UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ______________________________ ) JEFFREY MATTHEWS et al., ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 07-0031 (RWR) ) THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ) et al., ) ) Defendants. ) ______________________________)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiffs Jeffrey Matthews, Frankie West, and Earline
Hickman sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for compensatory and punitive
damages and equitable relief, alleging that the District of
Columbia and its Mayor deprived them of a constitutionally-
protected property interest without due process by terminating
their workers’ compensation benefits without providing them with
a post-deprivation hearing to challenge the termination. The
defendants move to dismiss or in the alternative for summary
judgment, and the plaintiffs cross-move for summary judgment.
Because the plaintiffs have now received their due process, have
failed to plead or present any evidence that the delay they
experienced in receiving their benefits caused them actual
damages, and do not seek nominal damages in their complaint, the -2-
claim for equitable relief will be dismissed as moot, and
judgment will be entered for the defendants on the claim for
damages.
BACKGROUND
The plaintiffs allege that in 1998, they suffered work-
related injuries while they were employees of the District.
(Compl. ¶¶ 5-7.) In 2004, Matthews’ workers’ compensation
benefits were suspended by the District’s Office of Risk
Management’s Disability Compensation Program (“DCP”). On several
occasions, Matthews submitted written requests to the DCP for a
formal denial order. Such an order was purportedly required
before Matthews could obtain an evidentiary hearing to challenge
the benefits suspension. (Id. ¶¶ 12, 15.) Similarly, in
June 2004, the DCP refused to pay a workers compensation invoice
submitted by Hickman’s treating physician because Hickman’s
“claim was closed.”1 (Id. ¶¶ 27-28.) In October 2006, Hickman
filed an application for a formal hearing with the Office of
Hearings and Adjudications’ Administrative Hearings Division
(“AHD”), but the AHD informed Hickman that she had no right to a
hearing until she received a formal denial of award of
compensation benefits or a formal notice of loss of wage earning
capacity from the DCP. In November 2006, Hickman made a written
1 DCP later informed Hickman that her causally-related medical benefits were terminated effective December 12, 1999. (See Pls.’ Opp’n Ex. 3 at 2.) -3-
request to DCP to issue a formal denial order. (Id. ¶¶ 29-31.)
Further, in October 2006, the DCP informed West’s treating
physician that the DCP would no longer accept responsibility for
West’s medical treatment.2 (Id. ¶ 19.) West attempted to file
an application for a formal hearing with the AHD, but the AHD
informed West that he had no right to a hearing until he received
a formal denial of award of compensation benefits or a formal
notice of loss of wage earning capacity from the DCP. (Id.
¶ 22.) In November 2006, West made a written request to the DCP
to issue a formal denial order. (Id. ¶ 23.) At the time the
complaint in this case was filed, the DCP had not yet issued any
of the plaintiffs a denial order. (Id. ¶¶ 16, 24, 32.)
On January 5, 2007, the three plaintiffs filed this action.
The complaint alleges one count against the defendants for
denying the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights under the color of
law in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, by depriving them of their
property -- their workers’ compensation benefits -- without
notice or the opportunity to defend their interests. (Compl.
¶¶ 35-38.) The complaint sought “appropriate affirmative relief
. . . including but not limited to [ordering defendants to]
grant[] each [plaintiff] a hearing . . . [and] compensatory and
pecuniary damages.” (Compl. ¶ 38.) Shortly after filing the
2 DCP later informed West that his causally-related medical benefits were terminated effective July 16, 2006. (See Pls.’ Opp’n Ex. 2 at 2.) -4-
complaint, the plaintiffs received formal letters of denial from
the District. West received his denial letter on February 16,
2007, and Matthews and Hickman received their letters on March 7,
2007. (Pls.’ Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss or for Summ. J. and
Cross Mot. for Summ. J. (“Pls.’ Cross Mot.”) at 3 n.3.)
In June 2008, the AHD held evidentiary hearings for Matthews
and Hickman, after which it issued a final order regarding both
of those plaintiffs’ claims. (Defs.’ Stmt. of Mat. Facts Not in
Dispute at ¶¶ 2, 6.) In August 2008, West requested and received
an order from the Department of Employment Services’ Office of
Hearings and Adjudication dismissing her application for an
evidentiary hearing. (Id. at ¶ 4.)
