Thompson, J.
Donald C. Mathews appeals a decree of dissolution, assigning error to (1) the property division, (2) the maintenance award, and (3) the order that he pay Mrs. Mathews' attorney fees. He also appeals a postdissolution order, challenging the court's (1) finding him in contempt for failing to comply with the decree of dissolution, and (2) ordering him to execute a wage assignment. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
M. Carolyn and Donald Mathews were married on May 2, 1964. During the marriage, Mrs. Mathews worked as a homemaker and cared for the couple's four children. Mr. Mathews worked as a Spokane Valley firefighter. He was also involved in a number of moonlight business ventures which supplemented the family's income.
At the time of the couple's separation on July 1, 1989, Mrs. Mathews, age 47, had minimal employment skills and work experience. She worked part time as a church bookkeeper-secretary earning $455 per month. Her retirement account was valued at $810. Mrs. Mathews suffered from a peptic ulcer, disabling migraines and stress, and was under the care of a clinical social worker. Mr. Mathews, age 48, earned a net monthly income of $2,800 as a firefighter. His retirement account after 23 years of service was valued at [119]*119$73,564 as of the date of the separation. The couple's four children are emancipated.
Following a 4-day trial, the court found that during the course of the marriage, Mr. Mathews evidenced an ability "to earn income from activities separate and apart from the fire department income .. .". The court found Mrs. Mathews' resources were minimal and, in order to raise a family, she had sacrificed her ability to be employed. The testimony of Mrs. Mathews' two doctors and her counselor raised a "question as to whether or not she will ever be able to handle frill-time gainful employment".
The court valued the family residence, held as community property, at $95,000. The residence was subject to a mortgage balance of $23,500, repair costs of $4,059, and selling costs of $9,5001 The court awarded Mrs. Mathews the net value of the residence, $57,941, but imposed a $15,000 non-interest-bearing judgment lien on the residence in favor of Mr. Mathews. Mrs. Mathews was also awarded, through a qualified domestic relations order (QDRO), a one-half interest in Mr. Mathews' retirement account valued as of the date of the separation. 2 The couple's personal community assets [120]*120were valued at approximately $29,000. The court awarded Mrs. Mathews $13,650 of these assets and separate property valued at $750.
Mr. Mathews was awarded his separate property valued at $2,200, a one-half interest in his retirement account as of the date of the couple's separation, a $15,000 lien on the residence, $5,000 worth of equipment used in a construction company he had operated while married, and other community assets valued at about $10,000. Mr. Mathews was ordered to pay the real estate taxes on the family residence, Mrs. Mathews' health insurance premiums for 3 years, and her tuition for 6 quarters of schooling so that she could obtain training as a medical secretary. A judgment was entered against Mr. Mathews for Mrs. Mathews' attorney fees in the amount of $16,500. Mr. Mathews was ordered to pay a $2,000 debt of the construction company.
The court awarded Mrs. Mathews $1,400 per month maintenance, payable until her death, remarriage, or upon her obtaining foil-time, gainful employment. The court's finding, in part, reads:
Should wife's physical and mental health conditions allow her to be full-time gainfully employed and should she demonstrate a substantial and reasonable capacity to earn, for a reasonable period of time, an income substantially and reasonably commensurate with spousal maintenance ordered here, then, and in that event, spousal maintenance herein may be modified and/or terminated.
The maintenance award was to be reduced, dollar for dollar, by any Social Security benefits Mrs. Mathews received in the future. A decree of dissolution was entered; Mr. Mathews appealed.
While the appeal was pending, Mrs. Mathews filed a motion to show cause regarding contempt for Mr. Mathews' failure to (1) pay spousal maintenance (arrearages equaled $3,575); (2) pay real properly taxes due on the family home (amount due $2,472.34); (3) pay Mrs. Mathews' health insurance premiums; and (4) remove certain items of personal property from the family home. Mr. Mathews argued that he did not have [121]*121the financial ability to pay Mrs. Mathews. The court concluded that Mr. Mathews had willfully violated the decree and held him in contempt. Judgment was entered against Mr. Mathews. The court ordered him to execute a wage assignment directing the Spokane Valley Fire Department to automatically withhold funds sufficient to meet his maintenance obligation. Mr. Mathews' appeal of the court's postdissolution order was consolidated with his appeal of the dissolution decree.
