FILED JANUARY 30, 2024 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE
In re the Marriage of: ) No. 39339-9-III ) TIMOTHY L. WALTERS, ) ) Appellant, ) ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION and ) ) PATRICE R. WALTERS, ) ) Respondent. )
LAWRENCE-BERREY, J. — This appeal and cross appeal challenge the trial court’s
division of property and award of spousal maintenance. We affirm, but remand for the
trial court to make a small correction to its maintenance award.
FACTS
In November 2020, Timothy Walters filed a petition for dissolution of his 29-year
marriage to Patrice Walters. After trial, the court awarded 50 percent of the community
estate to each spouse, along with their separate property. Ms. Walters’ separate property
consisted of a kayak and bedroom furniture. Mr. Walters’ separate property consisted
solely of a 45.1 percent interest in his Washington State Patrol (WSP) pension. The No. 39339-9-III In re Marr. of Walters
court’s ruling acknowledged the parties’ monthly Social Security benefits—$1,406 for
Mr. Walters and $1,126 for Ms. Walters—but did not allocate those benefits. At the time
of divorce, no children remained in the Walters’ home.
In addition to the above awards, the trial court ordered Mr. Walters to pay Ms.
Walters $1,250 per month in spousal maintenance as a means of equalizing the parties’
postdissolution incomes. Citing the parties’ ages and the duration of their marriage, the
court ordered maintenance payments to continue for life. The court considered awarding
Ms. Walters the full community share of Mr. Walters’ WSP pension in lieu of
maintenance, but decided not to.
The court’s dissolution order expressly considered every mandatory factor
enumerated in RCW 26.09.080 and RCW 26.09.090.
Contested assets
The trial court distributed much of the Walters’ estate without objection from the
parties. However, the court’s characterization of several assets draws scrutiny on appeal:
• Family residence: The Walters sold their home prior to trial with net
proceeds of $462,337.20. Each spouse claimed a $100,000.00 advance
from those proceeds. After satisfying other debts, $214,656.00 remained to
be distributed. The trial court’s oral ruling mischaracterized this
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$214,656.00 as the total proceeds from the sale itself, rather than the
undistributed remainder. However, the court’s final ruling corrected this
misstatement. The court awarded each spouse $107,328.00 as their final
share from the sale of the home.
• Vehicles: The trial court valued the Walters’ Ford pickup at $6,000 and
Subaru Outback at $7,000. It awarded the pickup to Mr. Walters and the
Outback to Ms. Walters. Because the pickup was too old to command
trade-in value, Mr. Walters proposed using its low retail value. For the
Outback, Mr. Walters proposed using its clean trade-in value. Ms. Walters
proposed using average retail for the pickup and average trade-in for the
Outback. The court’s valuations split the difference between these requests.
• Boat: The trial court valued the Walters’ boat at $15,000 and awarded it to
Mr. Walters. Fifteen thousand dollars was higher than the $13,845 low
retail value Mr. Walters proposed and lower than the boat’s $15,695
average retail value. Ms. Walters valued the boat at $19,119. However,
Ms. Walters’ valuation reflected the book value for a more expensive boat
than the model the couple owned. Noting this error, the court did not factor
Ms. Walters’ valuation into its own appraisal. Instead, the court’s $15,000
3 No. 39339-9-III In re Marr. of Walters
valuation balanced the boat’s age and usage against improvements the
Walters had made to the boat.
• All-terrain vehicle (ATV): Prior to trial, Mr. Walters sold the couple’s
ATV for $2,800. Because Ms. Walters believed the vehicle was worth
$4,000, Mr. Walters gave her $2,000 of the proceeds and kept only $800 for
himself. The trial court’s oral ruling incorrectly stated that Ms. Walters
herself had sold the ATV for $4,000, rather than stating Mr. Walters had
sold it for $2,800. In that ruling, the court valued the ATV at $4,000 and
charged each party with $2,000 in proceeds from the sale.
While the trial court’s final ruling did not correct any misstatements
concerning the ATV, the court’s denial of reconsideration stated accurately
that Mr. Walters had sold the vehicle for $2,800. Nevertheless, the court
defended its $4,000 valuation and $2,000 credits to each party. It argued
$4,000 represented a compromise between the value Ms. Walters sought1
1 The ruling stated that “Ms. Walters testified that the [ATV] was valued in excess of $4,000.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 193. Ms. Walters’ response to Mr. Walters’ motion for reconsideration echoes this assertion, stating that Ms. Walters proposed a value for the ATV that was “well in excess of $4,000.” CP at 156. However, both Ms. Walters’ testimony at trial and the parties’ joint trial management report indicate Ms. Walters only valued the ATV at or near $4,000, and not “in excess” of that figure.
