Lorenzo Duwan Smith v. San Diego Superior Courts

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 LORENZO DUWAN SMITH, Case No.: 25-cv-2365-RSH-VET Booking #25730963, 12 ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO Plaintiff, 13 PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS v. AND DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION 14 PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C.

15 §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) AND 1915A(b)(1) SAN DIEGO SUPERIOR COURTS, 16 Defendant. [ECF No. 2] 17 18 19 Plaintiff Lorenzo Duwan Smith, proceeding pro se while detained at the San Diego 20 Central Jail (“SDCJ”), has filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ECF 21 No. 1. Plaintiff seeks $22 million in damages against the San Diego Superior Court for 22 allegedly “making [him] serve two sentences” after he was found guilty of residential 23 burglary on May 5, 2023. Id. at 2, 3. Plaintiff has not paid the filing fee required by 28 24 U.S.C. § 1914(a) to commence a civil action, but instead has filed a motion to proceed in 25 forma pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). ECF No. 2. 26 For the reasons explained, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to proceed IFP, 27 but DISMISSES his Complaint without leave to amend. 28 /// 1 I. MOTION TO PROCEED IFP 2 All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 3 United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 4 $405, consisting of a $350 statutory fee and an additional administrative fee of $55, unless 5 granted leave to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (eff. Dec. 1, 2023). The action may 6 proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to 7 proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 8 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); cf. Hymas v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 73 F.4th 763, 765 (9th Cir. 9 2023) (“[W]here [an] IFP application is denied altogether, Plaintiff’s case [cannot] proceed 10 unless and until the fee[s] [a]re paid.”). 11 “While the previous version of the IFP statute granted courts the authority to waive 12 fees for any person ‘unable to pay[,]’ … the PLRA [Prison Litigation Reform Act] 13 amended the IFP statute to include a carve-out for prisoners.” Hymas, 73 F.4th at 767. 14 Namely, “if a prisoner brings a civil action or files an appeal in forma pauperis, the prisoner 15 ‘shall be required to pay the full amount of a filing fee.’” Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. 16 § 1915(b)(1)). Section 1915(b) “provides a structured timeline for collecting this fee.” Id. 17 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)-(2)). 18 To proceed IFP, prisoners must “submit[] an affidavit that includes a statement of 19 all assets [they] possess[,]” as well as “a “certified copy of the[ir] trust fund account 20 statement (or institutional equivalent) for … the 6-month period immediately preceding the 21 filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), (2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 22 (9th Cir. 2005). Using this financial information, the court “shall assess and when funds 23 exist, collect, … an initial partial filing fee,” which is “calculated based on ‘the average 24 monthly deposits to the prisoner’s account’ or ‘the average monthly balance in the 25 prisoner’s account’ over a 6-month term; the remainder of the fee is to be paid in ‘monthly 26 payments of 20 percent of the preceding month’s income credited to the prisoner’s 27 account.” Hymas, 73 F.4th at 767 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)–(2)). Thus, while 28 prisoners may qualify to proceed IFP without having to pay the statutory filing fee in one 1 lump sum, they nevertheless remain obligated to pay the full amount due in monthly 2 payments. See Bruce v. Samuels, 577 U.S. 82, 84 (2016); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); 3 Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002). 4 Here, Plaintiff’s IFP application complies with both 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) and (2). 5 Attached to his IFP affidavit is a prison certificate issued by an SDCJ deputy. See ECF No. 6 2 at 4; see also S.D. Cal. CivLR 3.2; Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119. This certificate shows 7 Plaintiff had no money credited to his account during the 6-month period immediately 8 preceding the filing of his complaint, and had an available balance of only $.06 at the time 9 of filing. ECF No. 2 at 4. 