McKenzie v. Auto Club Insurance Ass'n

580 N.W.2d 424, 458 Mich. 214

• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Decided: July 14, 1998
• Docket: 103676, Calendar No. 7
• Status: Published

Opinions

Taylor, J.

This case presents the issue whether plaintiff is entitled to personal injury protection (PIP) benefits under the no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq.-, MSA 24.13101 et seq., for injuries sustained when he was nonfatally asphyxiated while sleeping in a camper/trailer attached to his pickup truck. We conclude that plaintiffs injury is not covered by the no-fault act because it did not arise out of the use of a motor vehicle “as a motor vehicle” as required by MCL 500.3105(1); MSA 24.13105(1). Whether an iryury arises out of the use of a motor vehicle “as a motor vehicle” turns on whether the injury is closely related to the transportational function of automobiles. We accordingly reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand for entry of summary disposition in favor of defendant.

I

The basic facts are undisputed.¹ While on a hunting trip, plaintiff and Hughie McKenzie slept in a camper/trailer attached to the back of plaintiffs pickup truck. The camper/trailer was equipped with a propane-fueled, forced-air heater. Ostensibly, because of either poor ventilation or improper exhaust in the unit itself, carbon monoxide fumes from the heater leaked into the camper/trailer and overcame the two men. Fortunately, they were found the following day and recovered after being hospitalized.

Plaintiff filed the present suit for PIP benefits under his no-fault insurance contract with defendant. Defendant moved for summary disposition, contending that there was no coverage because the camper/trailer was not being used “as a motor vehicle” at the time the injury occurred as required by § 3105. The trial court granted summary disposition for plaintiff, finding Koole v Michigan Mut Ins Co, 126 Mich App 483; 337 NW2d 369 (1983),² controlling. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 211 Mich App 659; 536 NW2d 301 (1995).

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This case turns on whether plaintiffs injury, incurred while sleeping in a parked camper/trailer, arose out of the use of a motor vehicle “as a motor vehicle” as contemplated by § 3105. We are able to arrive at this ultimate question because all agree that this injury was occasioned while a person was occupying the vehicle as required by MCL 500.3106(l)(c); MSA 24.13106(l)(c).³

It is well to begin our analysis with the basic axioms of statutory construction:

The rules of statutory construction are well established. First and foremost, we must give effect to the Legislature’s intent. If the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the plain meaning of the statute reflects the legislative intent and judicial construction is not permitted. Further, we are to give statutory language its ordinary and generally accepted meaning. [Tryc v Michigan Veterans’ Facility, 451 Mich 129, 135-136; 545 NW2d 642 (1996) (citations omitted).]

The “use of a motor vehicle ‘as a motor vehicle’ ” limitation on no-fault coverage⁴ had its origins in the Uniform Motor Vehicle Accident Reparations Act. Thornton v Allstate Ins Co, 425 Mich 643, 657; 391 NW2d 320 (1986). As noted in Thornton,

[T]he commentary to the Uniform Motor Vehicle Accident Reparations Act (umvara), 14 ULA 55-56, § 1, explains that injuries covered by the act are limited by § 1(a)(2), (6) to those arising out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle:

“[Tjhe requirement that use of the motor vehicle be ‘as a motor vehicle’ qualifies the term so that both the tort exemption and the availability of basic reparation benefits are more nearly limited to activities whose costs should be allocated to motoring as part of an automobile insurance package. For example, it has no application to an injury which occurs when a person slips and falls inside a travel trailer which has been parked at a camp site.”

While the commentary acknowledges the remaining ambiguity of the definition and the resultant possibility that some accidents “too far removed from the general activity of motoring” might be construed as being covered, the commissioners left more specific definition in borderline cases to the courts. [Id. at 657-658.]t⁵)

As a matter of English syntax, the phrase “use of a motor vehicle ‘as a motor vehicle’ ” would appear to invite contrasts with situations in which a motor vehicle is not used “as a motor vehicle.” This is simply to say that the modifier “as a motor vehicle” assumes the existence of other possible uses and requires distinguishing use “as a motor vehicle” from any other uses. While it is easily understood from all our experiences that most often a vehicle is used “as a motor vehicle,” i.e., to get from one place to another, it is also clear from the phrase used that the Legislature wanted to except those other occasions, rare as they may be, when a motor vehicle is used for other purposes, e.g., as a housing facility of sorts, as an advertising display (such as at a car dealership), as a foundation for construction equipment, as a mobile public library, or perhaps even when a car is on display in a museum. On those occasions, the use of the motor vehicle would not be “as a motor vehicle,” but as a housing facility, advertising display, construction equipment base, public library, or museum display, as it were. It seems then that when we are applying the statute, the phrase “as a motor vehicle” invites us to determine if the vehicle is being used for transportational purposes.⁶

