[Cite as Maanu v. Bobie, 2024-Ohio-2395.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
BUTLER COUNTY
REGINA MAANU, :
Appellee, : CASE NO. CA2024-01-002
: OPINION - vs - 6/24/2024 :
FRANCIS BOBIE, :
Appellant. :
CIVIL APPEAL FROM BUTLER COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS DOMESTIC RELATIONS DIVISION Case No. DR20090633
Zachary D. Smith, LLC, and Zachary D. Smith, for appellee.
Smith, Meier & Webb, LPA, and Mark D. Webb, for appellant.
S. POWELL, P.J.
{¶ 1} Appellant, Francis Bobie ("Husband"), appeals a decision of the Butler
County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division. Specifically, Husband
challenges the trial court's classification of certain debts as non-marital although they
were incurred during the marriage. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the decision of
the trial court. Butler CA2024-01-002
{¶ 2} Husband and appellee, Regina Maanu ("Wife"), were married on August 10,
1992. Thereafter, on September 23, 2020, Wife filed a complaint for divorce against
Husband. The matter proceeded to a four-day final hearing, which concluded on May 20,
2022. During the final hearing, the trial court heard testimony from Husband, Wife, and
several additional witnesses regarding the parties' marital and separate property. On
August 31, 2022, the trial court rendered its decision on the various issues in dispute, and
the decree of divorce was journalized on December 6, 2022.
{¶ 3} In its decision, the trial court discussed the contested property issues, the
allocation of debts and expenses, child support, spousal support, and income. As
relevant here, the trial court divided the parties' marital and separate property and found
the total marital property equaled $4,904,097.56. The trial court ordered Husband to pay
Wife a lump sum property equalization payment in the amount of $922,591.13.
{¶ 4} In assessing the total marital property, the trial court considered the parties'
debts, including their consumer debt on several credit cards. Concerning the instant
appeal, the trial court allocated a $57,690.09 judgment in favor of American Express to
Husband, found that "Husband retain[ed] liability for any [other] debt he failed to disclose"
during the case, and held "[Wife] free and clear from any and all liability associated with
the same."
{¶ 5} Husband appealed from the trial court's decision, arguing, in part, that the
trial court erred in failing to address and allocate the following debts incurred during the
marriage:
(1) Discover Bank (credit card debt) for $15,681.44;
(2) Wells Fargo Vendor Financial Services ("Wells Fargo") for $112,687.95;
(3) PNC Core Visa ("PNC Visa") (credit card debt) for $10,334.58;
-2- Butler CA2024-01-002
(4) Capital One Mastercard (credit card debt) for $8,919.07;
(5) Liberty Mutual Insurance for $706.70; and
(6) UC Health for $312.
{¶ 6} Upon review, this court sustained Husband's assignment of error, and
determined that the trial court failed to address each of Husband's debts, did not
determine whether they were marital or separate debts, and did not allocate them in the
divorce decree. See Bobie v. Bobie, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2022-12-119, 2023-Ohio-
3293, ¶ 57 ("Bobie I"). Specifically, we found that
[b]oth parties submitted exhibit evidence of their respective debts at trial, and both briefly testified about their debts. * * * However, except for [Husband's] American Express debt, the trial court did not address [Husband's] debts, did not determine whether they were marital or separate debts, and did not allocate them in the divorce decree. * * * The trial court, therefore, erred by failing to address and allocate [Husband's] debts with Discover Bank, Wells Fargo Vendor Financial Services, PNC Visa, Capital One Mastercard, Liberty Mutual Insurance, and UC Health.
Id. As a result, we remanded the case for the trial court to address and allocate the six
debts specified above.