10 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to proceed IFP and assesses no 11 initial partial filing fee pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) 12 (providing that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action or 13 appealing a civil action or criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no assets 14 and no means by which to pay [an] initial partial filing fee.”); Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 15 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a 16 prisoner’s IFP case based solely on “failure to pay . . . due to the lack of funds available to 17 him when payment is ordered.”). The SDCJ, or any agency later having custody, must 18 hereafter collect the full balance of the $350 total fee owed in this case and forward 19 payments to the Clerk of Court as provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). 20 II. SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915A(b) 21 A. Standard of Review 22 Because Plaintiff is a prisoner as defined by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h) and is proceeding 23 IFP, his complaint requires preliminary screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and 24 § 1915A(b). “On review, the court shall . . . dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the 25 complaint,” if it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may 26 be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 27 Olivas v. Nevada ex rel. Dept. of Corr., 856 F.3d 1281, 1283 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing 28 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)); see also Hebrard v. Nofziger, 90 F.4th 1000, 1006–07 (9th Cir. 2024) 1 (citing Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126‒27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (discussing 28 2 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)). “The standard for dismissal for prisoner claims at screening is the 3 same as the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” 4 Long v. Sugai, 91 F.4th 1331, 1336 (9th Cir. 2024) (citing Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 5 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012)); Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) 6 (Section 1915A screening “incorporates the familiar standard applied in the contest of 7 failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).”). 8 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 “prescribes the information a plaintiff must 9 provide about the merits of his claim at the outset of litigation.” Berk v. Choy, 607 U.S. __, 10 __ S. Ct. __, No. 24-440, 2026 WL 135974, at *4 (U.S. Jan. 20, 2026). Thus, Rules 8 and 11 12(b)(6) together require a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, 12 to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 13 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Detailed 14 factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of 15 action supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. Dismissal “under Rule 16 12(b)(6) is proper when the complaint either (1) lacks a cognizable legal theory or (2) fails 17 to allege sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory.” Valame v. Trump, 157 F.4th 18 1172, 1173 (9th Cir. 2025) (per curiam) (citing Somers v. Apple, Inc. 729 F.3d 953, 959 19 (9th Cir. 2013)). 20 “[Section] 1983 ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely provides ‘a 21 method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 22 386, 393–94 (1989) (citation omitted). “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must 23 allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the 24 United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person 25 acting under the color of State law.” Benavidez v. Cnty. of San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1144 26 (9th Cir. 2021) (citing Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006)). 27 /// 28 /// 1 B. Factual Allegations 2 Plaintiff’s allegations are not entirely clear, but he claims to have been found guilty 3 of residential burglary on May 5, 2023, with a “hot prowl” allegation, and to have also 4 “pleaded out” to a deal after trial by which he would “have all [his] strikes struck,” and be 5 sentenced to a low-term 2-year sentence. ECF No. 1 at 3. Plaintiff believed this would 6 result in his serving only half that time, but he was nevertheless “kidnapped” and “illegally 7 ma[de] to serve two sentences,” in violation of his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment 8 rights. Id. at 3–4. He seeks $22 million in damages from the San Diego Superior Court 9 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 due to this “mistake.” Id. at 3, 7. 10 C. Discussion 11 Plaintiff’s complaint is subject to sua sponte dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 12 §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b) without leave to amend because it is clear from the face of 13 his pleading that suit is barred by both the Eleventh Amendment and Heck v. Humphrey, 14 512 U.S. 477 (1994). 