MEMORANDUM
BLAKE, District Judge.
Now pending before the court are plaintiffs’ motion to authorize this case to proceed as a collective action and for expedited notice to prospective class members pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (docket entry no. 10), as well as plaintiffs’ amended proposed notice plan (docket entry no. 20, Exhibit A) The issues have been fully briefed and no hearing is necessary. Local Rule 105.6. For the reasons that follow, the plaintiffs’ motion will be granted and the amended proposed notice plan will be approved.
BACKGROUND
This Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”)1 action arises out of the defendants’2 hiring of day laborers, almost exclusively Latino immigrant men of limited education, income and resources, in September and October of 2005 to perform debris removal work following Hurricane Katrina.3 Between September 9, 2005 and September 15, 2005 — and possibly over a longer period of time' — defendants recruited these day laborers from various locations in Prince George’s County.4 Apparently making multiple trips, Canales immediately transported these day laborers in vans to Mississippi to begin work. They were hired with the understanding that they would receive free transportation and lodging and be paid $10 per hour. (See Def s Opp’n at p. 1) Driving through the night, plaintiffs allege that they began work upon their arrival at sunup. Although the accounts vary slightly, plaintiffs allege — and it appears not to be contested — that they were housed, in some cases, first in tents, and then later moved to either trailers or apartments, allegedly sleeping 12 to 16 to a trailer, four to six to a room. (See, e.g., Mot. for Exp. Notice, Ex. C, Chiroy Aff. at 11; Ex. D, Vega Aff. at 8; Ex. E, Perez Aff. at 10; Ex. F, Hernandez Aff. at 12; Ex. G, Hernandez Aff. at 11 & 12; Ex. H, Leiva Aff. at 6; Ex I, Tubac Aff. at 17; Ex. J, Rodas Aff. at 14; Ex. K, Rodriguez Aff. at 18) The work consisted mainly of debris removal from casinos and, according to the defendants, lasted until Oc[259]*259tober 23, 2005.5 The laborers allegedly worked long days with no days off. (See, e.g., Mot. for Exp. Notice, Ex. C, Chiroy Aff. at 15; Ex. G, Hernandez Aff. at 15; Ex. K, Rodriguez Aff. at 14 & 15).
The named plaintiffs, thirty-seven of these day laborers, filed this collective action on behalf of themselves and similarly situated individuals, claiming defendants failed to pay the federal minimum wage and overtime, and failed to advise the workers of their rights as required under the FLSA and Maryland law. It is alleged that defendants made no mention of — nor paid — any overtime, and that many of the paychecks bounced.6 The parties generally agree that the entire potential class consists of approximately 150 laborers. The parties do not agree, however, on the current location of, or how difficult it will be to identify, the approximately 113 unidentified and allegedly aggrieved individuals. Nor do they agree on the means necessary to identify and adequately notify them of this action. The preliminary issues to be addressed, then, are whether proceeding as a collective action and providing court approved notice to potential class members are appropriate.7
ANALYSIS
Title 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)8 establishes an “opt-in” scheme whereby potential plaintiffs must affirmatively notify the court of their intention to become a party to the collective action. To effectuate the remedial purpose of the act, it is well settled that district courts have the discretion, in appropriate eases, to allow such claims to proceed as a collective action and to facilitate notice to potential plaintiffs. See Camper v. Home Quality Management Inc., 200 F.R.D. 516, 519 (D.Md.2000)(citing Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 169, 110 S.Ct. 482, 107 L.Ed.2d 480 (1989)).9 The question is whether such a collective action and notice are appropriate in this case.
