Boyle, J.
The question presented is whether a governmental agency is immune from liability arising out of an accident involving a driver who drove through a red light near an elementary school and a ten-year-old student who had raced into the street. The student and his mother sued Wayne County on the theory that it was negligent because it failed to post school warning signs on that street. We hold that the trial court should have granted the defendant’s motion for summary disposition on the ground of governmental immunity.
i
This case arises out of an accident that occurred on June 10, 1987, at the intersection of Outer Drive and Mendota in the City of Detroit. The plaintiff, Anthony Mason, who was engaged in a [133] race with a friend, ran out into the street and struck the side of a car that had just run the red light at the intersection. He sustained a closed head or traumatic brain injury.
Anthony Mason and his mother sued numerous defendants. Count v of the plaintiffs’ sixth amended complaint alleged that the City of Detroit, Wayne County, and their employees breached their duties pursuant to MCL 691.1402; MSA 3.996(102) to maintain the streets and the intersection in reasonable repair. The complaint alleged that the defendants failed to install stop signs, a pedestrian overhead walkway, a flashing red stoplight, school advance signs, school crossing signs, school speed limit signs, and school pavement markings.
Before trial, the plaintiffs settled with the driver of the automobile. In addition, the court granted defendant City of Detroit’s motion for summary disposition on the ground that the county had exclusive jurisdiction over the streets in question. Defendant Wayne County’s motion for summary disposition on the basis of governmental immunity was denied.
The plaintiffs proceeded to trial against both Wayne County and the crossing guard who was stationed at the intersection. The jury found in favor of the crossing guard, but against Wayne County and awarded the plaintiffs two million dollars in damages.1
Both the plaintiffs and Wayne County appealed. The Court of Appeals resolved several issues, all in favor of the plaintiff. With respect to governmental immunity, the Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling denying the county’s motion for summary [134] disposition. It reasoned that the duty to repair and maintain the highway "includes the duty to post adequate traffic signage, including school signs, because they serve an integral part of the highway designed for vehicular travel.” Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued June 11, 1992 (Docket No. 127003), slip op, p 6.
The county appealed, and we granted leave to appeal. 442 Mich 924 (1993).2
ii
By statute, governmental agencies are immune from tort liability while engaging in a governmental function, except activities that fall within one of the narrowly drawn exceptions. See MCL 691.1407; MSA 3.996(107); Ross v Consumers Power Co (On Rehearing.), 420 Mich 567, 618; 363 NW2d 641 (1984). This case involves the highway exception. See MCL 691.1402(1); MSA 3.996(102)(1).3
[135] Defendant Wayne County argues that it cannot be liable under the highway exception for failing to install school warning signs because a school crossing is not a danger to vehicles and the vehicle passengers. We agree. The plaintiffs’ action does not fall within the highway exception because a school does not present a special danger to vehicles. The highway exception abrogates governmental immunity except at "points of special danger to motorists . . . .” Grof v Michigan, 126 Mich App 427, 434; 337 NW2d 345 (1983); Comerica Bank of Kalamazoo v Dep’t of Transportation, 168 Mich App 84, 86; 424 NW2d 2 (1987).4 The plaintiffs’ argument that prior decisions abrogate governmental immunity for all "traffic control devices,” which include signs, reads those decisions far too expansively. The cases cited by the plaintiff involve signs warning vehicular traffic as opposed to pedestrians.
The highway exception specifically excepts the state and counties from liability for defects in crosswalks, the defect alleged by the plaintiff: "[t]he duty of the state and county road commissions to repair and maintain highways, and the liability therefor, shall extend only to the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel and shall not include sidewalks, crosswalks, or any other installation outside of the [136] improved portion . . . .”5 That limiting sentence definitively excludes from the exception specific installations whose only rational purposes narrowly service the unique needs of pedestrians.6 As [137] we explained in Roy v Dep’t of Transportation, 428 Mich 330, 336; 408 NW2d 783 (1987), "the exclusion of sidewalks, crosswalks, and other installations from the duty of maintenance and repair, reflects a [legislative] conclusion that pedestrians and users of these installations have been sufficiently protected by the separation of them from motorists, without any need to impose a duty of maintenance and repair enforced by liability for resultant injuries.” The fact that liability under the statute does not extend to those using the excluded installations may seem harsh. However, the phrase "designed for vehicular travel” can only be reasonably interpreted to mean "intended for vehicular travel.” The explicit removal of exclusively pedestrian installations from the highway exception, coupled with the express language of the provision itself, permits but one conclusion: Pedestrians who trek upon Michigan highways must and do venture beyond the protective mandates of MCL 691.1402(1); MSA 3.996(102)(1).7
The exclusion of crosswalks from the highway exception is consistent with the idea underlying the highway exception—that drivers of vehicles should be able to keep their minds on the traffic, and should not have to worry that dangerous [138] surprises lie ahead. Pedestrians are situated differently than vehicular traffic, which may approach obstacles in the highway too quickly to avoid them, or may avoid obstacles only by jeopardizing traffic in the adjoining lanes.