15 1. Eleventh Amendment Immunity 16 First, to the extent Plaintiff’s § 1983 suit seeks monetary damages and he names only 17 the San Diego Superior Court as a Defendant, it must be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 18 §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii) and 1915A(b)(2). See Chavez v. Robinson, 817 F.3d 1162, 1167–69, 19 (9th Cir. 2016) (noting § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii) “mandates early review” and requires dismissal 20 if it is clear from the face of the complaint that the governmental defendants are immune). 21 “In our constitutional scheme, a federal court generally may not hear a suit brought 22 by any person against a nonconsenting State.” Allen v. Cooper, 589 U.S. 248, 254 (2020). 23 This prohibition applies when either the “state or the ‘arm of a state’ is a defendant.” Munoz 24 v. Superior Ct. of Los Angeles Cnty., 91 F.4th 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2024) (citation omitted); 25 Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70 (1989) (holding that “‘arms of the 26 State’ for Eleventh Amendment purposes” are not liable under § 1983). “The State of 27 California has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to claims 28 brought under § 1983 in federal court,” Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1025–26 1 (9th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted), and the Supreme Court has held that “§ 1983 was not 2 intended to abrogate a State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity.” Id. (citing Kentucky v. 3 Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 n.17 (1985)). Thus, “[b]ecause the Superior Court is an arm of 4 the state—and no exception applies to the rule prohibiting suits against the state—it has 5 Eleventh Amendment immunity.” Munoz, 91 F.4th at 980; see also Simmons v. Sacramento 6 Cnty. Superior Court, 318 F.3d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Plaintiff cannot state a claim 7 against the Sacramento County Superior Court (or its employees), because such suits are 8 barred by the Eleventh Amendment.”). 9 2. Heck’s “Favorable Termination” Requirement 10 Second, Plaintiff seeks to challenge the constitutional validity of a criminal sentence 11 he alleges violated the terms of a post-conviction plea agreement by way of § 1983, but 12 does not also show that sentence has already been invalidated. ECF No. 1 at 3–4. Thus, 13 even if he named a proper Defendant, a Heck bar is “obvious from the face of his 14 complaint,” and his suit also requires sua sponte dismissal for failure to state a claim 15 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1). See Hebrard, 90 F.4th at 1007 16 (citing Washington v. Los Angeles Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 833 F.3d 1048, 1056 (9th Cir. 17 2016) (noting that a court may properly dismiss a Heck-barred claim [for failing to state a 18 claim “if there exists an ‘obvious bar to securing relief on the face of the complaint.’”)). 19 The Heck-bar, or “required favorable termination rule, is a rule of preclusion named 20 after Heck v. Humphrey—the Supreme Court case that outlined the doctrine.” Hebrard, 90 21 F.4th at 1007. In Heck, the Supreme Court held: 22 [W]hen a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply 23 the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be 24 dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated. But if the district court determines that the 25 plaintiff’s action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any 26 outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed, in the absence of some other bar to the suit. 27

28 512 U.S. at 487 (emphasis in original). 1 In short, “Heck’s ‘favorable termination’ rule is based on the ‘hoary principle that 2 civil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of outstanding 3 criminal judgments.’” King v. R. Villegas, 156 F.4th 979, 983 (9th Cir. 2025) (quoting 4 Heck, 512 U.S. at 486 & n.5). Thus, if a prisoner seeks relief in federal court based on 5 claims that fall “within the core of habeas corpus,” Nance v. Ward, 597 U.S. 159, 160 6 (2022) (citing Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 79 (2005)), and a grant of relief would 7 “necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence,” a habeas corpus petition, 8 and not a civil rights suit, serves as the “exclusive remedy.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 9 475, 487–89 (“[A] state prisoner challenging his underlying conviction and sentence on 10 federal constitutional grounds in a federal court is limited to habeas corpus.”); accord 11 McDonough v. Smith, 588 U.S. 109, 118 n.6 (2019) (noting “Congress has determined that 12 a petition for writ of habeas corpus, not a § 1983 action, is the appropriate remedy for state 13 prisoners attacking the . . . fact or length of their confinement”); Nettles v. Grounds, 830 14 F.3d 922, 927 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (“The Court has long held that habeas is the 15 exclusive vehicle for claims brought by state prisoners that fall within the core of habeas, 16 and such claims may not be brought in a § 1983 action.”) (citations omitted). 