Marroquin v. Canales

236 F.R.D. 257, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49348, 2006 WL 1892424
CourtDistrict Court, D. Maryland
DecidedJune 30, 2006
DocketCiv. No. CCB-05-3393
StatusPublished
Cited by24 cases

This text of 236 F.R.D. 257 (Marroquin v. Canales) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Maryland primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Marroquin v. Canales, 236 F.R.D. 257, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49348, 2006 WL 1892424 (D. Md. 2006).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM

BLAKE, District Judge.

Now pending before the court are plaintiffs’ motion to authorize this case to proceed as a collective action and for expedited notice to prospective class members pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (docket entry no. 10), as well as plaintiffs’ amended proposed notice plan (docket entry no. 20, Exhibit A) The issues have been fully briefed and no hearing is necessary. Local Rule 105.6. For the reasons that follow, the plaintiffs’ motion will be granted and the amended proposed notice plan will be approved.

BACKGROUND

This Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”)1 action arises out of the defendants’2 hiring of day laborers, almost exclusively Latino immigrant men of limited education, income and resources, in September and October of 2005 to perform debris removal work following Hurricane Katrina.3 Between September 9, 2005 and September 15, 2005 — and possibly over a longer period of time' — defendants recruited these day laborers from various locations in Prince George’s County.4 Apparently making multiple trips, Canales immediately transported these day laborers in vans to Mississippi to begin work. They were hired with the understanding that they would receive free transportation and lodging and be paid $10 per hour. (See Def s Opp’n at p. 1) Driving through the night, plaintiffs allege that they began work upon their arrival at sunup. Although the accounts vary slightly, plaintiffs allege — and it appears not to be contested — that they were housed, in some cases, first in tents, and then later moved to either trailers or apartments, allegedly sleeping 12 to 16 to a trailer, four to six to a room. (See, e.g., Mot. for Exp. Notice, Ex. C, Chiroy Aff. at 11; Ex. D, Vega Aff. at 8; Ex. E, Perez Aff. at 10; Ex. F, Hernandez Aff. at 12; Ex. G, Hernandez Aff. at 11 & 12; Ex. H, Leiva Aff. at 6; Ex I, Tubac Aff. at 17; Ex. J, Rodas Aff. at 14; Ex. K, Rodriguez Aff. at 18) The work consisted mainly of debris removal from casinos and, according to the defendants, lasted until Oc[259]*259tober 23, 2005.5 The laborers allegedly worked long days with no days off. (See, e.g., Mot. for Exp. Notice, Ex. C, Chiroy Aff. at 15; Ex. G, Hernandez Aff. at 15; Ex. K, Rodriguez Aff. at 14 & 15).

The named plaintiffs, thirty-seven of these day laborers, filed this collective action on behalf of themselves and similarly situated individuals, claiming defendants failed to pay the federal minimum wage and overtime, and failed to advise the workers of their rights as required under the FLSA and Maryland law. It is alleged that defendants made no mention of — nor paid — any overtime, and that many of the paychecks bounced.6 The parties generally agree that the entire potential class consists of approximately 150 laborers. The parties do not agree, however, on the current location of, or how difficult it will be to identify, the approximately 113 unidentified and allegedly aggrieved individuals. Nor do they agree on the means necessary to identify and adequately notify them of this action. The preliminary issues to be addressed, then, are whether proceeding as a collective action and providing court approved notice to potential class members are appropriate.7

ANALYSIS

Title 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)8 establishes an “opt-in” scheme whereby potential plaintiffs must affirmatively notify the court of their intention to become a party to the collective action. To effectuate the remedial purpose of the act, it is well settled that district courts have the discretion, in appropriate eases, to allow such claims to proceed as a collective action and to facilitate notice to potential plaintiffs. See Camper v. Home Quality Management Inc., 200 F.R.D. 516, 519 (D.Md.2000)(citing Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 169, 110 S.Ct. 482, 107 L.Ed.2d 480 (1989)).9 The question is whether such a collective action and notice are appropriate in this case.

While the inquiry at this stage is less stringent than the ultimate determination whether the class is properly constituted, see Jackson v. New York Telephone Co., 163 F.R.D. 429, 431 (S.D.N.Y.1995), and is often articulated as requiring only a relatively modest factual showing, see D'Anna v. M/A-COM, Inc., 903 F.Supp. 889, 894 (D.Md.1995), mere allegations in the complaint are not sufficient. See Camper, 200 F.R.D. at 519. An adequate factual showing by affidavit, however, may suffice to show that a similarly situated group of potential plaintiffs exists. See id.; see also Realite v. Ark Restaurants Corp., 7 F.Supp.2d 303, 307-08 [260]*260(S.D.N.Y.1998)(holding that ten affidavits submitted by plaintiffs alleging failures to pay overtime or use time clocks or sign-in sheets constituted a sufficient factual showing). A group of potential plaintiffs are “similarly situated” when they together were victims of a common policy or scheme or plan that violated the law. See Jackson, 163 F.R.D. at 432.

First, the plaintiffs have made an adequate showing that there were other yet-unidentified co-workers in the same position.10 Moreover, Canales does not contest that this is the case.11 The fact that there are, at least, approximately 113 unidentified co-workers who were in the same position weighs heavily in favor of allowing this case to proceed as a collective action and allowing a notice plan to move forward.12 Second, plaintiffs have put forth adequate evidence that the day laborers working for the defendants were subjected to the same FLSA violations.13 For example, one plaintiff avers that, immediately upon arrival, one group of workers told him that they had already been working for three weeks and had not been paid at all. {See Mot. for Exp. Notice, Ex. C, Chiroy Aff. at 10) Moreover, the submitted affidavits consistently tell of underpayment, unpaid overtime, and bounced paychecks.14 While courts often find the presence of a company-wide policy as key to the approval of court facilitated notice, see D'Anna, 903 F.Supp. at 894, here, plaintiffs cannot reason[261]*261ably be expected to have evidence of a stated policy of issuing bad checks or refusing to pay overtime.15

Third, plaintiffs also have demonstrated that there likely are class members who are not presently in the Prince George’s County area, and who, whether or not they are still in that area, would be difficult to contact.16 For example, plaintiffs aver that they are aware of how to contact only a few of their co-workers from the job in question and that they believe many returned to other states, such as Kentucky, Missouri, and Texas, or their respective home countries, such as Mexico. (See, e.g., Mot. for Exp. Notice, Ex. C, Chiroy Aff. at 16; Ex. D, Vega Aff. at 14; Ex. E, Perez Aff. at 12 & 17; Ex. F, Hernandez Aff. at 12 & 15; Ex. G, Hernandez Aff. at 20; Ex. H, Leiva Aff.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
236 F.R.D. 257, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49348, 2006 WL 1892424, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/marroquin-v-canales-mdd-2006.