{¶ 7} On remand, the trial court reviewed the transcripts and evidence presented
at the final hearing and issued a decision and order in accordance with this court's remand
instructions. In its decision, the trial court concluded that Husband had accumulated
consumer debt on several credit cards and is the named defendant in several debt
collection lawsuits. The trial court detailed the debts at issue, including Husband's
accounts with Discover Bank, Wells Fargo, PNC Visa, Capital One Mastercard, Liberty
Mutual Insurance, and UC Health, and found that, aside from the UC Health debt, each
of the six debts were "all dated after the valuation date established by the court." The
trial court further found that Husband's" testimony concerning his debt lacked
-3- Butler CA2024-01-002
transparency, and that "Husband incurred the consumer debt beyond the valuation date
for personal, non-marital purposes." Thus, the court concluded that, aside from the
outstanding account with UC Health, the above outlined debt is Husband's separate debt
and he is solely responsible for the same.
{¶ 8} Based on the above, the trial court recalculated the total marital property
and ordered Husband to pay Wife a revised sum of $913,593.25 within 90 days of the
order. Husband now appeals the trial court's decision on remand and raises the following
assignment of error for our review:
{¶ 9} WHEN DISTRIBUTING MARITAL PROPERTY, THE TRIAL COURT
ERRED IN IGNORING THE COURT OF APPEAL'S REMANDED ORDER AND FAILING
TO DIVIDE MARITAL DEBT.
{¶ 10} On appeal, Husband claims the trial court erred in finding that consumer
debt in his name was incurred after the valuation date set by the trial court. According to
Husband, the valuation date established by the court was May 20, 2022, and each of the
debts were incurred prior to that date. As such, Husband concludes the trial court erred
in classifying the debts as separate, non-marital property, and in failing to divide it
between the parties.
{¶ 11} As we noted in Bobie I, after determining the status of the parties' property,
the court must generally disburse a spouse's separate property to that spouse and
equitably distribute the marital estate. R.C. 3105.171(B) and (D); Wilson v. Wilson, 12th
Dist. Warren No. CA2004-04-037, 2004-Ohio-6248, ¶ 5. "Although the statute does not
mention debt as an element of separate or marital property, the rules of marital assets
have consistently applied to marital and separate debt." Ohmer v. Renn-Ohmer, 12th
Dist. Butler No. CA2012-02-020, 2013-Ohio-330, ¶ 35. Debts incurred during the
marriage are presumed to be marital. Bobie I at ¶ 56. Thus, when debt is accumulated
-4- Butler CA2024-01-002
during the marriage, the burden is on the party seeking to have that debt classified as a
separate liability to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that such debt was
the separate obligation of the other spouse. Nichols-Ross v. Ross, 12th Dist. Butler No.
CA2008-03-090, 2009-Ohio-1723, ¶ 26.
{¶ 12} We review the trial court's classification of property and debt as marital or
separate under the manifest weight of the evidence standard. Cooper v. Cooper, 12th
Dist. Clermont No. CA2013-02-017, 2013-Ohio-4433, ¶ 13. The weight of the evidence
concerns "the greater amount of credible evidence, offered in a trial, to support one side
of the issue rather than the other." Casper v. Casper, 12th Dist. Warren Nos. CA2012-
12-128 and CA2012-12-129, 2013-Ohio-4329, ¶ 11. There is a presumption that the
findings of the trial court are correct, as the trial judge is "best able to view the witnesses
and observe their demeanor, gestures, and voice inflections, and use these observations
in weighing the credibility of the testimony." Id. Our analysis requires us to review the
evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of the witnesses, and
determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the finder of fact clearly lost its
way and created a manifest miscarriage of justice. Sieber v. Sieber, 12th Dist. Butler
Nos. CA2014-05-106 and CA2014-05-114, 2015-Ohio-2315, ¶ 19.