First, Mr. Mathews contends the property division was. not fair and equitable. He argues that Mrs. Mathews was awarded a disproportionate share of the assets and that she was repeatedly favored in the court's valuation of the assets. In dividing property in a dissolution proceeding, the
court shall, without regard to marital misconduct, make such disposition of the property and the liabilities of the parties, either community or separate, as shall appear just and equitable after considering all relevant factors including, but not limited to:
(1) The nature and extent of the community property;
(2) The nature and extent of the separate property;
(3) The duration of the marriage; and
(4) The economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the division of property is to become effective, including the desirability of awarding the family home or the right to live therein for reasonable periods to a spouse with whom the children reside the majority of the time.
RCW 26.09.080.
The paramount concern is the economic condition in which the decree will leave the parties. In re Marriage of Tower, 55 Wn. App. 697, 700, 780 P.2d 863 (1989), review denied, 114 Wn.2d 1002 (1990). The parties' relative health, age, education and employability are also considered. In re Marriage of Dessauer, 97 Wn.2d 831, 839, 650 P.2d 1099 (1982). "The key to an equitable distribution of property is not mathematical preciseness, but fairness." In re Marriage of Clark, 13 Wn. App. 805, 810, 538 P.2d 145, review denied, 86 Wn.2d 1001 (1975). A trial court has broad discretion in its division of property. Baker v. Baker, 80 Wn.2d 736, 747, 498 P.2d 315 (1972).
[122]
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Thompson, J.
Donald C. Mathews appeals a decree of dissolution, assigning error to (1) the property division, (2) the maintenance award, and (3) the order that he pay Mrs. Mathews' attorney fees. He also appeals a postdissolution order, challenging the court's (1) finding him in contempt for failing to comply with the decree of dissolution, and (2) ordering him to execute a wage assignment. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
M. Carolyn and Donald Mathews were married on May 2, 1964. During the marriage, Mrs. Mathews worked as a homemaker and cared for the couple's four children. Mr. Mathews worked as a Spokane Valley firefighter. He was also involved in a number of moonlight business ventures which supplemented the family's income.
At the time of the couple's separation on July 1, 1989, Mrs. Mathews, age 47, had minimal employment skills and work experience. She worked part time as a church bookkeeper-secretary earning $455 per month. Her retirement account was valued at $810. Mrs. Mathews suffered from a peptic ulcer, disabling migraines and stress, and was under the care of a clinical social worker. Mr. Mathews, age 48, earned a net monthly income of $2,800 as a firefighter. His retirement account after 23 years of service was valued at [119]*119$73,564 as of the date of the separation. The couple's four children are emancipated.
Following a 4-day trial, the court found that during the course of the marriage, Mr. Mathews evidenced an ability "to earn income from activities separate and apart from the fire department income .. .". The court found Mrs. Mathews' resources were minimal and, in order to raise a family, she had sacrificed her ability to be employed. The testimony of Mrs. Mathews' two doctors and her counselor raised a "question as to whether or not she will ever be able to handle frill-time gainful employment".
The court valued the family residence, held as community property, at $95,000. The residence was subject to a mortgage balance of $23,500, repair costs of $4,059, and selling costs of $9,5001 The court awarded Mrs. Mathews the net value of the residence, $57,941, but imposed a $15,000 non-interest-bearing judgment lien on the residence in favor of Mr. Mathews. Mrs. Mathews was also awarded, through a qualified domestic relations order (QDRO), a one-half interest in Mr. Mathews' retirement account valued as of the date of the separation. 2 The couple's personal community assets [120]*120were valued at approximately $29,000. The court awarded Mrs. Mathews $13,650 of these assets and separate property valued at $750.
Mr. Mathews was awarded his separate property valued at $2,200, a one-half interest in his retirement account as of the date of the couple's separation, a $15,000 lien on the residence, $5,000 worth of equipment used in a construction company he had operated while married, and other community assets valued at about $10,000. Mr. Mathews was ordered to pay the real estate taxes on the family residence, Mrs. Mathews' health insurance premiums for 3 years, and her tuition for 6 quarters of schooling so that she could obtain training as a medical secretary. A judgment was entered against Mr. Mathews for Mrs. Mathews' attorney fees in the amount of $16,500. Mr. Mathews was ordered to pay a $2,000 debt of the construction company.