4 No. 39339-9-III In re Marr. of Walters
and the vehicle’s $3,555 low retail value. The court furthermore argued its
$2,000 credits were fair in light of Mr. Walters’ decision to sell the ATV at
below market value. The court’s $4,000 valuation also split the difference
between the vehicle’s low retail and average retail values.
• WSP pension: The Washington Department of Retirement Systems (DRS)
offered a time-rule calculation determining 45.1 percent of Mr. Walters’
WSP pension was his separate property, whereas 54.9 percent was
communal. Ms. Walters objected to this division, arguing the court should
characterize the entire pension as community property because Mr. Walters’
highest-earning years at WSP—from which pension payments are
calculated—occurred during the marriage. The court disagreed and adopted
the DRS calculation. Despite this decision, the trial court’s oral ruling
overstated Mr. Walters’ separate share of the pension as 49.1 percent. As a
result, the oral ruling inflated Mr. Walters’ postdissolution income by $236
per month.2 In turn, this error skewed the trial court’s maintenance award.
2 Mr. Walters’ correct postdissolution income was $4,764 per month: $1,406 (Social Security benefits) + $1,270 (half of community share of pension) + $2,088 (separate share of pension). The trial court’s oral ruling determined Mr. Walters’ income was $4,944 per month, which it rounded to $5,000.
5 No. 39339-9-III In re Marr. of Walters
Because Ms. Walters’ postdissolution earnings were $2,396 per month,3 the
court concluded $1,250 per month was necessary to equalize the parties’
incomes. In fact, $1,184 would have achieved this goal. The court’s final
ruling did not correct these calculations.
• Separate property contribution: Although 45.1 percent of Mr. Walters’
WSP pension was his separate property, he contributed this portion of the
pension to the community from 2005 to 2022. As a result, over $330,000 of
Mr. Walters’ separate property merged with the community estate.
Earning potential
At the time of divorce, Mr. Walters was 66 years old and retired. Before retiring,
he had served as Chief of Police at Eastern Washington University and had conducted
active shooter trainings through his Training for Survival, LLC. As of 2020, Mr.
Walters’ LLC was defunct.
Ms. Walters at the time of divorce also was of retirement age. For most of the
Walters’ marriage, she had worked as a homemaker. Toward the end of their marriage,
Ms. Walters had occasionally accepted part-time or seasonal employment. However,
3 $1,126 (Social Security benefit) + $1,270 (half of community share of pension) = $2,396.
6 No. 39339-9-III In re Marr. of Walters
since 2008, Ms. Walters had suffered from multiple sclerosis (MS). She testified that this
condition caused pain and numbness in her hands. As a result, she believed it was “not
practical or reasonable for [her] to work.” Rep. of Proc. (RP) at 114.
While Mr. Walters conceded Ms. Walters’ MS diagnosis, he argued the condition
did not prevent her from working. In support of this assertion, Mr. Walters cited the part-
time and seasonal jobs Ms. Walters had accepted in recent years. He also cited a
Facebook post wherein Ms. Walters purportedly claimed to have been healed. Ms.
Walters admitted in testimony that she was healthy enough to kayak and take vacations.
In its oral ruling, the trial court concluded Ms. Walters’ health prevented her from
supplementing her income through employment. Conversely, the court found Mr.
Walters could supplement his income by conducting active shooter trainings.
Procedural history
Mr. Walters moved for reconsideration, challenging the trial court’s valuation of
several assets and calculation of spousal maintenance. He argued the latter impermissibly
invaded his separate property and Social Security benefits. In her own motion for
reconsideration, Ms. Walters asked the court to award her a greater share of the WSP
pension in lieu of spousal maintenance. She argued this arrangement would be more
7 No. 39339-9-III In re Marr. of Walters
equitable because it would provide her with cost-of-living adjustments and because it
would alleviate the need for ongoing contact with Mr. Walters.
The trial court denied both motions. In its denial, the court noted that receiving
maintenance payments did not require Ms. Walters to disclose her physical address to Mr.
Walters, as she could receive her payments via direct deposit or at a post office box.
Mr. Walters timely appeals the trial court’s dissolution order and denial of
reconsideration. Ms. Walters cross appeals these same orders.
ANALYSIS
A. DIVISION OF PROPERTY
Mr. Walters argues the trial court’s division of property erred by (1) mischaracterizing
his separate property, (2) relying on erroneous asset valuations, and (3) incorporating
faulty calculations. Ms. Walters argues the court erred by characterizing too much of
their estate as Mr. Walters’ separate property and by not awarding one-half of his pension
to her, as equity demanded.
