Lemarco, Inc. v. Nancy Helton

559 F. App'x 465
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
DecidedMarch 18, 2014
Docket13-3499
StatusUnpublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 559 F. App'x 465 (Lemarco, Inc. v. Nancy Helton) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lemarco, Inc. v. Nancy Helton, 559 F. App'x 465 (6th Cir. 2014).

Opinion

COOK, Circuit Judge.

A coal company and its insurer (collectively “Lemarco”) petition this court for review of an award of black-lung benefits to Nancy Helton, the widow of former miner Wayne Helton. Discerning no legal error and finding that substantial evidence supports the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) conclusion, we deny the petition.

I.

Wayne worked as a coal miner for over thirteen years. After he died, Nancy filed for survivor benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. § 901 et seq., as a dependent of a miner who died from pneu-moconiosis, commonly known as black-lung disease. The Department of Labor (“DOL”) processed the claim, and the case proceeded to an ALJ for a hearing. To prevail, Nancy needed to show that pneu-moconiosis — defined as a chronic lung disease arising out of coal mine employment, *467 see 20 C.F.R. § 718.201(a)(2) — caused Wayne’s death. Wolf Creek Collieries v. Dir., OWCP, 298 F.3d 511, 520 (6th Cir.2002) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 718.205).

In assessing the claim, the ALJ looked to the opinions of four doctors. Nancy submitted opinions from Dr. William Clarke, an examining physician, and Dr. Rachel Eubank, Wayne’s treating physician for the last three years of his life. These doctors confirmed Wayne’s pneumo-coniosis on the basis that coal dust caused his chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (“COPD”). Dr. Eubank also linked pneu-moconiosis to Wayne’s death. Lemarco submitted opinions from Dr. David Rosenberg and Dr. Matthew Vuskovieh, who, after reviewing Wayne’s medieal records, each concluded that coal dust played no role in causing his COPD and that pneu-moconiosis did not hasten his death.

The ALJ held that Nancy proved the required elements by a preponderance of the evidence, according Lemarco’s doctors’ opinions “little weight” as flawed and conflicting with the DOL’s positions as articulated in the preamble to the Black Lung Act’s regulations. The ALJ credited Drs. Clarke and Eubank and determined that because Wayne suffered from COPD that arose out of his coal mine employment, he had pneumoconiosis. From that conclusion, the ALJ relied on Dr. Eubank’s report to find that pneumoconiosis hastened Wayne’s death because his COPD led to cor pulmonale (heart strain resulting from a lung disease), which directly caused his death from congestive heart failure.

Lemarco appealed to the Benefits Review Board (“BRB”), which affirmed Nancy’s award. After unsuccessfully moving for reconsideration before the BRB, Le-marco petitioned this court for review, arguing that the record fails to establish that: (1) Wayne’s COPD arose out of coal mine employment, and (2) pneumoconiosis caused Wayne’s death.

II.

Our review of the BRB’s decision “is limited to correcting errors of law and ensuring that [it] adhered to the substantial evidence standard in its review of the ALJ’s factual findings.” Cumberland River Coal Co. v. Banks, 690 F.3d 477, 482 (6th Cir.2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Substantial evidence is defined as relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Arch of Kentucky, Inc. v. Dir., OWCP, 556 F.3d 472, 477 (6th Cir.2009). “In deciding whether the substantial evidence requirement is satisfied, we consider whether the [ALJ] adequately explained the reasons for crediting certain testimony and evidence over other evidence in the record.” Wolf Creek Collieries, 298 F.3d at 519. We do not reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the ALJ, and thus reverse only if substantial evidence fails to support the decision below. Peabody Coal Co. v. Groves, 277 F.3d 829, 833 (6th Cir.2002).

A. COPD Arising Out of Coal Mine Employment

Lemarco first argues that the record fails to support the ALJ’s conclusion that Wayne’s COPD “arose out of’ his coal mine employment. “[A] disease ‘arising out of coal mine employment’ includes any chronic pulmonary disease ... significantly related to, or substantially aggravated by, dust exposure in coal mine employment.” 20 C.F.R. § 718.201(b). In finding Wayne’s COPD significantly related to or aggravated by coal dust, the ALJ first looked to Dr. Clarke’s opinion “that the most likely cause” of Wayne’s disease was “the breathing of the irritants of coal mine employment.” Dr. Clarke could “not find *468 any other significant etiology for [Wayne’s] disability.” (Id.) The ALJ rationally found that Dr. Clarke’s opinion deserved “some weight” insofar as he “took histories, performed objective testing and examined” Wayne, and then explained his report in light of a chest x-ray, pulmonary function test, and Wayne’s symptoms. Dr. Eu-bank, Wayne’s treating physician for the last three years of his life, corroborated Dr. Clarke’s opinion, finding that Wayne’s disease arose out of coal mine employment. 1 Reasonable minds might accept the reports of Drs. Clarke and Eubank as adequate to support the ALJ’s conclusion that Wayne had pneumoconiosis.

Lemarco also asserts that the ALJ treated the preamble to the DOL’s regulations as binding in determining the credibility of the doctors. When assessing a doctor’s credibility, the ALJ may consult the preamble as a statement of medical principles accepted by the DOL. A & E Coal Co. v. Adams, 694 F.3d 798, 801-02 (6th Cir.2012); see also Little David Coal Co. v. Dir., OWCP, 532 Fed.Appx. 633, 636 (6th Cir.2012) (“[I]t was permissible for the ALJ to turn to the preamble for guidance when determining the relative weight to assign two conflicting medical opinions.”). The ALJ acted reasonably within its discretion here, determining that Lemarco’s doctors deserved less weight given the clash between aspects of their opinions and DOL standards. Specifically, Dr. Rosenberg excluded coal dust as a cause of Wayne’s COPD due to a lack of fibrosis, even though a claimant need not show fibrosis to establish pneumoconiosis. See Cornett v. Benham Coal, Inc., 227 F.3d 569, 576 (6th Cir.2000) (discounting a doctor’s opinion that relied on a lack of fibrosis). And Dr.

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559 F. App'x 465, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lemarco-inc-v-nancy-helton-ca6-2014.