Birdsong, Presiding Judge.
Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority (“MARTA”) appeals a judgment based on a jury verdict in favor of Mesfin Mehretab on his claims arising from an automobile accident in which a MARTA bus pulled into Mehretab’s lane of traffic and forced him off the road and into a sign. The witnesses testified that Mehretab and a MARTA bus were traveling in the same direction on a multilane street when a third vehicle pulled into the lane of travel of the MARTA bus. When the bus then pulled into Mehretab’s lane of travel, Mehretab ran off the road. The MARTA bus did not stop, and no MARTA bus driver admitted any role in the accident.
At the trial, the trial court initially gave a charge on sudden emergency, but upon Mehretab’s objection later withdrew the charge from the jury’s consideration. MARTA contends the trial court erred by withdrawing the defense of sudden emergency from the jury, by denying MARTA’s motion for a directed verdict, and by denying MARTA’s motion for judgment n.o.v. or in the alternative a new trial. Held-.
1. The trial court did not err by withdrawing the defense of sudden emergency. Although under appropriate circumstances, the defense of sudden emergency might be established without the testi[264]*264mony of the person faced with the emergency, this is not one of those cases. “The defense of emergency is not available unless the evidence shows that there has been a sudden peril caused by circumstances in which the defendant did not participate and which offered him a choice of conduct without time for thought so that negligence in his choice might be attributable not to lack of care but to lack of time to assess the situation. . . . The doctrine requires that the person confronted by the emergency have the opportunity to exercise one of several reasonable alternative courses of action. In the absence of such factors, there can be no conduct to which to apply the standard and the doctrine is inapplicable.” (Citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original.) Thomas v. Stairs, 215 Ga. App. 288, 289 (450 SE2d 326). Here there is no evidence a MARTA driver, while driving without negligence, perceived that he was faced with a sudden emergency and then exercised an unplanned choice in the matter. See Johnston v. Woody, 148 Ga. App. 152, 153 (250 SE2d 873). All the MARTA bus drivers called as witnesses, who drove the bus route on the day and time of the incident, denied having been involved in any such incident. This testimony effectively destroyed any claim of sudden emergency. Even if this testimony shows, as MARTA claims, the bus driver was unaware of the accident, that is not sufficient to establish this defense because there is no evidence that the MARTA driver was not himself negligent, actually was faced with an emergency, or took an unplanned choice. See Davis v. Calhoun, 128 Ga. App. 104, 105 (195 SE2d 759). Moreover, the blind spot, mentioned by the dissent, had nothing to do with this incident; the blind spot is immediately behind the bus in the same lane. Neither the white pickup truck nor Mehretab’s car was located in that position.
Although we do not disagree with the dissent’s basic proposition that a jury charge on sudden emergency does not require testimony from the person who may have faced a sudden peril and would agree that standing alone the testimony from the other witnesses would authorize a sudden emergency charge, we cannot agree that such a charge was authorized by the evidence in this case because of the drivers’ testimony. What the dissent proposes would allow MARTA to have its cake (by disclaiming any involvement in the collision before the jury) and eat it too (by claiming that if the MARTA bus did cause the collision, it was the result of a sudden emergency). Our law, however, does not allow that result. MARTA did not assert that some missing bus driver caused the collision; instead, it called all the drivers who might have been involved and had each of them testify that although they remembered driving that route on the day in question, they did not remember any white truck pulling into their lane and causing them to change lanes abruptly. Such testimony denies that any bus driver faced a sudden peril — the essential element of the [265]*265defense of sudden emergency — and denies that MARTA’s driver made a choice of action without time for thought. See Thomas v. Stairs, supra; Johnson v. Woody, supra. By having its witnesses testify in this fashion, MARTA disproved the essential elements of the sudden emergency defense. Further, under the evidence MARTA presented denying any involvement in the incident, it is disingenuous to assert that MARTA did not deny that the incident took place. Unless MARTA’s purpose was to show that all of the bus drivers on the route that day had bad memories, what was the purpose of calling each of them to deny any recollection of a white pickup truck pulling into the drivers’ lane of travel? If MARTA truly wanted to show that the drivers were unaware that a car was forced off the road, why then was that question not asked?
There is no competent evidence establishing the defense of sudden emergency. The dissent’s reliance upon the other witnesses’ perception of the event is misplaced. The dissent assumes the MARTA driver shared these perceptions and assumes these perceptions caused the bus driver’s actions. This focus, however, ignores the bus drivers’ denials that they were involved in any incident. Although it is possible a bus driver faced the emergency the witnesses perceived and acted as these witnesses believe (and forgot it happened or lied about it on the witness stand), it is equally possible the bus driver involved did not consider the white pickup truck pulling into his lane as an emergency, pulled into Mehretab’s lane for some other reason, and negligently caused Mehretab to hit the sign. The testimony of these other witnesses is perfectly consistent with either possibility. Yet, to find a charge on sudden emergency warranted from this testimony, however, one must accept the first possibility as established fact, and reject the second. That cannot be done.