Standard of review
We review a trial court’s division of marital property for abuse of discretion. In re
Marriage of Muhammad, 153 Wn.2d 795, 803, 108 P.3d 779 (2005). A trial court
operates within its discretion when its findings derive from the factual record, its
8 No. 39339-9-III In re Marr. of Walters
conclusions apply sound law, and its decisions are not manifestly unreasonable. In re
Marriage of Bowen, 168 Wn. App. 581, 586-87, 279 P.3d 885 (2012). A decision is
manifestly unreasonable when it lies “‘outside the range of acceptable choices.’” Id. at
586 (quoting In re Marriage of Littlefield, 133 Wn.2d 39, 47, 940 P.2d 1362 (1997)).
Breadth of discretion
Under RCW 26.09.080, a trial court must divide marital property in a manner that
“appear[s] just and equitable after considering all relevant factors.” Factors the court
must consider include: (1) the nature and extent of community property, (2) the nature
and extent of separate property, (3) the duration of the marriage, and (4) the parties’
relative economic circumstances. RCW 26.09.080(1)-(4).
A correct division of property may or may not result in equal shares but must result
in fairness. See In re Marriage of Nicholson, 17 Wn. App. 110, 118, 561 P.2d 1116
(1977). A division is fair when it is the product of “‘wise and sound discretion’” rather
than “‘set or inflexible rules.’” Id. (quoting In re Marriage of Clark, 13 Wn. App. 805,
810, 538 P.2d 145 (1975)). While the separate or communal character of marital property
is one factor the trial court must consider, it is not controlling. In re Marriage of Konzen,
103 Wn.2d 470, 478, 693 P.2d 97 (1985). Instead, “all property is brought before the
court for a ‘just and equitable’ distribution.” In re Marriage of Farmer, 172 Wn.2d 616,
9 No. 39339-9-III In re Marr. of Walters
625, 259 P.3d 256 (2011).
One exception to the Farmer rule is Social Security benefits, which under
42 U.S.C. § 407(a) are inalienable by the recipient. In re Marriage of Tupper, 15 Wn.
App. 2d 796, 801, 478 P.3d 1132 (2020). While a trial court may consider Social
Security benefits when assessing the parties’ relative economic circumstances, it may not
“calculate a specific formal valuation” of Social Security benefits and award “a precise
property offset based on that valuation.” In re Marriage of Zahm, 138 Wn.2d 213, 222,
978 P.2d 498 (1999).
Within this framework, the court below was empowered to distribute the Walters’
marital assets in any manner, provided it (1) considered all relevant factors under
RCW 26.09.080 and (2) did not divide the parties’ Social Security benefits. Additionally,
the court’s factual findings required support from the record, its conclusions needed to
rest on sound law, and its decisions could not be manifestly unreasonable. Bowen, 168
Wn. App. at 586-87.
i. Consideration of relevant factors
The trial court expressly considered every RCW 26.09.080 factor when it divided
the Walters’ marital assets.
10 No. 39339-9-III In re Marr. of Walters
The court considered the “nature and extent of community property” when it
admitted exhibits tabulating the Walters’ community assets and debt. RCW 26.09.080(1).
The court heard testimony from the parties concerning the value of their assets. In its
findings of fact, the court delineated each community asset and assigned a value to it.
The court’s final opinion embraced the communal nature of this property by apportioning
it evenly between the Walters.
The trial court considered the “nature and extent of separate property” when it
carved out Ms. Walters’ kayak and bedroom furniture as separate property acquired by
gift and before marriage, respectively. RCW 26.09.080(2). Likewise, the court used
DRS’s line-rule calculation to carve out 45.1 percent of Mr. Walters’ WSP pension as his
separate property acquired before marriage. Mr. Walters correctly alleges the court in its
oral ruling misstated his interest as 49.1 percent, but the court corrected this error in its
findings of fact and final ruling.
As to both parties’ separate property, the trial court excluded these assets from its
calculation of community property while noting the disparity they created between the
parties’ respective financial outlooks. The court also noted Mr. Walters’ contribution to
the community of over $330,000 in separate-property pension payments between 2005
and 2022. Because these contributions flowed into the community, they became
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community property; the court did not allocate them to Mr. Walters. Nevertheless, the
attention the court paid to the disposition of those funds evinces its thorough
consideration of the Walters’ separate assets.
The trial court considered the duration of the Walters’ marriage when it recited
the three-decade history of that marriage during its oral ruling, taking care to
acknowledge the agreements, expectations, and contributions that accrued over that time.
RCW 26.09.080(3). The court also weighed the duration of the Walters’ marriage when
it awarded spousal maintenance on the grounds that “this is a 29-plus-year marriage
involving retired folks.” RP at 230.