Lending support to this logical reading of the statutory language is that the Motor Vehicle Code states in pertinent part, “ ‘Vehicle’ means every device in, upon, or by which any person or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a highway . . . .” MCL 257.79; MSA 9.1879. Similarly, the dictionary definition of “vehicle” is “any device or contrivance for carrying or conveying persons or objects, esp. over land or in space . . . .” Webster’s New World Dictionary (3d College Ed).

Accordingly, we are convinced that the clear meaning of this part of the no-fault act is that the Legislature intended coverage of injuries resulting from the use of motor vehicles when closely related to their transportational function and only when engaged in that function.⁷

Moreover, requiring that an injury be closely associated with the transportational function of a vehicle before coverage is triggered has support in much of our prior case law. We acknowledge that the expressed rationale of these cases was not articulated in terms of transportational function, and, indeed, some cannot be reconciled with this approach, but many are consistent with a focus on transportational function to determine whether the injuries at issue in those cases arose out of the use of a motor vehicle “as a motor vehicle.”

In Turner v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 448 Mich 22; 528 NW2d 681 (1995), a truck involved in a multiple vehicle accident smashed into a building and started a fire when the truck’s gas tank exploded. This Court held that the damage to the building arose out of the use of the truck “as a motor vehicle.” Id. at 32. This holding was not surprising in that it indicated that no-fault insurance generally covers damage directly resulting from an accident involving moving motor vehicles. This, of course, is consistent with the approach that focuses on transportational function because moving motor vehicles are quite obviously engaged in a transportational function.

In Putkamer v Transamerica Ins Corp of America, 454 Mich 626, 636-637; 563 NW2d 683 (1997), this Court held that injuries incurred while entering a vehicle with the intent to travel arose out of the use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle. Because entering a vehicle in order to travel in it is closely related to the transportational function, Putkamer also comports with this approach.

In Winter v Automobile Club of Michigan, 433 Mich 446; 446 NW2d 132 (1989), this Court denied no-fault insurance coverage when it held that an injury resulting when a cement slab fell from a crane attached to a parked tow truck did not arise out of the use of a motor vehicle “as a motor vehicle.” The Winter Court’s holding turned on the fact that the truck was parked and none of the exceptions set forth in § 3106 applied. Accordingly, it was unnecessary to explicitly consider whether the injury arose out of the use of a motor vehicle “as a motor vehicle,” as opposed to some other use. However, this holding is nonetheless consistent with the approach posited here because the injury arose out of the use of a motor vehicle as a foundation for construction equipment and was not closely associated with the transportational function.

In Thornton, supra at 660-661, and Bourne v Farmers Ins Exchange, 449 Mich 193, 203; 534 NW2d 491 (1995), this Court held that injuries arising from assaults in motor vehicles lacked a sufficient causal connection to the use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle to be compensable under the no-fault act.⁸ These holdings also support the approach articulated here because assaults occurring in a motor vehicle are not closely related to the transportational function of a motor vehicle.

Additionally, the analysis in Thornton supports this approach. In Thornton, the Court held that injuries sustained by a taxi driver in the course of an armed robbery did not arise out of the use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle. It clearly concluded that only injuries arising out of the “functional use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle” triggered no-fault coverage. Id. at 661. It found that the taxi was merely the situs of the robbery. Id. at 660. It held that, while robbery-related injuries were arguably “ ‘foreseeably identifiable’ with the occupational or commercial use of a motor vehicle as a taxicab, the relation of the gunshot wound to the functional use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle was at most, merely ‘but for,’ incidental, and fortuitous.” Id. at 661. It focused on whether the alleged injury was causally related to the “vehicular use,” “functional character,” or “functional use” of a motor vehicle. Id. at 660-661. These terms were intended to distinguish use “as a motor vehicle” from other possible uses of a vehicle. Our approach here, focusing on transportational function, makes the same distinction and provides a more specific definition for these terms.