{¶ 13} In Bobie I, we remanded the case for the trial court to address and allocate
six of Husband's debts. Upon remand, the trial court did not conduct an additional hearing
but considered the evidence of Husband's debt presented at the final hearing, including
the hearing's transcripts and Exhibits S and TT. Relevant here, Exhibit S is a compilation
of Husband's debts, including the six debts at issue in the instant appeal, and reveals the
following details:
(1) a $15,681.44 judgment rendered against Husband in favor of Discover Bank on April 19, 2022;
-5- Butler CA2024-01-002
(2) a $112,687.95 judgment rendered against Husband in favor of Wells Fargo on March 29, 2022;
(3) PNC Visa credit card debt in the amount of $10,334.58 as of October 13, 2021;
(4) Capital One Mastercard credit card debt in the amount of $8,919.07 as of August 16, 2021;
(5) an account with Liberty Mutual Insurance in the amount of $706.70 as of October 5, 2021; and
(6) an account with UC Health in the amount of $312.00 for services rendered on October 20, 2020.
Husband claims each of these debts were incurred "during the marriage," and should
have been divided between the parties.
{¶ 14} The crux of Husband's assignment of error concerns the valuation date
established by the trial court. On appeal, Husband and Wife disagree as to the valuation
date selected by the trial court. Wife claims that in accordance with the court's Local Rule
DR 28(B)(2)(b), the trial court established December 31, 2020 as the date of valuation
and division of marital property. Pursuant to that rule, "[t]he valuation date of marital
property will be presumed the last day of the calendar quarter following the filing of the
complaint unless a party, at least seven (7) days prior to the pretrial, files a motion to
establish an alternate date." Wife filed for divorce on September 23, 2020, rendering the
last day of the following quarter to be December 31, 2020.
{¶ 15} Husband, on the other hand, claims the trial court established May 20, 2022,
i.e., the last day of the final hearing, as the valuation date. In support, Husband cites to
well-settled Ohio law, which states that, in "[g]eneral * * *, the proper date for the
termination of a marriage, for purposes of property division, is the date of the final divorce
hearing." Dellinger v. Dellinger, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2015-12-229, 2016-Ohio-4995,
¶ 20, citing Fillis v. Fillis, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2008-10-093, 2009-Ohio-2808, ¶ 8;
-6- Butler CA2024-01-002
see also Williams v. Williams, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2012-08-074, 2013-Ohio-3318, ¶
24. Husband also relies upon language from this court's decision in Bobie I, in which we
"unequivocally stated, 'these debts were all incurred during the duration of the marriage,
which the trial court determined to be from August 10, 1992, until May 20, 2022 (the date
of the final hearing).'"
{¶ 16} After our review of the record, we find Husband's claim regarding the
valuation date to be disingenuous given the history of the case, the arguments raised by
Husband in Bobie I, and the repeated references throughout the record to the December
31, 2020 date.
{¶ 17} First, although Husband is correct that the proper date for the termination
of a marriage, for purposes of property division, is generally the date of the final divorce
hearing, it is well settled that a trial court has discretion to establish an alternate valuation
date. This includes an alternate date set forth in the trial court's local rules. Dellinger at
¶ 19-24; Grow v. Grow, 12th Dist. Butler Nos. CA2010-08-209, CA2010-08-218, and
CA2010-11-301, 2012-Ohio-1680, ¶ 34-35. Specifically, "pursuant to R.C.
3105.171(A)(2)(b), if the [trial] court finds the time period between the date of the marriage
and the date of the final divorce hearing would be 'inequitable,' the [trial] court may select
dates that it considers equitable in determining marital property." Waligura v. Waligura,
12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2022-11-076, 2023-Ohio-3747, ¶ 30. To do this, the trial court
need not make an explicit "equitable" or "inequitable" finding. Vaughn v. Vaughn, 12th
Dist. Warren No. CA2021-08-078, 2022-Ohio-1805, ¶ 51. Rather, based on the plain
language of the statute, the trial court is merely required to "select dates that it considers
equitable in determining marital property" if the court determines that using either the date
of the marriage or the date of the final divorce hearing "would be inequitable." Id.