Finally, the trial court considered the parties’ relative economic circumstances as a
result of the divorce. RCW 26.09.080(4). Specifically, the court concluded Mr. Walters’
postdissolution income would outstrip Ms. Walters’ postdissolution income because of
his separate share of the WSP pension and his larger Social Security benefit.
Additionally, Mr. Walters could augment his income with active shooter trainings,
whereas MS prevented Ms. Walters from earning any supplemental income. Although
the court’s property disbursement did not itself offset this disparity, the court’s findings of
fact and award of spousal maintenance indicate it was a consideration.
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In sum, RCW 26.09.080 imposes no requirements the trial court did not satisfy.
ii. Social Security benefits
The trial court properly considered “‘the amount of [S]ocial [S]ecurity benefits’”
the Walters received as a means of “‘evaluat[ing] the economic circumstances.’” Zahm,
138 Wn.2d at 223 (quoting In re Marriage of Zahm, 91 Wn. App. 78, 85, 955 P.2d 412
(1998), aff’d, 138 Wn.2d 213). The court did not, as Zahm forbids, “calculate a specific
formal valuation” of Mr. Walters’ Social Security benefit and award “a precise property
offset based on that valuation.” Id. at 222.
In its oral ruling, the trial court acknowledged Mr. Walters’ $1,406 Social Security
benefit and noted it was $300 higher than Ms. Walters’ $1,126 benefit. The court’s
acknowledgment of these amounts remained squarely within the zone of “consideration”
permitted by Zahm. Id. at 223. The acknowledgment did not stray into “calculat[ing] a
specific formal valuation” of Mr. Walters’ benefit because, plainly, no such valuation
occurred. Id. at 222. Valuating Mr. Walters’ monthly benefit would have entailed
discounting future payments over the span of Mr. Walter’s life expectancy to determine
the present value of his Social Security entitlement now, at dissolution. See In re
Marriage of Rockwell, 141 Wn. App. 235, 244, 170 P.3d 572 (2007). Subsequently, a
“precise property offset” would have manifested as a lump-sum award to Ms. Walters
13 No. 39339-9-III In re Marr. of Walters
effectively extracting the benefit’s value from Mr. Walters’ share of the estate. Zahm,
138 Wn.2d at 222. An examination of the court’s property division analysis reveals no
calculations like these and no offset like this. Accordingly, the trial court’s property
division did not divide either party’s Social Security benefits.
iii. Factual record
The trial court’s division of the Walters’ property rested on findings derived from
the factual record. Bowen, 168 Wn. App. at 587. Such findings are proper when
substantial evidence supports them. Rockwell, 141 Wn. App. at 242. Evidence is
substantial when it is of sufficient quantity to persuade a fair-minded, rational person of
the truth of the declared premise. Id.
Mr. Walters challenges the trial court’s findings on the grounds that they relied on
faulty valuations of several assets—namely, the parties’ home, vehicles, boat, and ATV.
However, as to each of these assets, the value the court assigned derived coherently from
the Walters’ testimony and exhibits.
The trial court valued the proceeds from the Walters’ home, minus sums paid to
creditors, at $414,656. Noting each party’s $100,000 advance from those proceeds, the
court divided the remaining $214,656 equally, awarding $107,328 to each spouse. All of
this was consistent with admitted testimony and exhibits. Mr. Walters correctly alleges
14 No. 39339-9-III In re Marr. of Walters
the court misstated the amount of home proceeds in its oral ruling, but the findings of fact
and final ruling cured those misstatements.
Regarding community vehicles, the trial court valued Mr. Walters’ Ford pickup at
$6,000 and Ms. Walters’ Subaru Outback at $7,000. These values bear a coherent
relationship to the valuations each party assigned the vehicles. Mr. Walters challenges
these valuations on the grounds that his truck received retail valuation, whereas Ms.
Walters’ vehicle received trade-in valuation. Because retail values outpace trade-in
values, Mr. Walters contends the trial court inflated the value of the asset it charged to
him.
However, it was Mr. Walters himself who furnished an appraisal schedule for the
pickup that included no trade-in value. Moreover, Mr. Walters testified that the Subaru
should receive clean trade-in value. The court considered this evidence when it arrived at
the valuations it did. There was no error and, if there was, it was invited. In re Marriage
of Blakely, 111 Wn. App. 351, 360, 44 P.3d 924 (2002) (a party may not challenge an
error he himself set up).