The court awarded Mrs. Mathews $1,400 per month maintenance, payable until her death, remarriage, or upon her obtaining foil-time, gainful employment. The court's finding, in part, reads:
Should wife's physical and mental health conditions allow her to be full-time gainfully employed and should she demonstrate a substantial and reasonable capacity to earn, for a reasonable period of time, an income substantially and reasonably commensurate with spousal maintenance ordered here, then, and in that event, spousal maintenance herein may be modified and/or terminated.
The maintenance award was to be reduced, dollar for dollar, by any Social Security benefits Mrs. Mathews received in the future. A decree of dissolution was entered; Mr. Mathews appealed.
While the appeal was pending, Mrs. Mathews filed a motion to show cause regarding contempt for Mr. Mathews' failure to (1) pay spousal maintenance (arrearages equaled $3,575); (2) pay real properly taxes due on the family home (amount due $2,472.34); (3) pay Mrs. Mathews' health insurance premiums; and (4) remove certain items of personal property from the family home. Mr. Mathews argued that he did not have [121]*121the financial ability to pay Mrs. Mathews. The court concluded that Mr. Mathews had willfully violated the decree and held him in contempt. Judgment was entered against Mr. Mathews. The court ordered him to execute a wage assignment directing the Spokane Valley Fire Department to automatically withhold funds sufficient to meet his maintenance obligation. Mr. Mathews' appeal of the court's postdissolution order was consolidated with his appeal of the dissolution decree.
First, Mr. Mathews contends the property division was. not fair and equitable. He argues that Mrs. Mathews was awarded a disproportionate share of the assets and that she was repeatedly favored in the court's valuation of the assets. In dividing property in a dissolution proceeding, the
court shall, without regard to marital misconduct, make such disposition of the property and the liabilities of the parties, either community or separate, as shall appear just and equitable after considering all relevant factors including, but not limited to:
(1) The nature and extent of the community property;
(2) The nature and extent of the separate property;
(3) The duration of the marriage; and
(4) The economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the division of property is to become effective, including the desirability of awarding the family home or the right to live therein for reasonable periods to a spouse with whom the children reside the majority of the time.
RCW 26.09.080.
The paramount concern is the economic condition in which the decree will leave the parties. In re Marriage of Tower, 55 Wn. App. 697, 700, 780 P.2d 863 (1989), review denied, 114 Wn.2d 1002 (1990). The parties' relative health, age, education and employability are also considered. In re Marriage of Dessauer, 97 Wn.2d 831, 839, 650 P.2d 1099 (1982). "The key to an equitable distribution of property is not mathematical preciseness, but fairness." In re Marriage of Clark, 13 Wn. App. 805, 810, 538 P.2d 145, review denied, 86 Wn.2d 1001 (1975). A trial court has broad discretion in its division of property. Baker v. Baker, 80 Wn.2d 736, 747, 498 P.2d 315 (1972).
[122]*122Here, the trial court considered the statutory factors delineated in RCW 26.09.080 and rendered a decision. The court analyzed the respective economic positions the parties will be left in after the dissolution. The economic realities favored Mr. Mathews who had 23 years of service as a firefighter. On the other hand, as a result of the couple's decision that Mrs. Mathews stay home and care for the four children, Mrs. Mathews has minimal earning capacity and minimal skills. These findings are supported by substantial evidence and will not be disturbed on appeal. In re Marriage of Stern, 57 Wn. App. 707, 717, 789 P.2d 807, review denied, 115 Wn.2d 1013 (1990). We find no abuse of discretion in the court's division of the Mathewses' property.
We are not persuaded by Mr. Mathews' argument that the court undervalued assets awarded to Mrs. Mathews and overvalued assets he was awarded. While the court may have assigned values to property different from those suggested by Mr. Mathews, the court's valuation of the items was within the scope of the evidence and will not be disturbed. In re Marriage of Soriano, 31 Wn. App. 432, 435, 643 P.2d 450 (1982). For example, Mr. Mathews valued the family residence awarded to Mrs. Mathews at $110,000. But the court was free to accept the $95,000 value set by the professional appraiser.