This legislative line drawing is also explicable on the ground that expanding the right to sue past a certain point does not prevent accidents, and amounts to nothing more than an expanded obligation to pay.8 The Legislature may well have concluded that governmental liability for injuries to pedestrians crossing the street will not enhance vehicular safety.
iii
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Boyle, J.
The question presented is whether a governmental agency is immune from liability arising out of an accident involving a driver who drove through a red light near an elementary school and a ten-year-old student who had raced into the street. The student and his mother sued Wayne County on the theory that it was negligent because it failed to post school warning signs on that street. We hold that the trial court should have granted the defendant’s motion for summary disposition on the ground of governmental immunity.
i
This case arises out of an accident that occurred on June 10, 1987, at the intersection of Outer Drive and Mendota in the City of Detroit. The plaintiff, Anthony Mason, who was engaged in a [133] race with a friend, ran out into the street and struck the side of a car that had just run the red light at the intersection. He sustained a closed head or traumatic brain injury.
Anthony Mason and his mother sued numerous defendants. Count v of the plaintiffs’ sixth amended complaint alleged that the City of Detroit, Wayne County, and their employees breached their duties pursuant to MCL 691.1402; MSA 3.996(102) to maintain the streets and the intersection in reasonable repair. The complaint alleged that the defendants failed to install stop signs, a pedestrian overhead walkway, a flashing red stoplight, school advance signs, school crossing signs, school speed limit signs, and school pavement markings.
Before trial, the plaintiffs settled with the driver of the automobile. In addition, the court granted defendant City of Detroit’s motion for summary disposition on the ground that the county had exclusive jurisdiction over the streets in question. Defendant Wayne County’s motion for summary disposition on the basis of governmental immunity was denied.
The plaintiffs proceeded to trial against both Wayne County and the crossing guard who was stationed at the intersection. The jury found in favor of the crossing guard, but against Wayne County and awarded the plaintiffs two million dollars in damages.1
Both the plaintiffs and Wayne County appealed. The Court of Appeals resolved several issues, all in favor of the plaintiff. With respect to governmental immunity, the Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling denying the county’s motion for summary [134] disposition. It reasoned that the duty to repair and maintain the highway "includes the duty to post adequate traffic signage, including school signs, because they serve an integral part of the highway designed for vehicular travel.” Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued June 11, 1992 (Docket No. 127003), slip op, p 6.
The county appealed, and we granted leave to appeal. 442 Mich 924 (1993).2
ii
By statute, governmental agencies are immune from tort liability while engaging in a governmental function, except activities that fall within one of the narrowly drawn exceptions. See MCL 691.1407; MSA 3.996(107); Ross v Consumers Power Co (On Rehearing.), 420 Mich 567, 618; 363 NW2d 641 (1984). This case involves the highway exception. See MCL 691.1402(1); MSA 3.996(102)(1).3
[135] Defendant Wayne County argues that it cannot be liable under the highway exception for failing to install school warning signs because a school crossing is not a danger to vehicles and the vehicle passengers. We agree. The plaintiffs’ action does not fall within the highway exception because a school does not present a special danger to vehicles. The highway exception abrogates governmental immunity except at "points of special danger to motorists . . . .” Grof v Michigan, 126 Mich App 427, 434; 337 NW2d 345 (1983); Comerica Bank of Kalamazoo v Dep’t of Transportation, 168 Mich App 84, 86; 424 NW2d 2 (1987).4 The plaintiffs’ argument that prior decisions abrogate governmental immunity for all "traffic control devices,” which include signs, reads those decisions far too expansively. The cases cited by the plaintiff involve signs warning vehicular traffic as opposed to pedestrians.
