McMillen Sulaymu-Bey v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJanuary 3, 2023
Docket1:22-cv-10097
StatusUnknown

This text of McMillen Sulaymu-Bey v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (McMillen Sulaymu-Bey v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
McMillen Sulaymu-Bey v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, (S.D.N.Y. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ALESHIA MCMILLEN SULAYMO-BEY, Plaintiff, 22-CV-10097 (LTS) -against- ORDER OF DISMISSAL PORT AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK AND NEW JERSEY, Defendant. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is appearing pro se, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. She alleges that an employee at the bus terminal in Manhattan, which is operated by the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (Port Authority), directed a racial slur at her. By order dated December 8, 2022, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis, that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth below, the Court dismisses the complaint but grants Plaintiff leave to replead within 30 days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in

original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of

action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND Plaintiff Aleshia McMillen Sulaymu-Bey alleges the following facts. Late in the evening on Sunday, January 6, 2021, Plaintiff went to the Port Authority bus terminal in Manhattan, to take a bus home to Bloomfield, New Jersey. (ECF 2 at 1-2.) Plaintiff was hurrying to board the last bus for the evening and needed directions. (Id. at 8-9.) She asked an employee, “John Doe,” who was a “starter worker in a neon green jacket” near gate 326, for directions. (Id. at 9.) John Doe, who is not named as a defendant in this action, “seemed irritable” and did not want “to give help with directions.” (Id.) He nevertheless followed Plaintiff as she boarded the bus. At some point, a different individual, who was wearing a grayish blue jacket and appeared to be a New Jersey Transit worker, used “a racial slur.” (Id.) When Plaintiff and her

daughter boarded the bus at gate 308, she described the incident to the bus driver. Thereafter, Plaintiff “cried for weeks, months, and years of ongoing pain.” (Id. at 10.) She brings this suit under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and the Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. She sues the Port Authority, seeking compensatory and punitive damages. DISCUSSION A. Claims Under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 Plaintiff names as a defendant the Port Authority, which is an entity with the legal capacity to be sued. See N.Y. Unconsol. Laws § 7101; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 32:1-157.1 “Although the Port Authority, a bi-state agency, is not technically a municipality, courts have treated it as such and have analyzed claims against it under the standards governing municipal liability under

§ 1983.” Cumberbatch v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., ECF 1:03-CV-0749, 2006 WL 3543670, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see Raysor v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 768 F.2d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 1985). When a plaintiff sues a municipality under Sections 1981 and 1983, it is not enough for the plaintiff to allege that one of its employees or agents engaged in some wrongdoing. The

1 The Court also notes that the Port Authority does not enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity. Feeney v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 873 F.2d 628, 629-30, 633 (2d Cir. 1989), aff’d, 495 U.S. 299 (1990); see also Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 52 (1994). plaintiff must show that the municipality itself caused the violation of the plaintiff’s rights. See Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011) (“A municipality or other local government may be liable under this section if the governmental body itself ‘subjects’ a person to a deprivation of rights or ‘causes’ a person ‘to be subjected’ to such deprivation.”) (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of

Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978)); Cash v. Cnty. of Erie, 654 F.3d 324, 333 (2d Cir. 2011).

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Related

Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs.
436 U.S. 658 (Supreme Court, 1978)
Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney
495 U.S. 299 (Supreme Court, 1990)
Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation
513 U.S. 30 (Supreme Court, 1994)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Raysor v. Port Authority Of New York And New Jersey
768 F.2d 34 (Second Circuit, 1985)
Hill v. Curcione
657 F.3d 116 (Second Circuit, 2011)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Haussman v. Fergus
894 F. Supp. 142 (S.D. New York, 1995)
Cash v. County of Erie
654 F.3d 324 (Second Circuit, 2011)
Goonewardena v. New York
475 F. Supp. 2d 310 (S.D. New York, 2007)
Ali v. Connick
136 F. Supp. 3d 270 (E.D. New York, 2015)
Connick v. Thompson
179 L. Ed. 2d 417 (Supreme Court, 2011)
Jones v. Town of East Haven
691 F.3d 72 (First Circuit, 2012)
Salahuddin v. Cuomo
861 F.2d 40 (Second Circuit, 1988)

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Bluebook (online)
McMillen Sulaymu-Bey v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mcmillen-sulaymu-bey-v-port-authority-of-new-york-and-new-jersey-nysd-2023.