The defendants have moved post-discovery to dismiss the
plaintiffs’ complaint, or in the alternative to enter summary
judgment for the defendants, arguing that the court lacks federal
question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the plaintiffs’
complaint fails to state a federal claim, the case is moot
because the plaintiffs have now received their procedural due
process, and the plaintiffs are not entitled to damages for the
purported deprivation of their property rights. The plaintiffs
opposed the defendants’ motion and cross-moved for summary
judgment, arguing that there is no genuine dispute of material
fact and that they have established a compensable due process
violation. -5-
DISCUSSION
I. FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION
The defendants argue that the plaintiffs’ complaint should
be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because the complaint fails
to allege a federal question. According to the defendants, the
plaintiffs fail to identify any substantive federal or
constitutional right that supports their claims, and that the
remedy for claims arising out of the District’s conduct as an
employer lies exclusively the Comprehensive Merit Personnel Act
(“CMPA”), D.C. Code §§ 1-601.01-1-607.08. (Defs.’ Mem. in Supp.
of Mot. to Dismiss or for Summ. J. (“Defs.’ Mem.”) at 6-9.) The
plaintiffs counter that what they challenge here is the District
blocking their opportunity to be heard regarding their benefit
terminations by withholding formal denial letters. They add that
the CMPA and the District of Columbia Administrative Procedure
Act, D.C. Code § 2-510(a)(2), provide inadequate remedies since
those provisions, unlike § 1983, would not enable them to recover
damages caused by their inability to have a prompt post-
deprivation hearing regarding the termination of their disability
benefits. (Pls. Cross Mot. at 9-11.)
Here, the complaint alleges a cause of action arising under
a federal statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, namely, that the defendants
violated the plaintiffs right under the Fifth Amendment not to be
deprived of property under color of District of Columbia law -6-
without due process. A district court has federal jurisdiction
over all “civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. A
plaintiff’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that a defendant
violated his constitutional rights is a claim arising under the
laws of the United States. See Johnson v. Dist. of Columbia, 528
F.3d 969, 972 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (stating that “[t]he district
court had federal-question jurisdiction over [the plaintiff’s]
§ 1983 claim [under] 28 U.S.C. § 1331”). In addition,
“[a]lthough ‘[t]he District of Columbia Court of Appeals has
consistently held that the CMPA provides the exclusive avenue for
aggrieved District employees to pursue work-related complaints,’
McManus [v. Dist. of Columbia], 530 F. Supp. 2d [46], 77 [(D.D.C.
2007)], that particular statutory remedy does not foreclose this
Court from entertaining the constitutional question over which it
has original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.” Deschamps v.
Dist. of Columbia, 582 F. Supp. 2d 14, 16 (D.D.C. 2008) (citing
Lightfoot v. Dist. of Columbia, 448 F.3d 392, 399 (D.C. Cir.
2006); see also McManus, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 72; Lightfoot v.
Dist. of Columbia, 339 F. Supp. 2d 78, 88 n.7 (D.D.C. 2004)
(recognizing “a property interest in [D.C. employees’s]
disability benefits” to which process is due). “‘[M]inimum
[procedural] requirements [being] a matter of federal law, they
are not diminished by the fact that the State may have specified -7-
its own procedures that it may deem adequate for determining the
preconditions to adverse official action.’” Cleveland Bd. of
Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985) (quoting Vitek
v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491 (1980)); see also Winstead v. Dist.
of Columbia, 620 F. Supp. 2d 119, 121-122 (D.D.C. 2009)
(rejecting the defendants’ proposition that the availability of
judicial relief with respect to delay in a state's administrative
process prevents a court from hearing a § 1983 action premised on
that delay). Federal question jurisdiction exists over the
plaintiffs’ cause of action.
II. ADEQUACY OF CLAIM PLED
A party may move under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “To
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, acceptable as true, to ‘state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.’ . . . [A plaintiff must plead]
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009)
(citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556
(2007)). “[A] court ‘must treat the complaint’s factual
allegations as true . . . and must grant plaintiff the benefit of
all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.’” -8-
Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 165
(D.C. Cir. 2003) (quoting Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216
F.3d 1111, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2000)).
“Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, now codified at
42 U.S.C. § 1983, provides a cause of action for monetary damages
and injunctive relief against ‘every person who, under color of
[law] . . . subjects or causes to be subjected, any person . . .
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution[.]’” Daskalea v. Dist. of Columbia,
227 F.3d 433, 440 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution prohibits the deprivation
of property without the due process of law. U.S. Const. amend.
