistant General Counsel to People’s Counsel, laid down for the People’s Counsel the same duties which were performed by the Assistant General Counsel. Under the State Reorganization Act, which took effect January 1, 1923, the office of Assistant General Counsel was abolished, and the Governor [210]*210of Maryland was authorized to appoint the People’s Counsel. The Act provided that all the rights, powers and duties which had been conferred upon the Assistant General Counsel ‘shall be transferred to and thereafter be exercised and performed by said people’s counsel, who shall be the lawful successor of said Assistant General Counsel.’ Laws of 1922, ch. 29, art. 13.
“While the Public Service Commission Law makes it the duty of the People’s Counsel to appear before the Commission on behalf of the public or in defense of the public interests (Laws of 1912, ch. 563, Laws of 1924, ch. 534, Laws of 1927, ch. 201, Code 1939, art. 23, sec. 353), it does not authorize him to prosecute appeals from orders of the Commission. It is also significant that Section 353, after providing that the services of the experts employed by the Commission and also its records and other facilities shall be availed of by the People’s Counsel in the performance of his public duties, further provides that nothing contained therein shall prevent ‘any party or interest’ in any proceeding before the Commission from appearing in person or from being represented by counsel. As the People’s Counsel is himself an attorney required to appear before the Commission, this provision strongly indicates that the Legislature did not consider him as a ‘party or interest.’ ”
Id. at 236-37, 60 A.2d at 694. The Court was also persuaded by the fact that it was the Commission’s practice to “call upon People’s Counsel to support its orders.” Id. at 239, 60 A.2d at 695. Moreover, it rejected the argument that a court is “at liberty to surmise a legislative intent contrary to the letter of the statute, or to indulge in the license of inserting or omitting words with the object of making the statute express an intent which is not evidenced in the original form.” Id. at 237, 60 A.2d at 694. See also, Public Service Comm’n of Maryland v. Maryland People’s Counsel, 309 Md. 1, 8-9, 522 A.2d 369, 372-73 (1987).
In neither Gregg nor Byron was the issue this case presents addressed. In Byron, there were two issues, whether a municipality benefitted by the Commission order was a neces[211]*211sary party to an action challenging the subject order and whether the Circuit Court for Baltimore City was the proper venue. See 153 Md. at 469, 138 A. at 406. Among the various questions raised in Gregg was whether the “action of the Commission amount[ed] to the granting of an execution before judgment [was] entered against the appellant.” 121 Md. at 32, 87 A. at 1114. It was in the course of responding to that argument that the statements concerning the interest of the challenger of the Commission’s order were made.
It is significant, we believe, that as enacted and when Bosley was decided, the law addressed the standing issue solely by reference to those entities to whom the Public Service Commission Law applied or as to whom it had an effect; it did not define, and, indeed, there was no statute which delineated, the rights to judicial review of a party to proceedings before the Commission. Only in Maryland Code (1951) Art. 78 § 16(d)11 was the term “party” used. That section, as did its predecessor, prescribed in very general terms the entities who could resort to the courts to challenge Commission orders. Section 74(a), former § 415(a), however, set out the standard necessary to be met to have standing to maintain such a challenge. Significantly, that section referred only to “person in interest,” after, again cataloguing the entities to which the law applies. Only with the re-codification of the Public Service Commission law, see 1955 Md. Laws, Chap. 441, did the concept of “party” become a part of the section of the law delineating the test for standing. See Maryland Code (1955, 1995 Repl.Vol.) Art. 78, § 83. And the re-codification provided for intervention in the Commission proceedings.
The appellees argue that “in interest,” as used in § 3-202, and as enacted in § 83, modifies both “party” and “person” and, so,
[212]*212“the requirements set forth in Gregg, Byron and Bosley, that only ‘regulated’ entities and other persons or parties ‘in interest,’ i.e., adversely affected, may obtain judicial review of a Commission order continue to control. Only associations (and other entities) ‘subject to regulation’ by the Commission and persons or parties ‘in interest’ have standing to appeal Commission decisions.”
They maintain, in other words, that the only substantive change effected by the 1955 re-codification of the Public Service Commission Law was the consolidation into one provision of the several that theretofore had addressed the issue.12 Support for the argument was found in a Staff Report to the Commission on Administrative Organization of the State, recommending no change to the existing judicial review requirements,13 the “Report of the Commission to Revise and Recodify the Laws Concerning the Public Service Commission,” which, like the Staff Report, contained no explicit recommendation to change the judicial review requirements14 and the absence of an explanatory note to § 83 indicating such an intention.
