Maanu v. Bobie

2026 Ohio 691

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: March 2, 2026
• Docket: CA2025-05-048
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as Maanu v. Bobie, 2026-Ohio-691.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO

BUTLER COUNTY

REGINA MAANU, : CASE NO. CA2025-05-048 Appellee, : OPINION AND vs. : JUDGMENT ENTRY 3/2/2026 FRANCIS BOBIE, :

Appellant. :

:

APPEAL FROM BUTLER COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS DOMESTIC RELATIONS DIVISION Case No. DR20090633

Zachary D. Smith, LLC, and Zachary D. Smith, for appellee.

Smith & Webb, Attorneys, and Mark D. Webb, for appellant.

____________ OPINION

SIEBERT, J.

{¶ 1} Appellant, Francis Bobie ("Husband"), appeals a decision from the Butler

County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, denying his Civ.R. 60(B) Butler CA2025-05-048

motion for relief from judgment. After review, we conclude that Husband failed to satisfy

the requirements for relief under Civ.R. 60(B) and, accordingly, the trial court did not err

in denying the motion.

Facts and Procedural History

Prior Litigation

{¶ 2} Husband and Regina Maanu ("Wife") were divorced pursuant to a decree

journalized on December 6, 2022. In that decree, the trial court divided the parties' marital

and separate property and determined that the total value of the marital property was

$4,904,097.56. As relevant here, the court awarded Husband the marital residence

located at 8194 Sea Mist Court, West Chester, Ohio (the "Property").

{¶ 3} To equalize the division of assets, the court ordered Husband to pay Wife

a lump sum property equalization payment of $922,591.13.1 To partially secure that

obligation, the court reserved jurisdiction to order the sale of the Property if necessary.

{¶ 4} Husband filed a direct appeal. For reasons stated therein, this court

reversed the trial court's reservation of jurisdiction and remanded the matter with

instructions to remove that language from the decree. Bobie v. Bobie, 2023-Ohio-3293

(12th Dist.) ("Bobie I"). The Supreme Court declined jurisdiction.

{¶ 5} While his appeal to the Supreme Court was pending, Husband filed a Civ.R.

60(B) motion for relief from judgment on December 4, 2023. In that motion, he sought an

order compelling Wife to convey her interest in the Property by quitclaim deed, asserting

that sole title was necessary for him to pursue insurance litigation arising from water

damage to the Property.

{¶ 6} Following this court's remand in Bobie I, the trial court removed the

1. Upon remand, the trial court recalculated the equalization payment and ordered Husband to pay Wife a revised amount of $913,593.25 within 90 days of the entry. -2- Butler CA2025-05-048

reservation-of-jurisdiction language from the decree. Husband then filed a new notice of

appeal on January 4, 2024. In Maanu v. Bobie, 2024-Ohio-2395 (12th Dist.) ("Bobie II"),

this court affirmed the trial court's decision.

{¶ 7} Because both the Supreme Court appeal and the appeal in Bobie II were

pending, the trial court did not conduct further proceedings on Husband's Civ.R. 60(B)

motion at that time. After those proceedings concluded, the trial court scheduled a hearing

on the motion for March 25, 2025.

Hearing on Civ.R. 60(B) motion

{¶ 8} At the hearing, Husband testified that in January 2023, he discovered

significant water damage at the Property after pipes burst during a winter freeze. He

asserted that the damage rendered the home uninhabitable. According to Husband, his

bank refused to extend financing for necessary repairs unless Wife agreed to join in the

loan application. Husband testified that he presented Wife with a quitclaim deed to

transfer her interest in the Property to him, but she declined to execute it.

{¶ 9} Husband further testified that he initiated litigation against his insurer

regarding a coverage dispute stemming from the water damage and ultimately reached

a settlement. Although he received a settlement, he maintained that additional repairs

were required and that he needed financing to complete them. He also claimed that he

lacked alternative housing. On cross-examination, however, Husband acknowledged that

he had purchased another residence in Tampa, Florida, valued at approximately

$600,000.

{¶ 10} On April 18, 2025, the trial court denied Husband's Civ.R. 60(B) motion. The

court concluded that Husband failed to demonstrate newly discovered evidence, fraud, or

any other basis warranting relief from judgment, and further determined that the decree

was not inequitable. Husband now appeals, raising two assignments of error for review.

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Appeal

First Assignment of Error: Denial of the Civ. R. 60(B) Motion

{¶ 11} In his first assignment of error, Husband claims the trial court erred by

denying his Civ.R. 60(B) motion. He specifically argues that the "unknown catastrophic

loss" to the Property constitutes newly discovered evidence and warrants equitable relief.

Husband asserts that neither he nor anyone else could have anticipated the severe winter

freeze or the resulting damage from burst pipes.