As to the Walters’ boat, the trial court used age, usage, and accessories—all in the
record—to arrive at a value of $15,000. This figure is higher than low retail for the boat
and lower than average retail. Mr. Walters correctly argues Ms. Walters based her
15 No. 39339-9-III In re Marr. of Walters
$19,119 valuation of the boat on a more expensive model than the one the Walters
owned. However, Mr. Walters incorrectly argues the trial court’s $15,000 valuation “split
the difference” between his $13,845 request and Ms. Walters’ misguided $19,119 request.
Br. of Appellant at 45. Had the trial court split the difference in this regard, it would
have valued the boat at $16,482—a figure nearly 10 percent higher than the value the
court actually assigned. Instead, the trial court apparently did exactly what it claimed to
have done—it accepted Mr. Walters’ low retail value for the boat, in light of its age and
usage, but then increased that value incrementally in light of improvements the Walters
made to the boat. Ms. Walters’ erroneous valuation did not ostensibly influence the trial
court’s analysis. The court made a reasonable assessment derived from the factual record.
The trial court valued the Walters’ ATV at $4,000, which it said was “in the
ballpark” of the vehicle’s $3,555 low retail value. RP at 224. This valuation is consistent
with the valuation Ms. Walters requested from the court. It also represents the price Ms.
Walters believed she and her husband should have sought for the ATV when they sold it.
Instead of seeking that price, the couple agreed to sell the ATV for $2,800, at which
point Mr. Walters would “make up for the difference” to Ms. Walters by paying her
$2,000 of the proceeds. RP at 145. In light of this agreement, the court was justified in
concluding $4,000 was a good-faith valuation for the ATV. If that valuation had been
16 No. 39339-9-III In re Marr. of Walters
absurd, Mr. Walters likely would not have offered to make up the difference to his wife.
Moreover, the record indicates average retail value for the ATV was $4,675. For all these
reasons, the record supports the trial court’s $4,000 valuation.
Mr. Walters correctly alleges the trial court in its oral ruling misstated certain facts
related to the ATV. Specifically, the court stated that Ms. Walters herself sold the ATV
for $4,000, rather than stating, as it should have, that Mr. Walters sold the vehicle for
$2,800. The court did not correct this misstatement in its final ruling, where it credited
each party with $2,000 in proceeds from the sale of the ATV.
However, the court did correct this misstatement in its denial of reconsideration.
The court in that order also clarified its valuation of the ATV, stating that $4,000
represented a balancing of the vehicle’s low retail value—offered in evidence—against
Ms. Walters’ own valuation. It is not clear whether such a balancing truly occurred, since
Ms. Walters appears only to have valued the ATV at $4,000, rather than valuing it in
excess of that sum. Even if the trial court simply honored Ms. Walters’ $4,000 request,
however, the record—as discussed above—amply supports the reasonableness of that
valuation.
The court’s denial of reconsideration also explained the $2,000 credits it allocated
to each party. According to the order, the court credited Ms. Walters with $2,000 because
17 No. 39339-9-III In re Marr. of Walters
she received that amount and credited Mr. Walters with $2,000 in consideration of his
decision to sell the ATV at below market value. In other words, Mr. Walters received
$2,000 in value because he received $800 in cash along with the $1,200 convenience of
accepting a lowball offer over his wife’s objection. The trial court’s $4,000 valuation of
the ATV and respective $2,000 credits accordingly find support in the record and were
not in error.
iv. Sound law
The trial court divided the Walters’ property according to sound law. Bowen, 168
Wn. App. at 587. Specifically, the court, as discussed above, considered every factor
required by RCW 26.09.080 and fashioned an equitable property distribution within the
broad discretion afforded by that statute. Additionally, the court followed the dictates of
Zahm when it considered Social Security benefits without precisely offsetting them.
Mr. Walters argues the trial court misunderstood case law to impose a requirement
that parties from long-term marriages emerge from a divorce in identical financial
positions. We agree no such requirement exists. In re Marriage of Doneen, 197 Wn.
App. 941, 950, 391 P.3d 594 (2017) (Rockwell does not mandate equal financial positions
following the dissolution of a long-term marriage.). However, nothing in the record
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indicates the trial court felt constrained in this way.4 Instead, the court in its own
discretion simply allotted equal shares of the Walters’ community estate. While it is true
the court in its spousal maintenance analysis elected to equalize the Walters’ incomes
postdissolution, nothing indicates the court ordered this maintenance in compliance with
any controlling case. Indeed, neither the court’s oral ruling nor its final ruling cites any
law at all besides RCW 26.09.080 and RCW 26.09.090. The court’s denial of
reconsideration does cite Zahm, but only to justify the court’s comparison of the parties’
Social Security benefits. 138 Wn.2d at 223.