Two cases cited by the dissent, ⁹ Koole, supra, and Engwis v Michigan Mut Ins Co, 181 Mich App 16; 448 NW2d 731 (1989), are inconsistent with an approach that focuses on transportational function. In both cases, injuries incurred in vehicles while the vehicles were being used as sleeping accommodations were held to be covered by the no-fault act. Use of a motor vehicle as a sleeping accommodation is distinct from and not closely related to the transportational function of a vehicle. These cases erroneously failed to distinguish use as a sleeping accommodation from use “as a motor vehicle” as required by § 3105. We are accordingly convinced that they were wrongly decided.

The dissent relies heavily on Bialochowski v Cross Concrete Pumping Co, 428 Mich 219; 407 NW2d 355 (1987), which is also inconsistent with the approach posited here. In Bialochowski, this Court concluded that an injury incurred while a cement truck was unloading its product arose out of the use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle. The Court stated at 228:

Motor vehicles are designed and used for many different purposes. The truck involved in this case is a cement truck capable of pouring cement at elevated levels. Certainly one of the intended uses of this motor vehicle (a motor vehicle under the no-fault act) is to pump cement. The accident occurred while this vehicle was being used for its intended purpose. We hold that the phrase “use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle” includes this use.

We find this holding utterly antithetical to the language of § 3105. As discussed above, § 3105’s requirement that injuries arise out of the use of a motor vehicle “as a motor vehicle” clearly distinguishes use “as a motor vehicle” from other possible uses. Bialochowski eviscerates this distinction by holding that the use of the vehicle at issue to pump cement constitutes use “as a motor vehicle.” Obviously, motor vehicles are designed and used for various purposes as the Bialochowski Court noted. In fact, only in the context of various possible uses would a limitation to use “as a motor vehicle” be necessary. Where the Legislature explicitly limited coverage under § 3105 to injuries arising out of a particular use of motor vehicles — use “as a motor vehicle” — a decision finding coverage for injuries arising out of any other use, e.g., to pump cement, is contrary to the language of the statute. Accordingly, we are convinced that Bialochowski was wrongly decided.

Entirely apart from this direct criticism of Bialochowski, we do not think it constitutes adequate support for the dissent’s proposed rule that any intended use of a multipurpose vehicle constitutes use “as a motor vehicle.”

First, this Court’s subsequent decision in Winter, supra at 455, explicitly limited Bialochowski:

Insofar as it related to the “as a motor vehicle” language, Bialochowski decided a narrow issue: whether a dual-purpose vehicle is necessarily not in use as a motor vehicle when it is being used for a nonlocomotive purpose. Bialochowski held that coverage is not necessarily precluded solely because there was no “vehicular movement” at the time of the injury.

This all means that the Winter Court read Bialochowski to only establish that vehicular movement was not necessary to constitute use of a motor vehicle “as a motor vehicle.” Here, the dissent’s reading of Bialochowski as meaning that any intended use of a multipurpose vehicle is use “as a motor vehicle” effectively overrules the Winter Court’s limitation of Bialochowski.

Second, the dissent’s broad reading of Bialochowski does similar damage, albeit unacknowledged, to Thornton, where, as noted above, this Court held that only injuries arising out of the “functional use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle” triggered recovery. Id. at 661. The rule proposed by the dissent here turns on whether the injuries arise out of any of the intended uses of a motor vehicle. As is apparent, this rule is inconsistent with Thornton.

What we have, then, is the dissent resuscitating a broad reading of Bialochowski without even doffing its cap to the later and thus controlling limitation thereof by Winter. Moreover, the dissent fails to explicitly consider and give meaning to the language of the statute or to apply cases like Thornton that appropriately made such an analysis. This is a peculiar, and unfortunate, exercise of our judicial tasks.

In summary, we think that the language of the statute ought to control and that Bialochowski is inadequate support for the rule advocated by the dissent.

Accordingly, we hold that whether an injury arises out of the use of a motor vehicle “as a motor vehicle” under § 3105 turns on whether the injury is closely related to the transportational function of motor vehicles.

If we apply this test here, it is clear that the requisite nexus between the injury and the transportational function of the motor vehicle is lacking. At the time the injury occurred, the parked camper/trailer was being used as sleeping accommodations. This use is too far removed from the transportational function to constitute use of the camper/trailer “as a motor vehicle” at the time of the injury. Thus, we conclude that no coverage is triggered under the no-fault act in this instance.