We are not persuaded. The argument flies in the face of the plain and unambiguous language of the statute. More[213]*213over, the drastic change in focus of the judicial review provision leads to the opposite conclusion. Before 1955, to seek judicial review, one need not have been a party to the Commission proceeding, just subject to the law or affected by the decision to be challenged. With the re-codification not only one interested or adversely affected by the decision was able to challenge the decision, but so, too, were those who were parties to the proceeding out of which the ruling to be challenged emanated. Thus, the clear language of the statute itself “leads, [and must have led the General Assembly,] to the conclusion that some change in meaning must have been intended.”
The appellees rely finally on Maryland cases indicating that an association is aggrieved and entitled to judicial review only when it has an interest or stake in the case separate and distinct from the interests of the members whose interests it represents, see Citizens Planning & Housing Ass’n v. County Executive of Baltimore County, 273 Md. 333, 345, 329 A.2d 681, 687-88 (1974); Bryniarski v. Montgomery County, 247 Md. 137, 142-46, 230 A.2d 289, 293 (1967); Norwood Heights Improvement Ass’n v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 195 Md. 1, 8, 72 A.2d 1, 4 (1950); Maryland Naturopathic Ass’n v. Kloman, 191 Md. 626, 630, 62 A.2d 538, 539 (1948), whether or not the association has participated as a party in the agency proceedings. See Medical Waste Assoc. v. Maryland Waste Coalition, 327 Md. 596, 613, 612 A.2d 241, 249-50 (1992); Sugarloaf Citizens’ Ass’n v. Department of the Env., 344 Md. 271, 286, 686 A.2d 605, 613 (1996). Although not relied on by the appellees, this principle also is embodied in the Maryland Administrative Procedure Act, see Maryland Code (1984, 1999 Repl. Vol.) § 10-222(a) of the State Government Article, which provides:
“(a) Review of final decision. (1) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a party who is aggrieved by the final decision in a contested case is entitled to judicial review of the decision as provided in this section.”
Sugarloaf, 344 Md. at 288, 686 A.2d at 614 (holding “that the statutory requirement that a party be ‘aggrieved’ mirrors [214]*214general common law standing principles applicable to judicial review of administrative decisions”), citing Medical Waste Assocs. v. Maryland Waste Coalition, supra, 327 Md. at 611 n. 9, 612 A.2d at 248-49 n. 9, quoting Bryniarski, 247 Md. at 144, 230 A.2d at 294.
Again, we are not persuaded. The appellees’ argument is once again belied by the plain language of the statute governing entitlement to judicial review. Additionally, the Public Service Commission and its proceedings have been exempted from the requirements of the APA, including the provision governing judicial review. This exclusion is indicative of an intention on the part of the Legislature to continue the applicability of the unique provisions to which the Public Service Commission is subject, separate from those applicable to agencies to which the APA applies. See State Government Article § 10-203(3)(vi).15 Had the Legislature intended that the standard for judicial review of Public Service Commission proceedings be the same as that prescribed for contested cases under the APA, it is inconceivable that it would have excluded the Public Service Commission from the APA, or at least not from the coverage of § 10-206.
Moreover, as the appellant points out, to interpret,, § 3-202(a) as the appellees do would render the word, “dissatisfied,” which has been a part of the scheme since its inception, “meaningless, surplusage, superfluous, or nugatory.” GEICO, 332 Md. at 132, 630 A.2d at 717. There is a difference, as our cases recognize, see Carusillo v. Prince George’s County, 289 Md. 436, 441, 424 A.2d 1106, 1108 (1981) (treating separately [215]*215the judicial review standard under the APA and that under Maiyland Code (1957, 1980 Repl.Vol.) Art. 43, § 404);16 see also, Medical Waste v. Maryland Waste, supra, 327 Md. at 611 note 9, 612 A.2d at 248 note 9, between the “dissatisfied” and “aggrieved” requirements. It long has been the law of Maryland and well settled, that statutes are to be read to give meaning to every word used and to do otherwise contravenes this cardinal rule of statutory construction. GEICO, 332 Md. at 132, 630 A.2d at 717. See Chase, supra, 360 Md. at 128, 756 A.2d at 991; Blitz v. Beth Isaac Adas Israel Congregation, 352 Md. 31, 40, 720 A.2d 912, 916 (1998).
For the foregoing reasons, this Court concludes that the appellant has standing to seek judicial review of the Commission order as to which it is dissatisfied.