Marlin Oil Corp. v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co.

700 F. Supp. 1076, 108 Oil & Gas Rep. 519, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13960, 1988 WL 130267
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Oklahoma
DecidedDecember 7, 1988
DocketCIV-87-1944-A
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 700 F. Supp. 1076 (Marlin Oil Corp. v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Oklahoma primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Marlin Oil Corp. v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 700 F. Supp. 1076, 108 Oil & Gas Rep. 519, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13960, 1988 WL 130267 (W.D. Okla. 1988).

Opinion

ORDER

ALLEY, District Judge.

The defendant, Colorado Interstate Gas Company (CIG), moves the Court under the Federal Arbitration Act to stay the proceedings on the plaintiffs’ fifth cause of action Generally, in the fifth cause of action, the plaintiffs allege that CIG is liable for breach of contract because CIG failed to adequately compensate the plaintiffs for deregulated gas under the pricing formula of two take-or-pay contracts. 1 As relief, the plaintiffs demand judgment against CIG for the deficiency under the two contracts. Alternatively, the plaintiffs request a declaratory judgment on certain issues that are largely determinative of their contractual rights to payment from CIG. For the reasons noted below, the Court grants the defendant’s motion.

I.

At the heart of this dispute are the arbitration provisions of two take-or-pay contracts between the defendant, CIG, and the plaintiffs. The parties executed the two contracts in 1978, one in December and the other in April. They generally provide for CIG’s purchase of certain quantities of natural gas from the plaintiffs. In identical language, the contracts anticipate the deregulation of natural gas prices. They specify that, in the event of deregulation, the sales price of the natural gas is to be the average of the “two highest prices” being paid by companies in the industry for gas of “substantially the same quality and comparable terms and conditions,” ninety days after deregulation in specified Oklahoma counties. 2

*1078 II.

As the foundation for its motion, the defendant directs the Court to the Federal Arbitration Act. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-4 (1982). In part, the Act targets the problems of delay and expense that are generally associated with courtroom litigation by making arbitration agreements enforceable against contractual parties. See In re Mercury Construc. Corp. v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 656 F.2d 933, 938-39 (4th Cir.1981) (en banc), aff'd, 460 U.S. 1, 103 S.Ct. 927, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983); Hanes Corp. v. Millard, 531 F.2d 585, 597 (D.C.Cir.1976); Collins Radio Co. v. Ex-Cello Corp., 467 F.2d 995, 998 (8th Cir.1972). As long recognized by the courts, the Federal Arbitration Act embodies a “strong pro-arbitration policy.” Tai Ping Ins. Co. v. M/V Warschau, 731 F.2d 1141, 1144 (5th Cir.1984); see, e.g., Hart v. Orion Ins. Co., 453 F.2d 1358, 1360 (10th Cir.1971); Note, Arbitrability of Disputes Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 71 Iowa L.Rev. 1137, 1143 (1986).

Section 3 of the Arbitration Act authorizes federal courts to stay judicial proceedings as to particular issues when the courts are satisfied that the issues are indeed “referable to arbitration,” and the applicants for stays are not in “default.” 9 U.S.C. § 3. 3 Therefore, in ruling on the defendant’s motion, the Court must focus on two issues: (1) arbitrability; and (2) waiver. See C. Itoh & Co. v. Jordan International Co., 552 F.2d 1228, 1231 (7th Cir.1977); Pioneer Supply Co. v. American Meter Co., 484 F.Supp. 227, 229 (W.D.Okla.1979); see also M. Domke, Commercial Arbitration § 19.01, at 276 (1984) (noting that a court “must stay the action once it finds the dispute is referable to arbitration and no other impediments prevent the application of the arbitration clause”). These two issues are addressed in turn.

A. Arbitrability

The plaintiffs contend that a stay of the fifth cause of action would be erroneous because the conditions for invoking the contractual arbitration clauses have not been satisfied. According to the plaintiffs, by their terms the arbitration provisions are only activated by a dispute between the parties over the “two highest prices” and the practical meaning of “substantially the same quality and comparable terms and conditions.” Here, argue the plaintiffs, the limited nature of the communication between the parties has not provided the basis for a dispute regarding these two factors. The defendant has not unilaterally attempted to redetermine the natural gas price, nor has the defendant communicated to the plaintiffs its understanding of the highest-price and substantially-the-same components of the price term. Thus, the plaintiffs contend that there is no ripe arbitrable dispute.

The Court finds, however, that the plaintiffs’ interpretation of the two arbitration clauses is overly narrow, given the potent bias of the Arbitration Act in favor of arbitration. To effectuate the Act’s policy, the courts generally give a “liberal reading to arbitration agreements.” Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Construc. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 22 n. 27, 103 S.Ct. *1079 927, 940 n. 27, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983). That is, they resolve all doubts regarding the arbitrability of issues in favor of arbitration. See Prudential Lines, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 704 F.2d 59, 63 (2d Cir.1983); Brener v. Becker Paribas Inc., 628 F.Supp. 442, 451 (S.D.N.Y.1985); Domke, supra, § 12.02, at 155 (noting “the trend in modern arbitration law that whenever possible, arbitration should be favored”). With little difficulty, the Court may read the language of the arbitration clauses at issue as encompassing all disputes between the parties involving the determination of the “fair value” of the plaintiffs’ deregulated gas.

Under the two arbitration clauses, the arbitrators’ task is to arrive at a determination regarding the “fair value” of the deregulated natural gas. The two central determinations that make up the “fair value” go to the highest-price and substantially-the-same factors. The clauses’ drafters recognized the importance of these two factors and chose to highlight them. Such contractual emphasis, however, does not suggest an intent to exclude other issues arising in connection with the determination of “fair value.” 4

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700 F. Supp. 1076, 108 Oil & Gas Rep. 519, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13960, 1988 WL 130267, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/marlin-oil-corp-v-colorado-interstate-gas-co-okwd-1988.