Although the witnesses’ testimony about what they saw is direct evidence, their testimony explaining why these events occurred, and particularly why the bus driver pulled into the other lane, is only their inadmissible guess about the bus driver’s motivation. At best, this testimony might be circumstantial evidence from which one could infer that the bus driver was faced with a sudden emergency and acted for that reason. Because this testimony is circumstantial evidence, however, it cannot overcome the unimpeached, direct evidence from MARTA’s bus drivers that none of them faced the sudden emergency.
“The test is whether the circumstantial evidence is ‘perfectly consistent’ or ‘inconsistent’ with the direct evidence. Circumstantial evidence which could be taken as inconsistent with the direct, positive testimony is sufficient to get the case to a jury. However, the rule where the circumstantial evidence is consistent with the direct, positive testimony is different. Circumstantial evidence from which the [266]*266existence of a fact might be inferred, but which did not demand a finding for [MARTA] to that effect, will not support a verdict, when by positive and uncontradicted testimony of unimpeached witnesses, which was perfectly consistent with the circumstantial evidence relied on by [MARTA], it was affirmatively shown that no such fact existed.” (Citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original.)
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Birdsong, Presiding Judge.
Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority (“MARTA”) appeals a judgment based on a jury verdict in favor of Mesfin Mehretab on his claims arising from an automobile accident in which a MARTA bus pulled into Mehretab’s lane of traffic and forced him off the road and into a sign. The witnesses testified that Mehretab and a MARTA bus were traveling in the same direction on a multilane street when a third vehicle pulled into the lane of travel of the MARTA bus. When the bus then pulled into Mehretab’s lane of travel, Mehretab ran off the road. The MARTA bus did not stop, and no MARTA bus driver admitted any role in the accident.
At the trial, the trial court initially gave a charge on sudden emergency, but upon Mehretab’s objection later withdrew the charge from the jury’s consideration. MARTA contends the trial court erred by withdrawing the defense of sudden emergency from the jury, by denying MARTA’s motion for a directed verdict, and by denying MARTA’s motion for judgment n.o.v. or in the alternative a new trial. Held-.
1. The trial court did not err by withdrawing the defense of sudden emergency. Although under appropriate circumstances, the defense of sudden emergency might be established without the testi[264]*264mony of the person faced with the emergency, this is not one of those cases. “The defense of emergency is not available unless the evidence shows that there has been a sudden peril caused by circumstances in which the defendant did not participate and which offered him a choice of conduct without time for thought so that negligence in his choice might be attributable not to lack of care but to lack of time to assess the situation. . . . The doctrine requires that the person confronted by the emergency have the opportunity to exercise one of several reasonable alternative courses of action. In the absence of such factors, there can be no conduct to which to apply the standard and the doctrine is inapplicable.” (Citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original.) Thomas v. Stairs, 215 Ga. App. 288, 289 (450 SE2d 326). Here there is no evidence a MARTA driver, while driving without negligence, perceived that he was faced with a sudden emergency and then exercised an unplanned choice in the matter. See Johnston v. Woody, 148 Ga. App. 152, 153 (250 SE2d 873). All the MARTA bus drivers called as witnesses, who drove the bus route on the day and time of the incident, denied having been involved in any such incident. This testimony effectively destroyed any claim of sudden emergency. Even if this testimony shows, as MARTA claims, the bus driver was unaware of the accident, that is not sufficient to establish this defense because there is no evidence that the MARTA driver was not himself negligent, actually was faced with an emergency, or took an unplanned choice. See Davis v. Calhoun, 128 Ga. App. 104, 105 (195 SE2d 759). Moreover, the blind spot, mentioned by the dissent, had nothing to do with this incident; the blind spot is immediately behind the bus in the same lane. Neither the white pickup truck nor Mehretab’s car was located in that position.
Although we do not disagree with the dissent’s basic proposition that a jury charge on sudden emergency does not require testimony from the person who may have faced a sudden peril and would agree that standing alone the testimony from the other witnesses would authorize a sudden emergency charge, we cannot agree that such a charge was authorized by the evidence in this case because of the drivers’ testimony. What the dissent proposes would allow MARTA to have its cake (by disclaiming any involvement in the collision before the jury) and eat it too (by claiming that if the MARTA bus did cause the collision, it was the result of a sudden emergency). Our law, however, does not allow that result. MARTA did not assert that some missing bus driver caused the collision; instead, it called all the drivers who might have been involved and had each of them testify that although they remembered driving that route on the day in question, they did not remember any white truck pulling into their lane and causing them to change lanes abruptly. Such testimony denies that any bus driver faced a sudden peril — the essential element of the [265]*265defense of sudden emergency — and denies that MARTA’s driver made a choice of action without time for thought. See Thomas v. Stairs, supra; Johnson v. Woody, supra. By having its witnesses testify in this fashion, MARTA disproved the essential elements of the sudden emergency defense. Further, under the evidence MARTA presented denying any involvement in the incident, it is disingenuous to assert that MARTA did not deny that the incident took place. Unless MARTA’s purpose was to show that all of the bus drivers on the route that day had bad memories, what was the purpose of calling each of them to deny any recollection of a white pickup truck pulling into the drivers’ lane of travel? If MARTA truly wanted to show that the drivers were unaware that a car was forced off the road, why then was that question not asked?