While the inquiry at this stage is less stringent than the ultimate determination whether the class is properly constituted, see Jackson v. New York Telephone Co., 163 F.R.D. 429, 431 (S.D.N.Y.1995), and is often articulated as requiring only a relatively modest factual showing, see D'Anna v. M/A-COM, Inc., 903 F.Supp. 889, 894 (D.Md.1995), mere allegations in the complaint are not sufficient. See Camper, 200 F.R.D. at 519. An adequate factual showing by affidavit, however, may suffice to show that a similarly situated group of potential plaintiffs exists. See id.; see also Realite v. Ark Restaurants Corp., 7 F.Supp.2d 303, 307-08 [260]*260(S.D.N.Y.1998)(holding that ten affidavits submitted by plaintiffs alleging failures to pay overtime or use time clocks or sign-in sheets constituted a sufficient factual showing). A group of potential plaintiffs are “similarly situated” when they together were victims of a common policy or scheme or plan that violated the law. See Jackson, 163 F.R.D. at 432.
First, the plaintiffs have made an adequate showing that there were other yet-unidentified co-workers in the same position.10 Moreover, Canales does not contest that this is the case.11 The fact that there are, at least, approximately 113 unidentified co-workers who were in the same position weighs heavily in favor of allowing this case to proceed as a collective action and allowing a notice plan to move forward.12 Second, plaintiffs have put forth adequate evidence that the day laborers working for the defendants were subjected to the same FLSA violations.13 For example, one plaintiff avers that, immediately upon arrival, one group of workers told him that they had already been working for three weeks and had not been paid at all. {See Mot. for Exp. Notice, Ex. C, Chiroy Aff. at 10) Moreover, the submitted affidavits consistently tell of underpayment, unpaid overtime, and bounced paychecks.14 While courts often find the presence of a company-wide policy as key to the approval of court facilitated notice, see D'Anna, 903 F.Supp. at 894, here, plaintiffs cannot reason[261]*261ably be expected to have evidence of a stated policy of issuing bad checks or refusing to pay overtime.15
Third, plaintiffs also have demonstrated that there likely are class members who are not presently in the Prince George’s County area, and who, whether or not they are still in that area, would be difficult to contact.16 For example, plaintiffs aver that they are aware of how to contact only a few of their co-workers from the job in question and that they believe many returned to other states, such as Kentucky, Missouri, and Texas, or their respective home countries, such as Mexico. (See, e.g., Mot. for Exp. Notice, Ex. C, Chiroy Aff. at 16; Ex. D, Vega Aff. at 14; Ex. E, Perez Aff. at 12 & 17; Ex. F, Hernandez Aff. at 12 & 15; Ex. G, Hernandez Aff. at 20; Ex. H, Leiva Aff.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
MEMORANDUM
BLAKE, District Judge.
Now pending before the court are plaintiffs’ motion to authorize this case to proceed as a collective action and for expedited notice to prospective class members pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (docket entry no. 10), as well as plaintiffs’ amended proposed notice plan (docket entry no. 20, Exhibit A) The issues have been fully briefed and no hearing is necessary. Local Rule 105.6. For the reasons that follow, the plaintiffs’ motion will be granted and the amended proposed notice plan will be approved.
BACKGROUND
This Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”)1 action arises out of the defendants’2 hiring of day laborers, almost exclusively Latino immigrant men of limited education, income and resources, in September and October of 2005 to perform debris removal work following Hurricane Katrina.3 Between September 9, 2005 and September 15, 2005 — and possibly over a longer period of time' — defendants recruited these day laborers from various locations in Prince George’s County.4 Apparently making multiple trips, Canales immediately transported these day laborers in vans to Mississippi to begin work. They were hired with the understanding that they would receive free transportation and lodging and be paid $10 per hour. (See Def s Opp’n at p. 1) Driving through the night, plaintiffs allege that they began work upon their arrival at sunup. Although the accounts vary slightly, plaintiffs allege — and it appears not to be contested — that they were housed, in some cases, first in tents, and then later moved to either trailers or apartments, allegedly sleeping 12 to 16 to a trailer, four to six to a room. (See, e.g., Mot. for Exp. Notice, Ex. C, Chiroy Aff. at 11; Ex. D, Vega Aff. at 8; Ex. E, Perez Aff. at 10; Ex. F, Hernandez Aff. at 12; Ex. G, Hernandez Aff. at 11 & 12; Ex. H, Leiva Aff. at 6; Ex I, Tubac Aff. at 17; Ex. J, Rodas Aff. at 14; Ex. K, Rodriguez Aff. at 18) The work consisted mainly of debris removal from casinos and, according to the defendants, lasted until Oc[259]*259tober 23, 2005.5 The laborers allegedly worked long days with no days off. (See, e.g., Mot. for Exp. Notice, Ex. C, Chiroy Aff. at 15; Ex. G, Hernandez Aff. at 15; Ex. K, Rodriguez Aff. at 14 & 15).