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Our conclusion on this issue requires us to briefly address a second issue raised by plaintiff. Plaintiff argues that, even if this injury did not arise out of the use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle, as required by the no-fault act, the policy of insurance at issue does not contain this requirement. Plaintiffs argument is, in effect, that the coverage under the insurance policy is broader than that required by the no-fault act. We disagree. While the policy exclusion regarding parked cars does not contain the use “as a motor vehicle” requirement, in preceding paragraphs on the same page, the policy plainly limits coverage generally:

We agree to pay only as set forth in the Code [defined as the Michigan no-fault law] the following Benefits to or for an insured person who suffers accidental bodily injury arising out of the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle. [Emphasis added.]

Thus, the insuring agreement limited coverage even before the exclusion became applicable. See Heniser v Frankenmuth Mut Ins Co, 449 Mich 155, 172; 534 NW2d 502 (1995).

conclusion

For these reasons, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand for entry of an order granting defendant’s motion for summary disposition.

Beickley, Boyle, and Weaver, JJ., concurred with Taylor, J.

1 “[W]here there is no dispute about the facts, the issue whether an injury arose out of the use of a vehicle is a legal issue for a court to decide and not a factual one for a jury.” Putkamer v Transamerica Ins Corp of America, 454 Mich 626, 630; 563 NW2d 683 (1997).

2 In Koole, the Court of Appeals found that the plaintiff was entitled to pip benefits for injuries incurred when gas leaked from a heater in the plaintiff’s camper and exploded when he awoke and lit a match. Id. at 485.

3 In Putkamer, n 1 supra at 635-636, this Court set forth a three-step analysis for coverage regarding injuries relating to a parked motor vehicle:

[A claimant] must demonstrate that (1) his conduct fits one of the three exceptions of subsection 3106(1); (2) the injury arose out of the ownership, operation, maintenance, or use of the parked motor vehicle as a motor vehicle; and (3) the injury had a causal relationship to the parked motor vehicle that is more than incidental, fortuitous, or but for.

However, here, defendant concedes that the parked vehicle was occupied at the time of the injury, i.e., that one of the three exceptions of subsection 3106(1) was met. Accordingly, a two-part test, consisting of factors (2) and (3) from Putkamer, applies here.

4 MCL 500.3105(1); MSA 24.13105(1) provides: “Under personal protection insurance an insurer is liable to pay benefits for accidental bodily injury arising out of the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle, subject to the provisions of this chapter.”

5 We note that the injury at issue — asphyxiation in a parked camper/trailer — is remarkably similar to the example of a slip and fall in a parked travel trailer that the umvara commentators stated did not qualify for coverage. Similarly, the umvara commentary indicates that the injuries at issue in Koole, supra (explosion in a parked camper), and Engwis v Michigan Mut Ins Co, 181 Mich App 16; 448 NW2d 731 (1989) (asphyxiation by a portable propane heater in a parked van), did not arise out of the use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle.

6 Of course, as § 3106 indicates, a vehicle need not be moving at the time of an injury for the ii\juiy to arise out of the use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle, i.e., out of its transportational function. See, e.g., Putkamer, n 1 supra at 636-637 (the plaintiffs injury, incurred when she slipped on ice while entering her vehicle with the intention of traveling to her brother’s home, was held to have arisen out of the use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle).

7 The dissent accuses us of judicial activism. It is always gratifying to hear members of the judiciary concern themselves with judicial restraint and proper deference to the Legislature. We fully agree with these principles. But the dissent’s concern is misplaced here. We have acted in accord with venerable norms of statutory construction by focusing on the language and syntax of the statute and then painstakingly endeavoring to be faithful to it even on pain of having to overrule some of our previous opinions. This repudiation of earlier efforts never comes easily to any judicial body and that is the case here. We have then not taken on a legislative role. Rather, it is paradoxically the dissent that attempts to rewrite the statute by effectively omitting portions of it. It is the dissent’s position that an injury arising out of any intended use of a motor vehicle triggers coverage. This would accord no meaning to the phrase “as a motor vehicle.” This a court cannot do, as we must read a statute to give meaning to every portion. That is what we have done and what separates us from the dissent.

8 Thornton and Bourne focused on causation. We note that it is analytically helpful to consider “causation” separately from the question whether a motor vehicle is being used as a motor vehicle as Putkamer did. However, what constitutes use of a motor vehicle “as a motor vehicle” also figures in a causation analysis, i.e., whether an injury’s relation to the use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle is more than “ ‘but for,’ incidental, and fortuitous.” Thornton, supra at 661. Thus, Thornton and Bourne bear on what constitutes use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle.

9 Our precise disagreement with the dissent lies in its proposition that when a multipurpose vehicle is used for any of its intended purposes, it is being used “as a motor vehicle.”