§ 2-510 — Judicial review.

District of Columbia § 2-510

• Jurisdiction: District of Columbia
• Title 2: Government Administration.
• Ch. 5: Administrative Procedure.

Text

(a) Any person suffering a legal wrong, or adversely affected or aggrieved, by an order or decision of the Mayor or an agency in a contested case, is entitled to a judicial review thereof in accordance with this subchapter upon filing in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals a written petition for review. If the jurisdiction of the Mayor or an agency is challenged at any time in any proceeding and the Mayor or the agency, as the case may be, takes jurisdiction, the person challenging jurisdiction shall be entitled to an immediate judicial review of that action, unless the Court shall otherwise hold. The reviewing Court may by rule prescribe the forms and contents of the petition and, subject to this subchapter, regulate generally all matters relating to proceedings on such appeals. A petition for review shall be filed in such Court within such time as such Court may by rule prescribe and a copy of such petition shall forthwith be served by mail by the clerk of the Court upon the Mayor or upon the agency, as the case may be. Within such time as may be fixed by rule of the Court, the Mayor or such agency shall certify and file in the Court the exclusive record for decision and any supplementary proceedings, and the clerk of the Court shall immediately notify the petitioner of the filing thereof. Upon the filing of a petition for review, the Court shall have jurisdiction of the proceeding, and shall have power to affirm, modify, or set aside the order or decision complained of, in whole or in part, and, if need be, to remand the case for further proceedings, as justice may require. Filing of a petition for review shall not in itself stay enforcement of the order or decision of the Mayor or the agency, as the case may be. The Mayor or the agency may grant, or the reviewing Court may order, a stay upon appropriate terms. The Court shall hear and determine all appeals upon the exclusive record for decision before the Mayor or the agency. The review of all administrative orders and decisions by the Court shall be limited to such issues of law or fact as are subject to review on appeal under applicable statutory law, other than this subchapter. In all other cases the review by the Court of administrative orders and decisions shall be in accordance with the rules of law which define the scope and limitations of review of administrative proceedings. Such rules shall include, but not be limited to, the power of the Court:

(1) Subject to subsections (c), (d), and (e) of this section and so far as necessary to decision and where presented, to decide all relevant questions of law, to interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and to determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of any action;

(2) To compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and

(3) To hold unlawful and set aside any action or findings and conclusions found to be:

(A) Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law;

(B) Contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;

(C) In excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations or short of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations or short of statutory rights;

(D) Without observance of procedure required by law, including any applicable procedure provided by this subchapter; or

(E) Unsupported by substantial evidence in the record of the proceedings before the Court.

(b) In reviewing administrative orders and decisions, the Court shall review such portions of the exclusive record as may be designated by any party. The Court may invoke the rule of prejudicial error.

(c) In reviewing an order or decision of an agency in any court or administrative proceeding, including proceedings under subsection (a) of this section, the reviewing tribunal shall defer to the agency's reasonable interpretation of a statute or rule it administers, when the statute or rule is silent or ambiguous with respect to a specific issue; provided, that the interpretation is not plainly wrong or inconsistent with either the statute's or rule's language or the legislature's or agency's intent.

(d) In reviewing a rule adopted by an agency, the reviewing tribunal shall defer to the agency's reasonable interpretation of a statute it administers, when the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to a specific issue; provided, that the interpretation is not plainly wrong or inconsistent with either the statute's language or the legislature's intent.

(e) In determining whether an interpretation by an agency is reasonable under subsection (c) or (d) of this section, the reviewing tribunal may consider, among other factors:

(1) Whether the interpretation provided by an agency has been consistent and longstanding;

(2) Whether the specific issue is within the scope of the agency's subject matter-expertise; and

(3) The thoroughness and formality of the agency's consideration.

Legislative History

Oct. 21, 1968, 82 Stat. 1209, Pub. L. 90-614, § 110, formerly § 11; July 29, 1970, 84 Stat. 582, Pub. L. 91-358, title I, § 162; Oct. 8, 1975, D.C. Law 1-19, title I, § 102(ll), 22 DCR 2055; renumbered, Mar. 29, 1977, D.C. Law 1-96, § 3(a), (c), 23 DCR 3744