{¶ 18} In this case, Husband does not argue the trial court abused its discretion in
-7- Butler CA2024-01-002
selecting a certain valuation date. Instead, he emphasizes that the trial court determined
the duration of the marriage was from August 10, 1992 until the date of the final hearing
(May 20, 2022), and that the relevant debts were incurred during that time. While this
may be true, the record does not indicate the trial court used the date of the final hearing
as the valuation date. Instead, the record reflects the trial court referenced the December
31, 2020 date in the divorce decree when valuing marital assets, including Husband's
various bank accounts, and referenced the "established valuation date" in its decision and
order on remand. The record also reflects the parties submitted valuations consistent
with the December 31, 2020 date. Although the record could be clearer regarding the
chosen date, a specific reference to the valuation date in the trial court's decision or order
is not required to establish the valuation date. Zimmerman v. Zimmerman, 12th Dist.
Butler No. CA2014-06-127, 2015-Ohio-1700, ¶ 34 (proceeding with the valuation date
agreed to by the parties on appeal where the trial court made no specific reference to the
date in its decision and order).
{¶ 19} Notwithstanding the above, we note that this court has already addressed
the valuation date used by the trial court in this case. Bobie I at ¶ 37-49. In Bobie I,
Husband acknowledged the December 31, 2020 valuation date established by the trial
court, and argued in his third assignment of error that the trial court erred in valuing certain
marital property on a date other than December 31, 2020. Bobie I at ¶ 41-43. In
overruling Husband's assignment of error, this court recognized that "[t]he trial court
established December 31, 2020, as the property valuation date," and that "Husband d[id]
not challenge th[at] valuation date." Bobie I at ¶ 38. Although we later stated in that
opinion that the trial court determined the duration of the marriage to be from August 10,
1992, until May 2, 2022, this was not in reference to the date used to value the marital
property. Instead, our decision consistently refers to December 31, 2020 as the valuation
-8- Butler CA2024-01-002
date established by the trial court.
{¶ 20} In light of our findings in Bobie I, as well our review of the entire record, it is
clear the trial court set December 31, 2020 as the valuation date for valuing and allocating
marital property.1 Turning to the issue raised on appeal, we will now address Husband's
argument that the trial court "seemingly ignored the explicit language used by [this court],"
when it held that the relevant consumer debt was dated after the valuation date
established by the trial court. According to Husband, the "explicit language" ignored by
the trial court is found in Bobie I, wherein we stated that Husband's argument in his fourth
assignment of error involved debts incurred "during the marriage," not debts incurred after
the date of divorce.
{¶ 21} As discussed above, a careful reading of Bobie I in its entirety does not
support Husband's position on appeal. That is, in Bobie I, we found the trial court
committed reversible error when it only addressed Husband's debt with American
Express, and did not otherwise "address Husband's debts, did not determine whether
they were marital or separate debts, and did not allocate them in the divorce decree." In
so doing, we noted the trial court's error in failing to "address and allocate six of Husband's
debts," despite evidence of their existence prior to the finalization of the parties' divorce.
In using this language, we did not decide, as Husband implies, that the debt at issue was
marital or separate, nor did we find the debts were incurred before the relevant valuation
date. Instead, we simply ordered the trial court to address each of the debts that it failed
to consider or allocate during the underlying proceedings.
{¶ 22} After our review, we find the trial court complied with this court's order on
1. We also note that, given our analysis of Husband's assignment of error concerning the valuation date, Husband's argument in the instant appeal advocating for a different valuation date is precluded by the law of the case doctrine. See Nolan v. Nolan, 11 Ohio St.3d 1, 3 (1984) ("the decision of a reviewing court in a case remains the law on the legal questions involved for all subsequent proceedings in the case at both the trial and reviewing levels"). -9- Butler CA2024-01-002
remand by analyzing, assessing, and allocating Husband's debts. Husband submitted
Exhibits S and TT as evidence of his debt, which, as discussed above, included copies
of two judgments obtained against Husband by creditors, as well as statements for other
consumer debt. Husband's testimony regarding Exhibits S and TT was minimal and did
not disclose any details regarding the debts aside from their total amounts and the dates
the documents were prepared. Based upon this evidence in the record, we find the trial
court did not err in concluding the debts with Discover Bank, PNC Visa, Capital One
Mastercard, and Liberty Mutual Insurance were incurred beyond the valuation date and
are Husband's separate debts. This is because the evidence produced by Husband
regarding these debts is all dated after December 31, 2020.