While Rockwell and other cases do not require equal financial positions in
circumstances like that of the Walters, those cases certainly do not forbid equal division
either. The trial court was empowered to award equal shares and did so.
v. Reasonableness
The trial court’s division of the Walters’ property was not manifestly unreasonable
because the court’s ruling lay within “‘the range of acceptable choices.’” Bowen, 168
Wn. App. at 586 (quoting Littlefield, 133 Wn.2d at 47). The court’s principle in dividing
4 The court did state that Ms. Walters was “entitled to an award of spousal maintenance to equalize the economic condition of the parties post-dissolution.” RP at 230. However, stating that Ms. Walters was “entitled” to such equalization falls short of citing case law requiring it. Obviously the court believed Ms. Walters was “entitled” to the spousal maintenance it awarded, or else the court would not have awarded it.
19 No. 39339-9-III In re Marr. of Walters
the Walters’ property was to (1) preserve each party’s separate property and Social
Security benefits and (2) award each party one-half of the community estate. Such a
methodology honors the character of all property involved and protects each party’s
interest in that property. While such equal division is not mandatory, it is certainly
acceptable.
Ms. Walters disagrees, arguing the trial court erred by not awarding her one-half of
the total WSP pension, as equity demanded. We agree with Ms. Walters that such an
award would have been within the court’s power, as “all property is brought before the
court for a ‘just and equitable’ distribution.” Farmer, 172 Wn.2d at 625. We also agree
that an increased share of the pension would have better protected Ms. Walters’ long-term
security, as a pension offers cost-of-living adjustments whereas maintenance payments do
not. Moreover, the trial court could have ordered such an award without invading Mr.
Walters’ separate portion of the pension.5
However, equity would merely have permitted such an award and did not require
it. The trial court’s broad discretion under RCW 26.09.080 empowered it to divide the
Walters’ property in any just and equitable fashion, provided it met the other requirements
5 Ms. Walters could have taken 91 percent of the community share of the pension—equaling 50 percent of the total pension—leaving Mr. Walters with 9 percent of the community share along with his full separate share.
20 No. 39339-9-III In re Marr. of Walters
already discussed. Ms. Walters’ preference for an alternative division does not, without
more, undermine the legitimacy of the one the court ordered.
Ms. Walters’ argument that an augmented share of the pension would better
protect her privacy than spousal maintenance also is without merit. As the trial court
indicated in its denial of reconsideration, Ms. Walters may already take measures to
protect her privacy. She may receive spousal maintenance payments via direct deposit or
at a post office box.
Ms. Walters further argues the trial court should have characterized the entirety of
the WSP pension as community property, as the pension funds commingled over the
course of the Walters’ marriage, and as Mr. Walters’ highest-earning years—from which
pension payments are calculated—occurred during the marriage. Ms. Walters’
contentions are without merit, however, because Washington courts have adopted the
time-rule method for dividing separate portions of a pension from community portions.
Rockwell, 141 Wn. App. at 251, 254 (“If the pension was accumulated partly prior to
marriage and partly after marriage, it is proportionately classified, with the portion
acquired during marriage characterized as community property.”).
In sum, the trial court’s assignment of separate property and equal division of
community property were manifestly reasonable.
21 No. 39339-9-III In re Marr. of Walters
B. SPOUSAL MAINTENANCE
Mr. Walters also argues the trial court’s spousal maintenance order impermissibly
invaded his separate assets, lacked sufficient evidentiary basis, improperly sought to
equalize the parties’ incomes, and, impropriety notwithstanding, failed to equalize those
incomes.
We review a trial court’s spousal maintenance order for abuse of discretion. In re
Marriage of Condie, 15 Wn. App. 2d 449, 459, 475 P.3d 993 (2020). Our preceding
discussion defines the scope of this review.
Under RCW 26.09.090(1), a trial court may order spousal maintenance “in such
amounts and for such periods of time as the court deems just . . . after considering all
relevant factors.” Factors the court must consider include: (a) the receiving party’s
financial circumstances, (b) the time necessary for the receiving party to retrain and seek
appropriate employment, (c) the standard of living established during the marriage,
(d) the duration of the marriage, (e) the age, health, and financial obligations of the party
receiving maintenance, and (f) the financial circumstances of the paying party.
RCW 26.09.090(1)(a)-(f).
22 No. 39339-9-III In re Marr. of Walters
A trial court may award maintenance is any amount or for any duration provided
the award is just. In re Marriage of Valente, 179 Wn. App. 817, 821, 320 P.3d 115
(2014). While permanent maintenance awards are disfavored, “a lifetime maintenance
award in a reasonable amount is proper ‘when it is clear the party seeking maintenance
will not be able to contribute significantly to . . . her own livelihood.’” Id. at 822
(alteration in original) (quoting In re Marriage of Mathews, 70 Wn. App. 116, 124, 853
P.2d 462 (1993)).