There is no competent evidence establishing the defense of sudden emergency. The dissent’s reliance upon the other witnesses’ perception of the event is misplaced. The dissent assumes the MARTA driver shared these perceptions and assumes these perceptions caused the bus driver’s actions. This focus, however, ignores the bus drivers’ denials that they were involved in any incident. Although it is possible a bus driver faced the emergency the witnesses perceived and acted as these witnesses believe (and forgot it happened or lied about it on the witness stand), it is equally possible the bus driver involved did not consider the white pickup truck pulling into his lane as an emergency, pulled into Mehretab’s lane for some other reason, and negligently caused Mehretab to hit the sign. The testimony of these other witnesses is perfectly consistent with either possibility. Yet, to find a charge on sudden emergency warranted from this testimony, however, one must accept the first possibility as established fact, and reject the second. That cannot be done.
Although the witnesses’ testimony about what they saw is direct evidence, their testimony explaining why these events occurred, and particularly why the bus driver pulled into the other lane, is only their inadmissible guess about the bus driver’s motivation. At best, this testimony might be circumstantial evidence from which one could infer that the bus driver was faced with a sudden emergency and acted for that reason. Because this testimony is circumstantial evidence, however, it cannot overcome the unimpeached, direct evidence from MARTA’s bus drivers that none of them faced the sudden emergency.
“The test is whether the circumstantial evidence is ‘perfectly consistent’ or ‘inconsistent’ with the direct evidence. Circumstantial evidence which could be taken as inconsistent with the direct, positive testimony is sufficient to get the case to a jury. However, the rule where the circumstantial evidence is consistent with the direct, positive testimony is different. Circumstantial evidence from which the [266]*266existence of a fact might be inferred, but which did not demand a finding for [MARTA] to that effect, will not support a verdict, when by positive and uncontradicted testimony of unimpeached witnesses, which was perfectly consistent with the circumstantial evidence relied on by [MARTA], it was affirmatively shown that no such fact existed.” (Citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original.) Douglas v. Gilbert, 195 Ga. App. 796, 798 (395 SE2d 9). Consequently, the testimony from the other witnesses was not evidence sufficient to warrant a charge on sudden emergency.
In reaching this result, we recognize that a jury charge is authorized if some evidence exists from which a legitimate process of reasoning can be carried on in respect to the charge even if the great preponderance of the evidence is to the contrary. Lyles v. State, 130 Ga. 294 (60 SE 578); T.G.&Y. Stores Co. v. Waters, 175 Ga. App. 884, 886 (334 SE2d 910). In this case, however, the testimony of the other witnesses simply was not such evidence.
Because MARTA’s motion for a new trial was based upon the trial court’s withdrawing this defense from the jury, the trial court also did not err by denying the motion for new trial.
2. MARTA’s contention that the trial court erred by denying its motions for a directed verdict and judgment n.o.v. because Mehretab’s evidence did not show that MARTA was negligent is also without merit. “In determining whether the trial court erred by denying appellants’ motions for a directed verdict and motion for judgment n.o.v., this court must view and resolve the evidence and any doubt or ambiguity in favor of the verdict. A directed verdict (and judgment n.o.v.) is not proper unless there is no conflict in the evidence as to any material issue and the evidence introduced, with all reasonable deductions therefrom, demands a certain verdict.” (Citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original.) Southern Store &c. Co. v. Maddox, 195 Ga. App. 2, 3 (392 SE2d 268). “The motion for judgment n.o.v. may be granted only when, without weighing the credibility of the evidence, there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the proper judgment. Where there is conflicting evidence, or there is insufficient evidence to make a ‘one-way’ verdict proper, judgment n.o.v. should not be awarded. In considering the motion, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party who secured the jury verdict. And this approach governs the actions of appellate courts as well as trial courts.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Denson v. City of Atlanta, 202 Ga. App. 325, 326 (414 SE2d 312). As the witnesses testified that the MARTA bus suddenly veered into Mehretab’s lane of traffic causing him to run off the road, it cannot be said that no evidence supported Mehretab’s negligence claim against MARTA. Therefore, the trial court properly submitted the issue to the jury, and then did not err by denying the [267]*267motion for judgment n.o.v.
Judgment affirmed.
McMurray, P. J., Johnson, Blackburn, Smith and Ruffin, JJ, concur. Andrews, C. J., Pope, P. J., and Beasley, J., dissent.