V. In order to have a property interest in disability
compensation, the plaintiffs must have a “legitimate claim of
entitlement to it.” Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth,
408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). The District’s CMPA creates such an
interest. See Fonville v. Dist. of Columbia, 448 F. Supp. 2d 21,
26 (D.D.C. 2006); McManus, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 72-73. “Procedural
due process imposes constraints on governmental decisions which
deprive individuals of ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ interests within
the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth
Amendment.” McManus, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 72 (quoting Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 323 (1976)). “Procedural due process
requires sufficient notice and ‘opportunity to be heard at a -9-
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’” Elkins v. Dist. of
Columbia, 527 F. Supp. 2d 36, 48 (D.D.C. 2007) (quoting UDC
Chairs Chapter, Am. Ass’n of Univ. Professors v. Bd. of Trustees
of the Univ. of the Dist. of Columbia, 56 F.3d 1469, 1472 (D.C.
Cir. 1995)).
A plaintiff suing the District of Columbia under § 1983
“must allege not only a violation of his rights under the
Constitution or federal law, but also that the municipality’s
custom or policy caused the violation.” Warren v. Dist. of
Columbia, 353 F.3d 36, 38 (D.C. Cir. 2004). A municipality can
be held liable under section 1983 when the municipality’s “policy
or custom . . . inflicts the injury.” Monell v. Department of
Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). “[A] city’s inaction,
including its failure to train or supervise its employees
adequately, constitutes a ‘policy or custom’ under Monell when it
can be said that the failure amounts to ‘deliberate indifference’
towards the constitutional rights of persons in its domain.”
Daskalea, 227 F.3d at 441 (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489
U.S. 378, 388-89 n.7 (1989); see also Triplett v. Dist. of
Columbia, 108 F.3d 1450, 1453 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (stating that
“inaction giving rise to or endorsing a custom” can be basis of
§ 1983 liability). -10-
Here, the plaintiffs allege that the defendants “have acted
under the color of state law and have maintained through habit,
custom, prior practices, rules and/or regulations, a policy and
practice of denying Plaintiffs due process of the law by
deprivation of [disability] benefits without notice or
opportunity to defend interest,” and that the defendants “have
intentionally, knowingly, willfully and with complete disregard
for Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights deprived them of property
without notice or opportunity to defend their interest.” (Compl.
¶¶ 35-36.) The complaint contains factual support for these
allegations by describing the history of the plaintiffs’ work
related injuries and the process by which these plaintiffs were
deprived of their disability benefits without receiving post-
deprivation hearings. (Id. ¶¶ 10-34.) Thus, the plaintiffs have
alleged that a custom or policy maintained by the district of
Columbia has subjected them to violations of their Fifth
Amendment rights to procedural due process, and they have
provided sufficient factual matter, acceptable as true, to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. The complaint
sufficiently states a claim to survive the defendants’ motion to
dismiss.
III. MOOTNESS AND DAMAGES
The defendants argue that the complaint should be dismissed
as moot since the plaintiffs received formal denial letters and -11-
evidentiary hearings to challenge the decision to terminate their
disability benefits –- “the relief they sought when they brought
this action” -- and thus are not “threatened with any actual
injury traceable to [d]efendants[.]” (Defs.’ Mem. at 13-14.)
The defendants also argue that even if an action for damages
could be brought by these plaintiffs, they would be entitled to
only nominal damages because they have not demonstrated that the
alleged denial of their due process caused them actual damages.
(Id. at 16.) The plaintiffs counter that despite the fact that
they received and prevailed in the hearings for which they
originally sued, the plaintiffs have not been made whole because
the delay in receiving benefits caused the defendants “actual
harm in the form of extended deprivation periods” for which they
were not compensated. (Pls.’ Cross Mot. at 11.)
“Federal courts lack jurisdiction to decide moot cases
because their constitutional authority extends only to actual
cases or controversies.” Larsen v. United States Navy, 525 F.3d
1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (internal quotations omitted); see also
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101 (1983) (“[T]hose
who seek to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts must
satisfy the threshold requirement imposed by Article III of the
Constitution by alleging an actual case or controversy.”). “A
case is moot when ‘the challenged conduct ceases such that there
is no reasonable expectation that the wrong will be repeated' in -12-
circumstances where ‘it becomes impossible for the court to grant
any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing party.’” Del
Monte Fresh Produce Co. v. United States, 570 F.3d 316, 321 (D.C.
Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 566
F.3d 1095, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 2009)). To satisfy the Article III
case or controversy requirement, a “plaintiff must have suffered
an injury in fact –– an invasion of a legally protected interest
which is (a) concrete and particularized . . . and (b) actual or
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical, . . . [that can be]
fairly trace[d] to the challenged action of the defendant, and
. . . [is] likely . . . [to] be redressed by a favorable
decision.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61
(1992) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
The plaintiffs concede that they have now been given the
process they were due and have had their benefits restored (Pls.’
Cross Mot. at 11), and they fail to make any argument that there
is a reasonable expectation that the wrong they complain of is
likely to occur again. Instead, they rely on the argument that
their action for actual damages remains live. The complaint
requests “compensatory and pecuniary damages” for the defendants’
purported deprivations of plaintiffs’ rights. (Compl. ¶ 38.)
“The purpose of a damage award under § 1983 is ‘to compensate
persons for injuries that are caused by the deprivation of
constitutional rights.’" Elkins v. Dist. of Columbia, 610 F. -13-
Supp. 2d 52, 60 (D.D.C. 2009) (quoting Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S.
247, 254 (1978)). “‘[M]ental and emotional distress,’ are
‘compensable under § 1983,’ even in the absence of physical
injury.” Daskalea, 227 F.3d at 443 (quoting Carey, 435 U.S. at
264). While the defendants argue that the plaintiffs cannot
maintain a claim for damages based upon an allegedly unreasonable
delay between the termination of their disability benefits and
the eventual reinstatement of their benefits after their post-
deprivation hearings, an unreasonable delay in a state’s
administrative proceeding for a claim of benefits “may constitute
the deprivation of property without due process of law,” allowing
the party who was deprived to bring a claim for damages under
§ 1983. See Winstead, 620 F. Supp. 2d at 121; see also Lowery v.
Dist. of Columbia Housing Authority, Civil Action No. 04-1868
(RMC), 2006 WL 666840, at *9-11 (denying motion to dismiss
plaintiff’s suit for damages under § 1983 for damages caused by
the wrongful termination of her housing voucher and the Housing
Authority’s failure to provide her with a “reasonably
expeditious” hearing after her housing voucher was terminated).
Therefore, the plaintiffs stated a viable claim for damages
caused by the delay in receiving their due process following the
termination of their disability benefits.
However, as the defendants point out in their motion for
summary judgment, the plaintiffs have presented no evidence -14-
establishing that they suffered actual damages as a result of the
purportedly unconstitutional delay in providing their post-
deprivation due process. The plaintiffs have made several
assertions in their filings that they did suffer actual injury,
but have come forth with no declarations, affidavits, deposition
testimony, or other admissible evidence of such injury despite
the discovery that has been conducted. Discovery has closed, the
factual record is complete, and the plaintiffs even agree that
the material factual issues are not disputed. (See Pls.’ Reply
at 5.) Indeed, in moving for summary judgment, the plaintiffs
implicitly concede that there are no disputed facts that need to
be resolved by a trial. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S.
242, 249-250 (1986) (stating that the inquiry performed at the
summary judgment stage “is the threshold inquiry of determining
whether there is the need for a trial –- whether, in other words,
there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be
resolved only by a finder of fact”). “The plain language of
[Federal] Rule [of Civil Procedure] 56(c) mandates the entry of
summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon
motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to
establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s
case, and on which the party will bear the burden of proof at
trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
With nothing more in the record beyond mere allegations of injury -15-
in the plaintiffs’ briefs, the plaintiffs have failed to
demonstrate that the purported violation of their procedural due
process rights resulted in actual damages. Although an alleged
“denial of procedural due process should be actionable for
nominal damages,” Carey, 435 U.S. at 266, the plaintiffs do not
even request nominal damages in their complaint. See Davis v.
Dist. of Columbia, 158 F.3d 1342, 1349 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(affirming district court’s sua sponte dismissal of the
plaintiff’s complaint for damages despite the possibility that
nominal damages could be awarded, because the complaint requested
only statutorily unavailable compensatory and punitive damages,
and lacked any specific request for nominal damages).
Accordingly, defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the
claim for damages, and the claim for equitable relief will be
dismissed as moot.
CONCLUSION
Because the defendants have demonstrated that the
plaintiffs’ equitable claim is moot and the defendants are
entitled to judgment on the damages claim, the defendants’ motion
to dismiss or for summary judgment will be granted, and the
plaintiffs’ cross-motion for summary judgment will be denied. An
appropriate order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion. -16-
SIGNED this 30th day of December, 2009.
/s/ RICHARD W. ROBERTS United States District Judge