17 Here, Plaintiff seeks damages based on an allegedly unlawful sentence imposed as 18 the result of a plea entered into after burglary conviction. ECF No. 1 at 3. Heck’s 19 prohibition applies to convictions resulting from a guilty plea. Martell v. Cole, 115 F.4th 20 1233, 1236 (9th Cir. 2024); see also Duarte v. City of Stockton, 60 F.4th 566, 571 (9th Cir. 21 2023) (noting that “Heck speaks of challenges that would impugn ‘a conviction or 22 sentence[.]’”) (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 486–87 (emphasis added)). Because Plaintiff 23 contends he was “made to serve two separate sentences,” and as a result is currently serving 24 a term of custody in violation of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 25 Amendments, see ECF No. 1 at 3, his suit necessarily attacks both the constitutional 26 validity and length of his confinement, and may not proceed pursuant to § 1983 unless he 27 also shows his conviction and/or sentence has already been invalidated. Heck, 512 U.S. at 28 486–87. 1 He has not. Plaintiff claims he “exhausted [his] habeas corpus,” see ECF No. 1 at 6, 2 but he does not identify the habeas proceedings he allegedly “exhausted,” and more 3 importantly, does not contend that his May 2023 conviction or sentence was invalidated in 4 his favor as a result of that petition or any direct appeal. A plaintiff must first prove that 5 his conviction or sentence has been favorably terminated—only then may he bring suit for 6 damages. See Roberts v. City of Fairbanks, 947 F.3d 1191, 1196–98 (9th Cir. 2020); 7 Nettles, 830 F.3d at 928. “Absent such a showing, ‘[e]ven a prisoner who has fully 8 exhausted available state remedies has no cause of action under § 1983[.]” Ramirez v. 9 Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 855–56 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 489); see also 10 Pattillo v. Lombardo, No. 2:17-CV-01849-JAD-VCF, 2017 WL 3622778, at *4 (D. Nev. 11 Aug. 23, 2017) (“When a prisoner challenges the legality or duration of his custody, raises 12 a constitutional challenge which could entitle him to an earlier release (such as ineffective 13 assistance of counsel), or seeks damages for purported deficiencies in his state court 14 criminal case, which effected a conviction or lengthier sentence, his sole federal remedy is 15 the writ of habeas corpus.”). 16 D. Dismissal & Leave to Amend 17 Because the Court finds Plaintiff both fails to state a claim upon which § 1983 relief 18 may be granted, and seeks monetary damages from a defendant who is immune, it 19 DISMISSES his complaint sua sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). 20 See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126–27; Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121; Chavez, 817 F.3d at 1167. As 21 Plaintiff cannot fix both these pleading deficiencies, the Court DENIES leave to amend as 22 futile. See Beets v. County of Los Angeles, 669 F.3d 1038, 1041–42 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding 23 that the filing of an amended complaint is futile if claims are barred by Heck), disapproved 24 of on other grounds by Lemos v. County of Sonoma, 40 F.4th 1002 (9th Cir. 2022); Bell v. 25 Allison, No. 20-16880, 2022 WL 4077119, at *1 (9th Cir. Sept. 6, 2022) (affirming 26 dismissal of Heck-barred claims without leave to amend because “amendment would be 27 futile”); Gallagher v. Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the L., No. 01-cv-01277-PJH, 2001 28 WL 1006809, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2001) (“The dismissal is without leave to amend 1 || because an amendment would be futile in view of the court’s finding that the defendants 2 || enjoy sovereign immunity.”) (citations omitted). 3 CONCLUSION 4 Accordingly, for all the reasons discussed, the Court: 5 1) GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF No. 2). 6 2) ORDERS the Facility Commander of the San Diego Central Jail, or his 7 designee, to garnish from Plaintiffs trust account the full $350 filing fee owed for this 8 and to forward in monthly payments an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the 9 || preceding month’s income to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in his account 10 || exceeds $10 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). 11 3) DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on the Facility 12 |}Commander, San Diego Central Jail, 1173 Front Street, San Diego, California, 92101. 13 4) DISMISSES this civil action in its entirety pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 14 || §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)(1); and 15 5) DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to enter a final judgment of dismissal and 16 || to close the case. 17 IT IS SO ORDERED. 18 || Dated: February 9, 2026 □ 19 / Put ¢ Howe 0 Hon. Robert S. Huie United States District Judge 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 9