{¶ 12} Civ.R. 60(B) provides that the trial court may relieve a party from a final

judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:

(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect;

(2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(B);

(3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party;

(4) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or

(5) any other reason justifying relief from the judgment.

{¶ 13} To prevail on a Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment, the moving

party must demonstrate that it (1) has a meritorious claim or defense to present if the

motion is granted, (2) is entitled to relief under one of the grounds stated in Civ.R. 60(B)(1)

through (5), and (3) has made the motion within a reasonable time. Kutz v. Kutz, 2013-

Ohio-532, ¶ 8 (12th Dist.). Failing to meet any one of these three factors is dispositive, for

all three must be satisfied to gain relief. Bowman v. Leisz, 2014-Ohio-4763, ¶ 16 (12th

Dist.).

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{¶ 14} This court reviews a trial court's decision granting or denying a Civ.R. 60(B)

motion for an abuse of discretion. Kutz at ¶ 9. An abuse of discretion means more than

an error of judgment; it implies that the trial court's attitude was unreasonable, arbitrary,

or unconscionable. Sparks v. Sparks, 2016-Ohio-2896, ¶ 7 (12th Dist.).

{¶ 15} Husband asserts that relief is warranted under Civ.R. 60(B)(2), (4), and (5).

We first address his reliance on Civ.R. 60(B)(2). That provision permits relief based upon

newly discovered evidence that could not have been discovered in time to move for a

new trial under Civ.R. 59(B). "Newly discovered evidence" refers to evidence that existed

at the time of the proceeding but could not have been discovered through the exercise of

reasonable diligence. In re L.D.M., 2021-Ohio-1853, ¶ 48 (12th Dist.); Dunham v.

Dunham, 2007-Ohio-1167, ¶ 109 (10th Dist.).

{¶ 16} In this case, the only "newly discovered evidence" identified by Husband is

the burst pipes and resulting water damage to the Property. However, the damage

occurred months after the divorce hearing and after the decree had been issued. Because

the condition did not exist at the time of the proceedings, it cannot qualify as "newly

discovered evidence" within the meaning of Civ.R. 60(B)(2). His claim under that

subsection therefore fails.

{¶ 17} Husband also relies on Civ.R. 60(B)(4) and (5) to argue for relief. Civ.R.

60(B)(4) allows relief where it is no longer equitable for a judgment to have prospective

effect because of unforeseen changes in circumstances. L.N.V. Corp. v. Edgar, 2012-

Ohio-1899, ¶ 21 (12th Dist.). Civ.R. 60(B)(5) serves as a catchall for exceptional cases

where justice requires relief. Hawkins v. Hawkins, 2012-Ohio-2795, ¶ 22 (2d Dist.).

{¶ 18} According to Husband's brief, he vacated the residence for an unspecified

period during the winter months of 2022. While the home was unoccupied, temperatures

fell below freezing, causing the pipes to burst and resulting in substantial damage.

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Husband filed an insurance claim, but he asserts that the proceeds were insufficient to

cover the necessary repairs.

{¶ 19} As an initial matter, Husband does not distinguish between Civ.R. 60(B)(4)

or (5) or explain why either provision applies. This omission is notable because Civ.R.

60(B)(5) is available only when none of the specific grounds in Civ.R. 60(B)(1) through

(4) apply. Strack v. Pelton, 70 Ohio St.3d 172, 174 (1994).

{¶ 20} Even addressing the merits, however, this argument is unpersuasive. We

agree with the trial court that freezing temperatures during winter months—and the

attendant risk of burst pipes in an unoccupied residence—are neither extraordinary nor

unforeseeable events. The fact that Husband maintained insurance, albeit allegedly for

an inadequate amount of coverage, further demonstrates that the risk could have been

anticipated. Property damage resulting from winter weather, and dissatisfaction with

insurance proceeds, do not constitute the type of unusual or extraordinary circumstances

necessary to justify relief under Civ.R. 60(B)(4) or (5).

{¶ 21} In his brief, Husband asserts that he merely seeks the ability to repair the

Property and access the equity in an asset already awarded to him under the decree.

However, as we explained in Bobie I, "a trial court always retains full power to enforce the

provisions of a divorce decree." Bobie I, 2023-Ohio-3293 at ¶ 72, citing Pettit v. Pettit,

2012-Ohio-1801, ¶ 58 (12th Dist.), and Cherry v. Figart, 86 Ohio App.3d 123, 126 (12th

Dist.1993).

{¶ 22} "Under Civ.R. 75([J]), the continuing jurisdiction of a court that issues a

domestic relations decree 'may be invoked by the filing of any motion by a party.'" Burns

v. Burns, 2018-Ohio-2262, ¶ 13 (12th Dist.), quoting State ex rel. Soukup v. Celebrezze,

83 Ohio St.3d 549, 551 (1998). "A postdecree show-cause motion filed by a party invokes

both the inherent power of a domestic relations court to enforce its own orders and the

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court's continuing jurisdiction under Civ.R. 75[J]." Davis v. Davis, 2022-Ohio-3179, ¶ 58

(12th Dist.); Barton v. Barton, 2017-Ohio-980, ¶ 75 (2d Dist.).