Second, Mr. Mathews contends the amount and indefinite duration of the maintenance award was an abuse of discretion. He argues that as a firefighter earning $2,800 per month, he does not have the financial ability to pay $1,400 per month maintenance, and pay Mrs. Mathews' health insurance premiums and her school tuition.
RCW 26.09.090(1) provides the court may grant a maintenance order for either spouse, in an amount and for a period of time the court deems just, after considering all relevant factors, including:
(a) The financial resources of the party seeking maintenance, including separate or community property apportioned to him, and his ability to meet his needs independently, including the extent to which a provision for support of a child living with the party includes a sum for that party;
[123]*123(b) The time necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to enable the party seeking maintenance to find employment appropriate to his skill, interests, style of life, and other attendant circumstances;
(c) The standard of living established during the marriage;
(d) The duration of the marriage;
(e) The age, physical and emotional condition, and financial obligations of the spouse seeking maintenance; and
(f) The ability of the spouse from whom maintenance is sought to meet his needs and financial obligations while meeting those of the spouse seeking maintenance.
An award of maintenance is within the trial court's discretion. In re Marriage of Vander Veen, 62 Wn. App. 861, 867, 815 P.2d 843 (1991).
We reverse the trial court's maintenance award to Mrs. Mathews because it does not evidence a fair consideration of the statutory factors and therefore constitutes an abuse of discretion. Mr. Mathews' net monthly income from his job as a firefighter is approximately $2,800. The trial court's maintenance award and its order that Mr. Mathews pay Mrs. Mathews' medical insurance premiums and education expenses for a period of several years presently leaves him with about $1,000 a month, and Mrs. Mathews with $1,855 per month. His personal property is not significant.
The trial court cited testimony that Mr. Mathews had moonlighted in the past, drawing an inference that he would continue to do so. But there was no evidence proving he was currently earning income apart from his firefighter salary. The court order does not provide for a reduction in maintenance after Mr. Mathews retires, when he will have even less income available. Thus, it appears Mr. Mathews does not have the "ability ... to meet his needs and financial obligations . . .", RCW 26.09.090(l)(f), while meeting the obligations imposed by the trial court.
RCW 26.09.090(l)(a) also requires the court to consider "[t]he financial resources of the party seeking maintenance, including separate or community property apportioned to [her], and [her] ability to meet [her] needs independently...". The trial court awarded Mrs. Mathews most of the equity in the family home, and ordered the home sold in 1992. She [124]*124therefore has that money available to her and income from her part-time job to help meet her needs. When this amount is added to the amounts Mr. Mathews has been ordered to pay, Mrs. Mathews has over $800 a month in excess of the available income remaining to Mr. Mathews.
The trial court's order that maintenance should continue for an indefinite time is based on the duration of the marriage and evidence of Mrs. Mathews' poor health. Our courts have approved awards of lifetime maintenance in a reasonable amount when it is clear the party seeking maintenance will not be able to contribute significantly to his or her own livelihood. See In re Marriage of Sheffer, 60 Wn. App. 51, 56-58, 802 P.2d 817 (1990); In re Marriage of Bulicek, 59 Wn. App. 630, 633-34, 800 P.2d 394 (1990); In re Marriage of Morrow, 53 Wn. App. 579, 770 P.2d 197 (1989). Here, the dissent relies on the trial court's finding that Mrs. Mathews "has suffered substantial health problems . . . which disáble her; and substantial stress, which also disables her at the present time”. But the court did not find Mrs. Mathews' health problems prevented her working. Indeed, the court's order that Mr. Mathews pay tuition for Mrs. Mathews' retraining conflicts with such a finding.
Mrs. Mathews argues the maintenance award reflects the trial court's consideration of the "facts" that Mr. Mathews (1) dissipated community assets by dismantling his construction company prior to the divorce, and (2) concealed community assets earned as a result of his "interest" in a restaurant. While the court may order maintenance to compensate a spouse when such allegations are proved, In re Marriage of Morrow, supra at 584, the record here fails in this proof.
