McGourkey v. Toledo & Ohio Central Railway Co.

146 U.S. 536, 13 S. Ct. 170, 36 L. Ed. 1079, 1892 U.S. LEXIS 2217
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
DecidedDecember 19, 1892
Docket35
StatusPublished
Cited by179 cases

This text of 146 U.S. 536 (McGourkey v. Toledo & Ohio Central Railway Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
McGourkey v. Toledo & Ohio Central Railway Co., 146 U.S. 536, 13 S. Ct. 170, 36 L. Ed. 1079, 1892 U.S. LEXIS 2217 (1892).

Opinion

Mr. Justíce Brown,

after stating the case, delivered the opinion, of 'the court.

The controversy in this case turns principally upon the title of the petitioner McGourkey to the rolling stock in question, and upon the relative priorities of the holders of the car-trust certificates, whom he represents, and the purchasers of the railway, who succeeded tp the fights of the first mortgagees under the after-acquired property clause of the mortgage- • '

(1) We aré confronted upon the threshold of the case with the proposition that the decree of June 9, 1885, ordering this' property to be turned over by the receiver to the petitioner, was a final decree, which it was not in the power of the court ■at'a subsequent term to disturb, and hence that the court was estopped to render the decree of February 4, -1889, from which this appeal was taken, at least in so far as it assumed to upset the title of McGourkey.

Probably no question of equity practice has been the sub *545 jeet of more frequent discussion'in this court than the finality of decrees. It has usually arisen upon appeals taken from decrees .claimed to he interlocutory; but it has occasionally happened that the power of the court to set aside such a decree at a subsequent term has been the subject of dispute. The cases, it must be conceded, are not ■ altogether harmonious. Upon the, one hand it is clear that a decree is final, though the case be referred to a master to execute the decree by a sale of property or otherwise, as in the case of the foreclosure of a mortgage. Ray v. Law, 3 Cranch, 179; Whiting v. Bank of the United States, 13 Pet. 6; Bronson v. Railroad Co., 2 Black, 524. If, however, the decree of foreclosure and sale leaves the amount due' upon the debt to be determined, and the property to be sold ascertained and defined, it is not final. Railroad Co. v. Swasey, 23 Wall. 405 ; Grant v. Phœnix Insurance Co., 106 U. S. 429. A like result follows if it merely determines the validity of the mortgage, and, without ordering a sale, directs the case to' stand continued for further decree upon the coming in of the master’s report. Burlington, Cedar Rapids &c. Railway v. Simmons, 123 U. S. 52 ; Parsons v. Robinson, 122 U. S. 112.

It is equally well settled that a decree in admiralty determining the question of liability for a collision or other tort, (The Palmyra, 10 Wheat. 502; Chace v. Vasquez, 11 Wheat. 429; Mordecai v. Lindsey, [The Mary Eddy,] 19 How. 199,) or in equity establishing the validity of a patent and referring the case to .a master to compute and report the damages, is interlocutory merely. Barnard v. Gibson, 7 How. 650; Humiston v. Stainthorp, 2 Wall. 106.

■ It may be said in general that if the court make a decree fixing the rights and liabilities of the parties,, and thereupon, refer the case to a master for a ministerial purpose only, and no further, proceedings in court are contemplated, the decree is final; but if it refer the case to him as a subordinate court and for. a judicial purpose, as to state an account between the parties, upon which a further decree is to be entered, the decree is not final. Craighead v. Wilson, 18 How. 199; Beebe v. Russell, 19 How. 283.

*546 But even if an account be ordered taken, if such accounting be not asked for in the bill, and be ordered simply in execution of the decree, and such decree be final as to all matters within the pleadings, it will still be regarded as final. Craighead v. Wilson, 18 How. 199; Winthrop Iron Co. v. Meeker, 109 U. S. 180.

In the case under consideration the petitioner prayed .for four distinct reliefs:

1. That the receiver perform all the covenants of the lease, and pay all sums due, etc.;

2. Or that he be directed to deliver to petitioner the rolling stock in order that the same might be sold ;

3. That he be directed to file a statement of the number of miles run, and of the sums received for the use of such rolling stock;

4. That it be referred to an examiner to take testimony and report the value of the use of such rolling stock while in .custody of the receiver, and that the receiver be directed to pay the amount justly due, etc.

The decree followed the general terms of the petition by ordering the rolling stock claimed to be delivered to McGourkey,

' and referring the case to a special master to determine the rental of the same while used by the receiver; the value of the rolling stock over and above the sums paid by the receiver to the petitioner while the same was in the custody of the receiver; the number of miles run by the receiver; the money received for the use of the same by other roads;' the loss, damage, and destruction to the same while in the custody of the receiver; and also to “ determine and report upon all questions and matters of difference between said receiver and said McGourkey, growing out of the use and restoration of said cars and locomotives;” It is claimed that inasmuch as the court granted . the prayer of the petitioner, and turned the property over to him, it was a final adjudication of his right to the same, notwithstanding the reference to a master for an accounting'; and we are referred to certain cases in this court as sustaining this contention. ,

In Forgay v. Conrad, 6 How. 201, the object of the bill was *547 to set aside sundry deeds for lands and slaves, and for an' account of the rents and profits of the property so conveyed. The court entered a decree declaring the deeds fraudulent and void, directing'the property to be delivered up to the complainant, directing one of the defendants to pay him $11,000, and that the complainant do have execution for the several matters aforesaid.” The decree then directed that the master take an account of the profits. Under the peculiar circumstances of the case the decree was held to be appealable, although, said Chief Justice Taney, “ Undoubtedly it is not final in the strict technical sense of that term.” The opinion was placed largely upon the ground that the decree not only decided the title to the property in dispute, but awarded execution.

In the very next case, Perkins v. Fourniquet, 6 How. 206, where the Circuit Court decreed that complainants were entitled to two-sevenths of certain property, and referred the matter to a master to take an account of it, the. decree "was held hot to be final. And again in the next case, Pulliam v. Christian, 6 How. 209, a.

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Bluebook (online)
146 U.S. 536, 13 S. Ct. 170, 36 L. Ed. 1079, 1892 U.S. LEXIS 2217, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mcgourkey-v-toledo-ohio-central-railway-co-scotus-1892.