{¶ 23} Husband argues in his reply brief that, even if December 31, 2020 is the
valuation date, the totality of the circumstances supports that he incurred the debts much
earlier than the date the judgments and/or statements were provided. Specifically,
Husband claims each of his outstanding debts are "judgments" obtained against him,
which took "substantial time" to work through the judicial process, and therefore, common
sense dictates he incurred the balances prior to December 31, 2020. Notwithstanding
Husband's argument, the record is clear that Husband failed to present any evidence to
establish when the individual balances on these accounts were incurred. Marital debt
has been defined as any debt incurred during the marriage for the joint benefit of the
parties or for a valid marital purpose. Bobie I at ¶ 56. (Emphasis added.) In this case,
Husband did not submit any evidence that any debt was incurred on the Discover Bank,
PNC Visa, Capital One Mastercard or Liberty Mutual Insurance accounts prior to the
December 31, 2020 valuation period. Instead, Husband merely presented evidence of a
judgment obtained by Discover Bank on April 19, 2022, as well as credit card statements
from October 13, 2021; August 16, 2021; and October 5, 2021. Despite Husband's
- 10 - Butler CA2024-01-002
argument to the contrary, we decline to assume he accrued some, all, or part of these
balances prior to the December 31, 2020 valuation date without any evidence establishing
the same.
{¶ 24} Regarding the final debt, i.e., the $112,687.95 judgment rendered against
Husband in favor of Wells Fargo on March 29, 2022, Husband provided an invoice in
addition to the judgment entry. The invoice is dated August 26, 2021, and reveals
Husband accrued several late charges on his account between November 30, 2020 and
July 30, 2021. The invoice does not provide any additional detail regarding the ongoing
balance owed on Husband's account or when any charges, aside from late charges, were
incurred. Pertinent here, the invoice reveals Husband accrued $114.28 in late charges
on November 30, 2020 and $114.28 in late charges on December 30, 2020. Given that
the late charges were accrued prior to the valuation date of December 31, 2020, these
debts are presumed to be marital. Bobie I at ¶ 56.
{¶ 25} Despite the presumption that $228.56 of the Wells Fargo judgment is marital
debt, the trial court further determined that Husband incurred each of the consumer debts
"for personal, non-marital purposes." On appeal, Husband does not challenge the court's
additional finding, and solely argues the trial court ignored this court's "directives upon
remand" and incorrectly relied upon an "inaccurate analysis of dates" when concluding
the debts were non-marital. Because Husband did not raise an issue regarding the trial
court's additional finding that the debts were incurred for personal, non-marital purposes,
we decline to address the issue here. Consequently, any debt that was found to be
accrued by Husband and for Husband, is Husband's separate debt and should be
allocated to him as his sole responsibility. See e.g., Gebremikael v. Aruma, 12th Dist.
Butler No. CA2022-02-022, 2022-Ohio-3686, ¶ 51. As such, we find no error in the trial
court's decision allocating the entire Wells Fargo debt to Husband.
- 11 - Butler CA2024-01-002
{¶ 26} Based on all the foregoing, we find the trial court complied with our mandate
on remand by considering Husband's debts and allocating them in accordance with Ohio
law. We further conclude the trial court's decision finding that Husband accrued debts
with Discover Bank, PNC Visa, Capital One Mastercard and Liberty Mutual Insurance
after the established valuation date is supported by the manifest weight of the evidence.
While the trial court erred in concluding that the entire Wells Fargo debt was accrued after
the valuation date, Husband does not challenge the court's finding that he incurred such
debt for personal, non-marital purposes and therefore, is his responsibility. Accordingly,
finding no merit to the arguments raised herein, we overrule Husband's assignment of
error.
{¶ 27} Judgment affirmed.
M. POWELL and BYRNE, JJ., concur.
- 12 -