The named plaintiffs, thirty-seven of these day laborers, filed this collective action on behalf of themselves and similarly situated individuals, claiming defendants failed to pay the federal minimum wage and overtime, and failed to advise the workers of their rights as required under the FLSA and Maryland law. It is alleged that defendants made no mention of — nor paid — any overtime, and that many of the paychecks bounced.6 The parties generally agree that the entire potential class consists of approximately 150 laborers. The parties do not agree, however, on the current location of, or how difficult it will be to identify, the approximately 113 unidentified and allegedly aggrieved individuals. Nor do they agree on the means necessary to identify and adequately notify them of this action. The preliminary issues to be addressed, then, are whether proceeding as a collective action and providing court approved notice to potential class members are appropriate.7
ANALYSIS
Title 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)8 establishes an “opt-in” scheme whereby potential plaintiffs must affirmatively notify the court of their intention to become a party to the collective action. To effectuate the remedial purpose of the act, it is well settled that district courts have the discretion, in appropriate eases, to allow such claims to proceed as a collective action and to facilitate notice to potential plaintiffs. See Camper v. Home Quality Management Inc., 200 F.R.D. 516, 519 (D.Md.2000)(citing Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 169, 110 S.Ct. 482, 107 L.Ed.2d 480 (1989)).9 The question is whether such a collective action and notice are appropriate in this case.
While the inquiry at this stage is less stringent than the ultimate determination whether the class is properly constituted, see Jackson v. New York Telephone Co., 163 F.R.D. 429, 431 (S.D.N.Y.1995), and is often articulated as requiring only a relatively modest factual showing, see D'Anna v. M/A-COM, Inc., 903 F.Supp. 889, 894 (D.Md.1995), mere allegations in the complaint are not sufficient. See Camper, 200 F.R.D. at 519. An adequate factual showing by affidavit, however, may suffice to show that a similarly situated group of potential plaintiffs exists. See id.; see also Realite v. Ark Restaurants Corp., 7 F.Supp.2d 303, 307-08 [260]*260(S.D.N.Y.1998)(holding that ten affidavits submitted by plaintiffs alleging failures to pay overtime or use time clocks or sign-in sheets constituted a sufficient factual showing). A group of potential plaintiffs are “similarly situated” when they together were victims of a common policy or scheme or plan that violated the law. See Jackson, 163 F.R.D. at 432.