Within this framework, the trial court was empowered to award Ms. Walters
spousal maintenance in any amount or for any duration, provided the award was just and
provided the court considered all relevant factors under RCW 26.09.090(1). The court
moreover was empowered to award lifetime maintenance if Ms. Walters was “‘not
. . . able to contribute significantly to . . . her own livelihood.’” Id. (second alteration in
original) (quoting Mathews, 70 Wn. App. at 124). Finally, the court’s factual findings
required support from the record, its conclusions needed to rest on sound law, and its
decisions could not be manifestly unreasonable. Bowen, 168 Wn. App. at 586-87.
The court below considered every factor required under RCW 26.09.090(1). The
court considered factors (a) and (f) when it determined Mr. Walters’ monthly income
23 No. 39339-9-III In re Marr. of Walters
postdissolution would be roughly double that of Ms. Walters. The court considered factor
(b) when it concluded Ms. Walters was retired and would not be seeking future
employment. The court considered factor (c) when it determined “both parties had a
comfortable standard of living during the marriage.” RP at 229. The court considered
factor (d) when it acknowledged that the 29-year duration of the Walters’ marriage
influenced its spousal maintenance award. Finally, the court considered factor (e) when it
concluded Ms. Walters’ MS diagnosis prevented her from supplementing her retirement
income.
ii. Justness of award
After considering the RCW 26.09.090(1) factors, the trial court awarded Ms.
Walters lifetime maintenance of $1,250 per month. This award was just because the court
used it to equalize the Walters’ incomes postdissolution. While case law does not require
a trial court to equalize spouses’ incomes in this way, nothing prevents it from doing so.
See Doneen, 197 Wn. App. at 950-51. Even the unpublished case Mr. Walters cites
states expressly that “it is permissible for the trial court to try to place the parties to a
long-term marriage on equal footing moving forward.” In re Marriage of McMaster,
No. 37176-0-III, slip op. at 11 (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 8, 2022) (unpublished),
https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/371760_unp.pdf.
24 No. 39339-9-III In re Marr. of Walters
iii. Lifetime maintenance
The trial court’s award of lifetime maintenance comported with Valente because
Ms. Walters’ age and health prevented her from “‘contribut[ing] significantly to . . . her
own livelihood.’” 179 Wn. App. at 822 (alteration in original) (quoting Mathews, 70 Wn.
App. at 124). While lifetime maintenance is disfavored, the court was empowered to
make such an award in this circumstance. Id.
iv. Factual record
The trial court’s maintenance order rested on findings derived from the factual
record. Bowen, 168 Wn. App. at 587. We discern no error besides a mathematical one
the court may easily correct.
Mr. Walters argues the trial court erred when it concluded without evidence that
Ms. Walters was unable to work. However, the record supported the court’s conclusion
in this regard. First, Ms. Walters offered uncontradicted testimony that she had suffered
from MS for 14 years. Ms. Walters also testified that her primary duties throughout the
marriage were as a homemaker—rather than as a breadwinner—suggesting diminished
professional prospects. Finally, the court properly inferred from testimony that Ms.
Walters was of retirement age, leaving her ill-suited for long-term employment.
25 No. 39339-9-III In re Marr. of Walters
The court heard other evidence suggesting Ms. Walters could work. Mr. Walters
testified that his wife was physically capable, despite her diagnosis. He also testified that
Ms. Walters had accepted part-time employment in the recent past and had celebrated her
recovery from MS. Ms. Walters admitted to being healthy enough to kayak and take
vacations.
Given the breadth of evidence before it, the trial court could have properly
concluded Ms. Walters could work or could not. It concluded she could not.
Mr. Walters similarly argues the trial court erred by concluding without evidence
that he was able to work. Specifically, Mr. Walters contends the court had no evidentiary
basis for its finding that he could use his defunct LLC to supplement his income. Without
disputing the LLC’s defunct status, however, the court merely inferred from the LLC’s
existence that Mr. Walters possessed a marketable skill—namely, conducting active
shooter trainings. This was a fair conclusion to draw from Mr. Walters’ own testimony,
where he admitted earning income from such trainings just two years prior to trial.
Finally, Mr. Walters argues the trial court erred by failing to calculate a
maintenance payment that fulfilled its goal of equalizing the Walters’ incomes. After
reviewing the record, we agree with Mr. Walters that the trial court erroneously
concluded a $1,250-per-month maintenance payment would “equalize the economic
26 No. 39339-9-III In re Marr. of Walters
condition of the parties post-dissolution.” RP at 230.