Finally, in determining a reasonable amount of maintenance, the court overlooked the effect of Mr. Mathews' disability or retirement when it ordered maintenance of one-half his current monthly income for an indefinite period. In the event of his disability or retirement, that stream of income is terminated; disability or retirement benefits replace it. But the QDRO operates to transfer to Mrs. Mathews one-half of [125]*125his retirement (or disability) income. The effect of the indefinite maintenance order is to require Mr. Mathews to pay maintenance out of his remaining retirement or disability income. This is not only an abuse of discretion, it is clear error.
Accordingly, we remand to the trial court with directions it. consider maintenance in light of the factors set forth above.
Third, Mr. Mathews asserts the court abused its discretion when it ordered him to pay Mrs. Mathews' attorney fees in the dissolution and the postdissolution proceedings.
After considering the financial resources of both parties, a court may order a party to pay a reasonable amount for the cost to the other party of maintaining or defending a proceeding for marital dissolution and for reasonable attorney fees. RCW 26.09.140. An award of attorney fees rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, which must balance the needs of the spouse requesting the fees with the ability of the other spouse to pay. In re Marriage of Greenlee, 65 Wn. App. 703, 707, 829 P.2d 1120, review denied, 120 Wn.2d 1002 (1992).
Here, the trial court's division of property and award of spousal maintenance reduced not only Mrs. Mathews' need for an award of attorney fees, but also Mr. Mathews' ability to pay. Moreover, the award of fees completely offsets the $15,000 judgment lien granted to him as part of the property division. The lien was necessary to equalize, to the
, extent possible, the property division. We are not persuaded by Mrs. Mathews' argument that she incurred the attorney fees as a result of her husband's intransigence, making the financial resources of the spouse seeking fees irrelevant. Morrow, at 591. Mrs. Mathews' argument ignores that Mr. Mathews was ordered to pay attorney fees following various pretrial hearings necessitated by his intransigence. Any portion of the attorney fees awarded for intransigence that are unpaid remain Mr. Mathews' obligation. However, any additional attorney fee awarded is reversed. On remand, the court will reconsider this issue.
[126]*126Fourth, Mr. Mathews challenges the contempt citation. A court in a dissolution proceeding has the authority to enforce its decree in a contempt proceeding. Stablein v. Stablein, 59 Wn.2d 465, 466, 368 P.2d 174 (1962); Decker v. Decker, 52 Wn.2d 456, 465, 326 P.2d 332 (1958); Berry v. Berry, 50 Wn.2d 158, 162, 310 P.2d 223 (1957); In re Marriage of Peacock, 54 Wn. App. 12, 17, 771 P.2d 767 (1989). Punishment for contempt of court is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. Schuster v. Schuster, 90 Wn.2d 626, 630, 585 P.2d 130 (1978); Seventh Elect Church v. Rogers, 34 Wn. App. 105, 117, 660 P.2d 280, review denied, 99 Wn.2d 1019 (1983).
Here, Mr. Mathews had a duty to do something other than ignore the trial court's orders as contained in the dissolution decree. There are provisions for stays pending appeal. RAP 8.1. But Mr. Mathews did not attempt to secure such a stay. In these circumstances, we cannot say the contempt order constituted an abuse of discretion.
Finally, Mr. Mathews argues that the court erred in ordering an assignment of his wages to Mrs. Mathews.
A court may order a party to perform an act to effectuate the court's resolution of a dispute. Peacock, at 17. RCW 7.21.010 et seq., which governs civil contempt proceedings, provides that the court may impose remedial sanctions including "[a]n order designed to ensure compliance with a prior order of the court." RCW 7.21.030(2)(c). Coercive sanctions imposed for contempt are within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion. Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Harris, 29 Wn. App. 859, 866, 631 P.2d 423, review denied, 96 Wn.2d 1013 (1981).
Here, the court's order to Mr. Mathews to execute a wage assignment was designed to ensure compliance with the decree which Mr. Mathews had violated. The court acted within its discretion in ordering Mr. Mathews to execute a wage assignment. RCW 7.21.030(2)(c). There is no error.3
[127]*127In summary, the trial court's division of property and its orders in the postdissolution proceeding are affirmed. The maintenance and attorney fees awards are reversed. We remand the cause for further proceedings on these issues. Each party is responsible for his or her own fees and costs on appeal.
Shields, C.J., concurs.