The highway exception specifically excepts the state and counties from liability for defects in crosswalks, the defect alleged by the plaintiff: "[t]he duty of the state and county road commissions to repair and maintain highways, and the liability therefor, shall extend only to the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel and shall not include sidewalks, crosswalks, or any other installation outside of the [136] improved portion . . . .”5 That limiting sentence definitively excludes from the exception specific installations whose only rational purposes narrowly service the unique needs of pedestrians.6 As [137] we explained in Roy v Dep’t of Transportation, 428 Mich 330, 336; 408 NW2d 783 (1987), "the exclusion of sidewalks, crosswalks, and other installations from the duty of maintenance and repair, reflects a [legislative] conclusion that pedestrians and users of these installations have been sufficiently protected by the separation of them from motorists, without any need to impose a duty of maintenance and repair enforced by liability for resultant injuries.” The fact that liability under the statute does not extend to those using the excluded installations may seem harsh. However, the phrase "designed for vehicular travel” can only be reasonably interpreted to mean "intended for vehicular travel.” The explicit removal of exclusively pedestrian installations from the highway exception, coupled with the express language of the provision itself, permits but one conclusion: Pedestrians who trek upon Michigan highways must and do venture beyond the protective mandates of MCL 691.1402(1); MSA 3.996(102)(1).7
The exclusion of crosswalks from the highway exception is consistent with the idea underlying the highway exception—that drivers of vehicles should be able to keep their minds on the traffic, and should not have to worry that dangerous [138] surprises lie ahead. Pedestrians are situated differently than vehicular traffic, which may approach obstacles in the highway too quickly to avoid them, or may avoid obstacles only by jeopardizing traffic in the adjoining lanes.
This legislative line drawing is also explicable on the ground that expanding the right to sue past a certain point does not prevent accidents, and amounts to nothing more than an expanded obligation to pay.8 The Legislature may well have concluded that governmental liability for injuries to pedestrians crossing the street will not enhance vehicular safety.
iii
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and hold that the trial court erred when it denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss on the basis of governmental immunity. The case is remanded to the trial court with instructions to grant the defendant’s motion for summary disposition on the ground of governmental immunity._
[139] Brickley, Riley, and Griffin, JJ., concurred with Boyle, J.
Each governmental agency having jurisdiction over any highway shall maintain the highway in reasonable repair so that it is reasonably safe and convenient for public travel. Any person sustaining bodily injury or damage to his or her property by reason of failure of any governmental agency to keep any highway under its jurisdiction in reasonable repair, and in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel, may recover the damages suffered by him or her from the governmental agency. The liability, procedure and remedy as to county roads under the jurisdiction of a county road commission shall be as provided in section 21 of chapter IV of Act. No. 283 of the Public Acts of. 1909, as amended, being section 224.21 of the Michigan Compiled Laws. The duty of the state and county road commissions to repair and maintain highways, and the liability therefor, shall extend only to the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel and shall not include sidewalks, crosswalks, or any other installation outside of the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel. No action shall be brought against the state under this section except for [135] injury or loss suffered on or after July 1, 1965. Any judgment against the state based on a claim arising under this section from acts or omissions of the state transportation department shall be payable only from restricted funds appropriated to the state transportation department or funds provided by its insurer.
(a) That part of a roadway at an intersection included within the connections of the lateral lines of the sidewalks on opposite sides of the highway measured from the curbs, or in the absence of curbs from the edges of the traversable highway.
(b) Any portion of a highway at an intersection or elsewhere distinctly indicated for pedestrian crossing by lines or other markings on the surface. [MCL 257.10; MSA 9.1810.]
This Court assumes that the Legislature intended to give terms in the governmental immunity act the same meaning as they have in the Motor Vehicle Code. See Roy v Dep’t of Transportation, 428 Mich 330, 338-340; 408 NW2d 783 (1987). Other sources also define "Crosswalk” as "a lane, usually marked, for pedestrians crossing a street or highway.” See The Random House College Dictionary. A crosswalk should not be confused with a "pedestrian overhead walkway.” Cf. MCL 257.627a(3); MSA 9.2327(1)(3). Unless the word is to be read out of existence, governmental agencies do not owe a duty to pedestrians in crosswalks. Pedestrians crossing outside crosswalks face the additional hurdle of comparative negligence.
It is hereby made the duty of the counties to keep in reasonable repair, so that they shall be reasonably safe and convenient for public travel, all county roads, bridges and culverts that are within their jurisdiction and under their care and control and which are open to public travel. The provisions of law respecting the liability of townships, cities, villages and corporations for damages for injuries resulting from a failure in the performance of the same duty respecting roads under their control, shall apply to counties adopting such county road system.
with 1948 CL 242.1:
Any person or persons sustaining bodily injury ... by reason of neglect to keep such public highways or streets, and all bridges, sidewalks, cross walks and culverts on the same in reasonable repair, and in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel by the township, village, city or corporation whose [137] corporate authority extends over such public highway, street, bridge, sidewalk, crosswalk or culvert, and whose duty it is to keep the same in reasonable repair ....