First, the plaintiffs have made an adequate showing that there were other yet-unidentified co-workers in the same position.10 Moreover, Canales does not contest that this is the case.11 The fact that there are, at least, approximately 113 unidentified co-workers who were in the same position weighs heavily in favor of allowing this case to proceed as a collective action and allowing a notice plan to move forward.12 Second, plaintiffs have put forth adequate evidence that the day laborers working for the defendants were subjected to the same FLSA violations.13 For example, one plaintiff avers that, immediately upon arrival, one group of workers told him that they had already been working for three weeks and had not been paid at all. {See Mot. for Exp. Notice, Ex. C, Chiroy Aff. at 10) Moreover, the submitted affidavits consistently tell of underpayment, unpaid overtime, and bounced paychecks.14 While courts often find the presence of a company-wide policy as key to the approval of court facilitated notice, see D'Anna, 903 F.Supp. at 894, here, plaintiffs cannot reason[261]*261ably be expected to have evidence of a stated policy of issuing bad checks or refusing to pay overtime.15
Third, plaintiffs also have demonstrated that there likely are class members who are not presently in the Prince George’s County area, and who, whether or not they are still in that area, would be difficult to contact.16 For example, plaintiffs aver that they are aware of how to contact only a few of their co-workers from the job in question and that they believe many returned to other states, such as Kentucky, Missouri, and Texas, or their respective home countries, such as Mexico. (See, e.g., Mot. for Exp. Notice, Ex. C, Chiroy Aff. at 16; Ex. D, Vega Aff. at 14; Ex. E, Perez Aff. at 12 & 17; Ex. F, Hernandez Aff. at 12 & 15; Ex. G, Hernandez Aff. at 20; Ex. H, Leiva Aff. at 13; Ex I, Tubac Aff. at 17 & 19; Ex. J, Rodas Aff. at 21; Ex. K, Rodriguez Aff. at 22) Moreover, several of the named plaintiffs testified that they themselves have changed apartments and phone numbers since returning from Mississippi. (See, e.g., Mot. for Exp. Notice, Ex. C, Chi-roy Aff. at 18; Ex. E, Perez Aff. at 16; Ex. F, Hernandez Aff. at 19; Ex. G, Hernandez Aff. at 19; Ex. J, Rodas Aff. at 20) Plaintiffs also are fairly consistent in their testimony that the defendants never had them complete any official paperwork which might contain reliable contact information, but rather only collected names for a daily “roll-call.”17 It is clear that some outreach efforts may be necessary to provide adequate notice to the potential class members.18
Thirty-seven named plaintiffs seek to represent what is, by plaintiffs’ own account, a class of only approximately 150 potential plaintiffs. While the relatively small number of “missing” plaintiffs does not affect the court’s view that an adequate factual showing for proceeding as a collective action has been made, it does suggest that a more limited notification plan, which could be expanded as needed, is appropriate.19 To that end, the [262]*262court finds that the plaintiffs’ amended proposed notice plan provides a reasonable starting point. The amended notice plan (“the plan”) will be approved in its entirety. (See docket entry no. 20, Exhibit A) As a preliminary matter, defendants should, pursuant to the June 21, 2006 conference call with the court, already be making efforts to locate as many laborers as possible. Defendants should provide the court with a status report on these efforts by July 21, 2006. The success of these efforts, along with the initial notice efforts authorized today, may limit or eliminate the need for more extensive notification.
In the meantime, an initial phase of notification may begin. The court approves plaintiffs’ amended proposed notice plan in its entirety. Additionally, to the extent residential addresses for any of the potential class members are located, direct mailings to those individuals is also authorized.20 At this stage, the plan remains geographically limited, except in the instances where plaintiffs have reliable information that a particular potential plaintiff or plaintiffs can be notified at a particular out-of-area address.21 This notification effort is warranted in light of the testimony produced, the importance of adequate notification in an “opt-in” regime such as this, the nature of this population and the defendants’ apparent failure to maintain adequate records. Based on the foregoing, this case may proceed as a collective action, and notification, pursuant to the amended proposed notice plan and attached order, is authorized.
A separate order follows.
ORDER
For the reasons stated in the accompanying Memorandum, it is hereby ORDERED that:
1. the plaintiffs’ motion to authorize this case to proceed as a collective action (docket entry no. 10) is Granted;
2. the plaintiffs’ amended notice plan is Approved in its entirety (See docket entry no. 20, Exhibit A);
3. defendants shall continue to provide plaintiffs with any discovered additional contact information for the potential class members in question; and
4. The parties shall file, by July 21, 2006, a status report detailing their efforts consistent with this order.