{¶ 23} Here, Husband complains that Wife has not executed a quitclaim deed to

the Property. Wife, in turn, maintains that Husband has not satisfied the ordered property

equalization payment. These are separate obligations arising from the decree. Neither

party may condition compliance with the court's order upon the other's performance. If

enforcement issues remain, the appropriate remedy lies in invoking the trial court's

continuing jurisdiction to enforce its decree—not in seeking to vacate the judgment as

Husband attempts to do in the instant matter.

{¶ 24} Following review, we find Husband is not entitled to relief under Civ.R.

60(B). Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion.

Husband's first assignment of error is overruled.

Second Assignment of Error: Alleged Contradiction of Prior Order

{¶ 25} In his second assignment of error, Husband argues that the trial court's

denial of his Civ.R. 60(B) motion violates this court's remand instructions in Bobie I and

R.C. 3109.171(I).

{¶ 26} In Bobie I, this court addressed, among other things, the limitations imposed

by R.C. 3105.171(I). We explained that "[o]nce a trial court has made an equitable

property division and issued a divorce decree, it lacks jurisdiction to modify or amend the

marital property division unless both spouses expressly consent in writing to the

modification." Bobie I, 2023-Ohio-3293, at ¶ 72. Applying that principle, we held that the

trial court abused its discretion by retaining jurisdiction to modify the property division and

ordered the trial court to excise the following language from the decree:

In the event Husband refuses to pay Wife the equalization payment, the Court reserves jurisdiction to order the sale of the home at 8194 Sea Mist Court or make other orders as

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necessary.

Id. at ¶ 74.

{¶ 27} On remand, the trial court complied with our mandate and removed the

offending language from the decree. While the trial court did not include language

regarding the title to the Sea Mist home in the order, the holding in Bobie I made it clear

that the divorce decree divided all the marital property and the trial court could not retain

jurisdiction over the property division, in whole or in part.

{¶ 28} Husband nevertheless contends that "[b]y failing to afford Husband a Quit

Claim Deed and ownership of the home free and clear . . . the Trial Court is in effect

circumventing the direct Orders contained within the prior remand." He asserts that the

court's refusal to grant him "free and clear" ownership effectively preserves the ability to

modify the property division despite this court's prior decision.

{¶ 29} We find this argument to be without merit. The trial court fully complied with

our mandate by striking the impermissible reservation-of-jurisdiction language. The denial

of Husband's Civ.R. 60(B) did not modify the property division or provide the trial court

with the opportunity to do so. As noted previously, if Husband believes the decree is not

being honored, the proper remedy lies in invoking the trial court's continuing jurisdiction

to enforce its orders—not in seeking to vacate the judgment under Civ.R. 60(B). The

denial of the motion therefore did not contravene either our remand instructions or R.C.

3105.171(I).

{¶ 30} Husband's second assignment of error is overruled.

Conclusion

{¶ 31} Husband and Wife have several options to file motions to enforce the

portions of the divorce decree the other has not complied with. Husband can move the

trial court to order Wife to sign the quitclaim deed. As discussed at oral argument, we

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presume the trial court would grant such a motion, in order to effectuate and enforce the

marital property division required by the decree and from the decision in Bobie I.2

Thereafter, Husband could file a motion to show cause why Wife should not be held in

contempt if Wife refuses to sign the quitclaim deed when ordered to do so. If Husband

has not made the court-ordered equalization payment, Wife could file a motion to show

cause why Husband should not be held in contempt, and the trial court has a multitude of

remedies to grant Wife—including asserting equitable liens against any property Husband

owns. How the parties and the trial court proceed from here is up to them, but a Civ.R.

60(B) motion cannot be substituted for a motion to enforce a prior divorce decree, which

was fully and properly adjudicated.

{¶ 32} Judgment affirmed.

PIPER, P.J., and M. POWELL, J., concur.

2. After all, the point of Bobie I's order to remove the trial court's improper retention of jurisdiction over property division was based on a recognition that the trial court has to actually divide marital property and could not hold it "hostage" until a party complies fully with the decree. Enforcement actions by the trial court properly handle noncompliance issues. -9- Butler CA2025-05-048

JUDGMENT ENTRY

The assignments of error properly before this court having been ruled upon, it is the order of this court that the judgment or final order appealed from be, and the same hereby is, affirmed.

It is further ordered that a mandate be sent to the Butler County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, for execution upon this judgment and that a certified copy of this Opinion and Judgment Entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.

Costs to be taxed in compliance with App.R. 24.

/s/ Robin N. Piper, Presiding Judge

/s/ Mike Powell, Judge

/s/ Melena S. Siebert, Judge

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