The error arose when the trial court mistakenly characterized 49.1 percent of the
WSP pension as Mr. Walters’ separate party, rather than 45.1 percent. As a result, the
court determined Mr. Walters’ postdissolution monthly income to be $4,944, which it
rounded to $5,000. Because this sum exceeded Ms. Walters’ income by approximately
$2,500, the court ordered a $1,250 equalization payment.
Although the court in its final ruling and denial of reconsideration correctly stated
that Mr. Walters’ separate share of the pension was 45.1 percent, neither order
recalculated the maintenance award to reflect that correction. Had the court done so, it
would have determined Mr. Walters’ postdissolution income to be $4,764 per month
rather than $4,944. Because Ms. Walters’ postdissolution income was $2,396, the
resulting equalization payment should have been $1,184 rather than $1,250.
Sixty-six dollars is not a tremendous sum within the context of a large marital
estate. However, because Mr. Walters must pay this maintenance monthly until he or Ms.
Walters dies, the overage as a result of the trial court’s error could prove substantial. Mr.
Walters is 66 years old. According to Social Security Administration actuarial tables, he
may expect to live another 16 years.6 In that time, he would pay $12,672 more in
6 https://www.ssa.gov/oact/STATS/table4c6.html.
27 No. 39339-9-III In re Marr. of Walters
maintenance than the court had intended him to pay.
v. Sound law
The trial court’s maintenance order remained within the requirements of
RCW 26.09.090 and all applicable case law. Mr. Walters disagrees, arguing case law
forbade the trial court from invading his separate property and Social Security benefits.
While Mr. Walters correctly states that Zahm forbids trial courts from reassigning
Social Security benefits, case law does not forbid a court from reassigning separate
property. As Farmer makes clear, “all property is brought before the court for a ‘just and
equitable’ distribution.” 172 Wn.2d at 625. While RCW 26.09.080(2) requires courts to
consider “the nature and extent of the separate property” as one factor in their distribution
analyses, what guides a court’s division order is fairness, not the preservation of any
separate estate. Konzen, 103 Wn.2d at 478.
Mr. Walters cites Stokes v. Polley in support of his position, which states that
“Washington courts refrain from awarding separate property of one spouse to the other if
a just and equitable division is possible without doing so.” 145 Wn.2d 341, 347, 37 P.3d
1211 (2001). However, we need not determine in this case whether equity compelled the
trial court to reassign Mr. Walters’ separate property, as the court made no such
reassignment. Nor did the court reassign Mr. Walters’ Social Security benefit.
28 No. 39339-9-III In re Marr. of Walters
Under the trial court’s dissolution order, Mr. Walters retained three sources of
income: (1) his 45.1 percent separate share of the WSP pension ($2,088 per month);
(2) his 50 percent share of the community portion of the pension ($1,270 per month); and
(3) his $1,406 Social Security benefit. The court’s maintenance award was $1,250 per
month. Accordingly, Mr. Walters’ $1,270-per-month share of the community portion of
the pension was sufficient to defray the maintenance award without reducing his separate
property pension payment or Social Security payment by even one dollar.
Mr. Walters proposes an alternative interpretation whereby the court’s $1,250
maintenance award resulted specifically from leveling the parties’ Social Security
benefits and halving Mr. Walters’ separate share of the pension. While this interpretation
enables Mr. Walters to assign dual errors—invasion of separate property and invasion of
Social Security—it also requires our court to divine which dollars in a pot of money came
from which sources, which we are unable to do. A deferential interpretation of the trial
court’s order—which abuse of discretion review requires—is that the order touched only
community property.
vi. Reasonableness
The trial court’s decision to place the Walters on equal footing postdissolution is
manifestly reasonable. To conclude otherwise would be to prohibit equal outcomes for
29 No. 39339-9-111 In re Marr. of Walters
equal partners in a marriage.
C. REQUEST FOR REASONABLE ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
Ms. Walters requests attorney fees on appeal. RCW 26.09.140 grants trial and
appellate courts discretion to award a party their reasonable attorney fees. In exercising
our discretion, we consider the merit of the issues on appeal and the parties' respective
financial resources. In re Marriage ofC.MC., 87 Wn. App. 84, 89, 940 P.2d 669 (1997),
aff'd, 136 Wn.2d 800, 966 P.2d 1247 (1998)). We decline Ms. Walters' request, largely
because the trial court's property and maintenance awards placed the parties on equal
financial footing.
Affirmed, but remanded for correction.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to
RCW 2.06.040.
Lawrence-Berrey, J.
WE CONCUR:
Cooney, J.